Madras High Court
M/S.Nilakantan & Brothers vs Board Of Trustees Of The Port Of on 23 October, 2025
Author: N. Anand Venkatesh
Bench: N. Anand Venkatesh
OP No. 309 of 2018
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 23-10-2025
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE N. ANAND VENKATESH
OP No. 309 of 2018
M/s.Nilakantan & Brothers
Constructions Pvt.Ltd.
Flat No.2, 1st Floor, Gokul Towers
No.7, C P Ramaswamy Road
Chennai 600 018 Petitioner
Vs
1. Board of Trustees of the Port of
Chennai
(Body Corporate Under Major Port
Trusts Act, 1963), represented by
the Chief Engineer, Rajaji Salai,
Chennai-600 001
2.Chokkaiyan Karthikeyan & Co.
No.83, E.V.K.Sampath Road
(Pudusanthai Road), Erode-638 003 Respondents
PRAYER
To set aside the Award dated 21.08.2010 and 16.10.2010.
1
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OP No. 309 of 2018
For Petitioner : Mr.K.Harishankar and
Ms.Mithreyi Kasthurirangan and
Mr.R.Pranav
For Respondents: Mr.R.Karthikeyan for R1
Mr.G.Ashokapathy
for M/s.Pass Associates for R2
ORDER
This original petition has been filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for brevity, hereinafter referred to as “the Act”)
questioning the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal dated 21.08.2010, for
which subsequent correction was made on 16.10.2010.
2. The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner company is carrying on
the business of construction contracting. The first respondent called for a tender
for the work of construction of mooring dolphin at BD111 etc., vide Tender
No.5/JDA/015/2005/E. The petitioner and the second respondent entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding (for brevity, hereinafter referred to as “the
MOU”) dated 26.05.2005 for the purpose of submitting tender for the said work
by forming a Joint Venture between the two, on the basis of mutually agreed
terms and conditions.
3. In line with the MOU, the second respondent submitted the tender on
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behalf of the joint venture, by letter dated 10.06.2005. Negotiations took place
between the first respondent and the petitioner and the first respondent was
insisting for a rebate of 10.5%, to which the second respondent also agreed, in
spite of the petitioner advising otherwise. The petitioner, therefore, sent a
revised offer letter dated 05.08.2005.
4. The tender was accepted by the first respondent and after getting
various clarifications from the joint venture partners, the first respondent
awarded the work by letter dated 15.09.2005. The work faced several
bottlenecks and ultimately, the contract was foreclosed and terminated by the
first respondent.
5. The second respondent made a claim for damages and for other
payments against the first respondent. The petitioner was not made aware of the
same and the second respondent straight-away started the arbitration
proceedings and the petitioner did not participate in the appointment of the
Arbitrator and they were included as the second respondent in the arbitration
proceedings.
6. In view of the above, the petitioner raised a preliminary issue with
regard to the very maintainability of the proceedings as against the petitioner.
The Arbitral Tribunal informed the petitioner that the preliminary objection will
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be considered at the time of passing the main award. Ultimately, the
preliminary objection raised by the petitioner was overruled and the award was
passed on merits. Aggrieved by the same, the present petition has been filed
before this Court.
7. Issues 1 & 2 framed by the Arbitral Tribunal pertain to the jurisdiction
of the Arbitral Tribunal. For proper appreciation, Issues 1 & 2 are extracted
hereunder:-
“1. Whether the claim petition filed by the claimant
individually without including its Joint Venture Partner
viz., Messrs.Nilakantan & Bros., Constructions Pvt Ltd.,
as a claimant is maintainable?
2. Whether the Hon'ble Tribunal has jurisdiction to
adjudicate the claims made against the second
respondent?”
8. The findings rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal for Issues 1 & 2 are also
extracted hereunder:-
“(51) Issues 1 & 2:
A reading of the above pleadings shows that parties are
blowing hot and cold on issues of maintainability and joinder
nd
of parties. Claimants and the 2 respondent are supposed to be
joint venture partners accepted by the 1st respondent while
st
awarding the subject contract work. In fact it was the 1
respondent who called to for a joint undertaking in stamp paper
nd
from the claimant and the 2 respondent. making them jointly
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liable for the contract work, but still the 1st respondent would
plead in his defence statement that the claim by the claimant
alone making the 2nd respondent as a party respondent is not
st
maintainable. The case of the 1 respondent is that both the
joint venture partners should, if at all, make a joint claim. The
fact remains that at some point of time, differences of opinion
arose between the joint venture partners and inspite of the best
nd
efforts of the claimant to pacify the 2 respondent and make a
joint claim by filing a joint statement of claim, failed. But
nd
while so, the claimant ignored the 2 respondent when they
sought for arbitration and got the present Arbitral Tribunal
constituted. It was the Tribunal which found on the basis of the
agreement between the parties that no final and effective
decision can be arrived at, without both the joint venture
partners on record. Since the 2nd respondent refused to align
with the claimant when the statement of claim was filed, they
had to be impleaded as 2nd respondent. No prejudice could be
nd
caused to the 2 respondent on this account because the
Arbitration and Constitution Act 1996, enables the 2nd
respondent to make all his claims by way of counter claim and
the Limitation Act 1963 applies to such claims and the 1st
respondent is also not prejudiced. A reference to the
correspondence, the joint venture agreement and form of
st
undertaking given at the instance of the 1 respondent, will
disclose the inter-connection between the parties by way of
obligations and liabilities. When we proceed to discuss the
issues, it would be amply proved that our decision to implead
all the necessary parties is in the interest of all parties. It is
never the intention or scope of the Civil Procedure Code,
which we largely follow in arbitration cases, to drive the
parties or pave the way for more and more litigation. If we now
look in to the course of events of this arbitration proceedings
right from the beginning, one can understand how the 2nd
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respondent came to be added as a party to the arbitration.
(52) The Arbitral Tribunal commenced its sittings on 18.3.08.
When they perused the agreement between the parties
providing for arbitration, they found that the agreement was
entered in to between Chennai Port Trust (Respondent-1) on
the one side the claimant with the 2nd respondent on the other
nd st
side. In fact without 2 respondent, the 1 respondent (Chennai
Port Trust) could not have entered in to the agreement or
awarded the contract to the claimant because admittedly, the
claimant did not have the prescribed qualification or
experience prescribed in the tender notice. That is precisely the
reason why the claimant searched for a joint venture partner
with pre-tender qualifications. Taking note of our observations
and the need to have the 2nd respondent also in the arbitration
case, time was given to the parties till 22.3.08 and then till
12.5.2008 and again till 8.10.2008. On 13.8.2008, a petition
was filed by M/s Pathy & Pathy, advocates for the claimant,
seeking more time for filing a joint claim statement, on the
nd
ground that talks were going on with the 2 respondent. On
18.10.2008. the Managing Director of the 2nd respondent
himself filed a memo that he had almost reached a settlement
with the claimant and wanted time till 15.12.2008. On
15.12.2008, again a joint memo signed by the counsel for the
claimant and the counsel for the 2nd respondent seeking time
till 16.02.2009 for filing a joint claim statement. For some
unknown reason, the 2nd respondent did not agree to join the
claimant in filing a joint statement of claim. Therefore, the
claimant filed their independent and separate claim statement
nd
on 16.03.2009, making the joint venture partner as 2
respondent. The Tribunal gave time to the respondents to file
defence statements and counter claims, if any. Instead of filing
defence statements, the respondents raised objections to the
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impleading of the joint venture partners as 2nd respondent. The
Tribunal therefore heard elaborate argument by all the parties,
and passed an interim order on 10.8.09 on the preliminary
objections, rejecting the preliminary objections and giving
liberty to the respondents to raise all their objections and
counter claims, if any. Fresh dates were given for filing
defence statement and counter claims if any. Accordingly the
respondents filed their defence statements and counter claims.
Rejoinders were filed by all parties to the claims made against
them. Time was given for filing agreed issues. Accordingly, the
parties filed an agreed memo of issues. The Tribunal discussed
the issues and adopted the said issues which we have already
quoted in the earlier paragraphs.
(53) We have adverted to the circumstances and the manner in
nd
which the 2 respondent came to be impleaded as party
respondent rather than a party claimant. We have also pointed
nd
out that without the 2 respondent, no valid and binding
decision could be rendered on the issues raised in the case. We
will for the present refer only to a few binding documents in
support of the above statement. Ex- C-2 is the Memorandum of
nd
Understanding between the claimant and 2 respondent
dt.26.5.05, enclosed along with the very first offer. Clause 5
and 10 of Ex C-1 amply establishes our stand that Ex C-4 in
the joint venture agreement on stamp paper. Exh C-22, 23 and
25 are the correspondence relating to the demand of
undertaking by the 1st respondent and the final undertaking
nd
furnished by claimant and 2 respondent puts an end to the
argument on mis-joinder of parties. The plea that the 2nd
respondent is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is
only an imagination of the 2nd respondent because notice was
st
given to them by the 1 respondent about the pendency of the
arbitration proceedings and the opinion of the Arbitral tribunal
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that for a satisfactory and complete disposal of the case the
nd
presence of the 2 respondent was absolutely essential. The
claims and rights of the claimant and the 2nd respondent are so
closely interconnected that it would prejudice both the parties
if they are dealt with separately Further, the arbitration and
conciliation Act 1996, provides a complete answer to all such
rights and claims and enables all the parties to raise their pleas
and also their objections to the opposite parties' claims and
rights. As already stated the claimant and the 2nd respondent
have already locked horns in an independent arbitration before
Justice K. Venkatasamy in respect of their inter se disputes. In
nd
fact the 2 respondent obtained favourable orders for removal
of his equipments from the port area and also got a
commissioner appointed for taking an inventory of his
equipments. The said equipments are subject matter of the
st
present arbitration and whether damages are payable to the 1
respondent for over stayal or whether the 2nd respondent is
entitled to damages for the loss and damage to such
equipments are issues in this case. We have therefore no
st nd
hesitation in rejecting the plea of the 1 and 2 respondents
regarding maintainability and jurisdiction in whatever form the
pleas are taken. All such objections are over ruled and issues 1
& 2 are answered accordingly.”
9. The learned counsel for petitioner submitted that as per the MOU that
was entered into between the petitioner and the second respondent, the second
respondent was to act as a lead partner and he should act on behalf of the joint
venture, after consultation with the petitioner in writing for the performance of
the contract. The learned counsel also relied upon clause 5 of the MOU, wherein
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the petitioner and the second respondent had agreed to enter into the Joint
Venture Agreement and each party was made responsible for execution of their
scope of work and will not interfere in the resultant profit/loss arising due to the
addition/deletion of any work. The learned counsel also relied upon clause 9,
which is the arbitration clause and clause 13, which made it clear that any
correspondence from the Chennai Port Trust pertaining to the work and
addressed to the lead partner, will be communicated in writing to the petitioner.
Thus it was contended that even though the second respondent is the lead
partner, the petitioner must always be kept in the loop and he must be consulted
at every stage and the correspondence with the Chennai Port Trust must be
necessarily communicated to the petitioner also.
10. The learned counsel submitted that the second respondent has
independently raised the dispute with the first respondent and the petitioner was
not even informed about the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal and the dispute
being referred to the Tribunal and that the petitioner came to know about the
proceedings for the first time only after he received the notice from the Arbitral
Tribunal. Hence the petitioner raised a preliminary objection on the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal and the Tribunal had proceeded to reject the preliminary
objection raised by the petitioner, mainly on the ground that no prejudice will be
caused to the petitioner. The learned counsel submitted that the petitioner could
not have challenged the jurisdictional issue independently and had to wait till
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the final award is passed. To substantiate this submission, the learned counsel
relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Abhibus Services India
Pvt.Limited and others v. Pallavan Transport Consultancies Services Ltd.
represented by its Managing Director and others, reported in 2022 SCC
OnLine Mad 796. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the
Apex Court in the case of Deep Industries Limited v. Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation Limited and another, reported in (2020) 15 SCC 706 and in the
case of Bhaven Construction through Authorised Signatory Premjibhai
K.Shah v. Executive Engineer, Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Limited and
another, reported in (2022) 1 SCC 75.
11. Per contra, the learned counsel for first respondent submitted that as
per the agreement dated 15.05.2006 that was entered into by the first respondent
with the joint venture partners, it is the second respondent, who was shown as
the contractor. The petitioner was only recognised as a joint venture partner.
Therefore, the dispute pertained to the joint venture and the same was contested
by the second respondent and the petitioner was made as a party in the
proceedings and his claim was also considered by the Tribunal and was rejected.
Hence, it was contended that the petitioner has to necessarily question the award
only on merits and there is no ground to interfere with the finding of the
Tribunal with regard to its jurisdiction. The learned counsel also brought to the
notice of this Court the earlier order passed by this Court on 29.02.2024, where
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the preliminary objection was answered against the petitioner.
12. The learned counsel for second respondent submitted that the Arbitral
Tribunal ultimately granted the claim made towards work done and even though
the first respondent had challenged the same by filing O.P.No.116 of 2011, the
amount was ultimately paid. The learned counsel further submitted that the
second respondent was the contractor under the agreement dated 15.05.2006
and was the lead partner under the MOU dated 26.05.2005, and if at all there is
any claim made on behalf of the petitioner, it can be done only on behalf of the
joint venture. Since the same has been considered by the Tribunal and an award
has been passed, which has become final insofar as the first respondent is
concerned, any remand made by this Court should not revive the earlier claim
that was awarded by the Tribunal.
13. This Court has carefully considered the submissions made by the
learned counsel for the parties and the materials available on record.
14. There are no serious disputes on the facts that are necessary in order
to decide the preliminary issue that was raised on the side of the petitioner
touching upon the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal in dealing with the
objections raised by the petitioner.
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15. The petitioner and the second respondent entered into a MOU dated
26.05.2005. The parties entered into the MOU for the purpose of submitting
tender for the work of construction called for by the first respondent. The
parties, namely, the petitioner and the second respondent entered into a joint
venture agreement, whereby they agreed to form a consortium solely for the
performance of the project awarded by the Chennai Port Trust. It was done only
with the intent of effectively utilising the expertise and resources for executing
their respective scope of work. It was made clear that each party will be solely
responsible for their scope of work and each of them will indemnify the other
party from any damage or loss arising out of or in relation to the performance of
its total scope of work for the project under the agreement. Each party will also
be responsible for the profit/loss arising out of the work. As per this agreement,
the second respondent will be the lead partner and he will act on behalf of the
joint venture. However, clause 3 makes it clear that even the second respondent
will do so only in consultation with the petitioner. It is also clear that the
correspondence received from the Chennai Port Trust by the second respondent
will also be communicated to the petitioner. Thus, the petitioner is not a
sleeping partner and the petitioner had an effective role to play in the joint
venture agreement.
16. It is not in dispute that the second respondent raised the dispute as
against the first respondent and at this point of time, the petitioner was nowhere
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in the picture. The second respondent seems to have suggested an Arbitrator and
the first respondent had suggested another Arbitrator and both of them had
chosen the presiding Arbitrator. Even at this stage, the petitioner was not in the
scene. During the arbitration proceedings, the petitioner was added as the
second respondent. The Tribunal issued notice to the petitioner and only on
receipt of the notice, the petitioner came to know that the dispute has been
referred to the Arbitrator. In view of the same, the petitioner raised preliminary
objection on the very jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal to deal with the
dispute insofar as the petitioner is concerned, since the Tribunal was not
constituted with the consent of the petitioner or at least after issuing notice to
the petitioner.
17. The Arbitral Tribunal, after commencement of its proceedings, found
that the claims and rights of the petitioner and the second respondent are closely
interconnected and therefore, no prejudice will be caused to the petitioner if the
claims are considered and liberty was granted to the petitioner to raise all the
objections and counter claims.
18. It is clear from the above that the Arbitral Tribunal did not really go
into the crux of the issue as to whether they had the jurisdiction to deal with the
claim made by the petitioner, since the appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal did
not have the concurrence of the petitioner and the petitioner was not put on
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notice before the Tribunal was constituted.
19. The scope of Section 16 of the Act was dealt with by the Apex Court
in Deep Industries Limited referred supra. Paragraph-22, which will have
relevance in this case, is extracted hereunder:-
“22. One other feature of this case is of some
importance. As stated hereinabove, on 9-5-2018, a
section 16 application had been dismissed by the
learned arbitrator in which substantially the same
contention which found favour with the High Court
was taken up. The drill of Section 16 of the Act is that
where a Section 16 application is dismissed, no appeal
is provided and the challenge to the Section 16
application being dismissed must await the passing of a
final award at which stage it may be raised under
Section 34. What the High Court has done in the
present case is to invert this statutory scheme by going
into exactly the same matter as was gone into by the
arbitrator in the Section 16 application, and then
decided that the two year ban was no part of the notice
for arbitration issued on 02.11.2017, a finding which is
directly contrary to the finding of the learned arbitrator
dismissing the Section 16 application. For this reason
alone, the judgment under appeal needs to be set aside.
Even otherwise, as has been correctly pointed out by
Mr. Rohatgi, the judgment under appeal goes into the
merits of the case and states that the action of putting
the Contractor and his Directors “on holiday” is not a
consequence of the termination of the agreement. This
is wholly incorrect as it is only because of the
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termination that the show cause notice dated 18-10-
2017 proposing to impose a two year ban/blacklisting
was sent. Even otherwise, entering into the general
thicket of disputes between the parties does not behove
a court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227, where
only jurisdictional errors can be corrected. Therefore to
state that the ban order was passed under a General
Contract Manual and not Clause 18 of the Agreement,
besides being incorrect, would also be incorrect for the
reason that the General Contract Manual does not mean
that such order was issued as an administrative order
invoking the executive power, but was only as an order
which emanated from the contract itself. Further to
state that “serious disputes” as to jurisdiction seem to
have cropped up is not the same thing as saying that the
Arbitral Tribunal lacked inherent jurisdiction in going
into and deciding the Section 17 application. In point
of fact, the Arbitral Tribunal was well within its
jurisdiction in referring to the contract and the ban
order and then applying the law and finally issuing the
stay order. Even if it be accepted that the principle laid
down by Section 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act was
infracted, in that damages could have been granted, as
a result of which an injunction ought not to have been
issued, is a mere error of law and not an error of
jurisdiction, much less an error of inherent jurisdiction
going to the root of the matter. Therefore, even
otherwise, the High Court judgment cannot be
sustained and is set aside.”
20. The above judgment was thereafter reiterated by the Apex Court in
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Bhaven Construction referred supra and the relevant paragraphs are extracted
hereunder:-
“23. Respondent 1 did not take legal recourse against the
appointment of the sole arbitrator, and rather submitted
themselves before the tribunal to adjudicate on the
jurisdiction issue as well as on the merits. In this situation,
Respondent 1 has to endure the natural consequences of
submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the sole
arbitrator, which can be challenged, through an application
under Section 34. It may be noted that in the present case,
the award has already been passed during the pendency of
this appeal, and Respondent 1 has already preferred a
challenge under Section 34 to the same. Respondent 1 has
not been able to show any exceptional circumstance, which
mandates the exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution.
26. It must be noted that Section 16 of the Arbitration Act,
necessarily mandates that the issue of jurisdiction must be
dealt first by the tribunal, before the court examines the
same under Section 34. Respondent 1 is therefore not left
remediless, and has statutorily been provided a chance of
appeal. In Deep Industries case7 , this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p.718, para 22)
“22. One other feature of this case is of some
importance. As stated hereinabove, on 9-5-
2018, a section 16 application had been
dismissed by the learned arbitrator in which
substantially the same contention which found
favour with the High Court was taken up. The
drill of Section 16 of the Act is that where a
7 Deep Industries Ltd. v. ONGC, (2020) 15 SCC 706
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Section 16 application is dismissed, no appeal
is provided and the challenge to the Section 16
application being dismissed must await the
passing of a final award at which stage it may
be raised under Section 34.”
(emphasis supplied)
21. It is clear from the above that as against the order passed by the
Tribunal while determining its jurisdiction under Section 16, no appellate
remedy is available to a party and it has to be necessarily challenged along with
the final award under Section 34 of the Act.
22. It is not a case where the petitioner submitted himself to the
arbitration proceedings. The petitioner, in fact, raised a preliminary objection on
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, since the petitioner never had an opportunity to
express his consent for the appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal.
23. This Court, on an earlier occasion, passed an order on 29.02.2024
holding that the preliminary objection raised by the petitioner is not sustainable,
since the petitioner has participated in the proceedings. Accordingly, this Court
directed both sides to address the case on merits.
24. When the earlier order was passed on 29.02.2024, the learned single
Judge had rendered a prima facie finding. That apart, insofar as the petitioner is
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concerned, the arbitration proceedings themselves did not commence from the
stage of Section 21 of the Act. The appointment of Arbitrator was not in
accordance with Section 11(6), since the petitioner was not a party when the
Arbitrator was appointed based on the Arbitrator suggested by the first
respondent and the second respondent, pursuant to which the Arbitral Tribunal
was constituted. Hence, this Tribunal cannot be thrust upon the petitioner, who
never had an opportunity to consent for the formation of such a Tribunal. Thus,
insofar as the petitioner is concerned, the arbitration proceedings did not
commence at the stage of Section 21 and the petitioner was also not aware of
the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal and that the petitioner came to know
about the constitution of the Tribunal only after receiving the notice from the
Tribunal. In view of the above, the order passed by this Court on 29.02.2024 on
the preliminary objection raised by the petitioner, will not bind the Court when
Section 34 petition is taken up for hearing finally. In any case, this Court did
not take into consideration the fact that the mandatory procedure under the Act
has not been complied with before the Arbitral Tribunal was constituted, insofar
as the petitioner is concerned.
25. The Tribunal did not go into this issue and the Tribunal straight-away
went into the issue of prejudice. The issue of prejudice will not really matter
when it touches upon the very jurisdiction of the Tribunal to conduct the
proceedings insofar as the petitioner is concerned. Whether the petitioner will
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be prejudiced or not becomes irrelevant, when the constitution of the Arbitral
Tribunal was not done with the consent of the petitioner. As already held by this
Court, even though the second respondent is the lead partner under the joint
venture, the petitioner certainly had a role to play in terms of consulting him in
writing and informing him about any correspondence made with the Chennai
Port Trust. If that is not done and the petitioner is kept in dark and ultimately
one fine day, the petitioner is asked to appear before the Arbitral Tribunal and
the petitioner has not consented or has voluntarily surrendered to the
jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal, the test of prejudice can never be applied
and the preliminary objection raised by the petitioner cannot be overruled.
26. In the light of the above discussion, this Court is of the view that the
award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal insofar as the petitioner is concerned, is
non est in the eye of law, since the Arbitral Tribunal lacked jurisdiction. To that
extent, the award passed by the Tribunal has to be set aside.
27. Even though the claim made by the petitioner will be considered if the
matter is sent back to the Tribunal, it goes without saying that the petitioner will
be acting on behalf of the joint venture. It is at this point of time, the learned
counsel appearing on either side submitted that a sole Arbitrator can be
appointed by this Court and the dispute can be referred to the Arbitrator to be
decided as expeditiously as possible. Accordingly, Mr.G.Pandurangarao,
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M.Tech, Retd.Additional Chief Engineer, Chennai Port Trust, residing at
No.102, Sri Nandini Towers, Vijayanagar Colony, Patamota, Vijayawada 520
007 (Phone:77027 20190) (email: [email protected]) is appointed as
the sole Arbitrator in this case. The Arbitrator is requested to adjudicate the
arbitral dispute that have arisen between the parties by holding the sittings in
any venue in Chennai to the convenience of all concerned and render an award.
Considering the fact that the dispute has been going on for nearly two decades,
the sole Arbitrator is requested to complete the proceedings and pass an award
as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of six months from
the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The Arbitrator is entitled to fix his
own fees, which will be equally shared by the petitioner and the second
respondent.
28. The original petition stands allowed in the above terms. There shall be
no order as to costs.
23-10-2025
Index:Yes/No
Speaking/Non-speaking order
Internet:Yes
Neutral Citation:Yes/No
ss
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To
1. The Chief Engineer
Board of Trustees of the Port of
Chennai,
(Body Corporate Under Major Port
Trusts Act, 1963), Rajaji Salai,
Chennai-600 001
2. Mr.G.Pandurangarao, M.Tech.,
Retd.Additional Chief Engineer,
Chennai Port Trust,
No.102, Sri Nandini Towers,
Vijayanagar Colony,
Patamota, Vijayawada 520 007
(Phone:77027 20190)
(email: [email protected])
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N.ANAND
VENKATESH J.
ss
23-10-2025
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