Dr. Surendranath Behera vs Union Of India And Others
2022 Latest Caselaw 6851 Ori

                       ORISSA HIGH COURT: CUTTACK
AFR
                           W.P(C) NO. 28791 OF 2019

         In the matter of an application under Articles 226 and 227 of
         the Constitution of India.
                                  ---------------

Dr. Surendranath Behera ..... Petitioner

-Versus-

Union of India and others ..... Opp. Parties

For Petitioner : Mr. S.K. Padhi, Senior Advocate, appearing along with M/s. S.M.

Mohanty, S. Rout and J.P. Patri, Advocates

For Opp. Parties : Mr. P.K. Parhi, DSGI, appearing along with Mr. S.S. Kashyap, Central Government Counsel.

P R E S E N T:

THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE B.R.SARANGI AND THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE B.P. SATAPATHY

Date of Hearing : 16.11.2022 :: Date of Judgment : 24.11.2022

DR. B.R. SARANGI,J. This is a case in which the petitioner, while

working as Senior Divisional Medical Officer, East Coast

Railway, Bandamunda, was involved in commission of

offences under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) and

Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 on the // 2 //

basis of a trap, in which he was caught red handed by the

CBI while taking a sum of Rs.1000/- as illegal gratification

for writing prescription for a railway employee. On the basis

of complaint, R.C. Case No.3 of 2008 was registered in the

Court of the learned Special Judge, CBI, Bhubaneswar,

which formed the subject matter of trial in T.R. No. 33 of

2008. While the matter was so pending, the petitioner was

issued with a memorandum of charge on 09.01.2009.

Consequentially, an order of punishment was imposed

against the petitioner by the disciplinary authority

withholding 100% of the monthly pension on permanent

basis and forfeiting the entire gratuity admissible to the

petitioner, which is in commensurate with the gravity of

misconduct committed by him, proved beyond reasonable

doubt. In the meantime, the learned Special Judge, CBI,

Bhubaneswar, vide judgment dated 22.12.2012, honourably

acquitted the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner filed a

review petition on 18.02.2013 to the President of India along

with a copy of the judgment of the CBI Court with a prayer to

review the order passed by the disciplinary authority in the // 3 //

departmental proceeding, which was rejected vide order

dated 19.03.2014 and communicated to the petitioner vide

letter dated 21.03.2014. Against the said order, the petitioner

filed O.A. No. 260/00105 of 2015 before the Central

Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack. After

hearing the counsel for the respective parties, the Tribunal

reserved the order on 24.04.2019 and pronounced the same

on 30.07.2019, affirming the order of punishment and

dismissing the original application filed by the petitioner.

2. The back-ground facts, which culminated into

initiation of the above noted proceedings, are that a

complaint was received from one Sri Uday Singh Swaiyan,

Safaiwala, South Eastern Railway Hospital, Adityapur on

23.02.2008 alleging that he attended Railway Hospital,

Bondamunda and met the petitioner, the then Senior

Divisional Medical Officer, Railway Hospital, Bondamunda,

for his treatment with prescription memo. The petitioner saw

the prescription memo and checked Sri Swaiyan but asked

him to come to his residence next day evening where he

would further examine him properly and give medicine. At // 4 //

the same time, it is alleged that the petitioner advised him to

attend his residence with a sum of Rs.1,000/- so that he can

give treatment and prescribe medicine. On the basis of the

written complaint received from Sri Uday Singh Swaiyan, a

criminal case, vide FIR RC 0152008A0003, was registered on

24.02.2008 by the Superintendent of Police, CBI,

Bhubaneswar against the petitioner under Section 13(1)(d)

read with Section13(2) and Section-7 of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988. As per the complaint, the CBI planned

a trap in his railway residence on 24.02.2008 during the

proposed evening. The CBI team and the complainant

reached at the residence of the petitioner at about 19.00

hours evening. The complainant entered the drawing room of

the bungalow of the petitioner and handed over the tainted

G.C. notes amounting to Rs.1,000/- (rupees one thousand)

only to the petitioner and the CBI caught the petitioner red

handed. On the basis of such complaint, RC Case No.03 of

2008 was registered in the Court of the learned Special

Judge, CBI, Bhubaneswar, and on being charge sheeted, the // 5 //

accused stood trial in T.R. Case No.33 of 2008 in the Court of

the learned Special Judge, CBI, Bhubaneswar.

2.1 A Major Penalty Charge Memorandum dated

09.01.2009, signed by General Manager, South Eastern

Railway was issued to the petitioner under Rule-9 of the

Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 on the

charges of demanding and accepting gratification of

Rs.1,000/- from Sri Uday Singh Swaiyan on 24.02.2008.

The Charge Memorandum dated 09.01.2009 was issued by

the General Manager, South Eastern Railway to the

petitioner. The list of the relied upon documents, on the basis

of which the Departmental Proceeding was initiated against

the petitioner, was supplied to the petitioner. Basing upon

the same, the petitioner filed his written statement of defence

denying the charges mentioned in the memorandum and

expressed his willingness to engage a defence counsel to

defend his case. The petitioner sought certain additional

documents. The Inquiry Officer supplied only one document,

i.e., Muster Roll of the complainant for the month of

February, 2008 together with the report why he was at // 6 //

Bondamunda on 23.02.2008 and 24.02.2008 was supplied.

But other documents, which were not relevant to the charges

framed, were not supplied to the petitioner. The Inquiry

Officer was vested with certain powers, including admission

of witnesses, supply of documents, admission of additional

documents submitted during inquiry etc.. While exercising

such power, the Inquiry Officer was to indicate the reason,

which has been done in the present case. The petitioner was

posted in Dongaposi Railway Hospital. But to conduct an

inquiry, the Inquiry Officer intimated the petitioner the date

of hearing before holding every hearing. The preliminary

hearing was held on 15.09.2009, on which date the petitioner

was absent. On 07.10.2009, regular hearing was held and

the petitioner was intimated well in advance, but he was

absent on that date. Next regular hearing was fixed and held

on 21.10.2009, on which date the petitioner was present

along with his defense counsel. Thereafter, next regular

hearings were held on 22.03.2010, 23.03.2010, 16.04.2010

and final regular hearing was fixed and held on 14.05.2010,

on which date the petitioner and his defense counsel were // 7 //

present, and inquiry was concluded. On 07.10.2009, the

petitioner and the complainant, i.e., the prosecution witness

were absent. One Sri Akhil Mohan Panda-Prosecution

Witness-2 and Sri Arnarnedra Sahoo-Prosecution Witness-3

were examined and their statements were duly recorded and

shown to the petitioner during subsequent hearing, when the

petitioner was present with his defense counsel. The

petitioner was also allowed to cross-examine the witnesses

examined during the last sitting. Ultimately, the inquiry

officer submitted his report on 03/16.08.2010, which was

served upon the petitioner by the Chief Medical

Superintendent, Chakradharpur, vide letter dated

19/20.1.2011, calling upon the petitioner to submit his final

representation against the findings made in the inquiry

report. In response thereto, the petitioner submitted his

representation dated 01.02.2011 addressing the General

Manager, South Eastern Railway, Garden Reach, Kolkata.

After going through the inquiry report submitted by the

Inquiry Officer, based upon the articles of charges,

documents relied upon and examination of the prosecution // 8 //

witnesses, the Railway Board, vide order dated 21.11.2012,

imposed the penalty of withholding 100% of the monthly

pension on permanent basis and forfeiting the entire gratuity

admissible to the petitioner.

2.2 In the meantime, R.C. Case No.3 of 2009, which

was registered on the basis of the complaint in the Court of

the learned Special Judge, CBI, Bhubaneswar, and which

formed the subject matter of trial in T.R. No 33 of 2008, was

decided and the judgment was rendered on 22.12.2012

holding that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its

case against the accused-petitioner beyond all reasonable

doubt. Therefore, the Court found that the petitioner is not

guilty of the offence Under Section 13 (1)(d) read with Section

13 (2) and Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,

1988 and accordingly honourably acquitted him under

Section 248(1) Cr.P.C.

2.3 The petitioner, after getting order of acquittal from

the learned Special Judge, CBI, Bhubaneswar on

22.12.2012, filed a review petition on 18.02.2013 to the

President of India, along with a copy of the judgment of the // 9 //

CBI Court, with a prayer to review the order passed by the

disciplinary authority in the departmental proceeding, which

was rejected vide order dated 19.03.2014 as communicated

to the petitioner vide letter dated 21.03.2014. Against the

said order, the petitioner filed O.A. No. 260/00105 of 2015

before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench,

Cuttack. After hearing the counsel for the parties, the

Tribunal reserved the judgment on 24.04.2019 and

pronounced the judgment on 30.07.2019, affirming the order

of punishment and dismissing the Original Application filed

by the petitioner. Hence, this writ petition.

3. Mr. S.K. Padhi, learned Senior Counsel appearing

along with Mr. S.S. Mohanty, learned counsel for the

petitioner vehemently contended that the, on the basis of the

complaint lodged, the CBI registered a case against the

petitioner under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) and

Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 on the

basis of trap, in which the petitioner was caught red handed

while taking a sum of Rs.1000/- as illegal gratification for

writing prescription for a railway employee. As such, R.C.

// 10 //

Case No.3 of 2009 was registered in the Court of the learned

Special Judge, CBI, Bhubaneswar, which formed the subject

matter of the trial in T.R. No 33 of 2008. After due

adjudication the petitioner was honourably acquitted vide

judgment dated 22.12.2022. While the matter was subjudice

before the learned Special Judge, CBI, Bhubaneswar, a

departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner

and the petitioner was issued with a memorandum of charge

on 09.01.2009. Basing upon the charge, the order of

punishment was imposed by the disciplinary authority

withholding 100% of the monthly pension on permanent

basis and forfeiting the entire gratuity admissible to the

petitioner vide order dated 19.12.2012.

3.1 It is further contended that standard of proof in

both the cases though different, still then for the self-same

fact if the petitioner has been acquitted honourably, in that

case the disciplinary authority could not have imposed such

a penalty, which is harsh in nature and, as such, the said

penalty cannot sustain in the eye of law. It is further

contended that in view of acquittal of the petitioner for the // 11 //

self-same charge in T.R. No. 33 of 2008, vide judgment dated

22.12.2012 passed by learned Special Judge, CBI,

Bhubaneswar, acquitting the petitioner honourably, the

petitioner filed a review petition on 18.02.2013 before the

President of India, along with a copy of the judgment of the

CBI Court, stating that for the self-same charges when the

petitioner has been honourably acquitted from the criminal

charge, there is no valid and justifiable reason to impose a

penalty in the departmental proceeding. Therefore, such

penalty which has been imposed by the disciplinary authority

should be set aside. But the review application was rejected,

vide order dated 19.03.2014, which was communicated to

the petitioner on 21.03.2014. Thereby, it is contended that

the same is an outcome of non-application of the mind and,

therefore, seeks for interference of this Court.

3.2 It is also contended that once the learned Special

Judge, CBI, Bhubaneswar, vide judgment dated 22.12.2012,

has honourably acquitted the petitioner by going through the

evidence available on record with the finding that the

prosecution has failed to prove the demand and acceptance // 12 //

of the illegal gratification, which has been brought on record

by the defence in cross-examination, where the complainant

himself has admitted that another person was present in the

room of the accused-petitioner, when he entered into the

room of the accused-petitioner, and that it is a fact that the

accused-petitioner had refused to accept money from him

towards the fees. But the disciplinary authority, without

taking note of such evidence and without waiting for the

finality of the result in the criminal case filed by the CBI

before the learned Special Judge, CBI, Bhubaneswar, vide

order dated 19.12.2012, imposed the penalty of withholding

100% of monthly pension and forfeiture of entire gratuity

admissible to the petitioner. The record clearly indicates that

the disciplinary authority communicated the order on

19.12.2012, whereas the learned Special Judge, CBI,

Bhubaneswar, for the self-same charge acquitted the

petitioner honourably vide judgment dated 22.12.2012,

which was three days after the order of punishment was

communicated to the petitioner. It is further contended that

since the petitioner has been honourably acquitted by the // 13 //

learned Special Judge, CBI, Bhubaneswar, then the

reviewing authority, on the basis of the application filed by

the petitioner on 18.02.2013, should have applied his mind

and reviewed the order passed by the disciplinary authority.

Therefore, the order passed by the reviewing authority suffers

from non-application of mind.

3.3 He further contended that there is gross violation

of principles of natural justice while conducting the inquiry

and imposing penalty by the disciplinary authority. It is

contended that the petitioner was not provided with the

relevant documents relied on by the Inquiry Officer, such as

duty charge of the complainant, statement of the

complainant, copy of the written sanction for conducting the

raid, copy of the statement of witness from Railway Muster

Roll of the complainant which were required by the petitioner

and applied for at different stages of inquiry. Therefore, due

to non-supply of relevant documents for the purpose of just

adjudication of the case, principles of natural justice has

been violated.

// 14 //

3.4 He further contended that even though the

disciplinary authority has accepted the nomination of defence

counsel on 17.06.2009, but the same was intimated to the

petitioner on 05.10.2009 and in the meantime the Inquiry

Officer conducted ex-parte inquiry on 15.09.2009. More so,

the Inquiry Officer did not ask for his defence as per Rule

9(19) of RS (D&A) Rules, 1969 nor afforded an opportunity to

the petitioner to give his oral statement. After completion of

examination of P.W.4, the Inquiry Officer closed the inquiry

and recorded the oral statement of the petitioner without

letting the petitioner to submit the same in writing. Thereby,

showing an undue haste, the disciplinary proceeding was

concluded, which amounts to gross non-compliance of

principles of natural justice.

3.5 It is further contended that due to non-

examination of defence witnesses and non-adducing of

evidence by the petitioner, the order so passed by the

disciplinary authority cannot sustain in the eye of law. It is

further contended that there is disproportionate of

punishment for alleged level of misconduct for accepting // 15 //

illegal gratification of Rs.1000/-, for which reason penalty of

withholding 100% monthly pension and forfeiture of entire

gratuity was imposed, which is arbitrary and unreasonable.

More so, for the self-same charges if the petitioner has been

honourably acquitted by the learned Special Judge, CBI,

Bhubaneswar, there is no valid and justifiable reason to

impose such penalty. Thus, it is contended that the same

cannot sustain in the eye of law.

3.6 To substantiate his contention, learned Senior

Counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied upon the

judgments in R.P. Kapur v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC

787, Inspector General of Police & Others v. S.

Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598, State of Rajasthan v.

Heem Singh, 2020 SCC Online SC 886, Kashinath

Dikhsita v. Union of India and others, (1986) 3 SCC 229,

State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohd. Sharif, (1982) 2 SCC 376,

Shankar Dass v. Union of India and others, AIR 1985 SC

772, Union of India and others v. Giriraj Sharma, AIR

1994 SC 604, Subash Chandra Sahu v. Union of India // 16 //

and others, 2019 (I) OLR 728 and Chantamani Padhi v.

Management of UCO Bank, 2017 (II) OLR 465.

4. Mr. P.K. Parhi, learned DSGI appearing along with

Mr. S.S. Kashyap, learned Central Government Counsel

appearing for the opposite party-Railways does not dispute

the factual matrix, as delineated above, and rather contended

that a major penalty proceeding was departmentally drawn

under Rule-9 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal)

Rules, 1968 on the charges of demanding and accepting

gratification pursuant to Memorandum of Charges dated

09.01.2009. He, however, refuted the allegation that the

petitioner was not supplied with the documents. Rather, the

petitioner was allowed all reasonable opportunities to defend

his case. He further contended that the enquiry took place on

15.09.2009, 07.10.2009, 21.10.2009, 21.03.2010,

23.03.2010, 16.04.2010 and 14.05.2010. The petitioner was

also permitted to take the assistance of his defence counsel.

The petitioner and his defence counsel were present and

enquiry was concluded. As such, during the course of

enquiry the petitioner never complained by filing any // 17 //

application. Consequentially, the enquiry was conducted by

the Inquiry Officer and a report was submitted on

03/16.08.2010 which was served upon the petitioner, basing

upon which he submitted a representation on 01.02.2011.

Accordingly, the Railway Board, vide order dated 21.11.2012,

imposed penalty of withholding of 100% of monthly pension

on permanent basis and forfeiting the gratuity. Thereby, no

illegality or irregularity has been committed by imposing

such penalty.

4.1 He further contended that after honourable

acquittal in the criminal case vide judgment dated

27.12.2012, even though the review was filed, but the same

was rejected on the ground that the law is well-settled that

the standard of proof required in a criminal case and in a

disciplinary proceeding is distinctly different. Where in a

criminal case punishment is to be imposed on conviction of

the accused "beyond all reasonable doubt", in case of

departmental proceeding punishment can be imposed on the

delinquent on the basis of "preponderance of probabilities".

In a criminal case the accused is to be punished for criminal // 18 //

misconduct whereas in a disciplinary proceeding of this

nature the punishment can be imposed for the act of

unbecoming of a government servant. Thereby, he contended

that the action of the authorities is well justified and, as

such, there was no procedural irregularity by which non-

observance of principle of natural justice would result in

defeating the course of justice and it is not a case of no

evidence, thereby the scope of judicial review of a disciplinary

proceeding is very limited and in a judicial review the Court

is not exercising or sitting in appeal over the order of

punishment. It is further contended that strict standard of

proof or applicability of Evidence Act stands excluded in a

departmental enquiry. Thereby, the punishment imposed by

the authority is well justified, which does not require any

interference by this Court. As such, the Tribunal is well

justified by dismissing the Original Application filed by the

petitioner against the imposition of penalty imposed by the

disciplinary authority.

4.2 To substantiate his contention, learned DSGI

appearing for the Railways has relied on the decisions in the // 19 //

cases of Pandian Roadways Corporation Ltd v. N.

Balakrishnan, (2007) 9 SCC 755, Ajit Kumar Nag v.

General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. Haldia and

others, (2005) 7 SCC 764, Shashi Bhushan Prasad v.

Inspector General, Central Industrial Security Force and

others, (2019) 7 SCC 797, The State of Karnataka and

Anr v. Umesh, Civil Appeal Nos. 1763-1764 of 2022 disposed

of on 22nd March, 2022 and State of Rajasthan and others

v. Heem Singh, Civil Appeal No.3340 of 2020 disposed of on

29th October, 2020.

5. This Court heard Mr. S.K. Padhi, learned Senior

Counsel appearing along with Mr. S.S. Mohanty, learned

counsel for the petitioner and Mr. P.K. Parhi, learned DSGI

appearing along with Mr. S.S. Kashyap, learned Central

Government Counsel appearing for the opposite party-

Railways in hybrid mode and perused the records. Pleadings

have been exchanged between the parties and with the

consent of learned Counsel for the parties, the writ petition is

being disposed of finally at the stage of admission.

// 20 //

6. Before delving into the merits or demerits of the

contentions raised by the respective parties, this Court

deemed it proper to examine the judgment and order

impugned delivered by the Tribunal and it is found that the

Tribunal heard the Original Application and reserved it for

judgment on 24.04.2019, but the impugned judgment and

order was delivered on 30.07.2019, i.e. after more than three

months' time. None of the counsels appearing for the parties

raised this question that the judgment was delivered contrary

to Rule-105 of The Central Administrative Tribunal Rules of

Practice, 1993 and, as such, the said judgment cannot

sustain. Therefore, this Court proceeded to examine whether

the Tribunal is justified to keep the order reserved on

24.04.2019 and pronounce the same on 30.07.2019, i.e.,

after three months and six days from the date of reserve.

7. It is of relevance to note that to provide for the

adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunals of disputes

and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of

service of persons appointed to public services and posts in

connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of // 21 //

any local or other authority within the territory of India or

under the control of the Government of India or of any

Corporation (or society) owned or controlled by the

Government in pursuance of Article 323A of the Constitution

and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto, the

Parliament had enacted "Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985",

hereinafter to be referred as "1985 Act".

7.1 Chapter-IV of 1985 Act prescribes the

procedure. Section-19 deals with applications to Tribunals.

As per Section-19 (1), subject to the other provisions of this

Act, a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter

within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal may make an application

to the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance. For filing of

such applications before Tribunal under Section 19 of the

1985 Act, other requirements under sub-sections (2), (3) and

(4) are to be complied with.

7.2 Section 22 of the 1985 Act deals with procedure

and powers of the Tribunals, which reads as follows:-

"22. Procedure and powers of Tribunals.--(1) A Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down in the // 22 //

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and subject to the other provisions of this Act and of any rules made by the Central Government, the Tribunal shall have power to regulate its own procedure including the fixing of places and times of its inquiry and deciding whether to sit in public or in private.

(2) A Tribunal shall decide every application made to it as expeditiously as possible and ordinarily every application shall be decided on a perusal of documents and written representations and [after hearing such oral arguments as may be advanced].

(3) A Tribunal shall have, for the purposes of [discharging its functions under this Act], the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely:--

(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;

(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;

(c) receiving evidence on affidavits;

(d) subject to the provisions of sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), requisitioning any public record or document or copy of such record or document from any office;

(e) issuing commissions for the examination of witness or documents;

(f) reviewing its decisions;

(g) dismissing a representation for default or deciding it ex parte;

(h) setting aside any order of dismissal of any representation for default or any order passed by it ex parte; and

(i) any other matter which may be prescribed by the Central Government."

7.3 Whereas, it was expedient to frame unified and

consolidated Rules of Practice, for which the Central

Administrative Tribunal, in exercise of the powers conferred

by Section 22 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, // 23 //

1985 (Central Act 13 of 1985) and all other powers thereunto

enabling it to frame Rules to regulate its own practice and

procedure, made the Rules of Practice in supersession of all

the existing orders, regulations and notifications, called the

"The Central Administrative Tribunal Rules of Practice, 1993"

(hereinafter to be referred as "1993 Rules").

Chapter-XVII of the 1993 Rules deals with

pronouncement of the order. Rule 105 reads as follows:-

"105 Pronouncement of order .--(a) The Bench shall as far as possible pronounce the order immediately after the hearing is concluded.

(b) When the orders are reserved, the date for pronouncement not later than 3 weeks shall be fixed. The date so fixed shall not be changed except after due notice to all parties/counsel.

(c) Reading of the operative portion of the order in the open Court shall be deemed to be pronouncement of the order.

(d) Any order reserved by a Circuit Bench of the Tribunal may be pronounced at the principal place of sitting of the Bench in one of the aforesaid modes as exigencies of the situation require."

7.4 A bare perusal of the aforementioned rule would go

to show that under sub-rule (a) of Rule 105, it has been

specifically provided that the Bench shall as far as possible

pronounce the order immediately after the hearing is

concluded. Sub-rule (b) provides that when the orders are // 24 //

reserved, the date for pronouncement not later than three

weeks shall be fixed. Thereby, a mandate has been put on the

Tribunal that in the event of reserving any order, the Tribunal

has the obligation to discharge its responsibility by

pronouncing the final order within three weeks. Per chance

the Tribunal could not able to pronounce the order of the

reserve matter within three weeks, then it owes a

responsibility to give notice to all the parties/counsel for

change of dates. Meaning thereby, if the date so fixed for the

reserved order to be pronounced within the period of three

weeks is changed, then it should be brought to the notice of

the parties. But, the same has not been adhered to in the

present case, because the matter was heard and reserved for

orders on 24.04.2019, without fixing the date of

pronouncement within a period of three weeks. As such at

the caprice and whims of the Tribunal the order was delivered

on 30.07.2019, long after expiry of three months, that too

without giving any notice to the parties/counsel. As such, the

date was changed for pronouncement of judgment after three

months, without giving notice to the parties/counsel and the // 25 //

same was done at the caprice and whims of the Tribunal,

though the Tribunal is duty bound to deliver the order in a

reserve matter within the period of three weeks.

7.5 The law is well settled in the case of Taylor V.

Taylor, (1875) 1 Ch. D. 426 that "where a power is given to

do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in

that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are

necessarily forbidden." The said principle has been followed

subsequently in Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor, AIR 1936

PC 253, State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh, AIR

1964 SC 358, Dhananjay Reddy v. State of Karnataka,

AIR 2001 SC 1512, Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahabir

Prasad, AIR 1999 SC 3558, Gujrat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd.

v. Essar Power Ltd., AIR 2008 SC 1921, Ram Deen Maurya

v. State of U.P., (2009) 6 SCC 735.

8. May it be noted that by applying Rule-105 of the

1993 Rules this Court has already delivered a judgment in

the case of Nityananda Barik v. Union of India and

others (W.P.(C) No. 16659 of 2014 disposed of on

05.05.2022) holding that the Tribunal has acted contrary to // 26 //

the aforementioned provision. Therefore, the order passed on

30.07.2019 under Annexure-12 cannot sustain and same is

liable to be quashed and is hereby quashed.

9. In view of the factual matrix, as mentioned above,

and also the rival contentions raised by learned counsel for

the parties by relying upon their respective judgments, the

matter is remitted back to the Central Administrative

Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack for its re-adjudication by

giving due opportunity of hearing to all the parties. Needless

to say that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the

merits of the case itself nor has given any opportunity to

either of the parties to add any other document, rather the

matter shall be decided on the materials available on the

record itself and the order shall be passed strictly in

compliance of Rule-105 of the 1993 Rules. Since it is an old

case of the year 2008 and in the meantime 14 years have

passed and the petitioner has been deprived of getting the

pensionary benefits because of the order passed by the

disciplinary authority, the Tribunal shall make all endeavor

to dispose of the matter as early as possible, preferably within // 27 //

a period of three months from the date of communication of

this judgment.

10. Thus, the writ petition is disposed of. However,

there shall be no order as to costs.

(DR. B.R. SARANGI) JUDGE

B.P. SATAPATHY. I agree.

(B.P. SATAPATHY) JUDGE

Orissa High Court, Cuttack The 24th November, 2022, Arun/GDS