Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 2989 Ori
Judgement Date : 6 July, 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.P(C) No.3203 of 2022
(Through hybrid mode)
M/S. Blue Line Resorts Pvt. Ltd. .... Petitioner
Mr. Avijit Pal, Advocate
-versus-
M/S. Hotel Sea Point Pvt. Ltd. .... Opposite Party
Mr. S. Routray, Advocate
CORAM: JUSTICE ARINDAM SINHA
ORDER
Order No. 06.07.2022
02. 1. Mr. Pal, learned advocate appears on behalf of petitioner and
submits, judicial review of order dated 27th December, 2021 is sought
by his client. The order was made in his client's petition under section
29A (5) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court below
dismissed it.
2. He submits, there is confusion created on identity of his client.
The reference was commenced on notice issued by opposite party.
Said opposite party, thereafter, filed Arbitration Petition no.39 of 2013
under section 11(6) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The
request petition was disposed of by order dated 5th November, 2015
appointing sole arbitrator. It cannot be disputed that the reference was
compelled pursuant to deed of lease dated 1st May, 2012, in which
clause-18 provided for arbitration. He hands up copy of the deed to
demonstrate that his client had executed it as 'Blue Line Resorts Pvt.
Ltd.', though description of his client was erroneously given in the
deed as 'Blue Line Hotel and Resorts Pvt. Ltd'. It is an inadvertent
error in writing of the deed, being relied upon by opposite party to
avoid conclusion of the reference by award, if possible. He submits
further, there is yet another hurdle faced by his client inasmuch as its
name was struck off by the Registrar of Companies (ROC) for not
filing return. He hands up order dated 26th April, 2022 directing
restoration of his client as a duly registered company, directed by
National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), Cuttack Bench.
3. He submits, there should be extension of time to enable the
tribunal to pass award. He reiterates, the arbitration was compelled by
opposite party as claimant. Said opposite party is now resisting
conclusion of the reference. Its motives are obvious.
4. Mr. Routray, learned advocate appears on behalf of opposite
party and submits, petitioner with oblique motive persuaded his client
to grant lease in respect of its property, a hotel. Petitioner took over
the hotel and has run its business to the ground. They did not pay lease
rent. As such, his client sought arbitration by notice. They were then
constrained to request The Hon'ble The Chief Justice for appointment
of arbitrator.
5. He submits, there should not be interference with impugned
order inasmuch as there is no illegality or material irregularity therein.
The reasons have been given after having heard the parties. Upon
application of mind the Court below found that taking into
consideration order dated 9th April, 2021 passed in the request petition
under section 11(6) and conduct of petitioner in having suppressed
same, the petition for extension of time was held to be not
maintainable in the eye of law and dismissed. In the facts and
circumstances before the Court below it was a possible view taken.
6. Mr. Routray's yet further submission is that section 29 A was
brought in by the amending Act. It is prospective in application. It
cannot apply to the arbitration proceeding, it having commenced much
prior to the amendment Act. Effective date for application of the
amendments is 23rd October, 2015. He relies on judgment dated 10th
November, 2021 of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal no.6112 of
2021 (Ratnam Sudesh IYER Vs. Jackie Kakubhai Shroff), inter
alia, paragraph 18 in the print handed up. Therein the Court relied on
its earlier judgment in Board of Control for Cricket in India v.
Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd., reported in (2018) 6 SCC 287 to declare on
reference made to section 26 of the 2015 amendment Act, nothing
contained in the amendment Act would apply to arbitration
proceedings commenced in accordance with provisions under section
21 of the principal Act, before commencement of the amending Act,
unless parties otherwise agreed. On query from Court he submits,
there is no agreement between parties that the amending Act would be
made to apply to the reference. As such also the petition under section
29 A (5) was not maintainable.
7. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, when enacted,
referred to as the principal Act as above, did not have a provision
limiting the mandate by time. It is clear, parties have not agreed that
provisions in the amendment Act of 2015 would be made applicable to
the reference, commenced much prior thereto. In the circumstances, it
cannot be said that mandate of the tribunal was limited by time. It
therefore appears, the petition made under section 29A(5) is
misconceived. Since the Court below had dismissed the same on
finding it otherwise not maintainable, the result of impugned order
does not need interference. However, it is made clear that the
contentions of earlier extension granted, it having become final and
the petition thereafter made under section 29A(5), do not need
adjudication since, as aforesaid, the petition itself is misconceived.
The tribunal is expected to expeditiously deal with and conclude the
reference, there being no limit by time on the mandate
8. The writ petition is disposed of as above.
(Arindam Sinha) Judge Prasant
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