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Umedmal B. Jain vs Suraj Devi
2023 Latest Caselaw 12872 Mad

Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 12872 Mad
Judgement Date : 21 September, 2023

Madras High Court
Umedmal B. Jain vs Suraj Devi on 21 September, 2023
                                                         C.R.P.(NPD)Nos.1382, 1385, 1386, 1387, 1388 & 1389 of 2021



                                  IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

                                                    DATED: 21.09.2023

                                                             CORAM :

                         THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V. LAKSHMINARAYANAN

                           C.R.P(NPD)Nos.1382, 1385, 1386, 1387, 1388 & 1389 of 2021
                         and CMP.Nos.10705, 10744, 10746, 10750, 10755 & 10764 of 2021

                     CRP(NPD)No.1382 of 2021


                     Umedmal B. Jain                                                          .. Petitioner

                                                                  vs

                     Suraj Devi                                                               .. Respondent

Petition filed under Section 25 of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, to set aside the Judgment and Decree dated 01.12.2020, passed by the Learned VII Court of Small Causes at Chennai, Appellate Authority, in RCA.No.712 of 2017, confirming the fair and decretal order dated 31.08.2017 made learned X Court of Small Causes, Chennai in RCOP.No.1990 of 2011 and thereby dismiss the petition filed for eviction.


                                       (In all CRPs)
                                       For Petitioners        : Ms.Tanya Kapoor

                                       For Respondent         : Mr.A.Ilaya Perumal


https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

C.R.P.(NPD)Nos.1382, 1385, 1386, 1387, 1388 & 1389 of 2021

COMMON ORDER These civil revision petitions have been preferred by the tenants.

There is no dispute in the jural relationship of landlady and tenants. For

the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred to as landlady and

tenants.

2.The landlady launched applications in R.C.O.P.Nos.1990, 1992,

1993, 1994, 1995 and 1998 of 2011 on the ground that her sons Kiran

Raj Jain, Dinesh Kumar Jain and Praveen Kumar Jain are carrying on

business in a rented premises. According to her, her sons' business is

growing in very huge volumes and therefore they are not in a position to

find enough space to accommodate their goods and to consult and meet

their clients. She would state that the existing rented premises in which

they are currently carrying on business i.e. No.56, Narayana Mudali

Street, Sowcarpet, Chennai is not suitable for expansion of the business.

She also stated that she has no other buildings in the City of Chennai and

existing business would be sufficient for the business purposes of her

sons. Even on the date of filing of the RCOPs, the landlady was about 63

years old.

3.On being served with notice each of the tenants entered

appearance and filed a detailed counter. The stand that they had taken in

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

C.R.P.(NPD)Nos.1382, 1385, 1386, 1387, 1388 & 1389 of 2021

the counter is that there is a vacant shop in the ground floor of the

premises and another shop had been vacated recently by one firm by

name “Sangeetha Toys” and that there is a suppression of facts by the

landlady to overcome the statutory provisions relating to additional

accommodation and also that the Court has to consider the relative

hardship between the eviction of the tenants vis-a-vis their continuance

in the property.

4.The tenants also pleaded that the landlady is the owner of the

premises in Moolakadai, Vepery High Road, Kondithoppu and several

other places. They would also state that the sons themselves are owners

of other premises and therefore, they are not entitled to seek for eviction.

The tenants will plea that they are in occupation of the premises for more

than 20 years and therefore, if the petition filed for eviction is allowed,

they would be put to cause irreparable hardship.

5.The matter went to trial before the learned Rent Controller, who

recorded the summary of proceedings. The Rent Controller was satisfied

that the requirements of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu

Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (in short 'Act') have been

satisfied and consequently ordered eviction.

6.Aggrieved by the same, the tenants filed R.C.A.Nos.712, 713, https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

C.R.P.(NPD)Nos.1382, 1385, 1386, 1387, 1388 & 1389 of 2021

714, 715, 716 & 718 of 2017. The Rent Control Appellate Authority

agreed with the findings returned by the Rent Controller and ordered

eviction.

7.Against the concurrent findings on both the bonafide

requirement of the landlady as well as on the orders of eviction, these

civil revision petitions have been presented before this Court.

8.When the matter came up before this Court, notice was issued to

the respondent and has been listed today before me for the purpose of

admission.

9. I heard Ms.Tanya Kapoor, learned counsel appearing for the

petitioners/tenants and Mr.A.Ilaya Perumal, learned counsel appearing

for the respondent/landlady.

10.Ms.Tanya Kapoor launched several attacks against the findings

of the Rent Controller as confirmed by the Appellate Authority. They are

as follows:

(i) The landlady had vacant shop in her possession in the ground

floor and subsequently another tenant has vacated the premises. The

landlady's sons did not occupy the said premises, which tells upon the

bonafides of the requirement.

(ii) Two shops having become vacant, the landlady is deemed to be https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

C.R.P.(NPD)Nos.1382, 1385, 1386, 1387, 1388 & 1389 of 2021

in possession of the property and therefore, Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the

Act is not the applicable provision, but the applicable provision would be

Section 10(3)(c) of the Act.

(iii) The landlady's family has other premises and therefore, it does

not satisfy the statutory requirements of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act.

(iv) The trial Court as well as the lower Appellate Court did not

consider the comparative hardship that the tenants would suffer in case

of eviction as against the requirements of the landlord.

(v) Expanding on the previous point, Ms.Kapoor would submit

that the tenants have developed a fantastic reputation in the market and

therefore, if eviction is ordered, they will suffer serious prejudice.

(vi) She would point out that the landlady having filed a petition

for fixation of fair rent is not entitled to seek for eviction on the grounds

of bonafide requirement.

(vii) She would then point out the lack of pleading on the part of

the landlady with respect to the buildings owned by her sons in other

areas in Chennai and therefore, it does not satisfy the statutory

framework of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act.

(viii) She would submit that two shops that the landlady had

subsequently let out was found to be on an understanding that they will https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

C.R.P.(NPD)Nos.1382, 1385, 1386, 1387, 1388 & 1389 of 2021

vacate and handover possession on the other eight tenants vacating and

this understanding have not been proved.

(ix) In fine, the argument of Ms.Kapoor is that the bonafide

requirement of the landlady had not been proved and therefore, she wants

the civil revision petitions to be allowed and the orders of eviction

should be set aside.

11. I have carefully considered the arguments of Ms.Tanya

Kapoor, I will have to address each one of them separately.

12. Insofar as the requirements of the landlord under Section

10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, the Rent Control Appellate Authority has

correctly laid down the position of law, namely, that the landlord must

prove the following:

(i)The building that had been let out is for non-residential

purposes.

(ii)The landlord or any member of his family should be carrying on

business on the date of application for eviction.

(iii)The landlord should not be occupying any building belonging

to him or his family members on his own within the City of Chennai.

(iv)The claim should be bonafide and not found to be a false

attempt to throw out the tenant from the premises. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

C.R.P.(NPD)Nos.1382, 1385, 1386, 1387, 1388 & 1389 of 2021

13.Let us apply the law that has been laid down above to the facts

of the present case. It is not in dispute that the landlady's sons are doing

business at No.56, Narayana Mudali Street, Sowcarpet, Chennai. The

nature of their business is dealing with paper products and supplying it to

their customers in and around the said area. The landlady's sons are

occupying shops which belong to a third party. They are tenants in

someone else property for the business that they are doing. In order to

prove that they are tenants under one Padmini Bai, who is the owner of

No.56, Narayana Mudali Street, Sowcarpet, Chennai, they have marked

Ex.P8, which shows that the aforesaid property had been leased out to

the landlady's sons for business purposes.

14.In order to prove that they are doing business, they have

marked Exs.P8, P9, P10 and P32 to show that one Masseyes Enterprises

is having a business dealing with their entity, M/s.Million Papier Private

Ltd. These documents bring forth to the Court, the factum

(i)that the landlady's sons are carrying on business on the date of

filing of the petition,

(ii)that they are in occupation of rented premises belonging to

Padmini Bai and

(iii)that the business is being carried on in a bonafide manner. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

C.R.P.(NPD)Nos.1382, 1385, 1386, 1387, 1388 & 1389 of 2021

15.The tenants did not let in evidence to show that the landlady's

sons are not carrying on business and that it is an invented story by the

landlady in order to throw them out of the premises unfairly.

16.Insofar as the argument that two shops have been kept vacant

on the date of filing of the RCOP and the landlady's sons did not occupy

the same, the answer is found in the evidence of PW1. He has

categorically stated that there are totally 10 shops in the building which

belongs to the landlady, which are the subject matter of eviction

proceedings. All the shops put together will bring about 1200 sq. ft. in

which they can store upto two tonnes of paper material. If the landlady's

sons want to do business, they cannot occupy the premises one by one

and thereafter expand the same. As seen from above, the petition itself

was meant for the purpose of expansion of the business which they are

carrying on in a rented premises.

17.The factum that they are storing materials at Royapuram has

been brought about during the course of evidence. The landlady's sons

are utilising the premises situated at Old No.32, New No.17, North

Railway Terminus Road, Royapuram for the purpose of a warehouse.

The evidence of PW1 read with the documents of business make it clear

that most of their business requirements are met with in and around https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

C.R.P.(NPD)Nos.1382, 1385, 1386, 1387, 1388 & 1389 of 2021

Sowcarpet area where the petition mentioned premise is situate.

18. It is too much on part of the tenants to expect that the

landlady's sons must pay third party rentals and also suffer huge

transportation cost for the purpose of transportation of goods from

Royapuram to Sowcarpet, when their own premises at Sowcarpet is

available and when it is easier to store their materials therein.

19.The result of this discussion is that the two shops which were

vacant are not suitable for storing their entire materials which they are

currently having in Royapuram. If I were to accept the arguments of

Ms.Kapoor, then not only should the landlord continue to pay

Rs.34,831/- as rents for the warehouse in Royapuram, but, they should

store materials also in the premises at Sowcarpet. That will be a logistical

nightmare for the landlady's sons to do their business. The landlady's

sons need not suffer in order to satisfy the whims of the tenants to prove

their bonafide. The shops being 100 sq. ft. each, it is hardly sufficient for

the landlady's sons to store their materials. Therefore, the requirement of

the entire shops for expansion of their business and shifting of their

business from rented premises to the own premises of the landlady is a

bonafide requirement.

20.The next aspect which Ms.Tanya Kapoor argued was that the https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

C.R.P.(NPD)Nos.1382, 1385, 1386, 1387, 1388 & 1389 of 2021

petition should have been filed under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act and not

under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. This is on the ground that two

shops having been vacated, it should be deemed to be in possession of

the landlady and therefore, since she is occupying a portion of the

premises, Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act is inapplicable and the

provision applicable is Section 10(3)(c) of the Act.

21.Section 10(3)(c) of the Act requires the landlady to be in actual

possession of the premises and not in legal or constructive possession

thereof. The fine distinction between the legal possession and actual

possession is not one contemplated under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. A

landlord who is in occupation of a portion of a premises is entitled to ask

for eviction only on the ground of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. However,

in the present case, the landlady has not occupied the premises which fell

vacant pursuant to the “Sangeetha Toy Shop” vacating. Since the

landlord is not in actual possession of the premises, the appropriate

application that should have been filed is only under Section 10(3)(a)(iii)

of the Act and not under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act.

22.This will also dispose of the other argument on comparative

hardship. The relative hardship is a requirement under Section 10(3)(c)

of the Act and not under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. Therefore, https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

C.R.P.(NPD)Nos.1382, 1385, 1386, 1387, 1388 & 1389 of 2021

neither the Rent Controller nor the Appellate Authority fell in error in not

taking into consideration the said aspect. The requirements of Section

10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act have been set forth above and comparative

hardship is not one such requirement by the statute.

23.Ms.Tanya Kapoor then would turn to the argument that the

landlady's sons are in occupation of other premises. It has been recorded

by the Rent Controller as well as by the Appellate Authority that the

landlady does not have any other property in her name in the City of

Chennai. She has also made the requisite pleading in paragraph No.4 in

the petition for eviction. Reading Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act

according to me, the petitioner who seeks for eviction should not own

any other property. If I were to read the way Ms.Tanya Kapoor wants me

to read the provision, then, if the landlady's sons had own property then,

the landlady would not be entitled to file an application for eviction.

Such a requirement is not found in the Act.

24. Insofar as the argument that the petitioners will suffer hardship

because the civil revision petitioners have developed a very good

reputation in the market is concerned, I feel this argument goes in favour

of the landlady and not in favour of the tenants. If the tenants have built a

good reputation in the business, then the customers will flock to them, https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

C.R.P.(NPD)Nos.1382, 1385, 1386, 1387, 1388 & 1389 of 2021

wherever they go. It is not dependent upon the place of business. In other

words, if the tenants were to move to an adjacent or nearby premises in

Sowcarpet, the customers will continue to come to them and they will not

stop on account of the fact that there are peculiarities in the building

which is occupied by them presently, which brings the customers for the

purpose of their business.

25.Furthermore, if such a reputation has been built and even if

comparative hardship were to apply, then I would have to see whether

the hardship of a person doing a business in the rental premises is less

than the hardship of a person, who has garnered very good reputation in

the market. The answer to this question is that the hardship of the

landlord would be more for he will not only be paying for the purpose of

transportation of his materials, but also incurring huge cost in a rented

premises for storing his materials.

26. Insofar as the argument that the filing of the fair rent petition

shows that the landlady does not have bonafide requirements for

eviction, in this too, I am not with Ms.Tanya Kapoor.

27.Filing of the Rent Control Original Proceedings for fixation of

fair rent is an exercise of a statutory right by the landlord for the property

which is under the occupation of the tenants. Exercise of a statutory right https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

C.R.P.(NPD)Nos.1382, 1385, 1386, 1387, 1388 & 1389 of 2021

conferred on a landlord cannot militate another provision namely,

Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. It has been seen over the period of nearly

six decades that the Rent Control Act was in force, that a landlord can

simultaneously launch an application for eviction as well as file a

petition for fixation of fair rent. It will be too much on my part to state

that the landlord till the eviction proceedings are over, cannot seek for

fixation of fair rent. The landlady has only gone above exercising her

statutory right and therefore, I will not put Section 4 against Section

10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act.

28.Furthermore, Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act does not have any

such statutory bar. If I were to agree with Ms.Kapoor, then I will be re-

writing the Statute stating, filing an application under Section 4 of the

Rent Control Act would be a bar for filing a petition under Section 10(3)

of the Act. Such a provision being absent and since I am not having the

powers to amend the statute, I am constrained to reject the said argument.

29.The next submission was on the lack of pleadings on part of the

landlord. Insofar as the lack of pleadings is concerned, I have to re-

collect that I am dealing with a Rent Control proceeding which is, but a

summary proceeding. The tribunal is not bound by the strict rigours of

the Code of Civil Procedure.

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

C.R.P.(NPD)Nos.1382, 1385, 1386, 1387, 1388 & 1389 of 2021

30. I have gone through the pleadings and I find, all the necessary

statutory requirements were pleaded and therefore there is no

requirement to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of pleadings. In

addition, the argument of Ms.Tanya Kapoor that the landlady has not

pleaded that she does not have any other premises is erroneous. I see

from paragraph No.4 there is a specific pleading to that effect. It is not

the requirement of the Rent Control Act that the landlady should give the

details of all the properties hold by her family members for the purpose

of seeking eviction under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. I have already

held, if the landlady does not have any other property in her name, she

can seek for eviction on the grounds of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act,

irrespective of the fact that her sons might own other properties.

31. Finally I turn to the argument of Ms.Tanya Kapoor the

understanding with the new tenants, who had been inducted, that they

will handover possession of the property on the eviction petitions being

allowed, has not been proved. Nothing prevented the tenants to summon

the new tenants, who have been inducted in the vacant shops measuring

about 100 sq. ft. each to the Court and demonstrating by giving positive

proof that there was no such understanding. The understanding is

between the landlord and the new tenants and the landlord had entered https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

C.R.P.(NPD)Nos.1382, 1385, 1386, 1387, 1388 & 1389 of 2021

the witness box and had stated so. The Rent Controller, who had the

benefit of seeing the witnesses has been convinced with the statement.

The Appellate Authority, which is the final Court of facts, has also

appreciated the said evidence and has come to the conclusion that the

understanding exists.

32. Sitting in revision under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu

Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, I am not in a position to

re-appreciate the evidence. I can interfere with the findings only if they

have been perverse, illegal or irregular. None of these three vices are

found in the impugned orders of the Courts below. Consequently, I am

not inclined to interfere with the orders passed by the Courts below.

33. In fine, these civil revision petitions are dismissed. Time for

eviction is three months. No costs. Consequently, connected

miscellaneous petitions are closed.

21.09.2023 Index:Yes/No Speaking order/Non-speaking order Neutral Citation:Yes/No vs

To

1.The VII Court of Small Causes, Chennai.

2.The X Court of Small Causes, Chennai.

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

C.R.P.(NPD)Nos.1382, 1385, 1386, 1387, 1388 & 1389 of 2021

V. LAKSHMINARAYANAN,J.

vs

C.R.P(NPD)Nos.1382, 1385, 1386, 1387, 1388 & 1389 of 2021 and CMP.Nos.10705, 10744, 10746, 10750, 10755 & 10764 of 2021

21.09.2023

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

 
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