[Cites 18, Cited by 0]
Orissa High Court
Ullash Ch. Samantray vs State Of Odisha And Another .... ... on 8 December, 2025
Author: Chittaranjan Dash
Bench: Chittaranjan Dash
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
AFR CRLMC No. 2361 of 2016
Ullash Ch. Samantray .... Petitioner
Mr. N. Lenka,, Advocate, Advocate
-versus-
State of Odisha and another .... Opposite Parties
Ms.. S. Mohanty, Addl. P. P.
Mr. Samir Kumar Mishra, Sr. Advocate
For O.P. No.2
CORAM:
THE HON'BLE
BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH
Date of Judgment: 08.12.2025
Chittaranjan Dash, J.
1. By means of this application, the Petitioner seeks
seek to quash
the criminal proceeding in connection with 1CC No.315 of 2016
pending before the learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar initiated at the
instance of the Opposite Party No.2.
2. The background facts of the case are that the
the mother of the
Opposite Party No.2, namely Pramila Paikray, the sister of the
present Petitioner filed a Civil Suit No.825 of 2006 in the court of
learned Civil Judge, (Sr. Division), Bhubaneswar against the
Petitioner praying for decree of partition of the suit properties
allotting 1/4th share in her favour. In the said suit, the mother of the
Opposite Party No.2 described the Petitioner as the son of the
Raghunath Samantray and nor Lokanath Samntaray. Finally, the
aforesaid suit was decreed on the basis of the compromise filed by
the Parties, wherein it was admitted that the Petitioner is the son of
Lokanath Samntray and not Raghunath Samantray. Having satisfied
with the decree passed by the learned court on the basis of the
compromise, the mother of the Opposite Party No.2 namely Pramila
Paikray got the properties fell in her share mutated in her name.
Subsequently, she sold away the said properties in favour of one
Gangadhar Sahoo of Baramunda, Bhubaneswar in the district of
khurda. It is alleged by the Petitioner that while filing the suit, the
said Pramila Paikaray intentionally described the Petitioner as son
of Raghunath Samantray instead of Lokanathi Samantray but the
Petitioner consistently asserted him to be the son of said Lokanath
Samantray. After
er about 3 years of the said final decree, the said
Pramila Paikray filed CMA No. 35/11 before the learned Civil
Court U/s 151 CPC, inter alia, praying to set aside the compromise
decree on the ground that the same has been obtained by
committing fraud. The
The petitioner contested the said proceeding by
submitting his objection. Despite the objection, the learned Trial
Court accepted the case of the Petitioner for consideration
whereupon the Petitioner preferred Criminal Revision Petition
before this Honhle Court in CRP No.3/12. This Court by order
dated 03.02.2012 stayed the further proceeding in the aforesaid
CMA No. 35/2011. When the matter stood thus, in the year 2015,
the said Pramila Paikray filed another CMC No.636 of 2015 under
Section 144 (2) Cr.P.C against the Petitioner and some others, inter,
alia, seeking for order under the said provision of law not to raise
any construction over the scheduled-A
scheduled A land of the said Petition.
When an interim order was passed in the said proceeding, the
Petitioner challenged
allenged the aforesaid order in CRLREV No.457 of
2015 before this Court. During pendency of the aforesaid Criminal
Revision, the Addl. DCP-cum-Executive
DCP Executive Magistrate, Bhubaneswar
vide order dated 28.07.2015 was pleased to drop the said
proceeding, inter alia,
alia, mentioning therein that the dispute are civil
in nature. It is further alleged by the Petitioner that in the meantime,
Pramila Paikray filed so many cases before the learned civil court
including the said CMA No.35 of 2011 but the CMA No.35 of 2011
got stayed
tayed by this Court. In the meanwhile, on the basis of a
complaint case filed by the son of Pramila Paikray,
Paikray inter alia
allegeing that the Petitioner is the son of Late Raghunath Samantray
but claimed to be the adopted son of Lokanath Samantray and has
soldd certain properties and further that the Petitioner managed to
obtain a compromise decree in the civil suit against his mother
namely Pramila Paikray. His mother Pramila Paikray, being an old
lady did not know the implication of putting signature on court
paper and her signature in the alleged compromise decree and now
she has been suffering and claiming himself to be the son of
Lokonath Samnatray, the Petitioner sold some properties in the
name of Hrusikeh Samantray, S/o. Raghunath Samantray. It is
furtherr alleged that the Petitioner sold certain properties to one
Swarnalata Mohanty as Ullash Samantray, S/o. Lokanth Samantray
and subsequently cancelled the same through a deed of cancellation.
In the above circumstances, the Petitioner has approached this
Court
ourt seeking to challenge the initiation of the criminal proceeding
instituted at the behest of the son of Pramila Paikray and has prayed
for quashing of the same.
same
3. Mr. Lenka, learned counsel for the Petitioner, submitted that
the entire set of allegations in the complaint arises out of a long-
long
standing property dispute between the parties, which is purely civil
in character, and that the criminal court ought not to entertain
matters that essentially pertain to civil rights over immovable
property. He contended
contended that right from the institution of the civil
suit, Opposite Party No.2, namely Pramila Paikray,, the elder sister
of the Petitioner, with the sole objective of appropriating the entire
properties of Lokanath Samantray,
Samantray, deliberately disputed the
parentagee of the Petitioner by describing him as the son of
Raghunath Samantray.
Samantray. Ultimately, however, the matter was
amicably settled and a compromise decree was passed wherein it
stood acknowledged that the Petitioner is the son of Lokanath
Samantray.. Only after alienating the properties that had fallen to her
share pursuant to the compromise decree, Pramila Paikray instituted
proceedings challenging the said compromise decree, despite the
fact that it had already been fully acted upon. Learned counsel
further argued
ued that the complaint case discloses no cause of action
whatsoever and that the issues raised therein have already been
settled between the parties. The land in question, according to him,
does not fall within the common hotchpotch nor was it the subject
matter of the compromise decree. Therefore, even assuming for the
sake of argument that the Petitioner has executed certain documents
describing himself as the son of Lokanath Samantray,, no criminal
liability can be attached to him, as no right in the property
prop of
Opposite Party No.2 or her son stands affected thereby. It is his
specific submission of Mr. Lenka that the core of the dispute
revolves around whether the Petitioner is the son of Lokanath
Samantray or Raghunath Samantray,
Samantray, which is a matter already
alread
settled in multiple unimpeachable records. He drew attention to the
Record-of-Rights
Rights of the year 1962 pertaining to Plot No. 37-E,
wherein the Petitioner has been recorded as the son of Lokanath
Samantray.. Likewise, the matriculation certificate issued by
b the
Board of Secondary Education, an unimpeachable document, also
reflects the Petitioner's parentage as the son of Lokanath
Samantray.. The same description appears consistently in the
Aadhar Card and other official documents issued thereafter.
Further, in a gift deed executed in the year 1976, Raghunath
Samantray himself described the Petitioner, Ullash Ch. Samantray,
Samantray
as his nephew, thereby acknowledging that the Petitioner was not
his son. Relying on these materials, Mr. Lenka contended that there
is no manner of doubt that the Petitioner is the son of Late Lokanath
Samantray.. He therefore submitted that the present criminal
proceeding, initiated at the instance of the Petitioner's nephew, is
nothing but an attempt to usurp property and to subject the
Petitioner
titioner to unwarranted harassment, and is liable to be quashed.
4. Mr. Samir Kumar Mishra, learned Senior Advocate
appearing for Opposite Party No.2, vehemently contested the
submissions advanced by Mr. Lenka,
Lenka, learned counsel for the
Petitioner. He submitted that the property in question, which has
been alienated by the Petitioner by impersonating himself as the son
of Lokanath Samantray, squarely attracts the offences alleged in the
complaint. According to him,
him, the averments in the complaint, taken
at their face value, clearly disclose the ingredients of the offences
alleged and make out a prima facie case against the Petitioner. In
such circumstances, it wass contended that the request of the
Petitioner for quashing
ashing the complaint is wholly untenable and does
not merit consideration.
5. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties
and upon perusal of the documents, it is established that the mother
of Opposite Party No.2 had filed Civil Suit No.825 of
of 2006, naming
the Petitioner as a defendant. In the said suit, the mother of the
plaintiff claimed a partition of the property under the common
hotchpotch to the extent of one-fourth
one fourth share, which ultimately
ended in a compromise, and a compromise decree was
was passed under
the joint signatures of all the parties in the suit, including the
Petitioners Purna Chandra Samantray, Swarnalata Badajena,
Jharana Baliarsingh, Urmila Mohanty, and Pramila Paikray. The
verification attached to the joint petition specifies the details of the
property involved in the common hotchpotch, from which the
mother of the plaintiff claimed her share.
Considering the submission of the learned counsel for the
Petitioner that the property allegedly sold by the Petitioner forms
part of his share in the common hotchpotch, both parties were asked
to submit affidavits regarding the properties. The Petitioner
submitted an affidavit providing details of the properties forming
part of the common hotchpotch and covered by the compromise
decree. The Opposite Party, however, filed an affidavit without
giving specific details of the land in the common hotchpotch and
reiterated their earlier contentions.
6. The joint petition, upon which the compromise decree was
based, was accepted by the competent court
court in 2009, granting the
mother of Opposite Party No.2 her one-fourth
one fourth share in the property
of the common hotchpotch. After the decree, the property was
mutated in her favor and has since been alienated by her. It is also
not disputed that the mother of Opposite
Opposite Party No.2 filed a civil
application challenging the compromise decree on the ground of
fraud, which is still pending before the competent court. The
allegations in that civil application form the basis of the complaint
case filed by the nephew of the Petitioner, registered as 1CC Case
No.315 of 2016.
The Petitioner's contention that Raghunath Samantray, in
his deed of gift in 1976, described the Petitioner as his nephew has
not been disputed by Opposite Party No.2. Further, the
acknowledgment by the
the mother of Opposite Party No.2 that the
Petitioner is the son of Lokanath Samantray, along with documents
reflecting the same, prima facie shows no material that incriminates
the Petitioner or establishes any criminal conduct on his part.
7. In the matter of Usha Chakraborty & another vs. State of
West Bengal and another reported in (2023) 15 SCC 135, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
follows:
"8. In Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand, this
Court held: (SCC p. 676, para 12)
"12.
12. While exercising its jurisdiction
jurisdiction under Section
482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious.
This power is to be used sparingly and only for the
purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether
a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not
depends upon the nature of the facts alleged therein.
Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are
present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A
complaint disclosing civil transactions may also
have a criminal texture.
texture. But the High Court must see
whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil
nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a
situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact,
adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court
should not
not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings
to prevent abuse of process of the court."
court.
×××
10.. In Kapil Aggarwal v. Sanjay Sharma, this Court
held that Section 482 is designed to achieve the
purpose of ensuring that criminal proceedings are not
permitted to generate into weapons of harassment.
11. In the decision in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, a
two-Judge
Judge Bench of this Court considered the statutory
provisions as also the earlier decisions and held as
under: (SCC pp. 378-79,
378 para 102)
"102....
102.... (1) Where
Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying the
FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying
an investigation by police officers under Section
156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the commission
of any offence and make out a case against the
accused.
(4) Where the allegations
allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
non-cognizable
cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable
on the basis of which no prudent person can ever
reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the Act
concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding
is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
×××
20. As noticed hereinbefore, the respondent alleged
commission of offences under Sections 323, 384, 406,
423, 467, 468, 420 and 120-B 120 B IPC against the
appellants. A bare perusal
perusal of the said allegation and the
ingredients to attract them, as adverted to hereinbefore
would reveal that the allegations are vague and they
did not carry the essential ingredients to constitute the
alleged offences. There is absolutely no allegation in
the complaint that the appellants herein had caused hurt
on the respondent so also, they did not reveal a case
that the appellants had intentionally put the respondent
in fear of injury either to himself or another or by
putting him under such fear or injury, dishonestly
induced him to deliver any property or valuable
security. The same is the position with respect to the
alleged offences punishable under Sections 406. 423.
467, 468, 420 and 120-B 120 B IPC. The ingredients to
attract the alleged offence referred
referred to hereinbefore and
the nature of the allegations contained in the
application filed by the respondent would undoubtedly
make it clear that the respondent had failed to make
specific allegation against the appellants herein in
respect of the aforesaid offences.
21. The factual position thus would reveal that the
genesis as also the purpose of criminal proceedings are
nothing but the aforesaid incident and further that the
dispute involved is essentially of civil nature. The
appellants b and the respondents
respondents have given a cloak of
criminal offence in the issue. In such circumstance
when the respondent had already resorted to the
available civil remedy and it is pending, going by the
decision in Paramjeet Batra, the High Court would
have quashed the criminal
criminal proceedings to prevent the
abuse of the process of the Court but for the
concealment.
22. In the aforesaid circumstances, coupled with the
fact that in respect of the issue involved, which is of
civil nature, the respondent had already approached the
jurisdictional
isdictional civil court by instituting a civil suit and it
is pending, there can be no doubt with respect to the
fact that the attempt on the part of the respondent is to
use the criminal proceedings as weapon of harassment
against the appellants. The indisputable
indisputable facts that the
respondent has filed the pending title suit in the year
2015, he got no case that he obtained an interim relief
against his removal from the office of Secretary of the
School Managing Committee as also the trusteeship,
that he filed the stated application for an order for
investigation only in April 2017 together with absence
of a case that despite such removal he got a right to get
informed of the affairs of the school and also the trust,
would only support the said conclusion.
23. For all these reasons, we are of the considered view
that this case invites invocation of the power under
Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR registered based on
the direction of the Magistrate Court in the aforestated
application and all further proceeding in pursuance
thereof. Also, we have no hesitation to hold that
permitting continuance of the criminal proceedings
against the appellants in the aforesaid circumstances
would result in abuse of the process of court and also
in miscarriage of justice."
justice
8. Havingg considered the submissions of the learned counsel
for the respective parties and upon perusal of the records, it is
evident that the dispute between the parties is primarily civil in
nature, relating to ownership and partition of the properties under
the common hotchpotch. The allegations in the complaint arise out
of the same civil dispute, and there is no material on record to prima
facie suggest that the Petitioner has committed any criminal
offence.
9. It is further clear from the documents filed and the
compromise decree passed in Civil Suit No. 825 of 2006 that the
Petitioner's parentage as the son of Lokanath Samantray has been
consistently acknowledged, including in official records such as the
Record-of-Rights,
Rights, educational certificates, and other documents.
doc
The initiation of the present criminal proceeding appears to be
motivated solely for harassment and to create unnecessary
litigation, without any genuine criminal cause of action.
10. In view of the above, and the principle laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the view that the present
complaint constitutes an abuse of the process of law. Accordingly,
the criminal proceeding in connection with 1CC No.315 of 2016
pending before the learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar stands quashed.
(Chittaranjan Dash)
Judge
Bijay
Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
