Manipur High Court
Mr. Gegin vs Khwairakpam Manglembi Devi on 25 November, 2022
Digitally
LAIREN signed by
MAYUM LAIRENMAYU
M INDRAJEET
INDRAJ SINGH
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
EET
Date:
2022.11.25 AT IMPHAL
SINGH 12:04:37
+05'30'
Maintainability No. 1 of 2019
Mr. Gegin, aged about 54 years, son of late Khupzuangam, of Churachandpur
Proper, P.O. & P.S. Churachandpur, Churachandpur District,
Manipur, PIN-795128.
....Petitioner
- Versus -
1. Khwairakpam Manglembi Devi, aged about 64 years, w/o Kh. Manibabu
Singh, of Awangkhunou Mayai Leikai, P.O. Langjing, P.S. Patsoi, Imphal
West District, Manipur, PIN-795113.
2. Mr. Vansiemlien, aged about 49 years, s/o R. Remmur of Saikot Village,
P.O. & P.S. Churachandpur, Churachandpur District,
Manipur, PIN-795128.
3. Mr. Thanglun, aged about 29 years, s/o Late Mangjakai of D. Phaillen
Village, P.O. & P.S. Churachandpur, Churachandpur District,
Manipur, PIN-795128.
4. Shri Khwairakpam Manibabu Singh, aged about 67 years, s/o Late Kh.
Tompokmacha Singh, of Awangkhunou Mayai Leikai, P.O. Langjing,
P.S. Patsoi, Imphal West District, Manipur, PIN 795113.
...Respondents
BEFORE
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SANJAY KUMAR
For the petitioner : N. Mahendra, Advocate
For respondent No.1 : W. Niranjit, Advocate
Date of Hearing : 22.11.2022
Date of Order : 25.11.2022
Maintainability No. 1 of 2019 Page 1
ORDER
[1] By Judgment and Order dated 29.06.2019, the Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal, Manipur at Lamphelpat, disposed of Motor Accident Claims Case No. 46 of
2017 filed by respondent No.1 herein. Thereby, the Tribunal directed respondent No. 2
in the Claims Case to deposit the compensation amount of ₹. 11,25,182/- (Rupees
Eleven Lakh Twenty-Five Thousand One Hundred and Eighty-Two only) along with
interest thereon @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till
realization. A copy of the said Judgment and Order was directed to be furnished to
respondent No. 2 for information and compliance. Aggrieved thereby, respondent No.
2 filed this appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity, 'the
Act of 1988'). As there was a delay of 54 days on his part in doing so, he filed
MC(Mac App). No. 3 of 2019 seeking condonation thereof. However, when the said
miscellaneous case was taken up for hearing on 26.11.2019, Mr. N. Mahendra, learned
counsel appearing for the applicant/appellant, made an endorsement to the effect that
no application for condonation of delay was necessary and that the miscellaneous case
may be closed as withdrawn. Recording the same, MC(Mac App). No. 3 of 2019 was
closed as withdrawn. Thereafter, when the matter came up on 28.11.2019, the issue
arose as to how and when the appellant received a copy of the judgment and order
under appeal. The matter was accordingly directed to be listed under the caption
'Maintainability'. However, the Registry misunderstood this direction and numbered the
case itself as 'Maintainability No. 1 of 2019'.
[2] The delay of 54 days in the filing of the appeal is yet to be condoned.
Mr. N. Mahendra, learned counsel, relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Bhagmal and others vs. Kunwar Lal and others [(2010) 12 SCC 159], wherein
it was held that a formal application for condonation of delay is not an essential
Maintainability No. 1 of 2019 Page 2
requisite. Similar was the edict of the Supreme Court in Sesh Nath Singh and
another vs. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Ltd. and another
[(2021) 7 SCC 313]. It was observed therein that a plain reading of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, makes it amply clear that it is not mandatory to file an application
in writing before relief can be granted thereunder and all that is required is a plea to
condone the delay. Therefore, withdrawal of MC (Mac App). No. 3 of 2019 is of no
consequence and would not bar this Court from considering the plea of the appellant
to condone the delay of 54 days in the filing of the appeal at this stage.
[3] Heard Mr. N. Mahendra, learned counsel for the applicant/appellant; and
Mr. W. Niranjit, learned counsel for respondent No.1, viz., the claimant.
[4] It is pertinent to note that the appellant herein, being respondent No. 2 in
Motor Accident Claims Case No. 46 of 2017, put in his appearance before the Tribunal
but was set ex parte, vide order dated 03.11.2018 passed by the Tribunal, owing to his
absence. He asserts that the Judgment and Order dated 29.06.2019 passed by the
Tribunal was delivered to him on 14.10.2019 by the claimant and it was only then that
he came to know of its existence. This claimed lack of knowledge on his part is what
he offers as 'sufficient cause' for condoning the delay in the filing of this appeal.
[5] Both sides pressed into service an abundance of case law on principles
relating to condonation of delay. However, each individual case would have to turn
upon its own peculiar facts, basing on the broad legal principles adumbrated over time.
It would not be necessary, therefore, to burden this order with all the cited case law.
Relevant legal principles culled out from the judgments cited by both sides will suffice.
Two considerations are important in the context of condonation of delay -
upon expiration of the period of limitation, a decree holder obtains a benefit under the
law of limitation to plead that the decree is beyond challenge and such a legal right
Maintainability No. 1 of 2019 Page 3
should not be light heartedly disturbed. The other consideration is that if sufficient
cause for excusing the delay is shown, discretion is given to the Court to condone the
delay and admit the appeal. This discretion is conferred upon the Court to advance
substantial justice. In the absence of a reasonable, satisfactory or an appropriate
explanation for seeking condonation of the delay, the same is not to be condoned
lightly. The law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied
with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the Court has no power to extend
the period of limitation on equitable grounds. Laws of limitation are founded on public
policy as an unlimited and perpetual threat of litigation would create insecurity and
uncertainty. The principle is based on the maxim: Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium,
i.e., the interest of the State requires that there should be an end to litigation. Discretion
to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously, based on the facts and
circumstances of each case. 'Sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted if
negligence, inaction or lack of bonafides is attributed to the party (See Ramlal,
Motilal, Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [AIR 1962 SC 361];
P.K.Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala and another [AIR 1998 SC 2276];
Pundlik Jalam Patil vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008)
17 SCC 448]; Basawaraj and another vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer
[(2013) 14 SCC 81]; and Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao vs. Reddy Sridevi and
others [Civil Appeal No. 7696 of 2021, decided on 16.12.2021].
[6] Notably, in Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others (2013) 12 SCC 649. the Supreme
Court set out the principles for condonation of delay after examining a plethora of case
law. The Supreme Court observed that there should be a liberal, pragmatic,
justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for
condonation of delay as Courts are not supposed to legalize injustice but are obliged to
Maintainability No. 1 of 2019 Page 4
remove injustice. It was further observed that the terms 'sufficient cause' should be
understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose, regard being had to the fact
that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the
obtaining fact-situation. Per the Supreme Court, no presumption can be attached to
deliberate causation of delay but gross negligence on the part of the counsel or the
litigant is to be taken note of. Similarly, lack of bonafides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. Further, the concept of liberal
approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed
a totally unfettered free play. The Supreme Court observed that there is a distinction
between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration, for to the former the doctrine
of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the
first one warrants a strict approach whereas the second calls for liberal delineation.
[7] In Brahampal @ Sammay and another vs. National Insurance
Company [(2021) 6 SCC 512], the Supreme Court observed that though the
provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, would not apply to proceedings under the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988, it is relevant to note that while interpreting 'sufficient cause' under
the Limitation Act, 1963, Courts have given it a liberal interpretation. Upon considering
earlier case law, the Supreme Court went on to state that the importance of introducing
the concept of 'reasonableness' had been highlighted in those decisions while giving
'sufficient cause' a liberal interpretation. The Supreme Court also cautioned about the
necessity of distinguishing cases where the delay is of few days, as against cases where
the delay is inordinate as it might cause prejudice to the rights of the other party.
[8] In the case on hand, the Judgment and Order dated 29.06.2019 in Motor
Accident Claims Case No. 46 of 2017 specifically directed that a copy thereof should be
furnished to respondent No. 2 therein, viz., the present appellant. However, there is no
Maintainability No. 1 of 2019 Page 5
evidence of furnishing of the said judgment and order to him by the Registry of the
Tribunal. On the other hand, it is an admitted fact that the certified copy received by
him on 14.10.2019 was supplied by the claimant, viz., respondent No. 1 herein.
Therefore, there was a clear violation of the direction in that regard of the Presiding
Officer of the Tribunal and also the mandate of Section 168(2) of the Act of 1988, which
unequivocally states that the Claims Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the
award to the parties concerned expeditiously and, in any case, within a period of 15
days from the date of the award.
[9] The next question that would arise is whether the appellant can claim
ignorance of the passing of the judgment and order in Motor Accident Claims Case No.
46 of 2017 when he had participated in the proceedings therein, till he was set ex parte.
In this regard, Mr. N. Mahendra, learned counsel, placed reliance on the decision of the
Madras High Court in Murugayyan Kangiar vs. Marudayyammal [(1956) 2 MLJ
86], wherein it was held that even if it is assumed that the defendant in the suit knew
that there was a suit pending against him, that would not necessarily mean that he was
aware of the fact that a decree had been passed against him. According to the Madras
High Court, the statement of the defendant that he became aware of the decree on a
particular date would have to be contradicted and disproved before rejecting such a
claim. On the same lines, in Pichai Ammal vs. Vellayya Thevar @ Ochi Thevar
[AIR 1963 Madras 198], a Division Bench of the Madras High Court observed that
knowledge of the date of hearing of the suit would not necessarily mean knowledge of
the fact that a decree had been passed on that date or subsequent to that date.
According to the Division Bench, it would be necessary to ascertain when the defendant
applying for setting aside such a decree had knowledge thereof and mere knowledge
of the date of the suit would not be enough for that purpose. Presently, no evidence
has been adduced to disprove the claim of the appellant that he did not have knowledge
Maintainability No. 1 of 2019 Page 6
of the passing of the judgment and order in Motor Accident Claims Case No. 46 of 2017
till he received a certified copy thereof on 14.10.2019 from the claimant. Having
received the same, he filed this appeal on 27.11.2019.
That being so and as the delay is not inordinate in itself, being a mere 54
days, this Court is of the opinion that the appellant cannot be non-suited at the
threshold on the technical ground of limitation. Sufficient cause has been shown by him
to entertain this appeal despite the delay of 54 days on his part. This Court therefore
deems it proper to entertain this appeal by condoning the delay of 54 days in its
institution. The Registry is directed to number the appeal and the miscellaneous case
filed therein, if they are otherwise found to be in order, and list the same forthwith
before the appropriate Court for further proceedings.
CHIEF JUSTICE
FR/NFR
Indrajeet
Maintainability No. 1 of 2019 Page 7
