Rojesh Nayak vs The C.G.M. (Tech) & Regional
2025 Latest Caselaw 11111 Ori

Orissa High Court

Rojesh Nayak vs The C.G.M. (Tech) & Regional on 12 December, 2025

Author: Sanjeebk Panigrahi

Bench: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi

                                                            Signature Not Verified
                                                            Digitally Signed
                                                            Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
                                                            Reason: Authentication
                                                            Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
                                                            Date: 18-Dec-2025 17:54:09




           IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

                          ARBA No.15 of 2025

     (In the matter of an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and
     Conciliation Act, 1996)

    Rojesh Nayak                              ....             Appellant(s)
                                   -versus-
    The C.G.M. (Tech) & Regional              ....           Respondent(s)
    Officer National Highway
    Authority of India, Regional
    Officer, Odisha &Ors.
  Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode:

    For Appellant (s)          :               Mr. Kumarbar Nayak, Adv.

    For Respondent (s)         :                   Mr. U.C. Mohanty, Adv.


              CORAM:
              DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI

                   DATE OF HEARING:-07.11.2025
                 DATE OF JUDGMENT:-12.12.2025
  Dr. SanjeebK Panigrahi, J.

1. ThisAppeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996 (hereinafter referred to as "A&C Act") is preferred by the

Appellantchallenging the Order dated 5.8.2024, in Arbitration Misc.

Case No. 2 of 2023, passed by the Learned District Judge, Bhadrak, in

an Application filed under Section 34 ofthe Act, which was filed

against the Arbitral Award u/s 3G of the National Highways Act,

1956, dated 7.10.2022, in Misc. Case No.2 of2012,passed by the

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Arbitrator-cum-Collector& District Magistrate, Bhadrak, wherein the

learned District Judge, was also pleased to reject the Application

preferred by the present Appellant for enhancement of the

compensation amount.

I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:

2. The dispute originates from the acquisition of the appellant's land,

Plot No.1551 (part), measuring Ac.0.08.200 out of a total Ac.0.50,

classified as Gharabari under Khata No.168 of MouzaDakhinbad,

BhandaripokhariTahasil, DistrictBhadrak. The land was notified for

acquisition for widening of National Highway-16 under Section 3(A)

of the National Highways Act, 1956, by S.O. 1013(E) dated 22.2.2019,

followed by a declaration under Section 3(D) via S.O. 792(E) on

19.2.2020.

3. Two permanent structures stood on the acquired land--one RCC-

roofed building and another asbestos-roofed building. These were

assessed under Section 29 of the RFCTLAR&R Act, 2013 by the

Assistant Engineer, R&B Division, Bhadrak on 17.1.2022.

4. Following the preparation of the estimate, the Competent Authority-

cum-Tahasildar, Bhandaripokhari consolidated the valuation of land

and structures while preparing the award under Section 3(G) of the

National Highways Act. The calculation sheet reflects that the land

value, when combined with the assessed structural value

of ₹35,64,329/-, yielded a total compensation of ₹74,66,359/-, which

was forwarded to the Regional Officer, NHAI, Bhubaneswar, vide

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Letter No.17 dated 1.2.2022, for administrative approval. Of the

assessed structural value, the two components alone of --E.I. and

P.H. (Electrical Installation and Public Health)--collectively

amounted to ₹19,25,828/-, as confirmed in the sheet appended to the

Tahasildar's calculation. Together, the civil elements and service

installations yielded the total structural valuation of ₹35,64,329/-,

which was transmitted as part of the award proposal.

5. On 2.3.2022, the Regional Officer, NHAI (Respondent No.1) issued

Letter No.655 directing the CALA to deduct the E.I. and P.H.

components from the total compensation on the ground that neither

the National Highways Act nor the RFCTLAR&R Act provided for

payment of compensation under those heads. This communication

became the central trigger of the present dispute.

6. Acting upon the above instruction, the Tahasildar deducted

₹19,25,828/- from the originally calculated award and disbursed the

remaining amount to the appellant on 23.6.2022.

7. Challenging this deduction, the appellant filed Arbitration Misc.

Case No.02/22 before the Arbitrator-cum-Collector, Bhadrak seeking

restoration of the deducted sum. On 7.10.2022, the Arbitrator rejected

the claim, holding that the compensation towards E.I. and P.H. was

not legally admissible under the governing statutes and therefore the

deduction could not be faulted.

8. The appellant then preferred Arbitration Misc. Case No.02/23 under

Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act before the District

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Judge, Bhadrak. The appellant contended that the Arbitrator

committed patent illegality and misconstrued the statutory

framework, particularly Section 29 of the RFCTLAR&R Act. The

District Judge dismissed the challenge on 5.8.2024, affirming the

Arbitrator's view that E.I. and P.H. costs could not be included

absent statutory sanction.

9. The appellant thereafter filed W.P.(C) No. 23177 of 2024 before this

Court, which was later withdrawn with liberty to file the present

Arbitration Appeal on 13.2.2025.

10. Accordingly, the present Arbitration Appeal (ARBA No.15 of 2025)

was filed on 21.2.2025, accompanied by IA No.5 of 2025 for

condonation of a 95days delay, which was allowed by this Court on

15.7.2025.

11. As the facts leading up to the instant Petition have been laid down,

this Court shall endeavour to summarise the contentions of the

Parties and the broad grounds that have been raised to seek the

exercise of this Court's writ jurisdiction.

II. APPELLANT'S SUBMISSIONS:

12. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the deduction

of ₹19,25,828/- towards Electrical Installation (E.I.) and Public Health

(P.H.) works was wholly unsustainable in law and contrary to the

statutory scheme governing compensation for structures. Referring

to Section 29 of the RFCTLAR&R Act, 2013, it was urged that

valuation of buildings must necessarily include all components that

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form part of the functional, usable structure, including electrical wiring,

fixtures, water supply, sanitation and other service installations.

These elements were duly assessed by the Assistant Engineer, R&B

Division, Bhadrak on 17.01.2022, whose estimate valued the entire

structure at ₹35,64,329/-, incorporating E.I. and P.H. expenses as

integral parts of the building. Counsel argued that once the

Competent Authority accepted this valuation and forwarded the

consolidated award of ₹74,66,359/- to NHAI on 1.2.2022, the Regional

Officer had no jurisdiction under the National Highways Act to

unilaterally alter or curtail any component of the structural

valuation.

13. It was further contended that the Regional Officer's letter

dated 2.3.2022, directing deduction of E.I. and P.H. components, was

without authority, arbitrary, and contrary to the statutory mandate.

The appellant emphasized that the National Highways Act, 1956

contains no provision empowering NHAI to modify a valuation

carried out by the Competent Authority under Section 3(G), nor does

it exclude E.I. or P.H. from compensable structural value. Counsel

argued that the impugned deduction was based solely on an internal

"committee observation" rather than on any statutory guideline or

expert assessment. The Tahasildar's para-wise report explicitly

recorded that the deduction was made onlybecause of this directive

from the Regional Officer, thereby demonstrating that the Competent

Authority had not independently applied its mind. The appellant

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submitted that this amounted to an extraneous and illegal

interference in the award process, rendering both the arbitral

decision dated 7.10.2022 and the Section 34 judgment vulnerable.

14. The appellant lastly contended that both the Arbitrator and the

learned District Judge committed serious errors in concluding that

E.I. and P.H. charges were not admissible under law. Counsel relied

on Schedule I and Section 29 of the RFCTLAR&R Act to argue that

compensation for buildings must reflect complete replacement cost,

which cannot be meaningfully computed without accounting for

essential service installations. The Assistant Engineer's estimate,

prepared in accordance with the Government's valuation guidelines,

had already treated E.I. and P.H. as inherent structural components;

the respondents never challenged the technical correctness of this

estimate. The appellant urged that the Arbitrator's view--treating

these costs as excludable--amounted to rewriting the statute and

ignoring expert evidence. It was submitted that exclusion of

nearly ₹19.25 lakh from the structural value inflicted manifest

injustice, undermining the statutory guarantee of full

indemnification for land and structures acquired for a public

purpose. Accordingly, the appellant prayed for restoration of the

deducted amount.

III. RESPONDENTS' SUBMISSIONS:

15. Per contra, Learned counsel for the Respondents submitted that the

deduction of ₹19,25,828/- towards Electrical Installation (E.I.) and

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Public Health (P.H.) components was entirely justified, as neither the

National Highways Act, 1956 nor Section 29 of the RFCTLAR&R Act,

2013 recognises E.I. and P.H. as independent compensable items. It

was argued that Section 29 permits valuation of buildings strictly on

the basis of civil structures and plinth-area cost, and does not

authorise addition of service installations such as electrical wiring,

sanitary pipelines, fixtures, or related accessories. The Regional

Officer's letter dated 02.03.2022, issued after consideration of the

Committee's observations, merely clarified this statutory position

and directed the CALA to remove inadmissible components from the

structure valuation. It was further submitted that the Competent

Authority is bound to follow NHAI's technical and financial

guidelines, and therefore acted correctly in revising the structural

valuation before disbursement.

16. The Respondents contended that the Appellant has attempted to rely

upon the estimate prepared by the Assistant Engineer as if it were

binding, whereas both the Arbitrator and the District Judge correctly

held that the estimate could not prevail over statutory limitations. It

was emphasised that an Assistant Engineer's estimate--even if

prepared under Section 29--does not compel NHAI to approve costs

that the governing law does not permit. The Committee's scrutiny

revealed that the assistant engineer included E.I. and P.H. charges

without any statutory basis, and hence those amounts had to be

excluded before sanction. The Respondents further argued that the

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Competent Authority's para-wise report makes it clear that the

CALA is neither the "approving" nor "sanctioning" authority; its

function is only to prepare and forward the award. Therefore, the

Appellant's contention that NHAI lacked authority to insist on

corrections was misconceived, as approval of the award vests solely

with NHAI under its delegated powers.

17. It was further urged that the Arbitrator's award dated 7.10.2022 and

the judgment of the District Judge dated 5.8.2024 are well-reasoned

and do not warrant interference. Both forums examined the statutory

framework and concluded that compensation for E.I. and P.H. is not

contemplated under the National Highways Act or the RFCTLAR&R

Act, and therefore cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The

Respondents highlighted that the appellant had already received the

legally admissible amount of ₹55,40,531/- through the BhoomiRashi

Portal, and that allowing the present claim would amount to

granting compensation under heads that the legislature has

consciously omitted. They argued that Section 37 does not permit re-

appreciation of factual or statutory findings unless perversity is

demonstrated--something the appellant has failed to establish.

Accordingly, the Respondents submitted that the appeal is devoid of

merit and liable to be dismissed.

18. It is finally submitted that there is no patent illegality in the

awardand therefore, the present Petition ought to be dismissed.

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IV. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:

19. Having heard the parties and perused the materials available on

record, this court here has identified the following issues to be

determined:

A. Whether this Court ought to interfere in the facts of the present case?

V. ISSUE A: WHETHERTHIS COURT OUGHT TO INTERFERE IN THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE?

20. The object of the A&C Act is to provide for a speedy and inexpensive

alternative mode of settlement of dispute with the minimum of

intervention of the courts. Section 5 of the Act is implicit in this

regard and prohibits interference by the judicial authority with the

arbitration proceedings except where so provided in Part-I of the

Act. The judicial interference, if any, is provided inter-alia only by

means of Sections 34 and 37 of the Act respectively.

21. Section 34 of the Act provides for getting an arbitral award set aside

by moving an application in accordance with sub-Section (2) and

sub-Section (3) of Section 34 of the Act which inter-alia provide for

the grounds on which an arbitral award is liable to be set aside. One

of the main grounds for interference or setting aside an award is

where the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India

i.e. if the award is induced or affected by fraud or corruption or is in

contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law or it is in

conflict with most basic notions of morality and justice. A plain

reading of Section 34 reveals that the scope of interference by the

court with the arbitral award under Section 34 is very limited and the

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court is not supposed to travel beyond the aforesaid scope to find out

if the award is good or bad.

22. Section 37 of the Act provides for a forum of appeal inter-alia against

the order setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award

under Section 34 of the Act. The scope of appeal is naturally akin to

and limited to the grounds enumerated under Section 34 of the Act.

23. It is pertinent to note that an arbitral award is not liable to be

interfered with only on the ground that the award is illegal or is

erroneous in law that too upon reappraisal of the evidence adduced

before the arbitral trial. Even an award which may not be reasonable

or is non-speaking to some extent cannot ordinarily be interfered

with by the courts. It is also well settled that even if two views are

possible there is no scope for the court to reappraise the evidence

and to take the different view other than that has been taken by the

arbitrator. The view taken by the arbitrator is normally acceptable

and ought to be allowed to prevail.

24. In paragraph 11 of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. L.K. Ahuja1it has been

observed as under:

"11. There are limitations upon the scope of interference in awards passed by an arbitrator. When the arbitrator has applied his mind to the pleadings, the evidence adduced before him and the terms of the contract, there is no scope for the court to reappraise the matter as if this

(2001) 4 SCC 86

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were an appeal and even if two views are possible, the view taken by the arbitrator would prevail. So long as an award made by an arbitrator can be said to be one by a reasonable person no interference is called for. However, in cases where an arbitrator exceeds the terms of the agreement or passes an award in the absence of any evidence, which is apparent on the face of the award, the same could be set aside."

14. It is equally well settled that the appellate power under Section 37 of

the Act is not akin to the normal appellate jurisdiction vested in the

civil courts for the reason that the scope of interference of the courts

with arbitral proceedings or award is very limited, confined to the

ambit of Section 34 of the Act only and even that power cannot be

exercised in a casual and a cavalier manner.

15. In Dyna Technology Private Limited v. Crompton Greaves Limited2,

the Apex Court observed as under:

"24. There is no dispute that Section 34 of the Arbitration Act limits a challenge to an award only on the grounds provided therein or as interpreted by various courts. We need to be cognizant of the fact that arbitral awards should not be interfered with in a casual and cavalier manner, unless the court comes to a conclusion that the perversity of the award goes to the root of the matter without there being a possibility of alternative interpretation which may sustain the arbitral award. Section 34 is different in its approach and cannot be equated with a normal appellate jurisdiction. The mandate under Section 34 is to respect the finality of the arbitral award and the party autonomy to get their

(2019) 20 SCC 1

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dispute adjudicated by an alternative forum as provided under the law. If the courts were to interfere with the arbitral award in the usual course on factual aspects, then the commercial wisdom behind opting for alternate dispute resolution would stand frustrated.

25. Moreover, umpteen number of judgments of this Court have categorically held that the courts should not interfere with an award merely because an alternative view on facts and interpretation of contract exists. The courts need to be cautious and should defer to the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal even if the reasoning provided in the award is implied unless such award portrays perversity unpardonable under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act."

16. It is seen that the scope of interference in an appeal under Section 37

of the Act is restricted and subject to the same grounds on which an

award can be challenged under Section 34 of the Act. In other words,

the powers under Section 37 vested in the court of appeal are not

beyond the scope of interference provided under Section 34 of the

Act.

17. In paragraph 14 of MMTC Limited v. Vedanta Limited3 it has been

held as under:

"14. As far as interference with an order made under Section 34, as per Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be disputed that such interference under Section 37 cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section

34. In other words, the court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award, and

(2019) 4 SCC 163

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must only ascertain that the exercise of power by the court under Section 34 has not exceeded the scope of the provision. Thus, it is evident that in case an arbitral award has been confirmed by the court under Section 34 and by the court in an appeal under Section 37, this Court must be extremely cautious and slow to disturb such concurrent findings."

18. Recently a three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court

in Konkan Railway Corporation Limited v. Chenab Bridge Project

Undertaking4referring to MMTC Limited (supra) held that the scope

of jurisdiction under Section 34 and Section 37 of the Act is not like a

normal appellate jurisdiction and the courts should not interfere with

the arbitral award lightly in a casual and a cavalier manner. The

mere possibility of an alternative view on facts or interpretation of

the contract does not entitle the courts to reverse the findings of the

arbitral tribunal.

19. In Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private

Limited v. Samir NarainBhojwani5, a Division Bench of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court followed and reiterated the principle laid down in

the case of MMTC Limited (supra) and UHL Power Company

Limited v. State of Himachal Pradesh6. It quoted and highlighted

paragraph 16 of the latter judgment which extensively relies

upon MMTC Limited(supra). It reads as under:

(2023) 9 SCC 85

2024 SCC OnLine SC 1656

(2022) 4 SCC 116

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"16. As it is, the jurisdiction conferred on courts under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is fairly narrow, when it comes to the scope of an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, the jurisdiction of an appellate court in examining an order, setting aside or refusing to set aside an award, is all the more circumscribed. In MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd. [MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 293], the reasons for vesting such a limited jurisdiction on the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act have been explained in the following words : (SCC pp. 166-67, para 11) "11. As far as Section 34 is concerned, the position is well-settled by now that the Court does not sit in appeal over the arbitral award and may interfere on merits on the limited ground provided under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) i.e. if the award is against the public policy of India. As per the legal position clarified through decisions of this Court prior to the amendments to the 1996 Act in 2015, a violation of Indian public policy, in turn, includes a violation of the fundamental policy of Indian law, a violation of the interest of India, conflict with justice or morality, and the existence of patent illegality in the arbitral award. Additionally, the concept of the "fundamental policy of Indian law" would cover compliance with statutes and judicial precedents, adopting a judicial approach, compliance with the principles of natural justice, and Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., [1948] 1 K.B. 223 (CA)] reasonableness. Furthermore, "patent illegality" itself has been held to mean contravention of the substantive law of India, contravention of the 1996 Act, and contravention of the terms of the contract.""

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25. Sections 3-A to 3-J of the National Highways Act, 1956 ("NH Act")

exhaustively delineates the process of land acquisition,

compensation determination, and disbursal. These provisions

collectively establish a self-contained and comprehensive

framework. The entire process, from notification of intent to acquire

land to the final disbursement of compensation, is conducted under

statutory authority.

26. Since Section 3-G(6) of the Act of 1956 makes the provisions of the

Act of 1996 applicable, remedy under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is

available to the party aggrieved by the award passed by the

Arbitrator. It may be noted that Chapter VII of the Act of 1996 in

which Section 34 finds place refers to recourse against an arbitral

award.

27. The scope of judicial intervention under Section 34 therefore, remains

uniformly limited, irrespective of whether the arbitration is statutory

or consensual. The Act does not envisage a merits-based review or

re-assessment of compensation by the courts; it merely permits

setting aside an award on narrowly defined grounds such as patent

illegality or violation of natural justice.

28. Courts have repeatedly emphasized the need for judicial restraint

when called upon to interfere with compensation awards under the

National Highways Act. The statute prescribes a detailed

methodology for determination of compensation, involving

assessment by the competent authority and statutory arbitration.

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Unless there is an evident and glaring illegality, patent perversity, or

manifest error apparent on the face of the record, the courts ought

not to disturb the award.

29. The statutory scheme under the NH Act, read with the RFCTLAR&R

Act, is unequivocally aimed at safeguarding landowners against

inequitable treatment during compulsory acquisition. This Court

notes that while the NH Act provides the acquisition framework, the

valuation principles are borrowed from the RFCTLAR&R Act,

ensuring parity across similarly situated land parcels.

30. This Court shall now examine the statutory scheme under which

compensation for land and structures acquired for widening of

National Highway-16 has been determined.

31. Section 3G(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956 provides

that "where any land is acquired under this Act, there shall be paid an

amount which shall be determined by the competent authority."

32. Section 3G(7) further states that "in determining the amount under sub-

section (1), the competent authority shall take into consideration the market

value of the land on the date of publication of the notification under Section

3A, and the damages sustained by reason of the acquisition."

33. Section 3G(7)(a) of the National Highways Act expressly imports "the

provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land

Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, so far as may be

applicable." The relevant provision of that Act is Section 29, which

deals with valuation of structures. Section 29(1) provides:

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"The Collector shall adopt the latest Schedule of Rates for valuation of buildings and other immovable property and shall consider the depreciated cost of construction of the building."

34. Section 29(2) adds that the Collector shall determine damages

for "other structures attached to the land." The statute does not

enumerate sub-heads such as Electrical Installation (E.I.) or Public

Health (P.H.) as separate compensable items. There is no express

reference to service installations such as electrical wiring or sanitary

pipelines. This Court, therefore, is of the opinion that the statutory

compass for determining building value is circumscribed by what

the Act recognises as compensable heads. The Learned District Judge

interpreted this silence to mean exclusion. This Court finds that this

interpretative exercise was neither erroneous nor perverse.

35. This Court notes that the term "structure" under Section 29 has been

judicially understood to refer to civil components of a building, unless

a statute expressly includes ancillary systems. The valuation method

under the Schedule of Rates followed by the Assistant Engineer

separates civil plinth-area cost from internal service installations. The

District Judge held that while the Schedule permits engineers to

quantify E.I. and P.H. expenses, such quantification does not

automatically convert them into statutorily compensable components.

The Court is unable to fault this conclusion, as valuation guidelines

do not override statutory limits.

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36. Neither Section 3G(7) of the National Highways Act nor Section 29 of

the RFCTLAR&R Act mentions compensation for E.I. and P.H.

installations. The District Judge's reasoning--based on statutory

interpretation--was that items not forming part of the statutory

enumeration cannot be judicially introduced. This view is buttressed

by the principle expressed in Expressiouniusestexclusioalterius--where

the legislature specifies particular items, others must be deemed

intentionally omitted. This Court finds the application of that

principle appropriate.

37. Under Section 3G(1), the authority determining compensation is the

Competent Authority. However, disbursement of funds for National

Highway acquisition requires prior approval of the National

Highways Authority of India (NHAI). The District Judge carefully

noted that the Competent Authority's valuation is not final or

binding until approval is granted. The appellant's argument that

NHAI lacked power to direct reconsideration of inadmissible

components is contrary to the statutory scheme, where NHAI

provides funds and must ensure conformity with law.

38. The communication of the Regional Officer dated 2.3.2022 merely

conveyed that E.I. and P.H. components were inadmissible and

directed the Competent Authority to issue the award in compliance

with law. The District Judge found no illegality in this direction

because it neither altered land value nor modified the civil structure

valuation; it only excluded non-statutory components. This Court

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finds this conclusion well-founded, as NHAI's directive was

consistent with ensuring statutory adherence rather than substituting

its own valuation.

39. The Ld. Arbitrator also examined Section 29 and Section 3G(7) and

held that E.I. and P.H. did not fall within the ambit of compensable

loss. Section 34(2)(b)(ii) permits interference only where an award

is contrary to public policy of India, including patent illegality on the

face of the award. The District Judge found that the Arbitrator's

interpretation was a legally sustainable view. This Court, sitting in

appeal under Section 37, cannot substitute its own view unless the

finding is irrational or contrary to statute.

40. Section 37 does not permit re-assessment of evidence or re-

appreciation of findings merely because another view is possible.

The jurisdiction is corrective, not appellate. The District Judge,

constrained under Section 34, examined whether the Arbitrator's

view was plausible--not whether it was the only view. This Court

must apply the same discipline. The appellant has shown no patent

illegality or violation of statutory principle.

41. The appellant relies heavily on the Assistant Engineer's estimate,

which quantified the E.I. and P.H. components. But Section 29

requires valuation in accordance with the Act, not merely in accordance

with an engineer's estimate. Where the estimate includes items that

the Act does not recognise, statutory text must prevail. The District

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Judge's reasoning that an engineer's estimate cannot enlarge

statutory entitlement is correct.

42. In fact, this Court finds merit in the District Judge's approach

distinguishing between the civil structure--which Section 29

compensates--and ancillary systems like wiring and sanitation,

which are not expressly included. The Arbitrator concluded that E.I.

and P.H. were amenities rather than structures. This classification,

being factual and interpretative, falls squarely within the Arbitrator's

domain. No grounds exist for appellate interference.

43. Where a statute prescribes a method for determining compensation,

that method is exhaustive. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held

that compensation cannot be awarded under unenumerated heads in

land acquisition matters. The District Judge applied this doctrine in

concluding that inclusion of E.I. and P.H. would amount to judicial

legislation.

44. The appellant argued that principles of "fair compensation" under

the 2013 Act required inclusion of all structure-related components.

This Court notes that Section 29's fairness guarantee

operates within the statutory boundaries; it does not expand them.

The District Judge rightly held that fairness cannot be interpreted to

contradict express statutory omissions. The appellant's grievance

cannot translate into a legal entitlement.

45. For interference under Section 37, the appellant must show

perversity--defined as a finding so unreasonable that no reasonable

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adjudicator could reach it. The Arbitrator's conclusion rested on

statutory text; the District Judge applied correct legal principles; and

the Competent Authority acted pursuant to statutory limits. No

material irregularity, jurisdictional error, or misapplication of law

has been shown.

VI. CONCLUSION:

46. In conclusion, this Court finds that the impugned judgment of the

Ld. District Judge is firmly rooted in statutory mandate, sound

reasoning, and the principles of fairness inherent in compulsory

acquisition law. Upon a holistic examination of the statutory

provisions, documentary material, valuation process, award, and the

judgment under Section 34, this Court is satisfied that the view

adopted by the Learned District Judge is a legally sustainable one,

grounded in statutory interpretation rather than factual misdirection.

The concurrent findings that E.I. and P.H. components are not

compensable under Sections 3G(7) and 29 cannot be said to suffer

from any infirmity warranting interference under Section 37. The

appeal, therefore, does not merit intervention at the appellate stage.

47. ARBA No. 15 of 2025 is accordingly dismissed. There shall, however,

be no orders as to costs.

48. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.

(Dr.SanjeebK Panigrahi) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack, Dated the12th December, 2025/