Orissa High Court
Afr vs State Of Orissa on 17 May, 2022
ORISSA HIGH COURT: CUTTACK
W.P.(C) NO. 12033 OF 2014
In the matter of an application under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution of India.
---------------
AFR
Rupanwita Panda ..... Petitioner
-Versus-
State of Orissa
and others ..... Opp. Parties
For Petitioner : Mr. Manoj Kumar Mishra,
Sr. Advocate along with
Mr. S. Senapati, Advocate.
For Opp. Parties : Mr. A.K. Mishra,
Addl. Government Advocate
[O.Ps. 1 & 2]
Mr. Lalitendu Mishra.
Advocate [O.Ps. 3 & 4]
M/s. P.K. Mishra and
S.K. Dash, Advocates
[O.P. 5]
P R E S E N T:
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE B.R.SARANGI
AND
THE HON'BLE MISS JUSTICE SAVITRI RATHO
Date of hearing & judgment: 17.05.2022
DR. B.R. SARANGI, J. The petitioner, who was opposite party
no.5 in O.A. No. 669 of 2010, which was filed by the
present opposite party no.5 before Orissa Administrative
Tribunal, Bhubaneswar, has filed this writ petition
seeking to quash the order dated 02.05.2014 passed by
the tribunal under Annexure-11 to the writ petition and
also the consequential gradation list prepared and
communicated vide letter dated 03.06.2014 under
Annexure-12 to the writ petition. The petitioner also seeks
direction to the State-opposite parties to fix her seniority
over and above present opposite party no.5, who was the
applicant before the tribunal, as was before.
2. The factual matrix of the case, in brief, is that
in the year 1989 names of the petitioner, opposite party
no.5 and others were sponsored by the employment
exchange for appointment in the post of Junior Coach in
different disciplines under the Directorate of Sports. After
following due procedure of selection, the petitioner was
appointed as a Junior Coach in the discipline of Athletics
and opposite party No.5 was appointed as Junior Coach
in the discipline of Volleyball. One Rashmiranjan
Samantray was appointed as Junior Coach in the
discipline of Basketball. The petitioner, opposite party
no.5 and Rashmiranjan Samantaray were appointed, vide
order dated 27.09.1989, and opposite party No.5 was
shown junior to the petitioner.
2.1 After getting the order of appointment, the
petitioner joined in her post and continued as such
without any interruption. While she was so continuing,
the petitioner got an offer from Sports Authority of India
(in short "SAI"), vide order dated 17.09.1992, to join as
Athletic Coach. Consequentially, the petitioner was
relieved by the Director of Sports with effect from
16.09.1992 to join as coach in Regional Office, SAI. On
reporting before the Regional Director, SAI, the petitioner
was directed to join as a coach in SAI at Cuttack. Due to
some personal problem, the petitioner preferred not to
join as coach in SAI at Cuttack. Instead, on 19.09.1992,
she requested the Director, Sports & Youth Services-
opposite party no.2 to allow her to re-join as a Junior
Coach and treat the period of her absence as leave,
besides requesting the SAI authorities to cancel their
order dated 17.09.1992.
2.2 Considering the grievance of the petitioner, the
Director, Sports & Youth Services, vide order dated
21.09.1992, permitted the petitioner to re-join in the post
of Junior Coach, Athletics and, vide letter dated
22.09.1992, intimated this fact to the Regional Director,
SAI requesting him to recall the order dated 17.09.1992,
by which the petitioner was directed to resume the duty
of Athletic Coach at SAI, Cuttack. The Director, vide order
dated 23.12.1992, allowed the period of absence of the
petitioner from 17.09.1992 to 21.09.1992 as earned leave
and regularized the said period. Present opposite party
no.5 had not objected, when the petitioner was placed
above him at the time of her appointment and also the re-
joining of the petitioner on 22.09.1992 as Junior Coach
under the Directorate of Sports, Orissa. As such, the
petitioner continued without any interruption.
2.3 After lapse of 9 years, i.e., in the year 2001, in
order to maintain the inter se seniority among the Junior
Coaches in the Directorate of Sports, a provisional
gradation list was published and it was also
communicated to all Junior Coaches appointed in the
Directorate, including opposite party no.5, vide letter
dated 12.02.2001, inviting objection if any to the said
provisional gradation list within 30 days from the date of
its issuance. In the said provisional gradation list dated
12.02.2001, the petitioner was shown to be senior to
opposite party no.5 and, as such, the name of the
petitioner was found place at sl. no.32, whereas the name
of opposite party no.5 was found place at sl. no. 33.
Opposite party no.5 accepted the said position in the
gradation list and did not file any objection to the said
provisional gradation list. Finally, after considering the
objections filed by some of the Junior Coaches, the final
gradation list was published and communicated to all
Junior Coaches on 02.05.2001. In the said final gradation
list, the name of the petitioner was shown at sl. no. 32
and opposite party no.5 was placed below the petitioner
at sl. No. 33. At that stage also, opposite party no.5 never
objected the fixation of seniority in the gradation list.
2.4 Due to retirement of some of the Junior
Coaches and leaving of jobs by some Coaches, in the year
2006 another provisional gradation list was
communicated to all the Junior Coaches, vide letter dated
24.10.2006, inviting objections if any within 30 days. In
the said provisional gradation list dated 24.10.2006, the
name of the petitioner was shown above opposite party
no.5. At this stage, opposite party no.5 submitted his
representation raising the objection relating to his
seniority in the gradation list as well as the acceptance of
the re-joining report of the petitioner, which had already
reached its finality in the year 2001, when the provisional
gradation list was published. Consequentially, the
authorities rejected the representation filed by opposite
party no.5 and published the final gradation list on
15.01.2007, which was also communicated to opposite
party no.5.
2.5 After publication of the final gradation list on
15.01.2007, opposite party no.5 made an objection before
the Director for reconsideration of his case. The Assistant
Director, vide his letter dated 19.02.2008, informed
opposite party no.5 that his representation deserved no
consideration since the final gradation list had already
been published vide office order dated 15.01.2007. On
receipt of the letter dated 19.02.2008 from the authority,
the petitioner preferred an appeal to the appellate
authority, i.e. opposite party no.1 for consideration of his
grievance. But the appellate authority, without issuing
any notice to the petitioner, vide order dated 23.06.2008,
directed the Director to prepare the gradation list keeping
in view the leaving of service by the petitioner as per the
existing provision of the service rules. As this fact came
to the knowledge of the petitioner, the petitioner made a
representation before the authority, who had passed the
order on 23.06.2008 claiming her seniority. On receipt of
the representation of the petitioner, opposite party no.1,
after conducting the inquiry, vide order dated 17.10.2008
directed the Director for disposal of the representation of
the petitioner stating inter alia that there is no fault on
the part of the petitioner. Therefore, after passing the
order dated 17.10.2008, the competent authority did not
make any change in the final gradation list.
2.6 Challenging the final gradation list dated
15.01.2007, opposite part no.5 filed O.A. No. 669 of 2010
before the Orissa Administrative Tribunal, Bhubaneswar
seeking direction to opposite party no.2 to declare the
opposite party no.5 as senior to the petitioner in the rank
of Junior Coach by recasting the gradation list in
accordance with the instruction dated 23.06.2008. To the
said Original Application, counter affidavit was filed by
the State opposite parties stating inter alia that the order
sanctioning leave of the petitioner had been passed since
1992 and the gradation list had been prepared since the
year 2001 following due procedure, wherein the petitioner
was shown senior to the opposite party no.5 and the
gradation list had attained its finality. It was further
asserted that there was no change in the gradation list
prepared in the year 2001 and the said list was published
as provisional gradation list in the year 2006 for deletion
and addition of names. The order dated 17.10.2008 had
also been filed, along with the counter affidavit, stating
that opposite party no.1, after conducting due inquiry,
had directed the Director for disposal of the
representation of the petitioner, stating inter alia that
there was no fault on the part of the petitioner. But the
tribunal, without considering the fact of preparation of
gradation list in the year 2001 and order dated
17.10.2008, disposed of the original application, vide
order dated 02.05.2014 under Annexure-11, observing
that opposite party no.2, who is the competent authority,
is to carry out the order of the appellate authority dated
23.06.2008 and accordingly directed for correction of final
gradation list.
3. Mr. S. Senapati, learned counsel for the
petitioner vehemently contended that in the year 2001 the
final gradation list was prepared and published in
compliance of all the procedures and the same was
communicated to all the Junior Coaches, including the
opposite party no.5. The same had reached its finality and
at no point of time, more particularly, at the stage of
publication of provisional gradation list which was
communicated to all the Junior Coaches and or at the
stage of publication of final gradation list on 02.05.2001,
opposite party no.5 had raised any objection or
challenged the same. As such, the same having reached
finality, is binding on all the Junior Coaches, including
opposite party no.5. After lapse of 6 years of publication
of final gradation list, when the next provisional gradation
list was published in the year 2006 for deletion and
inclusion of names, opposite party no.5 cannot assail the
same, as he is estopped to do so. Thereby, at his behest,
challenge to the placement in the final gradation list
cannot be made. The fact, that the petitioner is senior to
opposite party no.5, was never objected to by him
(opposite party no.5). As such, for the conduct of opposite
party no.5, if at all he had got any right, the same has
been waived and the present claim for his seniority over
and above the petitioner, is hit by doctrine of waiver,
acquiescence and estoppel. It is further contended that
the tribunal has not taken into consideration the
materials placed before it in proper perspective and, as
such, the order impugned cannot sustain in the eye of
law. It is also contended that as the seniority of the
petitioner had already been fixed since the date of her
appointment over and above opposite party no.5, even
after rejoining in the service in the year 1992 treating the
period of absence as earned leave, and consequentially
her seniority was fixed in the year 2001, after inviting
objection from all the Junior Coaches, including opposite
party no.5, and final gradation list was published on
02.05.2001, it is binding on all the Junior Coaches,
including opposite party no.5. Therefore, after lapses of
six years, opposite party no.5 cannot challenge the
seniority of the petitioner, when the next provisional
gradation list was published and had reached its finality
in the year 2001.
3.1 It is further contended that the tribunal,
relying upon the order of the appellate authority dated
23.06.2008, which had been passed without giving
opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, directed for re-
fixation of seniority. The same cannot sustain in the eye
of law and, thereby, the tribunal has committed gross
error apparent on the face of the record, while passing the
order impugned, as the order of the appellate authority
suffers from vice of non-compliance of principle natural
justice. Therefore, he seeks for quashing of the order
dated 02.05.2014 passed by the tribunal in O.A. No. 669
of 2010 under Annexure-11 and the consequential
gradation list communicated under Annexure-12.
4. Mr. Amiya Kumar Mishra, learned Additional
Government Advocate appearing for opposite party nos. 1
and 2 contended that with regard to fixation of seniority
in the final gradation list dated 15.01.2007 by the
Director of Sports, a representation was filed by the
opposite party no.5 before opposite party no.1, who
directed the Director-opposite party no.2 to dispose of the
said representation and for doing so views of the opposite
party no.1 were supplied to opposite party no.2, vide
letter dated 23.06.2008. The opposite party no.1 received
a letter dated 13.08.2008 from the Director-opposite party
no.2, along with representation filed by the petitioner. He
re-examined the stand taken by the Director-opposite
party no.2 and accordingly issued necessary direction to
him, vide order dated 17.10.2008. The subsequent
developments taken place in this matter were not taken
note of by the tribunal and accordingly, the order
impugned was passed on 02.05.2014, which was binding
on opposite party no.1. As a result thereof, the fresh
gradation list was published on 03.06.2014. The fresh
gradation list, which was prepared by opposite party no.1
on 03.06.2014 was in compliance of the order of the
tribunal passed on 02.05.2014, but the same has not
been given effect to pursuant to the interim order passed
by this Court on 30.07.2014 in the present writ petition.
5. Mr. L. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for
opposite parties no.3 and 4 contended that the petitioner
herself preferred not to join as Coach at SAI, Cuttack and,
thereby, she is no way an employee of opposite parties
no.3 and 4. As such, no relief can be granted against the
opposite parties no.3 and 4 and, therefore, they should
not have been impleaded as parties to this writ petition.
6. Mr. P.K. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for
the opposite party no.5 vehemently contended reiterating
the fact that the petitioner and opposite party no.5 had
got appointment on 27.09.1989, pursuant to the selection
conducted by the opposite party no.2. On publication of
the provisional gradation list showing the name of the
petitioner above the opposite party no.5, the same was
questioned by opposite party no.5 by filing a
representation to correct the gradation list on the plea
that the petitioner had quitted the job without any lien
and at best her rejoining would amount to fresh
appointment and accordingly she should have been
placed in the gradation list. But the same was not
considered and final gradation list was published on
05.01.2007 reiterating the provisional gradation list.
Opposite party no.5 also filed another representation on
15.01.2007 claiming his position above the petitioner and
again he made another representation on 18.01.2007.
But, vide letter dated 19.02.2008, it was intimated that
since the gradation list has already been made final, the
representation filed by opposite party no.5 cannot be
acceded to and, as such, he was permitted to prefer
appeal. Pursuant to which, he preferred an appeal and
the appellate authority, vide order dated 23.06.2008,
directed the Director to take necessary steps. As a
consequence thereof, the tribunal passed the order
impugned. But the same has not been implemented
because of the interim order passed by this Court.
Thereby he seeks for dismissal of the writ petition.
7. This Court heard Mr. S. Mohanty, learned
counsel appearing for the petitioner; Mr. A.K. Mishra,
learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for
the State-opposite parties no.1 and 2; Mr. L. Mishra,
learned counsel appearing for opposite parties no.3 and
4; and Mr. P.K. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for
opposite party no.5 by hybrid mode, and perused the
records. Pleadings having been exchanged between the
parties, with the consent of learned counsel for the
parties this writ petition is being disposed of finally at the
stage of admission.
8. On the basis of the factual matrix, as discussed
above, there is no iota of doubt that both the petitioner
and opposite party no.5 were appointed along with one
Rashmiranjan Samantray, vide order dated 27.09.1989,
as Junior Coach. In the said appointment order, the
petitioner's name was shown above opposite party no.5,
meaning thereby, the petitioner was shown as senior to
opposite party no.5. In the year 1992, when the petitioner
got an offer from the SAI as the Athletic Coach, she was
relieved on 16.09.1992, but, subsequently, she chose to
continue under the State Government and, accordingly,
on 19.09.1992 requested the authorities to allow her to
rejoin as Junior Coach and to treat the period of absence
as leave. As a result thereof, the Director, vide order dated
21.09.1992, allowed the grievance of the petitioner and
permitted her to join as Junior Coach and, more so, the
period from 17.09.1990 to 21.09.1992 was treated as
earned leave and such period was regularized. Once such
regularization was made, it is deemed that the petitioner
is continuing in service from the date of her initial
appointment, i.e. w.e.f. 27.09.1989. At that point of time,
opposite party no.5 had not challenged the decision of the
authority allowing the petitioner to continue in the post.
In the year 2001, when a provisional gradation list was
prepared placing the petitioner at sl. no.32, i.e., over and
above the placement of opposite party no.5 at sl. No. 33
and objections were invited, opposite party no.5 never
raised any objection. Consequentially, when the final
gradation list was published on 02.05.2001, in the said
list also the petitioner was placed at sl. No. 31 and
opposite party no.5 was placed at sl. no. 32. From the
above, it would be seen that opposite party no.5, at no
point of time, had raised any objection with regard to
fixation of inter se seniority, either in the provisional
gradation list or in the final gradation list published on
02.05.2001. Thereby the fixation of seniority of the
petitioner over and above opposite party no.5 had reached
its finality.
9. Due to retirement of some of the Junior
Coaches and leaving of jobs by some Junior Coaches, a
provisional gradation list was prepared on 24.01.2006
taking into consideration the final gradation list dated
02.05.2001. In the said provisional gradation list, the
petitioner was shown as senior to opposite party no.5.
Though opposite party no.5 filed a representation raising
objection with regard to seniority and acceptance of the
joining report of the petitioner, which had already reached
its finality since 2001, when the final gradation list was
prepared on 02.05.2001, but the authority rejected the
same and published the final gradation list on
15.01.2007. After publication of final gradation list, again
opposite party no.5 filed an objection which was also
rejected. Against the order rejecting his representation,
opposite party no.5 preferred an appeal. However,
opposite party no.1, who is the appellate authority,
without giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner,
passed an order on 23.06.2008 directing the Director to
prepare the gradation list, keeping in view of the leaving
of the service by the petitioner, as per the existing
provisions of the service rule. Needless to say, when
opposite party no.1 considered the representation filed by
opposite party no.5, without detriment to the interest of
the petitioner, he ought to have given opportunity of
hearing to the petitioner in compliance of the principle of
natural justice.
10. In S.A. de Smith, Judicial Review of
Administrative Action, 4th Ed. P. 156, it has been
stated that English law recognizes two principles of
natural justice: that an adjudicator be disinterested and
unbiased (nemo judex in causa sua) and that the
parties be given adequate notice and opportunity to be
heard (audi alteram partem)
The purpose of following the principles of
natural justice is prevention of miscarriage of justice and,
hence, the observance thereof is the pragmatic
requirement of fair play in action. Principles or rules of
natural justice operate as checks on the freedom of
administrative action.
The second rule is audi alteram partem, i.e.
'hear the other side'. At times and particularly in
continental countries, the form audietur et altera pars
is used, meaning very much the same thing. The rule
that no one should be condemned unheard is a die hard
principle of natural justice. Fairness is considered to be
the soul of natural justice.
11. In Wiseman v. Borneman, [1971] AC 297,
Lord Reid observed that natural justice requires that the
procedure before any tribunal which is acting judicially
shall be fair in all the circumstances. The apex Court has
time and again equated the principles of natural justice
with fairness in action. The Court has insisted upon not
so much to act judicially but acting fairly, justly,
reasonably and impartially.
12. In General Medical Council v. Spackman,
[1943] 2 All ER 337, Lord Wright said that if the
principles of natural justice are violated in respect of any
decision, it is indeed, immaterial whether the same
decision would have been arrived at in the absence of the
departure from the essential principles of justice. The
decision must be declared to be no decision.
13. In D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd.
(1993) 3 SCC 259, the Supreme Court insisted that in
arriving at a decision, the procedure adopted must be
just, fair and reasonable in the particular circumstances
of the case.
In view of the above settled principles of law,
due to non-compliance of the principle of natural justice
by the appellate authority, the order dated 23.06.2008
passed by him cannot sustain in the eye of law.
14. Subsequently, the petitioner, having come to
know the order dated 23.06.2008, made a grievance
before opposite party no.1, who, after conducting inquiry,
categorically held that there was no fault on the part of
the petitioner and by so holding passed the order on
17.10.2008 retaining the service and seniority of the
petitioner and opposite party no.5, as before, meaning
thereby keeping the petitioner as senior to opposite party
no.5. Therefore, the order passed on 23.06.2008 having
been merged with the order dated 17.10.2008, relief
cannot be granted on the basis of the earlier order dated
23.06.2008, as such order had a nullity in the eye of law.
Therefore, relief claimed before the tribunal on the basis
of the order dated 23.06.2008 was otiose. As such, the
tribunal has committed a gross error apparent on the face
of the record, having passed the order impugned, without
taking into consideration the subsequent developments
taken place in the matter, i.e. the order dated 17.10.2008
passed by the appellate authority upholding the seniority
of the petitioner over and above opposite party no.5.
Thereby, the order of the tribunal dated 02.05.2014 is an
outcome of non-application of mind, when the order dated
17.10.2008 passed by the appellate authority had not
been taken into consideration, and direction was given on
the basis of the order dated 23.06.2008, which was non-
existent. Thereby, the order so passed by the tribunal
cannot sustain in the eye of law.
15. Considering from other angle, if the seniority
had been fixed keeping the petitioner as senior to opposite
party no.5, vide final gradation list published on
02.05.2001, which was done by following due procedure,
that is to say by inviting objection at the stage of
provisional gradation list, and the same was finalized on
02.05.2001 and even after publication of the final
gradation list, opposite party no.5 had not objected to the
same, after six years, when fresh gradation list was
prepared, raising of objection by opposite party no.5 to
the fixation of seniority of the petitioner over and above
the opposite party no.5 cannot have any justification, as
the seniority already fixed, pursuant to the final gradation
list published on 02.05.2001, had reached its finality and,
more so, the claim of opposite party no.5 subsequently is
also hit by the principle of estoppel.
16. Otherwise also, if contention of opposite party
no.5 is accepted that he is senior to the petitioner, the
same is also not permissible at a belated stage, as the
petitioner had not raised any objection, when the final
gradation list was published on 02.05.2001, even at the
stage of provisional gradation list published by the
authority. Thereby, opposite party no.5 had waived his
right to claim seniority over the petitioner and, as such,
the subsequent claim made is hit by principle of waiver
and acquiescence.
17. In Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture
Department, (2015) 15 SCC 1, the apex Court held that
doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable doctrine which
applies when a party having a right stands by and sees
another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right,
while the act is in progress and after violation is complete,
which conduct reflects his assent or accord. He cannot
afterwards complain.
In literal sense, the term acquiescence means
silent assent, tacit consent, concurrence, or acceptance,
which denotes conduct that is evidence of an intention of
a party to abandon an equitable right and also to denote
conduct from which another party will be justified in
inferring such an intention. Acquiescence can be either
direct with full knowledge and express approbation, or
indirect where a person having the right to set aside the
action stands by and sees another dealing in a manner
inconsistent with that right and in spite of the
infringement takes no action mirroring acceptance.
Similar view has also been taken by the apex
Court in the case of The Chairman, State Bank of
India v. M.J. James, (2022) 2 SCC 301.
18. In Dawson's Bank Ltd. v. Nippon Menkwa
Kabushiki Kaisha, AIR 1935 PC 79, it was held that
waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a right. It
involves conscious abandonment of an existing legal
right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except
for such a waiver, a party could have enjoyed. In fact it is
an agreement not to assert a right. There can be no
waiver unless the person who is said to have waived, is
fully informed as to his rights and with full knowledge
about the same, he intentionally abandons them.
Similar view was taken in Sikkim Suba
Associates v. State of Sikkim, AIR 2001 SC 2062; and
Krishna Bahadur v. Purna Theatre, AIR 2004 SC
4282.
Acquiescence, being the principle of equity,
must be made applicable in a case where the order has
been passed and complied with without raising any
objection. Estoppel follows acquiescence.
19. In the case of Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of
India, AIR 1957 SC 397, the Constitution Bench of the
apex Court had explained the scope of estoppels
observing that once an order is passed against a person
and without raising any objection he submits to the
jurisdiction or complies with such order, he cannot be
permitted to challenge the said order merely because he
could not succeed there, for the reason that such
conduct of that person would disentitle him for any relief
before the Court.
Similar view was also taken by the apex Court
in the case Manak Lal Advocate v. Prem Chand
Singhvi, AIR 1957 SC 425, Maharashtra State Road
Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor
Service, Amaravati, AIR 1969 SC 329.
20. In Municipal Corporation of Greater
Bombay v. Hakimwadi Tenants' Assn., AIR 1988 SC
233, the apex Court held that in order to constitute
waiver, there must be voluntary and intentional
relinquishment of a right. The essence of a waiver is an
estoppels and where there is no estoppels, there is no
waiver.
In the above view of the matter, the order
passed by the tribunal cannot also sustain in the eye of
law.
21. If the fact of the instant case is considered from
other angle, though the order was passed by the appellate
authority on 23.06.2008, but opposite party no.5
approached the tribunal by filing O.A. No. 669 of 2010 on
23.06.2010. As per the provisions contained in the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the opposite party
no.5 had to prefer the original application within a period
of one year. The original application, having been filed by
opposite party no.5 after near about two years, was
barred by limitation. Therefore, the tribunal has
committed gross error apparent on the face of record by
entertaining the original application, beyond the period of
limitation prescribed in the Act itself. Thereby, the
original application so filed by opposite party no.5 should
have been dismissed being barred by limitation.
22. In view of the facts and circumstances, as well
as the law, as discussed above, this Court is of the
considered view that the tribunal, while passing the order
impugned dated 02.05.2014 by entertaining O.A. No. 669
of 2010 filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation,
has committed gross error apparent, which cannot
sustain in the eye of law and is liable to be quashed. As a
result of which, the consequential order dated 03.06.2014
under Annexure-12 in communicating the gradation list
prepared in compliance with the order passed by the
tribunal under Annexure-11, is also not sustainable in
the eye of law.
23. It is of relevance to mention that by virtue of
the interim order dated 30.07.2014 passed in Misc. Case
No. 10780 of 2014, this Court had already stayed the
operation of the order dated 02.05.2014 under Annexure-
11 passed by the Orissa Administrative Tribunal,
Bhubaneswar and also directed not to give effect the
order under Annexure-12.
24. In view of the above, the order dated
02.05.2014 passed by the Orissa Administrative Tribunal,
Bhubaneswar in O.A. No. 669 of 2010 under Annexure-
11 and the consequential final gradation list
communicated vide order No. 7014 dated 03.06.2014
under Annexure-12, are hereby quashed and opposite
parties no.1 and 2 are directed to maintain seniority of
the petitioner over and above opposite party no.5,
pursuant to the final gradation list prepared on
02.05.2001, and grant all benefits to the petitioner, as
due and admissible to her in accordance with law.
25. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. No
order as to costs.
..................................
DR. B.R. SARANGI,
JUDGE
SAVITRI RATHO, J. I agree.
..................................
SAVITRI RATHO,
JUDGE
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
The 17th May, 2022, Arun/GDS
