Manipur High Court
Ph. Seijang Mate & Anr vs The Tengnoupal Village Authority ... on 12 October, 2022
No. 61
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
LHAINEI Digitally
by
signed
AT IMPHAL
CHONG LHAINEICHONG
HAOKIP
HAOKIP Date: 2022.10.12
15:50:55 +05'30'
WP(C) No. 77 of 2020
Ph. Seijang Mate & Anr.
.....Petitioner/s
- Versus -
The Tengnoupal Village Authority & 3 Ors.
.... Respondent/s
BEFORE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AHANTHEM BIMOL SINGH
12.10.2022
[1] Heard Mr. Mayonkui Ngalung, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners, Ms. S. Pamchuila Gangte, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent No. 1 and Mr. A. Vashum, learned Government Advocate
appearing for the respondents No. 2, 3 & 4.
[2] The present writ petition had been filed assailing the order and
information issued by the Tengnoupal Village Authority which had been
issued on the basis of the decision taken by the Village Authority on
13.10.2019 and with the prayer for quashing and setting aside the same.
[3] It has been submitted by Mr. Mayonkui Ngalung, learned counsel
appearing for the petitioners that by the said impugned order, certain
restrictions have been imposed upon the petitioners and their family
members on the ground of their refusal to reconsider their religious
conversion. The restrictions imposed upon the petitioners and their family
members are as under:-
"1. In the event of hardship, lost, and happiness, the church and the
village will take no responsibility in any courses for the welfare of
Mr. Seijang Mate family and Mr. Khaikholun Mate family.
WP(C) No. 77 of 2020 Page 1
"2. Mr. Seijang Mate and Khaikholun Mate families have been
terminated/restricted from getting access to public utility, facilities
and other provisions provided by the village authority.
3. Mr. Seijang Mate and Khaikholun Mate families have been
restricted to touch and use every natural resources/properties, i.e.
wood, bamboo etc within the village supervision."
[4] It has been submitted by Mr. Mayonkui Ngalung, learned counsel
appearing for the petitioners that the Tengnoupal Village Authority has no
power, authority and jurisdictions to issue the said impugned order thereby
putting the restrictions quoted hereinabove upon the petitioners and their
family members. The learned counsel further submitted that the said
impugned order had been issued in violation of the Constitutional provisions
under Art. 25 & 26 and also in violation of their fundamental rights
guaranteed under Art. 19 (1) (d) & (e) and Art. 21 of the Constitution of
India. It has also been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners
that similar issue raised in the present writ petition had already been
decided by this Court its judgment and order dated 16.01.2018 passed in
WP(C) No. 651 of 2017 and the said judgment squarely covers the issue
raised in the present writ petition. The learned counsel accordingly
submitted that the impugned order is liable to be quashed and set aside in
view of the aforesaid Constitutional provisions and the judgment and order
rendered by this Court.
[5] Ms. S. Pamchuila Gangte, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent No. 1 raised a preliminary issue with regard to the
maintainability of the present writ petition. It has been submitted by the
learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 that under Section 43 of the
Manipur (Village Authorities in Hill Areas) Act, 1956 there is an effective and
WP(C) No. 77 of 2020 Page 2
efficacious statutory remedy for redressing the grievances of the petitioners
raised in the present writ petition. It has been submitted by the learned
counsel that without exhausting the effective and efficacious statutory
remedy provided under Section 43 of the said Act, the petitioners have
directly approached this Court by filing the present writ petition thereby
assailing the impugned order. In view of the above, the present writ petition
is not maintainable.
[6] In support of her contention, the learned counsel relied on the
judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in the case of
"National Plywood Industries Ltd. Vs. Union of India" reported in 2007
(1) GLT 584 wherein, it has been held as under:-
"26. This now leads us to the second issue as to whether the petitioner
ought to have availed the alternative remedy by way of preferring appeal to
the Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal. The petitioner
instead of exhausting alternative remedy of appeal has invoked the writ
jurisdiction. As has been observed by the Apex Court in the decision
reported in (1998) 8 SCC 01 (Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade
Marks, Mumbai), the High Court exercising its power under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a
writ petition and that the High Court has imposed upon itself certain
restrictions, one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is
available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction.
"27. In the case of State of H.P. Vs. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd.
reported in (2005) 6 SCC 499, the Apex Court while observing that the
power relating to alternative remedy has been considered to be a rule of
self imposed limitation and that it is essentially a rule of policy,
convenience and discretion and never rule of law, it is within the discretion
of jurisdiction of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The Apex Court further observed that though the matter
relating to an alternative remedy has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of
the case, normally the High Court should not interfere, if there is an
adequate efficacious alternative remedy and that if some body approaches
the High Court without availing the alternative remedy provided, the High
Court should ensure that he has made out a strong case or that there exist
good grounds to invoke the extra ordinary jurisdiction. In the instant case,
the position has been explained above. I am of the considered opinion that
to exercise the writ jurisdiction in the given facts and circumstances of the
case instead of augmenting the cause of justice, it will be a failure of
justice and the abuse in the process of the Court."
WP(C) No. 77 of 2020 Page 3
[7] The learned counsel also relied on the judgment and order passed
by the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in the case of "Dal Thang Vs. State of
Mizoram" reported in 2004 (2) GLT 145 wherein it has been held as under:-
"19. The petitioners are aware of the confiscation proceeding
and the final adjudication orders passed on 20-12-2002. Even assuming
that they were not aware of the confiscation proceedings initiated against
them before filing of the writ petition, but there is no denial and cannot be
so that the petitioners atleast could come to know about the finality
attained to the aforesaid proceedings with the filing of the affidavit-in-
opposition on 7.8.2003. They did not disown the facts disclosed in the said
affidavit till the matter was taken up for hearing. It was only during the
course of hearing. The petitioners being confronted with the plea of the
respondents as raised in the affidavit-in-opposition filed their affidavit-in-
reply making a vague and evasive statement as noticed above. They have
also not chosen to do anything relating to the said confiscation proceeding
by way of preferring appeals as provided for by the Customs Act, 1962
itself. The said Act is a self contained code and Chapter XV of the Act,
deals with the provisions relating to appeals. The petitioner has alternative
remedy by way of preferring appeals against the final Adjudication orders.
The Apex Court in the case of Union of India V. Lexus Exports as reported
in (1997) 10 SCC 232 held that the proceedings of seizure and
confiscation are proceedings in rem. Reacting to the interference made by
the High Court, the Apex Court held that such interference at the particular
stage was totally uncalled for. It has already been noticed that the final
Adjudication Orders have been passed on 20.12.2002 and the petitioners
have got remedy under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 itself. It
will be a wise discretion not to exercise the power under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India so as to interfere with the confiscation proceedings,
which culminated to the aforesaid final Adjudication Orders. There is also
no challenge to the same. The petitioners even after the disclosure made
in the affidavit did not choose to bring any amendment to the writ petition
by way of making challenge to the final Adjudication Orders. To grant the
prayers made in the writ petitions would amount to interference with the
confiscation proceedings and the final Adjudication orders. The writ
petitioners have raised the plea that as per the above quoted provisions of
the Customs Act, 1962, they are entitled to get back the seized
motorcycles without, however, making any prayer for interference with the
final Adjudication orders dated 20.12.2002. I have gone through the said
order dated 20.12.2002, which clearly reflects as to how the petitioners did
not respond to the show cause notice and the opportunity of personal
hearing. It was under these circumstances the said orders dated
20.12.2002 were passed."
[8] Mr. A. Vashum, learned Government Advocate appearing for the
respondents No. 2, 3 & 4 submitted that the State respondents have
categorically stated in Para 3 of their affidavit-in-opposition that Tengnoupal
Village Authority has no power and authority to issue the impugned order
WP(C) No. 77 of 2020 Page 4
and that the action of the Tengnoupal Village Authority is unconstitutional
and ultra-vires the mandate of Art. 19 (1) (d) & (e), Art. 21 and Art. 25 & 26
of the Constitution of India and accordingly, the impugned order is not
sustainable in the eyes of law.
[9] With regard to the contention raised by the counsel for the
respondent No. 1 about the maintainability of the present writ petition, it has
been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that under Section
30 of the Manipur (Village Authorities in Hill Areas) Act, 1956, the jurisdiction
of Village Court in Civil Cases are clearly laid down. The said provisions of
Section 30 is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:-
"30. Jurisdiction of village courts in civil cases. - Notwithstanding
anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), or in any
other law for the time being in force, but subject to the provisions of section 31
and the section 32, the village court and the ordinary civil court, within the
local limits of whose jurisdiction the village is situated, shall have concurrent
jurisdiction to try the following classes of suits, namely :-
"(a) suits for money due on contracts;
"(b) suits for the recovery of movable property or the value of such
property;
"(c) suits for compensation for wrongfully taking or injuring movable
property; and
"(d) suits for damages by cattle trespass;
When the value of the suit does not exceed five hundred
rupees."
[10] In view of the aforesaid provisions under Section 30, it has been
submitted that the impugned order cannot be said to be passed under
Section 30 of the said Act and the objection raised by the counsel for the
respondent No. 1 is misconceived and not sustainable.
[11] I have heard the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel
appearing for the parties and I have also perused the record of the present
WP(C) No. 77 of 2020 Page 5
case. Except for the objection raised by the counsel for the respondent No.
1 with regard to the maintainability of the present writ petition, no argument
has been advanced by the counsel for the respondent No. 1 with regard to
the contention raised by the counsel for the petitioners.
[12] Under Section 43 of the said Manipur (Village Authorities in Hill
Areas) Act, 1956, it is provided that the decision of the Village Court in any
suit can be challenged before the District Judge on the application of any
parties to the suit within 30 days from the date of decree of the Village
Court. Under Section 30 of the said Act, which has been reproduced
hereinabove, the Village Court has not been empowered or given
jurisdiction for the trial of the issue raised in the present writ petition and the
impugned order cannot be taken to be one passed in exercise of the power
conferred under Section 30 of the said Act. In view of the above, this Court
is of the considered view that the provisions of Section 43 of the said Act is
not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
Accordingly, the Authorities relied on by the counsel for the respondent No.
1 is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
[13] On careful perusal of the judgment and order dated 16.01.2018,
passed by this Court in WP(C) No. 651 of 2017, it is found that the Hon'ble
Court has clearly held that Village Authority is a statutory authority
constituted under the Manipur (Village Authority in Hills Areas) Act, 1956
having statutory power of Village Administration as provided under the Act
and task with the responsibility of maintaining law and order in the Village
having of its power as provided under the Act, 1956 and that if the Village
Authority has directed banishment and expulsion of any villagers, the same
WP(C) No. 77 of 2020 Page 6
will be illegal and violative of the fundamental rights of the villagers
guaranteed under Art. 19 (1) (d) & (e) as well as Art. 25 & 26 of the
Constitution of India. On the basis of such finding, the Hon'ble Court held
that the Act of the Village Authorities with regard to the imposing restriction
of the banishment from the village for conversion of religious acts is illegal
and violative of the Constitutional provisions and set aside such activities of
the Village authorities.
[14] On careful consideration of the rival submissions advanced by the
learned counsel appearing for the parties and on careful examination of the
record of the present writ petition, this Court finds that the Tengnoupal
Village Authorities has no authority, power and jurisdiction to issue the
impugned order and that such action of the said Village Authorities is illegal
and ultra-vires the Constitutional provisions provided under Art. 19 (1) (d) &
(e), Art. 21 and Art. 25 & 26 of the Constitution of India and the same is
liable to be quashed and set aside. Accordingly, the said impugned order
and information is hereby quashed and set aside.
[15] With the aforesaid directions, the present writ petition is disposed of.
There will be no order as to costs.
JUDGE
Lhaineichong
WP(C) No. 77 of 2020 Page 7
