Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 874 Ori
Judgement Date : 25 January, 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
FAO No. 484 of 2017
An appeal under Section 24-C of Odisha Education Act,
1969 against the judgment dated 24.11.2017 passed by
Presiding Officer, State Education Tribunal, Bhubaneswar
in G.I.A. Case No.427 of 2011.
------------------
AFR Smt. Rebati Goswami ...... Appellant
-Versus-
State of Odisha & others ...... Respondents
Advocate(s) appeared in this case:-
_______________________________________________________
For Appellant : Mr. P. Acharya, Advocate
For Respondents : Mr. P.K. Panda,
Standing Counsel for School &
Mass Education Department
_______________________________________________________
CORAM:
JUSTICE SASHIKANTA MISHRA
JUDGMENT
th 25 January, 2023
SASHIKANTA MISHRA, J.
The appellant calls in question the
correctness of the judgment passed by the Presiding
Officer, State Education Tribunal, Bhubaneswar on
24.11.2017 in GIA Case No. 427 of 2011 on the ground
that despite holding the withdrawal of approval of
appointment of the appellant as invalid, the matter was
remanded to the Director to cause further enquiry in the
matter.
2. The facts of the case, in brief, is that the
appellant was appointed as Watchman-cum-Sweeper (3rd
peon) as per resolution of the Managing Committee of
Bhanjabhumi Girls' High School, Kalma in the District of
Mayurbhanj. Pursuant to such resolution and order of
appointment issued by the Secretary of the Managing
Committee dated 18.09.2006, the appellant joined in
service on 25.09.2006. The School was notified as an
Aided Educational Institution after coming into force of
the GIA Order, 2008. Accordingly, the School authority
submitted proposal before the Director for approval of
appointment of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the
School including the appellant. On verification of records,
the Director being satisfied, approved the appointment of
the appellant against the post of Watchman-cum-Sweeper
vide order dated 25.02.2011. While the matter stood thus,
a grievance petition was filed by the local people, basing
on which an enquiry was conducted without giving any
opportunity of hearing to the appellant. Ultimately, the
order of approval was withdrawn vide order dated
22.10.2011 by the Director. Being aggrieved, the appellant
initially approached this Court in W.P.(C) No. 28957 of
2011, which was disposed of on 16.11.2011 by passing
the following order.
"Mr. Acharya learned counsel for the petitioner prays to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to file appeal before the State Education Tribunal. A memo has been filed in court to that effect. Accordingly, the petitioner is permitted to be withdraw the writ petition giving liberty to file appeal before the State Education Tribunal within two weeks. In the event the appeal is filed within time alongwith in an application for condonation of delay, the Tribunal shall condone the delay and dispose of the appeal on merit. In view of the decision of this Court reported in 2009 (I) OLR 953 Dhurba Charan Mohapatra - vrs.- State of Odisha, service of statutory notice on the State Government as required by the provision U/s. 24(B)(3) is waived."
Pursuant to such order, the appellant approached the
Tribunal by filing GIA Case No. 427 of 2011 challenging
such order of the Director withdrawing the approval.
3. The State-respondents appeared before the
Tribunal and filed a counter affidavit taking a specific
stand that the Managing Committee had forwarded the
recommendation of the appellant by manipulating
documents and the District Inspector of Schools without
verifying the same had approved her appointment. The
basis of the allegation was that in the year 2008, the
headmaster had given a status report showing the post of
Sweeper as vacant. Thus, it was surprising that the
headmaster recommended her case for approval showing
the post to have been filled up since 25.09.2006. All these
facts came to light on the basis of the enquiry conducted
and therefore, the order of approval was rightly
withdrawn.
4. The Tribunal after considering the rival
contentions held that the enquiry was conducted on
18.05.2011 and by order dated 10.10.2011 the Inspector
of Schools was directed to withdraw the approval of
appointment. Prior to issuance of the letter dated
10.10.2011, the appellant having come to learn about the
enquiry, submitted representations before the Director
and Inspector of Schools on 15.07.2011 but no
opportunity of hearing was extended to the appellant. The
Tribunal further found that the so called manipulated
documents collected by the enquiring officer during
enquiry had not been made part of the counter affidavit
filed by the Sate-respondents nor produced before the
Tribunal during course of hearing. As such, the Tribunal
held that the order of withdrawal of approval of
appointment of the appellant without giving an
opportunity of being heard is against the principles of
natural justice and is rendered invalid. However, despite
holding so and upon setting aside the order of withdrawal
of the approval of the appointment of the appellant, the
Tribunal also directed the Director to cause a further
enquiry into the matter after giving a reasonable
opportunity of being heard including the appellant and to
pass order afresh within a period of four months with the
further condition that till such decision of the Director no
financial benefits shall be released in her favour.
5. Heard Mr. P. Acharya, learned counsel for
the appellant and Mr. P.K. Panda, learned Standing
Counsel for School and Mass Education Department.
6. It is contended by Mr. Acharya that once the
Tribunal comes to a definite finding that the impugned
order of withdrawal of approval of the appointment is
invalid being contrary to the principles of natural justice,
the only thing that it should have done was to set aside
the said order. Though the Tribunal has passed order
setting aside the impugned order, yet it has gone on to
pass order to cause further enquiry into the matter.
According to Mr. Acharya, this amounts to exceeding the
jurisdiction conferred upon the Tribunal by the statute.
7. Mr. P.K. Panda has argued that though the
impugned order was set aside for non-adherence to the
principles of natural justice yet fact remains that the
inquiry conducted into the matter had revealed
manipulation of documents for which the Tribunal rightly
directed the Director to cause further enquiry after giving
opportunity of hearing. According to Mr. Panda therefore,
no illegality was committed by the Tribunal.
8. Be it noted at the outset that the impugned
order in so far as it relates to the finding that the order of
withdrawal of approval of appointment of the appellant
without giving her an opportunity of being heard is
against the principles of natural justice and rendered
invalid, has not been challenged by the State by filing
appeal. Thus, that part of the impugned order must be
treated as final and not open to scrutiny anymore.
9. The only question that survives for
determination in the present appeal is the contention
advanced regarding exceeding of jurisdiction conferred by
the Statute by the Tribunal. In this regard it would be apt
at the outset to first refer to the order passed by this
Court in W.P.(C) No. 28957 of 2011, already quoted
hereinbefore, whereby the appellant was granted liberty to
prefer appeal. There was a specific direction by this Court
to the Tribunal to condone the delay and dispose of the
appeal on merit. It would now be profitable to refer to
Section 24-B of the Odisha Education Act, which reads as
follows:
"24-B. Adjudication by Tribunal- (1) The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction, power and authority to adjudicate all disputes and differences, between the Managing Committee or, as the case may be, the Governing Body of any private educational institution and any teacher or employee of such institution or the State Government or any officer in any authority of the said Government, relating to or connected with the eligibility, entitlement, payment or non- payment of grant-in-aid.
(2) Any person, aggrieved by an order pertaining to any matter within jurisdiction of the Tribunal, may make an application to the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance.
(3) On receipt of an application under Sub- section (2), the Tribunal shall, if satisfied after such inquiry as it may deem necessary that the application is a fit case for adjudication by it, admit such application, but where the Tribunal is not so satisfied, it may summarily reject the application after recording its reasons:
Provided that no application before the Tribunal seeking a claim of grant-in-aid against the State Government or any officer or authority of the said Government shall be admitted, unless the applicant has served a notice on the State Government or concerned officer or authority furnishing the details of the claim and a period of two months has expired from the date of receipt of the said notice by the State Government or, as the case may be, the concerned officer or authority.
(4) The Tribunal shall not admit an application under Sub-section(2), unless it is made within one year from the date of expiry of the period of two months referred t in Sub-section (3). (5) The Tribunal shall not be bond by the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and, subject to any rules made by the Government, shall have power to regulate its own procedure. (6) All the proceedings before the Tribunal shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860."
Thus the statute has conferred power upon the Tribunal
to adjudicate upon the matters specified therein. Read
plainly, the provision implies that the Tribunal is to take a
decision in any application filed by a party to either grant
the relief claimed or to reject the same. No further power
has been conferred upon the Tribunal by the statute. It is
well settled that when the statute requires a thing to be
done in a particular manner, the same has to be done in
that manner or not at all. Reference may be had to the
decision of Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor reported in
AIR 1936 PC 253.
10. Moreover, this Court in the case of Harjit
Kaur vs. State of Odisha, reported in AIR 2014 Ori 198
has taken the same view after taking note of the decision
of the Apex Court in the case of State of West-Bengal vs.
State of Subhas Kumar Chatterjee and others,
reported in AIR 2010 SC 2927 wherein it was held that
the power conferred upon the Tribunals can never be
delegated except under a valid law made by the
parliament and that the Tribunals by their own act cannot
delegate the power to decide any dispute which in law is
required to be decided exclusively by such Tribunals.
Thus, this Court in Harjit Kaur (supra) held that the
Tribunal committed gross error apparent on the face of
the record in remitting the matter to the authorities
without adjudicating the same.
11. Viewed in backdrop of the legal position
referred above, this Court has no hesitation in holding
that the Tribunal in the instant case has committed gross
error in remitting the matter to the Director to cause
further enquiry. Having once set aside the impugned order
on the ground of its inherent invalidity, the Tribunal
should have brought a quietus to the issue without
traversing further.
12. For the forgoing reasons therefore, the appeal
succeeds and is therefore, allowed. The impugned
judgment in so far as it relates only to the direction issued
to opposite party no.2 to cause further enquiry and to not
release the financial benefit in favour of the appellant till
the decision of the Director, is hereby set aside. The
remaining part of the impugned judgment shall remain
intact.
...............................
Sashikanta Mishra, Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack, The 25th January, 2023/ A.K. Rana.
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