Orissa High Court
Dillip Kumar Ray vs Orissa State Financial on 8 August, 2025
Author: S.K. Sahoo
Bench: S.K. Sahoo
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK
W.P.(C) No.5049 of 2008
An application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of
India
-------------------------
Dillip Kumar Ray ....... Petitioner
-Versus-
Orissa State Financial
Corporation through its
Chairman-cum-Managing Director,
OMP Square, Cuttack and
others. ....... Opp. Parties
For Petitioner: - Mr. Bansidhar Baug,
Senior Advocate
For Opp. Parties: - Mr. Avijit Patnaik, Advocate
for opp. party nos. 1 & 2
Mr. P.K. Nayak, Advocate
for opp. party nos. 3 & 4
-------------------------
P R E S E N T:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.K. SAHOO
AND
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.S. MISHRA
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date of Hearing: 09.07.2025 Date of Judgment: 08.08.2025
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
S. S. Mishra, J. This writ petition has been filed by
the petitioner assailing the action of the Orissa State
Page 1 of 26
Financial Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "OSFC"
or "the Corporation") in proceeding with the sale of his
industrial unit under Section 29 of the State Financial
Corporations Act, 1951, and seeks quashing of the
consequential registered sale deeds executed in favour
of Opposite Party Nos.3 and 4. The petitioner also
seeks a direction to the Corporation to consider his One
Time Settlement (OTS) proposal and accept the same
in terms of the order dated 04.10.2005 passed by this
Court in W.P.(C) No.5324 of 2002.
2. Mr. Bansidhar Baug, learned Senior Advocate
appearing for the petitioner, Mr. Avijit Patnaik, learned
counsel for opp. party nos. 1 & 2, Mr. P.K. Nayak,
learned counsel for opp. party nos. 3 & 4 have been
heard in extenso.
3. The facts giving rise to the present writ
petition are not much in dispute. The petitioner had
availed an initial term loan of Rs.2,35,000/- in 1974
from the OSFC for setting up an Ice Factory and Cold
Page 2 of 26
Storage under the name and style "LA-Glace Ice
Factory and Cold Storage". Additional loans aggregating
Rs.1,12,000/- were disbursed from 1987 to 1993.
Although the latter loans were repaid, the original loan
remained unpaid, eventually leading to the account
becoming Non-Performing Asset (NPA).
4. On 25.02.2002, OSFC issued a recall notice
under Section 30 of the Act, directing the petitioner to
clear his dues within 20 days, failing which the
Corporation would take recourse under Section 29 of
the SFCs Act, 1951. On 23.10.2002, OSFC took
possession of the mortgaged assets, including land,
building, and machinery, and issued a seizure
inventory. Subsequent notice dated 20.11.2002
demanded repayment of Rs.13,56,150/-.
5. The petitioner alleged that despite a pending
application for OTS in terms of this Court's earlier order
dated 04.10.2005, the Corporation proceeded to issue
a sale notice on 10.03.2008. Thereafter, without
Page 3 of 26
conducting a proper auction, the Corporation
negotiated the sale of Lot No.1 and Lot No.2 properties
to Opposite Party Nos.4 and 3 respectively. Sale deeds
were executed on 26.03.2008 and 08.04.2008. The
petitioner was not served any notice of the negotiated
sale. Upon learning of the sale, the petitioner filed this
writ petition on 02.04.2008.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted
that the impugned sale deeds were executed without
adherence to the statutory requirement of conducting a
public auction and without providing a reasonable
opportunity to the petitioner. It is submitted that the
sale under Section 29, bypassing Section 31 of the SFC
Act, is impermissible when the property is mortgaged.
It is further contended that since the mortgage was
created by deposit of title deeds under Section 58(f) of
the Transfer of Property Act, there was no registered
mortgage deed, yet the mortgage is valid and binding.
Page 4 of 26
7. The petitioner further submitted that he was
never served with a notice for the negotiated sale and
that the property was undervalued and sold at
throwaway prices to single bidders without competitive
bidding. The sale of Lot No.1 (land and building) was
for Rs.6,08,500/-, which was later resold, and the
building demolished, causing irreversible loss. The
petitioner relied on several decisions including:
Karnataka State Financial Corporation v. N.
Narasimahaiah and others, (2008) 5 SCC 176
Subhransu Sekhar Padhi v. Gunamani Swain and
others, AIR 2015 SC 542
Gunamani Swain and others v. Orissa State
Financial Corporation and others, AIR 2011 Orissa 83
Prasana Kumar Rath v. Odisha State Financial
Corporation & another, 2025 (I) ILR-CUT-507
It is contended that these decisions prohibit
the sale of mortgaged assets under Section 29 of the
SFCs Act, 1951 without following due process and
uphold the borrower's right to challenge the arbitrary
action of the Corporation.
8. Per contra, learned counsel for the OSFC
submitted that the petitioner was a chronic defaulter
Page 5 of 26
who failed to repay the dues for over three decades.
The petitioner was given several opportunities,
including a final opportunity for settlement via OTS vide
communication dated 24.04.2006. However, he failed
to comply with the terms or deposit the upfront
amount, resulting in cancellation of the OTS.
9. It is submitted that due notice was issued
and the seizure of the unit was lawful. The sale was
preceded by publication in "The Samaj" on 10.03.2008
and offers were received during the BLDC meeting on
19.03.2008. Since only one bidder applied per lot, the
properties were sold on "as is where is basis" in
accordance with law. Possession was handed over, and
registered sale deeds were executed on 26.03.2008
and 08.04.2008.
10. Reliance is placed on Valji Khimji v. Official
Liquidator, reported in (2008) 9 SCC 299, to argue
that post-sale objections are not to be entertained
except on limited grounds like fraud, and also on
Jasbir Kaur v. Punjab SIDC and another reported in
Page 6 of 26
2001 SCC OnLine P&H 901, wherein Section 29 was
held to authorize the sale of mortgaged property for
recovery without recourse to Section 31.
11. Mr. P.K. Nayak, learned counsel for the
opposite party nos.3 and 4 submitted that the conduct
of the petitioner is reprehensible. He was a persistent
defaulter. This could be inferred from the settlement
order dated 24.04.2006 issued by the Corporation and
the subsequent letter dated 07.07.2006 issued to the
petitioner by the Corporation calling upon him to show-
cause as to why the OTS offer shall not be withdrawn.
Despite multiple opportunities being given to the
petitioner, the petitioner never reverted back to the
Corporation, rather conveniently ignored all the
correspondence. Finally, on 01.03.2007, the OTS
proposal was cancelled and the process for auction sale
was initiated. Mr. Nayak, learned counsel, has also read
out the auction sale notice published by the Corporation
in the popular daily "The Samaja". He has highlighted
the portion of the advertisement which reads as under:
Page 7 of 26
"the loanee(s)/Guarantor(s)/Mortgager(s)
of the industrial assets/vehicles/collateral
assets as advertised above are requested
to appear in person or through their
accredited authorized representative(s)
before the DDAC/ BLDC meeting on the
date, time and place mentioned in the said
notice with their proposal for getting
release the assets."
The petitioner or anyone on his behalf did not
appear before the Committee. Therefore, on
24.03.2008, the sale was confirmed. The petitioner filed
the writ petition without challenging the validity of the
auction sale.
12. Mr. Nayak, learned counsel, also pointed out
that in between, the petitioner has indulged in the
unfair and fraudulent practice of alienating part of the
mortgaged property. He has relied upon the additional
affidavit dated 24.07.2024 filed by the opposite party
nos.1 and 2. The main thrust of the argument of Mr.
Nayak, learned counsel, is that once the auction sale is
confirmed, it is not open for challenge. He has pointed
out that, after confirmation of the sale, the opposite
party no.3 has constructed relics centre, mediation hall,
Page 8 of 26
science lab, guest house, kitchen room and school
hostel over the said land, where the students are being
provided free education, food and hostel. The opposite
party no.2 has in the meantime sold the said property
to number of persons and the property has changed
hands, and huge constructions have also taken place in
the said property.
13. We have perused the entire record placed
before us and also carefully taken into account the
submissions made by learned counsel for both parties
before us. From the record, it is evident that the
present petitioner has indeed not challenged the
auction notice or auction sale in any manner
whatsoever. However, after lapse of 13 years, the
petitioner sought an amendment to the writ petition to
challenge the Registered Sale Deed only after the sale
was duly conducted as per the provisions of law and the
subject property was handed over to the opposite party
nos.3 and 4. To appreciate this aspect, the prayer
made by the petitioner in the writ petition is important
Page 9 of 26
to be reproduced for convenience. The prayer reads
thus:
"To issue RULE NISI calling upon the
Opp. Parties to show cause and if they fail to
show cause or show insufficient cause issue
appropriate writ, direction, or order quashing
Annexures-2 and 9 series and the registered
deed of transfer dated 26.03.2008 and
08.04.2008 in favour of the Opp. Party Nos.3
& 4 respectively and direct the OSFC
authorities to take a decision on the OTS
Application submitted by the petitioner and
accept the same.
And further be pleased to pass
appropriate writ, direction and order
preventing the opp. Parties Nos.1 & 2 from
disposing of the property of the petitioner's
unit in favour of the opp. Parties No.3 & 4 or
any other party in any manner."
14. This is also eminent from the record that in
between, the nature and character of the property has
hugely changed, as the auction sale purchaser i.e. the
opposite party nos.2 and 3 have either sold the
property to many other purchasers or put it to good
use. Therefore, on the ground, the change that has
taken place assumes relevance for the purpose of
deciding the present case.
Page 10 of 26
15. Learned counsels appearing for all the parties
have taken us to the pleadings and documents before
this Court from which it can be safely concluded that
none of the parties has indeed largely disputed the
factual aspect of the matter. Therefore, the only legal
issue remains to be decided in the present matter is
regarding invocation of Section 29 of the SFC Act by
the Corporation for the purpose of putting the land to
public auction instead of undertaking the rigors of the
procedure contemplated u/s 31 of the SFC Act, leading
to violation of the principle of natural justice.
16. Mr. Baug, learned Senior Advocate, has
vehemently submitted on the basis of series of case
laws that it was imperative on the part of the
Corporation only to resort to Section 31 of the SFC Act
for putting the mortgaged collateral land to the public
auction. However, the Corporation has chosen a
shortcut method by resorting the provisions of Section
29 of the SFC Act so as to deprive the petitioner from
Page 11 of 26
being heard before the auction sale. For ready
reference, Sections- 29 and 31 of the SFC Act are
reproduced below:
"29. Rights of Financial Corporation in case
of default.--(1) Where any industrial
concern, which is under a liability to the
Financial Corporation under an agreement,
makes any default in repayment of any loan
or advance or any instalment thereof [or in
meeting its obligations in relation to any
guarantee given by the Corporation] or
otherwise fails to comply with the terms of
its agreement with the Financial Corporation,
the Financial Corporation shall have the
[right to take over the management or
possession or both of the industrial
concern], as well as the [right to transfer by
way of lease or sale] and realise the
property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated
or assigned to the Financial Corporation.
(2) Any transfer of property made by the
Financial Corporation, in exercise of its
powers [* * *] under sub-section (1), shall
vest in the transferee all rights in or to the
property transferred [as if the transfer] had
been made by the owner of the property.
(3) The Financial Corporation shall have the
same rights and powers with respect to
goods manufactured or produced wholly or
partly from goods forming part of the
security held by it as it had with respect to
the original goods.
(4) [Where any action has been taken
against an industrial concern] under the
provisions of sub-section (1), all costs,
Page 12 of 26
[charges and expenses which in the opinion
of the Financial Corporation have been
properly incurred] by it [as incidental
thereto] shall be recoverable from the
industrial concern and the money which is
received by it [* * *] shall, in the absence of
any contract to the contrary, be held by it in
trust to be applied firstly, in payment of
such costs, charges and expenses and,
secondly, in discharge of the debt due to the
Financial Corporation, and the residue of the
money so received shall be paid to the
person entitled thereto.]
(5) [Where the Financial Corporation has
taken any action against an industrial
concern] under the provisions of sub-section
(1), the Financial Corporation shall be
deemed to be the owner of such concern, for
the purposes of suits by or against the
concern, and shall sue and be sued in the
name of [the concern].
31. Special provisions for enforcement of
claims by Financial Corporation.--(1) Where
an industrial concern, in breach of any
agreement, makes any default in repayment
of any loan or advance or any instalment
thereof [or in meeting its obligations in
relation to any guarantee given by the
Corporation] or otherwise fails to comply
with the terms of its agreement with the
Financial Corporation or where the Financial
Corporation requires an industrial concern to
make immediate repayment of any loan or
advance under Section 30 and the industrial
concern fails to make such repayment [then,
without prejudice to the provisions of
Section 29 of this Act and of Section 69 of
Page 13 of 26
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of
1882)], any officer of the Financial
Corporation, generally or specially
authorized by the Board in this behalf, may
apply to the District Judge within the limits
of whose jurisdiction the industrial concern
carries on the whole or a substantial part of
its business for one or more of the following
reliefs, namely:--
(a) for an order for the sale of the property
pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or
assigned to the [Financial Corporation] as
security for the loan or advance; or
[(aa) for enforcing the liability of any surety;
or]
(b) for transferring the management of the
industrial concern to the Financial
Corporation; or
(c) for an ad interim injunction restraining
the industrial concern from transferring or
removing its machinery or plant or
equipment from the premises of the
industrial concern without the permission of
the Board, where such removal is
apprehended.
(2) An application under sub-section (1)
shall state the nature and extent of the
liability of the industrial concern to the
Financial Corporation, the ground on which it
is made and such other particulars as may
be prescribed."
17. Reading of the aforementioned provisions u/s
29 make it abundantly clear that on failure of the
borrower (industrial concerned) to abide by the terms
Page 14 of 26
of agreement enter with the Corporation, the
Corporation has power under the Act to take over the
management or possession or both of all the industrial
concerned and not the property in question i.e. the
mortgaged property. However, Section 31 makes it
clear that, if the borrower fails to comply with the
terms of its agreement with the Corporation or the
Corporation requires the industrial concerned to make
immediate payment of the loan amount or the loan
amount advance under Section 30 and the industrial
concerned fails to make such payment, then without
prejudice to the provisions under Section 29 of the Act
and Section 69 of the Transfer of Properties Act, 1882,
any officer of the Financial Corporation authorized by
the Board may apply to the District Judge within the
limits of whose jurisdiction the industrial concerned
carries whole or substantial part of its business for an
order for sale of the property pledged, mortgaged,
hypothecated or assigned to the financial corporation as
a security for the loan or advance. The procedure
Page 15 of 26
contemplated under Sections 29 and 31 of the Act has
been widely discussed by various judgments of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court and different High Courts.
18. It is no more res integra that for the purpose
of putting a mortgaged property up for public auction,
the Corporation is obliged to follow the procedure
contemplated under Section 31 of the SFC Act.
19. Therefore, the first ingredient to be satisfied
regarding the applicability of procedure under Section
29 of the SFC Act or 31 of the Act is to ascertain as to
whether the property in subject was mortgaged,
pledged, hypothecated or assigned to the Financial
Corporation in lieu of the loan or advance extended to
the industrial concerned or not. In the present case, the
petitioner could not place before the Court, despite
repeated directions, the mortgaged deed/pledge
document of the property in subject. The petitioner, by
taking us to different documents, intended us to draw
an inference that the land in subject was mortgaged. In
Page 16 of 26
absence of any mortgaged deed placed on record, it is
difficult to draw an inference on the basis of the
transactional documents to infer that the land was
pledged or mortgaged by the industrial concerned while
availing the loan or advance by the Corporation.
20. Mr. Baug, learned Senior Advocate for the
petitioner, sought to infer the existence of a mortgage
in respect of Lot No.2 (the tank/pond) by relying upon
certain correspondences, including (i) the letter dated
23.10.2002 issued under Section 29 of the Act referring
to an alleged mortgage deed dated 03.12.1996 and
31.03.2000 and inventory list showing land mortgaged
to the Corporation, (ii) the letter dated 20.11.2002
addressed to the petitioner with copy to the alleged
mortgager, and (iii) subsequent notices addressed to
the petitioner with copies forwarded to Smt. Pramoda
Kumari Ray, reiterating the contents of the earlier
letters and describing her as the guarantor. However,
this Court, after hearing the matter and upon a careful
Page 17 of 26
perusal of the materials placed on record, found that
there was no registered mortgage deed produced nor
any definitive proof of creation of mortgage strictly in
accordance with Section 58(f) read with Section 59 of
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The so-called
mortgage was merely attempted to be established by
way of correspondence and not through any
substantive or conclusive legal instrument. Accordingly,
realizing the absence of proper proof of mortgage in the
eyes of law, this Court vide order dated 27.07.2023
directed the petitioner to produce valid proof of
mortgage in respect of Lot No.2. The said order was
passed in light of the insufficiency of the petitioner's
claim and the requirement of legal sanctity under the
Transfer of Property Act. The relevant portion of the
aforesaid order is extracted herein below:-
"2. Mr. B. Baug, learned counsel appearing
for the petitioner contended that the land
(Lot-II), measuring Ac.0.790 dec. of the unit
of M/s. Laa Glace Ice Factory and Cold
Storage, Kalupadaghar, Khurda is a pond and
the mortgaged property, showing undue
Page 18 of 26
haste, has been auctioned and sold on the
very same day, i.e., 24.03.2008. It is further
contended that as per the provisions
contained in Section-29 of the State Financial
Corporations Act, 1951, the mortgaged
property, being a pond, cannot be auctioned
or sold by the opposite parties.
3. On perusal of the record, it appears that
nothing has been placed on record to indicate
that the said property, i.e., Lot-II is a pond
and has been mortgaged. Therefore, learned
counsel for the petitioner seeks time to
produce relevant documents to satisfy this
Court that Lot-II is a mortgaged property."
21. Therefore, although we agree with the legal
proposition propounded by Mr. Baug that once the
property is pledged or mortgaged by the industrial
concerned with the Corporation even the failure on the
part of industrial borrower to make good the payment,
the mortgage or pledged property could only be dealt
with the procedure contemplated under Section 31 of
the SFC Act but not under Section 29 of the SFC Act. In
that regard, Mr. Baug, learned Senior Advocate, has
relied upon the following judgments :
(1) Karnataka State Financial Corporation vs. N.
Narasimahaiah and others, reported in (2008) 5 SCC
176.
Page 19 of 26
(2) Subhransu Sekhar Padhi vs. Gunamani Swain
& others, reported in AIR 2015 Supreme Court 542.
(3) Gunamani Swain & others vs. Orissa State
Financial Corporation & others, reported in AIR 2011
Orissa 83.
(4) Prasana Kumar Rath vs. Odisha State
Financial Corporation & another, reported in 2025 (I)
ILR-CUT-507.
All the above judgments cited by Mr. Baug,
learned Senior Advocate on the question of applicability
of Section 31 of the SFC Act, are good law and are
binding. However, on the facts of the present case, the
applicability of the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court and this Court, as cited above, is
distinguishable due to the lack of documentary support.
22. It is found from the record that on
10.03.2008, the public auction notice was advertised
through a widely circulated newspaper. The loanee/
guarantor/mortgager of the industrial assets was
requested to appear in person or through their
representative before the Branch Level Disposal
Committee Meeting on 19.03.2008. The petitioner
conveniently avoided the meeting to get the unit
Page 20 of 26
released or to give better offer than the prospective
buyers. Therefore, the Corporation had sold the assets
on 19.03.2008 for a sale consideration of
Rs.12,25,000/- for Lot-1 property in favour of one
Kalpana Mohapatra and Lot-2 property in favour of
Aurobindo Matruseba Trust for Rs.1,65,000/-. The
auction purchasers have paid the entire sale
consideration, took over the possession of the asset on
24.03.2008. One of the auction purchasers has now put
the land to use for its philanthropic purposes, whereas
the other auction purchaser has sold the property.
23. In the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the matter of Valji Khimji and Company vs.
Official Liquidator of Hindustan Nitro Product
(Gujarat) Ltd. & others, reported in (2008) 9 SCC
299, it is held as under:
"30. In the first case mentioned
above i.e. where the auction is not subject to
confirmation by any authority, the auction is
complete on the fall of the hammer, and
certain rights accrue in favour of the auction-
purchaser. However, where the auction is
Page 21 of 26
subject to subsequent confirmation by some
authority (under a statute or terms of the
auction), the auction is not complete and no
rights accrue until the sale is confirmed by
the said authority. Once, however, the sale is
confirmed by that authority, certain rights
accrue in favour of the auction-purchaser,
and these rights cannot be extinguished
except in exceptional cases such as fraud.
31. In the present case, the
auction having been confirmed on 30-7-2003
by the Court, it cannot be set aside unless
some fraud or collusion has been proved. We
are satisfied that no fraud or collusion has
been established by anyone in this case."
In the present case, the petitioner has
not even assailed the validity of the auction notice, as
apparent from the prayer made in the writ petition.
Therefore, the petitioner has indeed waived its right
and is now estopped from challenging the legality of the
recovery adopted by the Corporation and the
consequent auction conducted by it. The development
that unfolded in the present case changed the factual
scenario of the entire case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court,
in the matter of Arce Polymers Private Limited vs.
Alphine Pharmaceuticals Private Limited & others,
Page 22 of 26
reported in (2022) 2 SCC 221, has settled the law in
that regard.
24. It is also reflected from the record that during
the follow-up action and inspection, it has been
discovered that the petitioner had already sold a
portion of the mortgaged land. The alienation of the
mortgaged land is duly recorded in the mutation
proceedings in favour of certain individuals from the
locality. It has come to light that the petitioner and his
mother have sold part of the mortgaged property by
executing the Registered Sale Deed dated 11.10.1999
in favour of one Sukanta Kumar Palai. The said
transaction includes 14 decimals of Plot No.132 and 22
decimals of Plot No.133, which is reflected in the
Record of Rights. Such alienation of the property by the
petitioner or at the instance of the petitioner is an act
of suppression of material facts before this Court. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of K.D. Sharma
vs. Steel Authorities of India Ltd. & others,
reported in (2008) 12 SCC 481, has held as under:
Page 23 of 26
"In the case on hand, the appellant has not
come forward with all the facts. He has
chosen to state the facts in the manner suited
to him by giving an impression to the writ
court that an instrumentality of State (SAIL)
has not followed doctrine of natural justice
and fundamental principles of fair procedure.
This is not proper. Hence, on that ground
alone, the appellant cannot claim equitable
relief. But we have also considered the merits
of the case and even on merits, we are
convinced that no case has been made out by
him to interfere with the action of SAIL, or
the order passed by the High Court."
The law is well settled in this regard. It is
expected that every litigant should approach the Court
with clean hands. Concealment and suppression of facts
entails the petitioner to get no relief. This case is one of
such cases of suppression of facts before this Court.
25. Reading of the documents, pleadings of the
present matter apparently gives an impression that the
development unfolded in the present case and the facts
entangled are largely disputed facts. Therefore,
segregation of the admitted facts from those of the
disputed facts arising from the sequence of events
unfolded from the transaction ranging for about three
Page 24 of 26
decades is a herculean task. The writ Court shall not
venture into the task of separating chaff from the grain.
In Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee,
Bhatinda reported in (1969) 3 SCC 769, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court observed that the Courts may decline to
entertain or grant relief in a writ petition if the subject
matter requires complex factual determination or where
the determination of disputed questions of fact is
needed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus-
"14. The High Court observed that they will
not determine disputed question of fact in a
writ petition. But what facts were in dispute
and what were admitted could only be
determined after an affidavit in reply was
filed by the State. The High Court, however,
proceeded to dismiss the petition in limine.
The High Court is not deprived of its
jurisdiction to entertain a petition
under Article 226 merely because in
considering the petitioners right to relief
questions of fact may fall to be determined.
In a petition under Article 226 the High
Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of
fact and law. Exercise of the jurisdiction is, it
is true, discretionary, but the discretion
must be exercised on sound judicial
principles. When the petition raises
questions of fact of a complex nature, which
may for their determination require oral
evidence to be taken, and on that account
Page 25 of 26
the High Court is of the view that the
dispute may not appropriately be tried in a
writ petition, the High Court may decline to
try a petition. Rejection or a petition in
limine will normally be justified, where the
High Court is of the view that the petition is
frivolous or because of the nature of the
claim made, dispute sought to be agitated,
or that the petition against the party against
whom relief is claimed is not maintainable or
that the dispute raised thereby is such that
it would be inappropriate to try it in the writ
jurisdiction, or for analogous reasons."
26. Having regard to the conspectus of the entire
discussions above, we are unable to grant any writ in
favour of the petitioner.
27. The Writ is declined.
..........................
S.S. Mishra, J.
S.K. Sahoo, J. I agree.
................................
S. K. Sahoo, J.
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
Dated the 8th August, 2025/Subhasis Mohanty
Designation: Personal Assistant
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack.
Date: 13-Aug-2025 11:08:27
