Madras High Court
C.Singaram vs The Managing Director on 14 February, 2025
2025:MHC:407
WP(MD).24706 of 2022
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
RESERVED ON : 06.02.2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 14.02.2025
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SHAMIM AHMED
WP(MD)No.24706 of 2022
C.Singaram Petitioner(s)
Vs
1. The Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (KMB)
Limited, Kumbakonam 612001
2. The General Manager, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (KMB)
Limited, Karaikudi Region, Sivagangai Respondent(s)
Prayer:- This Writ Petition has been filed, under the Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, to issue a Writ of Mandamus to direct the Respondents to
promote the Petitioner as a Ticket Checking Inspector retrospectively from 2018
and on the basis of the same, to revise the Petitioner's terminal benefits and
pension and to disburse all the difference arrears amount to the Petitioner.
For Petitioner(s) : Mr.K.Gokul
For Respondent(s) : Mr.K.Jagadeesh Balan
ORDER
1. This Writ Petition has been filed, under the Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, to issue a Writ of Mandamus to direct the Respondents to
promote the Petitioner as a Ticket Checking Inspector retrospectively from
2018 and on the basis of the same, to revise the Petitioner's terminal
benefits and pension and to disburse all the difference arrears amount to
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the Petitioner.
2. The facts of case, in a nutshell, led to filing of this Writ Petition and
necessary for disposal of same, are as follows:-
(a) The Petitioner joined in the Respondent Corporation as a Conductor on
01.04.1995 and he got a PG Degree in M.A (Economics) in 2007 and a
Diploma in Labour Law in 2010. The Petitioner had retired from the
service as a Grade IV Conductor on 31.03.2019 on attaining the age of
superannuation. As per the promotion procedure in the Transport
Corporation, Karaikudi Region, Conductors with a Post Graduate Degree
and two review services, were eligible for promotion to the post of Ticket
Checking Inspector. Despite meeting the said criteria and being called
for certificate verification and an interview in the year 2008, he was never
promoted. The Petitioner had made several representations, including a
last representation, dated 17.08.2020, requesting retrospective
promotion and it consequential retirement benefits, but no action was
taken by the respondents. Hence, this Writ Petition has been filed,
seeking the relief as stated supra.
3. In the counter affidavit filed by the 2nd Respondent, it is stated as follows:-
(a) The Petitioner sent a representation through RPAD on 17.08.2020,
which was after 1½ years of his retirement on 31.03.2019. At the time of
his appointment, the Petitioner only had an SSLC qualification. The
persons, who possess a Post Graduate Degree through the Open
University System, without obtaining a regular basic Degree, cannot be
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WP(MD).24706 of 2022
considered for appointment to public services. As per the G.O.Ms.No.
107, dated 18.08.2009 and G.O.Ms.No.116 dated 18.08.2010, Degrees
obtained from the Open University Distance Education System cannot
be taken into consideration for employment or promotion. Therefore, this
Writ Petition is misconceived and time barred and accordingly, liable to
be dismissed.
4. This Court heard Mr.K.Gokul, the learned counsel for the Petitioner and
Mr.K.Jagadeesh Balan, the learned counsel for the Respondents.
5. The learned counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that since the
Petitioner possessed the Post Graduate Degree and Diploma, during the
period of his service, he was eligible to get promotion to the post of Ticket
Checking Inspector and consequently, he is eligible to get the terminal
benefits, etc. and that in spite of his representation, dated 17.08.2020,
seeking such retrospective promotion and the consequential terminal
benefits, the Respondents did not consider the same and hence, this Writ
Petition has been filed.
6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the Respondents has submitted that
though the Petitioner retired from the service on 31.03.2019, he sent a
representation belatedly only on 17.08.2020, which was after 1 ½ year of
his retirement and and thus, this Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed, on
the ground of delay and laches.
7. I have given my careful and anxious consideration to the contentions put
forward by the learned counsel on either side and also perused the entire
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materials available on record.
8. According to the Petitioner, the Petitioner joined in the Respondent
Corporation as a Conductor on 01.04.1994 and he got a Post Graduate
Degree in M.A (Economics) in 2007 and a Diploma in Labour Law in 2010.
The Petitioner had retired from the service as Grade IV Conductor on
31.03.2019 on attaining the age of superannuation.
9. It is not in dispute that the Petitioner had made a representation, dated
17.08.2020, requesting retrospective promotion and consequential
retirement benefits. Thus, it is clear that the said representation of the
Petitioner was belatedly made after 1 ½ years of his retirement on
31.03.2019 and that the Petitioner filed the present Writ Petition for the
relief claimed on 20.10.2022 almost 3 ½ years after his retirement from
service.
10. After perusal of records, this court finds that there is no proper and
satisfactory explanation for giving such a belated representation and also
filing the present Writ Petition almost 3 ½ years after his retirement.
Hence, the Petitioner's claim for retrospective promotion and its
consequential retirement benefits is a time barred one and it cannot be
sustained on the ground of laches.
11. The expression “sufficient cause“ and satisfactory explanation has been
held to receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice
and generally a delay in preferring a petition may be condoned in interest
of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona
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fide is imputable to parties, seeking condonation of delay. In the case of
Collector, Land Acquisition Vs. Katiji, reported in 1987(2) SCC 107, the
Honourable Supreme Court said that when substantial justice and
technical considerations are taken against each other, cause of
substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for, the other side cannot
claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non
deliberate delay. The Court further said that judiciary is respected not on
account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds, but
because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.
12. In the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala, reported in AIR
1998 SC 2276, the Honourable Supreme Court was pleased to observe
as under:-
“Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to
be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the
Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable
grounds.“
13. The Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy rights of parties. They
virtually take away the remedy. They are meant with the objective that
parties should not resort to dilatory tactics and sleep over their rights.
They must seek remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy
is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The statute
relating to limitation determines a life span for such legal remedy for
redress of the legal injury, one has suffered. Time is precious and the
wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time, newer causes would
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come up, necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by
approaching the Courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy.
Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending
uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The statute providing limitation is
founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae
up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to
litigation). It is for this reason that when an action becomes barred by time,
the Court should be slow to ignore delay for the reason that once limitation
expires, other party matures his rights on the subject with attainment of
finality. Though it cannot be doubted that refusal to condone delay would
result in foreclosing the suiter from putting forth his cause but
simultaneously the party on the other hand is also entitled to sit and feel
carefree after a particular length of time, getting relieved from persistent
and continued litigation.
14. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the Court is always
deliberate. No person gains from deliberate delaying a matter by not
resorting to take appropriate legal remedy within time but then the words
“sufficient cause“ show that delay, if any, occurred, should not be
deliberate, negligent and due to casual approach of concerned litigant,
but, it should be bona fide, and, for the reasons beyond his control, and, in
any case should not lack bona fide. If the explanation does not smack of
lack of bona fide, the Court should show due consideration to the suiter,
but, when there is apparent casual approach on the part of suiter, the
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approach of Court is also bound to change. Lapse on the part of litigant in
approaching Court within time is understandable but a total inaction for
long period of delay without any explanation whatsoever and that too in
absence of showing any sincere attempt on the part of suiter, would add to
his negligence, and would be relevant factor going against him.
15. I need not to burden this judgment with a catena of decisions explaining
and laying down as to what should be the approach of Court on construing
“sufficient cause“ and it would be suffice to refer a very few of them
besides those already referred.
16. In the case of Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari, reported, AIR
1969 SC 575, a three Judge Bench of the Court said that unless want of
bona fide of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the
protection, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be
refused to be condoned.
17. The Privy Council, in the case of Brij Indar Singh Vs. Kanshi Ram
reported in ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94, observed that true guide for a court to
exercise the discretion is whether the appellant acted with reasonable
diligence in prosecuting the appeal. This principle still holds good
inasmuch as the aforesaid decision of Privy Council as repeatedly been
referred to, and, recently in State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok AO and others,
AIR 2005 SC 2191.
18. In the case of Vedabai @ Vijayanatabai Baburao Vs. Shantaram
Baburao Patil and others, reported in JT 2001 (5) SC 608, the Court said
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that under Section 5 of the Act, 1963, it should adopt a pragmatic
approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is
inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. In the former case
consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor so the
case calls for a more cautious approach but in the latter case no such
consideration may arise and such a case deserves a liberal approach. No
hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard and the basic guiding
factor is advancement of substantial justice.
19. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRS. Vs. Executive
Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and Another, reported in (2008) 17
SCC 448, in para 17 of the judgment, the Court said :-
“...The evidence on record suggests neglect of its own right for long
time in preferring appeals. The court cannot enquire into belated and
state claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The court
helps those who are vigilant and “do not slumber over their rights.“
20. In the case of Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan
Mumbai, reported in 2012 (5) SCC 157, in para 18 of the judgment, the
Court said as under:-
“What needs to be emphasized is that even though a liberal and
justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise
of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar
statutes, the Courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that
the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the
judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various
stages of litigation apart from the cost. What colour the expression
“sufficient cause” would get in the factual matrix of a given case
would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the
Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the
applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack
bonafides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the
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explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is
thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a
legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay. In cases
involving the State and its agencies/instrumentalities, the Court can
take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decision
making process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or
utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and / or its
agencies/instrumentalities and the applications filed by them for
condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by
accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar
of limitation will cause injury to the public interest.“
21. In my view, the kind of explanation rendered herein does not satisfy the
observations of the Honourable Supreme Court that if delay has occurred
for reasons, which does not smack of mala fide, the Court should be
reluctant to refuse condonation. On the contrary, I find that here is a case,
which shows complete careless and reckless long delay on the part of the
Petitioner, which has remain virtually unexplained at all. Therefore, I do
not find any reason to exercise my judicial discretion exercising judiciously
so as to justify the condonation of delay in the present case.
22. Seeking retrospective promotion and its consequential benefits, at this
stage is highly belated and lacks justification. Even though on merits, at
the time of his appointment, the Petitioner only had an SSLC qualification.
The persons, who possess a Post Graduate Degree through the Open
University System, without obtaining a regular basic Degree, cannot be
considered for appointment to public services. As per the G.O.Ms.No.107,
dated 18.08.2009 and G.O.Ms.No.116 dated 18.08.2010, Degrees
obtained from the Open University Distance Education System cannot be
taken into consideration for employment or promotion. There are no
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WP(MD).24706 of 2022
merits whatsoever in this Writ Petition. Accordingly, the Petitioner's claim
for retrospective promotion and its consequential retirement benefits is
untenable for want of merits and on the ground of laches. Accordingly,
this Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed.
23. In the result, in the light of the above said observations and discussions
made above and in the light of the decisions referred to above, this Writ
Petition is dismissed, as devoid of merits. There is no order as to costs.
14.02.2025
Index:Yes/No
Web:Yes/No
Speaking/Non Speaking
Neutral Citation
Srcm
To
1. The Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (KMB)
Limited, Kumbakonam 612001
2. The General Manager, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (KMB)
Limited, Karaikudi Region, Sivagangai
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WP(MD).24706 of 2022
SHAMIM AHMED, J.
Srcm
Pre-Delivery Order in
14.02.2025
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
