Orissa High Court

Saubhagya Kumar Swain vs State Of Odisha & Another ....... ... on 19 August, 2025

         IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

                             CRLMC No.334 of 2021

 (In the matter of an application under Section 482 of the Criminal
                       Procedure Code, 1973)

Saubhagya Kumar Swain                            .......                  Petitioner

                                           -Versus-
State of Odisha & another                      .......               Opposite Parties


        For the Petitioner           : Mr. Subir Palit, Senior Advocate

        For the Opp. Parties : Mr. S.N. Biswal, ASC and
                               Mr. Biswajit Nayak, Advocate

CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA
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Date of Hearing: 12.03.2025 : Date of Judgment:19.08.2025

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S.S. Mishra, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition under

Section 482 Cr. P.C. seeking quashing of the cognizance order dated

19.12.2019 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Khurda at

Bhubaneswar in T.R. No. 262 of 2018 arising out of C.T. No. 52 of

2018 corresponding to Bhubaneswar Mahila P.S. Case No. 02 of 2018

registered under Sections 376(2)(a)(iii), 342, 506 of the Indian Penal

Code, 1860 and Sections 3(1)(w)(ii), 2(v), and 2(vii) of the Scheduled

Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

2. Heard Mr. Subir Palit, learned Senior Advocate appearing for

the Petitioner, Mr. S.N. Biswal, learned Additional Standing Counsel

and Mr. Biswajit Nayak, learned counsel appearing for the opposite

parties/victim.

3. The Petitioner is a Police Officer serving in a responsible

capacity under the Government of Odisha at the relevant time of the

alleged commission of the offence. The Opposite Party No. 2 (the

complainant) is a female employee of the same department and was

posted under the direct administrative control of the Petitioner. The

two were professionally acquainted and had regular official

interactions.

4. On 3rd January, 2018, the Opposite Party No. 2 lodged a First

Information Report at Bhubaneswar Mahila Police Station, registered

as Mahila P.S. Case No. 02 of 2018, alleging that the Petitioner had

committed rape on her at his government quarters, wrongfully

confined her, and later threatened her with dire consequences if she

discloses the incident. She further alleged that the Petitioner

humiliated her on the grounds of her caste, thus attracting the

offences under the provisions of SC/ST (P.A.) Act, 1989. On the basis

of the said complaint, Bhubaneswar Mahila P.S. Case No. 02 of 2018

was registered under Sections 376(2)(a)(iii), 342, and 506 of the

Indian Penal Code and Sections 3(1)(w)(ii), 2(v), and 2(vii) of the

SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

5. Significantly, the F.I.R. was filed after a prolonged and

unexplained delay of over five months from the alleged incident.

During this entire period, there was no indication from the Opposite

Party No. 2 of any grievance or complaint, formal or informal, against

the Petitioner. In fact, she continued to work under the supervision of

petitioner, attended departmental meetings, and responded to official

correspondence without protest or discomfort.

6. The case of the petitioner is that the belated complaint was

filed only after he initiated disciplinary proceedings against the

Opposite Party No. 2 for certain irregularities and dereliction of duty,

which had been officially recorded and communicated. The

complaint, therefore, appears to have been filed as a counterblast with

an ulterior motive to thwart the disciplinary process and to discredit

the Petitioner in the eyes of the department and society.

7. Pursuant to the F.I.R., the police conducted an investigation

and submitted a final Charge Sheet No. 85 dated 12.12.2019 before

the Learned Sessions Judge, Khurda at Bhubaneswar. The Charge

Sheet arrayed the Petitioner as the sole accused and included offences

under Sections 376(2)(a)(iii), 342, and 506 of the IPC, and Sections

3(1)(w)(ii), 2(v), and 2(vii) of the SC/ST (P.A.) Act, 1989.

8. The Charge Sheet is entirely based on the oral statement and

allegation of the complainant and lacks any supporting medical

evidence, forensic material, or independent witness testimony.

Notably, the medical examination of the complainant was conducted

belatedly and failed to yield any findings indicative of sexual assault

or physical violence. No injury marks, signs of struggle, or other

corroborative findings were recorded. Moreover, CCTV footage from

the residential complex was never seized or examined.

9. The learned Sessions Judge, Khurda proceeded to take

cognizance of the offences vide order dated 19.12.2019. The order

does not discuss the prima facie ingredients of the offences, nor does

it record any judicial satisfaction having been attained to conclude

regarding the applicability of the provisions of SC/ST (P.A.) Act. It

merely notes that a case is made out against the petitioner and directs

issuance of summons.

10. The Petitioner submitted that the allegations are wholly false,

fabricated, and motivated by mala fide intentions, particularly to

derail and malign the Petitioner's service career. The alleged incident

pertains to a personal grudge arising out of disciplinary proceedings

initiated by the Petitioner against the complainant in the course of his

official duty.

11. The Petitioner, aggrieved by the arbitrary, mechanical, and

unreasoned nature of the cognizance order, has approached this Court

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of the said order and all

further proceedings emanating therefrom in G.R. Case No. 15 of

2018.

12. Mr. Palit, learned Senior Advocate for the Petitioner, submitted

that the impugned cognizance order is bad in law as it has been

passed mechanically without any discussion on the prima facie

satisfaction of the learned Court regarding the ingredients of the

offences alleged. There is a total non-application of judicial mind, and

no reasons have been recorded as to how each offence is made out.

13. It is further submitted that there is an unexplained delay of

more than five months in lodging the F.I.R., without any cogent

explanation from the complainant, which severely affects the

credibility of the allegations. There is no medical, forensic, or

independent corroborative evidence to support the claim of sexual

assault or unlawful confinement. The complainant has failed to

produce any contemporaneous material such as messages, emails, or

eyewitness accounts to substantiate the charges.

14. The statements of the complainant recorded under Sections 161

and 164 Cr.P.C. are vague, inconsistent, and lacking in material

particulars. They fail to disclose the essential ingredients of the

alleged offences. Even after the alleged incidents, the complainant

continued to correspond professionally with the Petitioner, which

further undermines the veracity of her claim.

15. It is submitted that the invocation of the provisions of the S.C.

& S.T. (P.A.) Act is clearly an abuse of process, as there is no

material on record to suggest that the alleged acts were committed on

account of the complainant's caste. Moreover, as the Petitioner is a

public servant, sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is a condition

precedent for taking cognizance where the alleged acts are

purportedly done in discharge of official duties. The cognizance has

been taken without such sanction, which renders the entire proceeding

vitiated.

16. The Petitioner relied upon the principles laid down in State of

Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, reported in 1992 AIR 604, which

enumerates illustrative cases where interference under Section 482

Cr.P.C. is warranted to prevent abuse of process.

17. The learned counsel on behalf of Opposite Party No. 2 has filed

a counter affidavit stating that the FIR was lodged belatedly due to

fear, trauma, and social stigma, and that delay in sexual assault cases

should not be treated as fatal. She has alleged that the petitioner used

his official position to exploit her and suppress the matter, and that

she faced departmental harassment when she tried to resist his

advances. The petitioner being in the dominant position, has been

exploiting the complainant, therefore, she could not muster courage

against the petitioner to immediately file the case.

18. It has been further submitted by the Opposite Party No.2 that

the investigation has been conducted independently, and a Charge

Sheet has been submitted based on statements recorded under Section

164 Cr.P.C., which support the version of the complainant. It is

contended that once a Charge Sheet is filed and the Court finds a

prima facie case, it is not appropriate to invoke the jurisdiction of this

Hon'ble Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to abruptly scuttle the trial

at the threshold.

19. This Court has carefully considered the rival submissions

advanced by the learned counsel for both sides and perused the

material placed on record. The core contention raised by the petitioner

relates to the lack of application of judicial mind at the stage of

cognizance, absence of sufficient material, unexplained delay in

lodging of the FIR, and the alleged mala fide origin of the complaint

rooted in professional discord. It has been contended that certain

documents and evidence, including WhatsApp messages and

electronic communications that would have a material bearing on the

innocence of the Petitioner, were not considered or were not part of

the record placed before the learned Sessions Court at the time of

taking cognizance. It has also been pointed out that the complainant's

version is inconsistent and not corroborated by independent or

medical evidence, and that her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C.

lacks the credibility required to sustain a prima facie case.

20. The allegation relates to commission of offences punishable

under Sections 376(2)(a)(iii), 342, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code

along with Sections 3(1)(w)(ii), 2(v), and 2(vii) of the SC/ST

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. It is contended that the entire

case arises out of an employment-related dispute between the

complainant and the petitioner, and the allegations have been levelled

as a counterblast to departmental proceedings initiated against the

complainant by the petitioner.

21. It is submitted that not all relevant documents were presented

before the Court at the stage of cognizance and hence, a fair

conclusion could not have been drawn by the learned trial Court.

However, it is equally well settled that at the stage of cognizance, the

trial Court is not required to conduct a roving inquiry or appreciate

the evidence in depth. The trial Court is merely to examine whether a

prima facie case is made out from the police report and the

accompanying material as contemplated under Section 190 read with

Section 173 of the Cr.P.C..

22. This Court is of the considered view that the power under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly and in rare cases

where continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to an

abuse of process of the Court. It is not within the province of this

Court to sift and weigh the evidence in detail at this stage. The

materials forming part of the case record, including the 164 Cr.P.C.

statement of the complainant and the WhatsApp exchanges, though

partially annexed, are not sufficient for this Court to conclusively

hold that no offence is made out. Moreover, all documents that form

part of the charge-sheet are not presented before this Court in full, the

parties have selectively filed the documents and hence any conclusion

at this stage would be premature and speculative.

23. The Court is also mindful of the fact that interfering at the stage

of cognizance, especially in a serious offence involving allegations

under the SC/ST (P.A.) Act and Section 376 IPC, may frustrate the

very foundation of due process of law and could potentially pre-empt

the evidentiary evaluation by the trial Court. The presence of

WhatsApp chats and other communications may, at best, form part of

the petitioner's defence and ought to be considered during trial or may

be at the stage of framing of charges, rather than being examined

prematurely in a quashing petition at cognizance stage.

24. This Court is mindful of the settled position of law that at the

stage of taking cognizance, the Magistrate or the Court is not required

to weigh the evidence meticulously or conduct a mini-trial. The

jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly and

with great caution, and only where the allegations are so inherently

improbable that no prudent person can reach a conclusion to proceed

with the criminal trial. The principle laid down in State of Haryana v.

Bhajan Lal (supra) and consistently reiterated thereafter is that the

power to quash proceedings must be used to prevent abuse of process

or to secure the ends of justice, but not as a substitute for the trial

process itself.

25. It is also well established that this Court ought not to interfere

with the cognizance order unless it can be shown that the order

suffers from legal infirmity or patent illegality. The Hon'ble Supreme

Court in Sonu Gupta v. Deepak Gupta reported in 2015 (3) SCC 424,

has clarified that at the stage of cognizance or framing of charge, the

Court is merely to examine whether a prima facie case is made out,

and detailed appreciation of evidence is beyond its remit at that stage.

This Court does not sit in appeal over the evidence but is to examine

whether the allegations are lack of substance that no offence is made

out at all. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:-

"Considering the stage at which the criminal complaint is pending and the nature of proposed order, this Court would not like to express any definite opinion on the merits of the allegations made in the complaint petition or upon the defence taken by the accused persons before the courts below or in this Court lest it prejudices one or the other party in future. Having considered the details of allegations made in the complaint petition, the statement of the complainant on solemn affirmation as well as materials on which the appellant placed reliance which were called for by the learned Magistrate, the learned Magistrate, in our considered opinion, committed no error in summoning the accused persons. At the stage of cognizance and summoning the Magistrate is required to apply his judicial mind only with a view to take cognizance of the offence, or, in other words, to

find out whether prima facie case has been made out for summoning the accused persons. At this stage, the learned Magistrate is not required to consider the defence version or materials or arguments nor he is required to evaluate the merits of the materials or evidence of the complainant, because the Magistrate must not undertake the exercise to find out at this stage whether the materials will lead to conviction or not. It is also well settled that cognizance is taken of the offence and not the offender. Hence at the stage of framing of charge an individual accused may seek discharge if he or she can show that the materials are absolutely insufficient for framing of charge against that particular accused. But such exercise is required only at a later stage, as indicated above and not at the stage of taking cognizance and summoning the accused on the basis of prima facie case. Even at the stage of framing of charge, the sufficiency of materials for the purpose of conviction is not the requirement and a prayer for discharge can be allowed only if the court finds that the materials are wholly insufficient for the purpose of trial. It is also a settled proposition of law that even when there are materials raising strong suspicion against an accused, the court will be justified in rejecting a prayer for discharge and in granting an opportunity to the prosecution to bring on record the entire evidence in accordance with law so that case of both the sides may be considered appropriately on conclusion of trial."

26. Considering the totality of circumstances, this Court is not

inclined to exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to

quash the cognizance order. However, in the interest of justice, liberty

is granted to the petitioner to approach the appropriate Court at the

stage of framing of charge or thereafter in accordance with law. The

trial Court shall be at liberty to consider all documents placed before

it to decide any more of the petitioner.

27. Accordingly, while declining to quash the cognizance order,

this Court grants liberty to the petitioner to take recourse to any other

remedy available under law, including filing an application before the

trial Court seeking discharge, if so advised. The trial Court is directed

to proceed in accordance with law and decide the application by