Haraprasanna Tripathy vs Principal Secretary
2025 Latest Caselaw 11012 Ori

Orissa High Court

Haraprasanna Tripathy vs Principal Secretary on 4 December, 2025

Author: Murahari Sri Raman

Bench: Murahari Sri Raman

              IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

                                  W.A. No.1275 of 2025


           Haraprasanna Tripathy                             ....                 Appellant

                                      -Versus-
           Principal Secretary, Department of                ....              Respondents
           Higher Education, Bhubaneswar and
           others


           Advocates appeared in this case:
               For Appellant                  : Mr. Surya Prasad Mishra,
                                                Senior Advocate (Amicus
                                                Curiae)
                                                 Mr. Haraprasanna Tripathy,
                                                 In-person
               For Respondents                : Mr. Saswat Das,  Additional
                                                Government Advocate for State


                                CORAM:
                    HON' BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
                                AND
              HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN

                                     JUDGMENT

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date of Judgment : 4th December, 2025

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- HARISH TANDON, CJ.

1. The seminal point involved in the instant writ appeal is whether

a writ petition can be maintained / entertained against an order dated

27th March, 2025 passed by the Director, Higher Education,

Government of Odisha in rejecting the representation of the appellant

claiming for approval of his promotion to the post of Lecturer in

Physics, the 7th post, without approaching the Odisha Education

Tribunal (the „Tribunal‟ for short) constituted under the Odisha

Education Act, 1969 (the „O.E. Act‟ for short).

2. The learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petition being

W.P.(C) No.15175 of 2025 filed by the appellant solely on the ground

that in view of the provisions contained under Section 24-B of the

O.E. Act, the Tribunal is competent and vested with the power to

adjudicate the dispute raised in the writ petition and, therefore, the

writ petition, by passing the said provision, does not deserve to be

entertained as it is open to the appellant to challenge the said order

before the Tribunal.

3. Shorn of unnecessary details and in order to determine the

point as formulated hereinbefore, it would be apposite to recapitulate

the prelude to the litigations ensued at the behest of the appellant in

different fora. Undeniably, the appellant (petitioner) was appointed as

a Demonstrator in Physics on 8th September, 1987 by the Governing

Body of the KBDAV College, Nirakarpur („college‟ for short). While

discharging the duties and responsibilities attached to the said post,

the appellant was permitted to hold the 7th post of Lecturer in Physics

with effect from 6th August, 2000 as the Lecturer in Physics tendered

resignation on 5th August, 2000. Subsequently, in a meeting held on

9th April 2003, the Governing Body of the college took a resolution to

approve the promotion and/or appointment of the appellant in the 7th

post of Lecturer in Physics and approached the Director, Higher

Education, Government of Odisha to grant the final approval to such

resolution. The Director vide its letter No.47870 dated 4th December,

2012 declined to grant approval to the resolution adopted by the

Governing Body of the college on the premise that a Demonstrator in

Direct Payment Scheme does not come within the purview of the

initial recruitment procedure prescribed for Lecturer in terms of the

provisions contained in the O.E. Act and Odisha Education

(Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers and Members of

the Staff of Aided Educational Institution) Rules, 1974 („1974 Rules‟

for short).

3.1. Feeling aggrieved by such decision, a writ petition being

W.P.(C) No.9325 of 2013 was filed by the appellant before this

Court. Amidst the pendency of the said petition, a letter was caused

by the Director, Higher Education as posted in the official website of

the Higher Education Department asking the Principal of the college

to appear with the relevant documents for verification in order to file

the counter affidavit in the aforementioned writ petition and upon

completion of such exercise, the writ petition was disposed of on 27 th

April, 2017 without extending any benefits in absolute terms to the

appellant. However, the Court observed that the grievance raised by

the appellant should be considered by the said authorities as the

appellant has demonstrated the act of discrimination founded upon

the fact that one of the Demonstrators, who was subsequently

appointed as a Lecturer, was granted a post facto approval. As the

said grievance petition remained pending in the domain of the said

authority, the application being GIA Case No.70 of 2018 was filed

before the Tribunal, which came to be disposed of on 23 rd February,

2022 in the following:

"12. xxx. On the face of the above documents and keeping in view the afore quoted observations of the Hon'ble Court in the matter of Nilambar Satapathy, the claim of the petitioner cannot be brushed aside on the ground that it is not in terms of Rule8(2)(b) of the 1974 Rules. The O.P. Nos.1 and 2 are required to consider the claim of the petitioner in the manner the claims of above mentioned Demonstrators were considered.

13. Thus, the G.I.A. application is allowed in part against the O.P. Nos.1 and 2 and ex parte against the

O.P. No.3, Governing Body. The O.P. Nos.1 and 2 are directed to consider the claim of the petitioner in the light of the observations made above, within four months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. The petitioner be given an opportunity of personal hearing."

4. Despite the direction as above having passed by the Tribunal,

the authorities kept the claim raised by the appellant in the said

representation in suspended animation, which constrained the

appellant to file the Execution Case No.8 of 2023 before the Tribunal.

Amidst the pendency of the said execution case, the representation

was taken up by the Director and rejected the claim by passing an

order No.17373/HE dated 27th March, 2025. The aforesaid facts were

brought on record in the said execution proceeding which was

disposed of with the categorical findings that "since the O.P. Nos.1

and 2 have been directed to consider the claim of the petitioner, as it

appears, they have considered the same by affording an opportunity

of personal hearing to the petitioner and rejected his claim vide

Order No.17373/HE dtd. 27.03.2025. So, nothing is left in this

proceeding to be executed. Therefore, the objection filed by the

petitioner to the aforesaid rejection order of the O.P. No.2 is

rejected."

5. Instead of challenging the said order dated 27th March, 2025

before the Tribunal, the appellant approached the writ Court by filing

the writ petition, which was disposed of by the impugned order

relegating the appellant to challenge the said order before the

Tribunal.

6. Though the order impugned in the instant writ appeal does not

in explicit term contained the genesis of the dispute, yet it can be

reasonably inferred that the learned Single Judge declined to entertain

the writ petition assailing the order of the Director dated 27 th March,

2025 taken on the basis of a direction passed in the order dated 23 rd

March, 2022 by the Tribunal as the appellant cannot be permitted to

jump the forum.

7. A piquant situation arose on the provisions contained under

Section 24-B of the O.E. Act, which provides the power, authority

and the jurisdiction exercised by the Tribunal in relation to the

disputes and differences between the Managing Committee, the

Governing body of any private institution, any teacher or employee of

such institution or the State Government or any officer or authority of

the said Government, relating to the eligibility, entitlement, payment

or non-payment of grant-in-aid. Initially, an impression was created

on the meaningful reading of the language employed in the

aforementioned Section with regard to the expression "Grant-in-Aid"

having nexus with the eligibility and entitlement and in order to have

the clarity on the same and to ponder upon such issues, we invited

Mr. Surya Prasad Mishra, learned Senior Counsel to assist the Court

as Amicus Curiae for the reason that the appellant is pursuing his

cause by appearing in person and the arguments were advanced by

him purely on a factual matrix.

8. Before we proceed to determine the point as involved in the

instant writ appeal, it would be profitable to quote the said provision

in extenso, which runs thus:

"24-B. Adjudication by Tribunal - (1) The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction, power and authority to adjudicate all disputes and differences, between the Managing Committee or, as the case may be, the Governing body of any private educational institution and any teacher or employee of such institution or the State Government or any officer or authority of the said Government, relating to or connected with the eligibility, entitlement, payment or non-payment of grant-in-aid.

(2) Any person, aggrieved by an order pertaining to any matter within jurisdiction of the Tribunal, may make an application to the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance.

(3) On receipt of an application under Sub-

section (2), the Tribunal shall, if satisfied after such inquiry as it may deem necessary that the application is a fit case for adjudication by it, admit such

application, but where the Tribunal is not so satisfied, it may summarily reject the application after recording its reasons:

Provided that no application before the Tribunal seeking a claim of grant-in-aid against the State Government or any officer or authority of the said Government shall be admitted, unless the applicant has served a notice on the State Government or concerned officer or authority furnishing the details of the claim and a period of two months has expired from the date of receipt of the said notice by the State Government or, as the case may be, the concerned officer or authority.

(4) The Tribunal shall not admit an application under Sub-section (2), unless it is made within one year from the date of expiry of the period of two months referred to in Sub-section (3).

(5) The Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and, subject to any rules made by the Government, shall have power to regulate its own procedure.

(6) All the proceedings before the Tribunal shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

9. Initially, the point would have been set at rest on the factual

aspect discerned from the record that on an earlier occasion, the

appellant approached the Tribunal wherein the orders were passed

and the impugned order being resultant effect thereof, it is

impermissible for the litigant to choose the forum of his convenience

ignoring the Statute and the provisions contained therein. The point

involved in the instant writ appeal relates to a harmonization of the

expressions--„eligibility‟ and „entitlement‟ in conjunction with the

payment or non-payment of grant-in-aid.

10. Mr. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel fervently submits that

Section 7-C of the O.E. Act was introduced by way of an Amendment

Act No.14 of 1993 to extend grant-in-aid to non-Government

Institutions on account of placement of teachers and the payment of

salary in commensurate with the others subject to the economic

capacity of the State. According to Mr. Mishra, the use of „comma‟

(punctuation) cannot be a sole determinant factor in ascertaining the

intent and the purport underlining the introduction of the said

provision and, therefore, the Court must bear in mind the object and

purpose envisaged from the decision of the Government or the

Cabinet taken in this regard. According to Mr. Mishra, the eligibility

and/or entitlement is intricately connected with the payment or non-

payment of grant-in-aid and, therefore, the jurisdiction exercised by

the Tribunal under Section 24-B of the O.E. Act must be confined to

a grand-in-aid, which necessarily excludes such jurisdiction and the

competence of the Tribunal in relation to any other disputes being

outside the purview thereof. Mr. Mishra arduously submits that

expression "relating to or connected with" appearing in sub-section

(1) of Section 24-B of the O.E. Act should be ascribed a reasonable

meaning relatable to the eligibility, entitlement, payment or non-

payment of grant-in-aid, which denuded the Tribunal to adjudicate

any other disputes outside the ambit of the grant-in-aid. He thus

submits that there is no ambiguity in perceiving the intent and the

purport of applicability of the said provision in ascertaining the

jurisdiction, the power and the authority exercised by the Tribunal

under the aforesaid provision and, therefore, the writ petition

assailing the order of the Director, Education Department is

maintainable and should not be thrown out solely on the ground of an

alternative efficacious remedy provided in the Statute.

11. Learned Additional Government Advocate for the State

however took a dissenting opinion on the interpretation of the words,

the expressions and the language employed in Sub-section (1) of

Section 24-B of the O.E. Act as each word or expression used therein

has to be given a proper meaning and the moment the intention is

manifested providing an unambiguous meaning, the Court should not

employ the interpretative tools in giving a meaning not perceived at

the time of its introduction in the Statute. According to learned AGA,

the appellant should not be permitted to choose the forum at his

convenience, more particularly, on an earlier occasion the approach

was made to the Tribunal and the impugned orders sees the birth

therefrom. According to him, the purpose of constituting a Tribunal

and bestowing the authority powers and jurisdiction should not be

abridged by taking a view, which is not in consonance therewith.

12. On the conspectus of the facts adumbrated hereinabove and the

points so urged, the pivotal issue as narrated in the opening

paragraphs of this Judgment is required to be determined not only on

a meaningful reading of the words or expressions used in the said

statutory provision but also to be gathered from the legislative intent,

more particularly, the Bills and the Cabinet decisions of the State

Government.

13. The Grant-in-Aid was envisioned and felt inevitable by the

Government as the educational institution set up within the State was

felt inadequate to cater the need and in order to ratify its commitment

in providing the quality education as ordained in the Constitution of

India, the Government decided to extend grant-in-aid subject to its

economic capacity to the private educational institutions within the

State. Despite such aid being granted to such private educational

institutions, the reports continued pouring into the Government that

there is no uniform standard adopted by the educational institutions in

appointing the teachers as the Managing Committees or the

Governing Bodies of such institutions were indiscriminately

appointing the teachers without following the standards or the

procedures relating thereto. In order to put an end to such perceived

discrepancies, it was felt that the standard and the procedures as

provided by the other institutions including the University Grants

Commission should be strictly followed. Despite such decision

having taken, a spate of litigations were pouring in the docket of the

High Court concerning the eligibility, the entitlement and the

payment or non-payment of the grant-in-aid, which led the

Government to establish a special forum to adjudicate such issues not

only to ease out the burden of the High Court in dealing with such

issues in exercise of writ jurisdiction but also to provide a specialized

forum by constituting a Tribunal. Based upon such infirmities,

Section 24-B of the O.E. Act was introduced into the said Act by way

of an amendment not only encompassing the jurisdiction, powers and

the authority to adjudicate all disputes and differences between the

educational institutions, the State or its officers or authority but also

the eligibility, entitlement and payment and non-payment of the

grant-in-aid, which are intricately related to the educational

institutions or any teachers or the employees of such institutions.

14. A point is taken that the „comma‟ (punctuation) used in the

said Section is distinctive in the sense that the eligibility or

entitlement must be construed in conjunction with the grant-in-aid. It

is sought to be contended that the punctuation cannot be used as an

effective tool of interpretation but are used to effectuate the clarity in

languages. We are not unmindful of the proposition that the

punctuation though one of the cannon of interpretation of the

statutory provisions, but may at times, has an infallible guide

resulting into an ambiguity to be brought in juxtaposition with the

legislative intent.

15. The apex Court in State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar

Guha reported in (1982) 1 SCC 561 in explicit, lucid and

unambiguous term held that the grammar and/or the punctuation are

hapless victims of a pace of life, yet have been placed as a matter of

convenience and meaningfulness. It is further held that any clause

that follows with „comma‟ often brings a sense of doubt and,

therefore, it would be appropriate for the Court / Tribunal to ascertain

the true meaning of the provision with due regard to the substance of

the matter emerging from the object and the purpose of the Act.

16. The importance of the „comma‟ used in the statutory provision

is succinctly dealt with in a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court

in case of Bihar State Electricity Board v. Pulak Enterprises

reported in (2009) 5 SCC 641 in the following:

"40. Counsel for the writ petitioners referred to the "comma" occurring prior to the words "out of".

Though sometimes presence or absence of comma has been taken aid of in interpreting the particular provision, the ordinary rule is that punctuation mark is a minor element in the interpretation of statute (see Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose [(1952) 2 SCC 237 : AIR 1952 SC 369] ). More so, in the case of subordinate legislation."

What can be culled out from the aforementioned report that the

significance of „comma‟ used in a statutory provision though a minor

element in the interpretative process, but at times, may be used as

useful tool to ascertain the true meaning of the provision flowing

from the object and purpose of the Act. The support can be lent from

various discussions and discourse undertaken in the Cabinet meeting

leading to the amendment to be brought to enlarge the scope,

authority and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in dealing with the cases

concerning the grant-in-aid to the institutions or the individual

teaching and non-teaching employees.

17. We had a privilege of perusing the memorandum issued by the

Commissioner-cum-Secretary to the Government for proposal to

bring an amendment in the Odisha Education Act, 1969 in order to

regulate the payment of the grant-in-aid to the private educational

institutions and the matters connected therewith. The Bill was placed

before the Cabinet in the meeting dated 7th September, 1997 and a

decision was taken to constitute a Cabinet Sub-committee to

formulate appropriate proposals with an intent to streamline the

payment of grant-in-aid to private educational institutions. The Sub-

committee of the Cabinet recommended the amendment to be brought

in the said Act upon taking into consideration the spate of litigations

filed before the High Court concerning the eligibility of payment or

non-payment of grant-in-aid in paragraph-8 of the Cabinet

memorandum of the even date in the following:

"(8) It is observed that there are a large number of cases in the form of writ petitions filed by employees of the Non-Government colleges and schools claiming that their institutions or posts should be brought within the grant-in-aid fold. Attending to such large number of cases on time has become well-nigh impossible. Both Higher Education and School & Mass Education Departments and the Directorates are at present

crushed under the burden. There is hardly any time left for long-term, even medium term, planning for the development of education and measures necessary for ensuring quality of education. Experience reveals that large number of cases are being filed before the Hon'ble High Court invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction in the matter of dispute relating to eligibility of payment or non-payment of grant-in-aid. As a result Hon'ble High Court is unnecessarily burdened with large number of such cases and it is desirable that the cases filed in the High Court should be reduced through a process of screening at the lower level. It would, therefore, be appropriate to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Educational Tribunal constituted under section 24-A of the Orissa Education Act, 1969 sо that such dispute can be adjudicated by the said Tribunal. It is proposed that the Tribunal may adjudicate the followings:

(i) (a)Disputes relating to eligibility of an educational institution and/or of teaching and non-teaching staff of educational institution to receive grant-in-aid.

(b) Any dispute or difference between the managing committee or the governing body or any employee of any private educational institution and the State Government or any authority which is connected with the grant-in-aid.

(ii) No petition before the Education Tribunal seeking to make a claim against the Government or any other authority of Government shall be entertained unless the petitioner has served a notice on the concerned authority furnishing the details of the claim and a period of 2 months has expired from the date of receipt of that notice by the said authority or Government, as the case may be.

(iii) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Tribunal including the Government may prefer an appeal before the High Court within 60 days."

Ultimately, the proposal was mooted out to amend Section 7-B and 7-

C of the O.E. Act and also to insert new Sections as 24-B and 24-C to

give effect to the proposal as above. The Odisha Education

(Amendment) Bill, 1998 was placed on the floor of the House of the

Assembly and after having passed by majority, the Odisha Education

(Amendment) Act, 1998 received assent of the Governor on 2nd April,

1998 and was published in the Odisha Gazette on 7th April, 1998.

18. The conjoint reading of the aforementioned factual events

leading to incorporation of Section 24-B of the Act manifestly

indicates the intention of the Legislators in bringing such amendment

in relation to a dispute concerning the eligibility of not only the

educational institution, but also of teaching and non-teaching staff of

the institution to receive grant-in-aid. Such being the manifest

intention apparent from the object and purpose underlining the

incorporation of a newly inserted Section 24-B removes any doubt or

ambiguity by using the punctuation after „eligibility‟ and

„entitlement‟ before "payment or non-payment of grant-in-aid" which

is relatable to the eligibility towards the grant-in-aid. The grant-in-aid

as evident from the proposal of the Sub-committee includes the

entitlement and also eligibility of a teaching or non-teaching staff to

get the grant-in-aid, which in unambiguous term includes the salary

attached to the post. Thus, the denial of payment of the salary and

also the approval to the post, which is intricately and intrinsically

connected to the payment of the salary, comes within the purview

thereof. Any other meaning assigned to the provision contained under

Section 24-B of the O.E. Act by giving due importance to the

punctuation and ascribing the meaning in segregation shall be

opposed to the legislative intent and purpose and object for bringing

the said provision by way of an amendment shall be meaningless.

Section 7-C of the said Act, which was also amended

contemporaneously with the insertion of Section 24-B, is exposit of

such intention that the salary cost or any other expenses made by the

private educational institutions or for any post or to any person

employed in such institutions comes within the ambit of grant-in-aid.

19. Having held so, let us now revert to the facts involved in the

instant case in pursuit of determining whether the judgment of the

learned Single Judge in relegating the appellant to the Education

Tribunal warrants any interference.

20. As indicated hereinbefore, the appellant, who was admittedly

appointed as a Demonstrator by the Governing body of the college

until he was permitted to hold the 7th post of Lecturer in Physics with

effect from 6th August, 2000. Though the resolution was taken by the

Governing body of the college to approve such promotion, but the

Director of the Higher Education, Government of Odisha declined to

grant such approval as the Demonstrator in direct payment scheme

does not come within the purview of the initial appointment

procedure prescribed in this regard. Though the appellant moved a

writ petition challenging the said decision before this Court, but

subsequently the issue was again activated by the Director by causing

a letter to the Principal of the college to submit the relevant

documents for verification. Subsequently, the Writ Court relegated

the matter to the authorities as the appellant pleaded the act of

discrimination that the similarly circumstanced people were granted

post facto approval. Interestingly, the appellant approached the

Tribunal as the authority remained silent and did not take any

decision on the grievance petition, which was allowed in part

directing the authorities to consider the claim of the appellant in the

light of the observations made therein. The said order was passed on

23rd February, 2022 and attained finality as no challenge was made

from any corner. Despite such specific direction to consider and

dispose of the said grievance petition within a time frame, the

authorities sat over the same for which an execution petition was filed

before the Tribunal. During the pendency of the said execution

proceeding, the decision was taken by the Director on 27 th March,

2025 and after noticing the aforesaid fact, the execution case was

disposed of. Although the order dated 27th March, 2025 passed by the

Director in terms of the direction passed by the Tribunal, the

appellant challenged the said order before the learned Single Judge in

a writ proceeding instead of assailing the same before the Tribunal.

The learned Single Judge relegated the appellant to the Tribunal as

the appellant cannot choose the forum at his convenience.

21. It is axiomatic to record that the appellant has been taking steps

assailing the action of the authorities either by filing writ petition

before this Court and at times before the Tribunal, which appears to

be convenient to him. It is a matter of concern that such proceedings

are being dealt with, obviously in absence of any plea relating to the

jurisdiction. A litigant cannot choose the forum at his convenience as

the jurisdictional issue strikes at the root and, therefore, it is the

foremost duty of a Court while dealing any litigation to satisfy itself

whether it has a jurisdiction to deal with the disputes/issues raised

therein. Any uncertainty in relation to jurisdictional issue would not

only invite an anomaly situation, but also conflicting decisions

bringing uncertainty in its due implementation. Once the Legislature

has provided a forum for redressal and/or determination of the

disputes, it would be preposterous to suggest that such forum is a

forum of convenience and does not limit or abridge the right of the

litigant to approach another forum. Even if the power of High Court

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be ousted being

a basic structure of the Constitution, yet the Writ Court may decline

to entertain the writ petition if a forum is provided in the statute,

which is competent to deal with such issues within its folds. The

order dated 27th March, 2025 was passed in due implementation of

the direction issued by the Tribunal and, therefore, we do not find any

infirmity in the impugned order, which relegate the appellant to move

the forum provided under Section 24-B of the said Act.

22. We have discussed in extenso the scope and jurisdiction of the

Tribunal constituted under Section 24-A of the said Act and the

dispute comes within the four-corners of the said jurisdiction and,

therefore, the challenge to the order dated 27th March, 2025 can be

made by approaching the said Tribunal.

23. We, thus, do not find any infirmity and/or illegality in the

impugned order. The appeal is, thus, dismissed.

(Harish Tandon) Chief Justice

(M.S. Raman) Judge

M. Panda/ Arun Mishra

Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack