"35. Generally, the principle has found vast application in cases of
there being two statutes: general or specific with the latter treating
the common subject-matter more specifically or minutely than the
former. Corpus Juris Secundum, 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 482 states
that when construing a general and a specific statute pertaining
to the same topic, it is necessary to consider the statutes as
consistent with one another and such statutes therefore should
be harmonised, if possible, with the objective of giving effect to a
consistent legislative policy. On the other hand, where a general
statute and a specific statute relating to the same subject-matter
cannot be reconciled, the special or specific statute ordinarily will
control. The provision more specifically directed to the matter at
issue prevails as an exception to or qualification of the provision
which is more general in nature, provided that the specific or
WA No. 44 of 2025 Contd.../-
this court and as such, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
said meeting for appointing the respondent No. 4 as Principal of the
WA No. 44 of 2025 Contd.../-
said College. However, the Chairman of the Governing Body did not
append his signature and another member also walked out. It has
of quorum in order to obtain favourable order from this court. The
the writ petition is liable to be rejected outright. In support of such
"37. The person seeking equity must do equity. It is not just the clean
hands, but also clean mind, clean heart and clean objective that
are the equi-fundamentals of judicious litigation. The legal
maxim jure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento
WA No. 44 of 2025 Contd.../-
et injuria fieri locupletiorem, which means that it is a law of nature
that one should not be enriched by the loss or injury to another,
is the percept for courts. Wide jurisdiction of the court should not
become a source of abuse of process of law by the disgruntled
litigant. Careful exercise is also necessary to ensure that the
litigation is genuine, not motivated by extraneous considerations
and imposes an obligation upon the litigant to disclose the true
facts and approach the court with clean hands.
"38. No litigant can play "hide and seek" with the courts or adopt "pick
and choose". True facts ought to be disclosed as the court knows
law, but not facts. One, who does not come with candid facts and
clean breast cannot hold a writ of the court with soiled hands.
Suppression or concealment of material facts is impermissible to
a litigant or even as a technique of advocacy. In such cases, the
court is duty-bound to discharge rule nisi and such applicant is
required to be dealt with for contempt of court for abusing the
process of court. (K.D. Sharma v. SAIL.)"
[9] The third limb of the arguments on behalf of the appellant is
that it is a settled position of law that if the petitioner does not have a
direct and personal interest in the matter or failed to demonstrate that
he had been directly affected by any alleged illegality or abuse of
authority, the court may refuse to entertain the writ petition due to lack
of standing. That being the position of law, the writ petition is liable to
be dismissed as the writ petitioner has not shown anywhere in the
writ petition that he has a direct and personal interest in the matter of
appointment of respondent No. 4 as Principal of Kumbi College.
[10] Another point raised by the learned counsel appearing for
the appellant during the course of argument is that necessary party
has not been impleaded in the writ petition and as such, the writ
WA No. 44 of 2025 Contd.../-
petition is liable to be rejected on ground of non-impleadment of
necessary party. Elaborating this point, it has been submitted by
the learned counsel that the Secretary of the Governing Body, Kumbi
College, who issued the impugned order is not impleaded as one of
the respondents in the writ petition even though the writ petitioner
seeks for quashing and setting aside the said impugned order in the
writ petition. According to the learned counsel, the Secretary of the
Governing Body of Kumbi College is a necessary party in the writ
proceedings and non-impleadment of such necessary party is fatal to
the writ petition.
[11] After hearing the submissions advanced by the learned
counsel appearing for the appellant at length and on careful perusal
of the impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge, we
are of the considered view that the arguments advanced by the
learned counsel appearing for the appellant before us is nothing but
reiteration of the submissions made before the learned Single Judge
and that the learned Single Judge had already considered such
arguments and elaborately deal with the same in the impugned
judgment and order. We are also of the considered view that there is
no substance or merit in the arguments advanced by the learned
counsel appearing for the appellant and we do not find any ground or
material to disagree with the findings and decisions arrived at by the
WA No. 44 of 2025 Contd.../-
learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment and order. The
reasons for arriving at such conclusions are as under:-
(1) In connection with the first limb of the arguments, it is to be
pointed out that the Kumbi College, Kumbi, was registered
under the old Act, i.e., the Societies Registration Act, 1860.
Under Section 6 of the old Act, it is, inter alia, provided
that a Society registered under the Act may sue or be
sued in the name of the President, Chairman, or Principal
Secretary, or Trustees, as shall be determined by the
rules and regulations of the society (emphasis
supplied). In terms of the said provision of Section 6 of the
old Act, the Governing Body of the Kumbi College, while
framing its regulations named as Constitution of the
Governing Body, have determined under Article 26 of its
Constitution that all suits by or against the College should
be in the name of the Secretary.
Subsequently, the Manipur Societies Registration
Act, 1989 (new Act) was enacted by the Manipur Legislature
with the assent of the President of India which came into
force w.e.f. 17-03-1990. The application of the old Act to the
State of Manipur was repealed by Section 32(1) of the new
WA No. 44 of 2025 Contd.../-
Act. In Section 32 sub-section (2) proviso (a) of the new Act,
it is provided as under:-
"32(2) Any society registered in any place within the State of
Manipur, under the Registration Act, 1860, shall be deemed
to have been registered under this Act, and its principal
office shall be deemed to be the registered office of the
society:
Provided that -
(a) The memorandum of association and the regulations of any
such society shall, if they are repugnant to any of the
provision of this Act and the rules, be brought in conformity
wherewith within the six months from the Commencement
of this Act or within such further period as the Registrar may
allow, and thereafter shall, to the extent of such
repugnancy, be deemed to be void an of no effect."
(1-a) The corollary is that on enforcement of Section 32 of the
new Act -
(i) The old Act has been repealed in its application to the
State of Manipur;
(ii) Any society registered in any place within the State of
Manipur under the old Act shall be deemed to have been
registered under the new Act;
(iii) The memorandum of association and the regulations of
any such society, if there is any repugnancy with any
provisions of the new Act, unless brought in conformity
with the provisions of the new Act within the prescribed
period, shall to the extent of such repugnancy be
deemed to be void and of no effect.
WA No. 44 of 2025 Contd.../-
(1-b) There is a fundamental difference between the provision of
Section 6 of the old Act and Section 19 of the new Act, which
are reproduced hereunder for ready reference:-
"6. Suits by and against societies. - Every society registered
under this Act may sue or be sued in the name of the
president, chairman, or principal secretary, or trustees, as
shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the
society and, in default of such determination, in the name of
such person as shall be appointed by the governing body
for the occasion."
"19. Suits and proceeding by and against a society: - (1) Every
society may sue or be sued in the name of the President, the
Secretary, or any office-bearer authorised the Registrar in
this behalf."
(1-c) Under the old Act, the society can determine the official or
officials to represent it while framing its rules and regulations
whereas under the new Act, the Act itself provides officials
to represent a society.
(1-d) In the present case, the society has already determined
under Article 26 of its regulations that the society can sue or
be sued in the name of the Secretary only and that no action
has been taken by the society to amend or modify the
provisions of the said Article 26 of its regulations to bring it
in conformity with the provision of Section 19 of the new Act.
Therefore, we are of the considered view that there is
repugnancy between the provisions of the said Article 26 of
the societies regulations and the provision of Section 19 of
WA No. 44 of 2025 Contd.../-
the new Act and that by operation of law, as provided under
Section 32(2)(a) of the new Act, such repugnancy shall be
deemed to be void and of no effect. We are, accordingly,
of the view that the President or the Secretary or any
authorised Office Bearer can represent a society as
provided under Section 19 of the new Act and that the writ
petition in its present form is maintainable.
(1-e) There is also another aspect of the matter to be considered.
Section 31 of the new Act empowers the State Government
to make rules for carrying out the purpose of the Act and in
exercise of the said power, the State Government has
framed a rule called the Manipur Societies Registration
Rules, 2004 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rule" for
Clarity). Rule 4 of the said Rules provides for framing
regulations of the society which shall contain provisions,
among others, the name of the person or officer, if any,
authorized to sue or be sued on behalf of the society. The
rules and regulations of the society is framed under this
delegated power as provided under Rule 4 of the said Rules.
According to us, the rules and regulations of a society
framed under Rule 4 of the said Rules cannot be treated
as a statutory rule at par with the provisions of the Rules
WA No. 44 of 2025 Contd.../-
or the provisions of the Societies Registration Act. It is trite
principle of law that if there is a conflict between the rules
made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of
India or under a delegated provision of an Act and the law
made by the appropriate legislature, the law made by the
appropriate legislature will prevail and if there is a conflict
between the executive instructions or guidelines and the
rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the
Constitution of India or under a delegated provision of an
Act, the rules made under proviso to Article 309 or under a
delegated provisions of an Act will prevail. It is elementary
principle of law that a bye-law or a rule framed under an
Act cannot override the express provisions of the Act. It
must be consistent with and subordinate to the provisions of
the Act. In such view of the settled principle of law, we
cannot subscribe ourselves to the submissions made by the
learned counsel appearing for the appellant and that the
provisions of Article 26 of the societies regulations shall
prevail over the provision of Section 19 of the new Act and
we are of the considered view that such submissions are
misconceived and contrary to the well-settled principle of
law.
WA No. 44 of 2025 Contd.../-
(2) With regard to second limb of the argument advanced by
the learned counsel for the appellant, the claim and counter
claim made by the writ petitioner and the appellant is
about convening or non-convening of the meeting of the
Governing Body of Kumbi College on the scheduled date,
i.e., on 30-01-2025. The plea taken by the writ petitioner is
that the meeting of the said Governing Body which was
scheduled on 30-01-2025 could not be convened for want
of quorum as well as on the objection raised by certain
members against the continued membership of the
appellant as the Secretary of the said Governing Body and
accordingly, no resolution was taken. On the other hand,
the stand taken by the appellant is that the writ petitioner,
i.e., the Chairman of the Governing Body was present and
presided the General Body Meeting held on 30-01-2025
though he refrained from signing the proceeding of the
meeting. In our considered view, such claim and counter
claim is nothing but a disputed question of fact which we
cannot decide in the present proceedings. On examination
of the record, we do not find any material to come to
the conclusion that the writ petitioner has deliberately
concealed material facts and as such, we cannot bring
WA No. 44 of 2025 Contd.../-
ourselves to agree with the submissions made by the
learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the writ
petition is liable to be dismissed outright for concealment of
material facts.
[12] With regard to the third limb of the argument advanced by
the learned counsel for the appellant, it may be pointed out that the
writ petition has been filed on behalf of the society by its Chairman in
a representative capacity (not in a personal capacity) challenging the
impugned order dated 03-02-2025 on the ground that the appellant
had issued the same illegally ultra-virus the relevant rules and on the
basis of a non-existent and manufactured resolution of the Governing
Body alleged to be taken in its meeting held on 30-01-2025. In such
view of the matter, we are of the considered view that there is
no question of involvement of any personal interest or personal
grievances or affecting any personal rights and as such, we are not
inclined to accept the arguments advanced by the learned counsel
appearing for the appellant.
[13] With regard to the additional point raised by the learned
counsel appearing for the appellant during the course of hearing of
the present appeal that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed for
non-joinder of necessary party, we are not inclined to entertain such
submission as the appellant has neither raised such point in his
WA No. 44 of 2025 Contd.../-
pleadings in connection with the writ petition nor has he raised any
such point before the learned Single Judge at the time of hearing of
the writ petition. We are not inclined to allow the appellant to challenge
the impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge on
grounds not raised by him during the proceedings of the writ petition.
Moreover, as the person who issued the impugned order, i.e., the
appellant himself, has been impleaded as one of the respondents in
the writ petition, we are of the considered view that there is no
question of non-impleadment of necessary party. Accordingly, we are
not inclined to accept such submission advanced by the learned
counsel appearing for the appellant.
[14] In the facts and circumstances of the present case and in
view of the findings and reasons given hereinabove, we are of the
considered view that the case laws cited by the counsel for the
appellant is of no help to the case of the appellant.
In the result, the writ appeal and the connected application
are hereby dismissed as being devoid of merit, however, without any
order as to cost.
JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE
Devananda
FR / NFR
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