Orissa High Court
State Of Orissa And Another vs Sangita Tripathy And Another on 22 August, 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.A. No.997 of 2021
State of Orissa and another .... Appellants
Mr. Arnav Behera, ASC for State
-versus-
Sangita Tripathy and another .... Respondents
Mr. Sangram Jena, Advocate for Respondent No.1
CORAM:
THE CHIEF JUSTICE
JUSTICE SAVITRI RATHO
ORDER
22.08.2023
Order No.
I. A. No.2465 of 2021
03. 1. This matter is taken up through hybrid mode.
2. This is an application for condonation of delay of 650 days in
filing the intra-court appeal from the order dated 12th February,
2020 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.27147 of
2017.
3. Heard Mr. Arnav Behera, learned Additional Standing Counsel
(ASC) for the Applicant-Appellant and Mr. Sangram Jena, learned
counsel for the Opposite Party No.1 (Respondent No.1).
4. Having appreciated the causes assigned, despite opposition from
Mr. Jena, we condone the delay as aforestated.
5. In the result, this interlocutory application is allowed and
disposed of.
W.A. No.997 of 2021
6. Heard Mr. Arnav Behera, learned ASC appearing for the
Appellants-State and Mr. Sangram Jena, learned counsel appearing
for the Respondent No.1.
7. There is no representation for the Respondent No.2 when the
matter is taken up.
8. To challenge the order dated 12th February, 2020 passed by the
learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.27147 of 2017 by means of this
intra-court appeal, the Appellants have stated that in the said order
no date has been ascribed for granting the actual financial benefit.
9. Mr. Behera, learned ASC has submitted that the actual financial
benefit shall be restricted to three years preceding the date of
institution of the writ petition. In support of the said contention, Mr.
Behera has placed his reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court
in Union of India and others v. Tarsem Singh: (2008) 8 SCC 648.
In Tarsem Singh (supra), the Apex Court has given a signification
direction towards understanding the doctrine of continuing wrongs
vis-à-vis delay and laches. The denial of pay, it has been held in
Tarsem Singh (supra), gives rise of a fresh cause on every day but
while observing in respect of stale matters, the Apex Court has
observed that "if the issue relates to payment or re-fixation of pay
or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not
affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues
relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay
would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will
be applied. In so far as the consequential relief of recovery of
arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to
recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High
Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears
normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the
writ petition."
10. Mr. Jena, learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.1 has
strongly contended that there cannot be any application of Tarsem
Singh (supra) in respect of the impugned order dated 12th February,
2020 (Annexure-2 to the memorandum of appeal) as the order
passed by the Education Tribunal and the order passed in FAO
No.327 of 2014 are unambiguous and the order in the appeal has
not been challenged by the Appellants. Hence, no clarification
is called for. Even the challenge as projected on the basis of Tarsem
Singh (supra) cannot be sustained inasmuch as the learned Single
Judge has considered the principles of Tarsem Singh (supra). In the
said order, it has been observed as follows:
"On the cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts and reasons,
this Court is of the considered view that there remains no
justification on the part of the opposite parties in issuing the
impugned order under Annexure-3 series in supersession of
the order passed by the learned Education Tribunal and the
order in FAO No.327 of 2014. Accordingly the condition
imposed in clause-3 under Annexure-3 series restricting the
benefit for a period of three years is hereby set aside with
direction to the authorities to extent the benefits as has been
directed by the learned Education Tribunal vide order dated
02.11.2012 passed in GIA Case No.489 of 2011. The entire
exercise shall be completed within a period of three months
from the date of communication of this order."
11. The State Education Tribunal (the Tribunal) by the judgment
dated 2nd November, 2012 delivered in GIA Case No.489 of 2011
had observed as follows:
"5. It is accordingly ordered that the O.P. Nos.1 and 2 are
directed to approve the appointment of the applicant w.e.f.
the date of her joining i.e. 17.8.1993 and to release grant-in-
aid in favour of the applicant strictly in accordance with
Grant in Aid Order, 1994 along with the differential salary
components within a period of four months from the date of
communication of this order."
12. The said judgment was challenged in FAO No.327 of 2014 by
the Appellants herein. But their plea could not be accepted.
Consequently, the said appeal was dismissed by the order dated 10th
November, 2014. However, the said order was not passed on merit.
The appeal was dismissed on the ground of limitation.
13. It has been stated by Mr. Jena, learned counsel that no challenge
was taken forward by the Appellants herein after the appeal was
dismissed. In compliance of the order dated 2nd November, 2012 as
passed by the Tribunal, the Appellants issued a memorandum on
the face of the contempt proceeding on 15th July, 2015 (Annexure-3
series to the writ petition) by restricting the arrears of pay to three
years preceding the date of the institution in terms of Tarsem Singh
(supra). The said order was challenged by the Respondent No.1 in
W.P.(C) No.27147 of 2017 and learned Single Judge has struck
down Clause 3 of the said order whereby the arrears was restricted
to three years preceding to the date of institution of the GIA Case
holding that the Respondent No.1 is entitled to get financial benefits
for the intervening period from the date when she was appointed
under the Grant-in-Aid till the date on which the Respondent No.1
was granted the financial benefit of GIA Scale.
14. Since there was no challenge against the order of the Tribunal
and the appeal therefrom was dismissed, it has to be inferred that
the Appellants have acceded to the judgment of the Tribunal. On
reading of the passage as quoted above, we do not have any
hesitation to hold that the judgment intended to pay arrears in
accordance with the GIA Order, 1994. There is no controversy that
the effective date for applying GIA is 1st June, 1994. As such, the
arrears shall be paid to the Respondent No.1 from 1st June, 1994.
The entire amount on account of the arrears for the period from 1st
June, 1994 to 28th February 2008, the day when the Appellants had
released financial GIA pay earlier, shall be paid to the Respondent
No.1 within a period of 30 days from today.
15. The Tribunal had categorically observed that the differential
salary component shall be paid within a period of four months from
the date of communication of the order. As in the order, the
differential salary has been mentioned, it shall mean and shall only
mean that arrears shall be paid from the day of the Respondent
No.1's joining under the GIA scale and she will be entitled to the
differential salary. Having observed thus, we dismiss this appeal
being bereft of merit holding further that the principles laid down in
Tarsem Singh (supra) do not have any relevance in the case in hand.
The Respondent No.1 is directed to furnish a certified copy of this
order to the competent authority forthwith. There shall be no order
as to costs.
(S. Talapatra)
Chief Justice
(Savitri Ratho)
Judge
M. Panda
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Designation: Secretary
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 25-Aug-2023 19:34:54
