Madras High Court
Pappa vs Gandhimathi on 22 December, 2023
S.A.No.670 of 2017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED :22.12.2023
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.SOUNTHAR
S.A.No. 670 of 2017 and
C.M.P.No.17405 of 2017
1.Pappa
2.Varadharajan ...Appellants
Vs.
1.Gandhimathi
2.Nandhini
3.Minor Santhiya
4.Minor Dinesh ...Respondents
PRAYER: Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code,
against the judgment and decree of the Sub-Ordinate Judge at Kallakurichi dated
30.06.2014 in A.S.No.52 of 2012 confirming the judgment and decree of the I
Additional District Munsif Court at Kallakurichi dated 18.01.2012 in
O.S.No.226 of 2006.
For Appellants : M/s.P.Valliappan
Senior Counsel
for Mr.S.M.S.Shriram Narayanan
For Respondents : Mr.N.Manokaran
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1/26
S.A.No.670 of 2017
JUDGEMENT
The unsuccessful plaintiffs in a suit for specific performance is the
appellants. The suit was dismissed by the Trial Court in respect of the main relief
of specific performance and suit was decreed in respect of alternative relief for
return of advance amount. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs preferred an
appeal and the First Appellate Court also confirmed the findings of the Trial
Court. Hence, the plaintiffs are before this Court.
2. According to the appellants/plaintiffs, the property covered by suit
agreement originally belonged to 1st respondent's husband and father of
respondents 2 to 4 Velusamy. After death of Velusamy, the
respondents/defendants succeeded to his estate and they had been enjoying the
property. The 1st respondent, mother of other respondents was acting as Manager
of the family. The suit sale agreement was entered into by 1st plaintiff and 1st
defendant where under 1st respondent/1st defendant agreed to sell the suit
property to 1st plaintiff for a sale consideration of Rs.1 lakh. The agreement was
entered into by 1st defendant in her capacity as Manager binding shares of minor
defendants. On the date of agreement, a sum of Rs.30,000/- was paid as an
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advance. It was agreed between the parties that balance amount of Rs.70,000/-
should be paid on or before 14.03.2006. Though the appellants were ready and
willing to pay the balance sum of Rs.70,000/- and in spite of several demands,
the respondents failed to complete the sale transaction. Therefore, a legal notice
was issued by the 1st appellant on 01.03.2006 calling upon the 1st defendant to
receive the balance sale consideration and complete the sale transaction. In spite
of the same, the 1st respondent failed to come forward to execute the sale deed.
In these circumstances, the appellants were constrained to file a suit for specific
performance.
3. The respondents filed a written statement wherein it was claimed by
them that on the date of suit sale agreement, yet another agreement christened as
consent deed was entered into between the parties where under the consideration
for sale was mentioned as Rs.1,60,000/-( Rupees one lakh sixty thousand only).
It was averred that a sum of Rs.30,000/- was paid as an advance and appellants
agreed to deposit a sum of Rs.60,000/- in the name of minor respondents 2 to 4
in a nationalized bank and agreed to pay the balance amount of Rs.70,000/-
within 14.03.2006. It was also contended by the respondents that the appellants
burked relationship between the parties. The 1st plaintiff's husband, the 2nd
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plaintiff is the elder brother of Velusamy namely the deceased husband of 1 st
defendant. The respondents also denied the averments in the plaint that 1st
appellant was always ready and willing to perform her part of the contract. It
was specifically pleaded by the respondents that appellants never had shown any
interest to deposit Rs.60,000/- in the name of minor respondents 2 to 4 as agreed
in the consent deed.
4. The 1st respondent filed a separate written statement on behalf of the
minor respondents 2 to 4 wherein it was contended that the agreement was
entered into by 1st respondent on behalf of minors' share without obtaining
sanction from the Court and therefore, the suit for specific performance of the
same was unsustainable.
5. Before the Trial Court, the husband of the 1st appellant was examined as
P.W.1 and the attestor to Ex.A1 has been examined as P.W.2 on behalf of
appellants/plaintiffs. Three documents were marked as Ex.A1 to Ex.A3 on behalf
of the appellants. The 1st defendant was examined as D.W.1 and yet another
attestor to Ex.A1 was examined as D.W.2. On behalf of the
respondents/defendants, 7 documents were marked as Ex.B1 to Ex.B7.
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6. The Trial Court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence
available on record, came to the conclusion that as per the consent deed executed
by appellants on the date of suit sale agreement, the consideration agreed was
Rs.1,60,000/- . The appellants having failed to disclose the consent deed were
not entitled to specific performance of the suit sale agreement. Hence, the Trial
Court granted an alternative relief of return of advance amount. Aggrieved by the
same, the appellants preferred an appeal in A.S.No.52 of 2012 on the file of Sub-
ordinate Judge, Kallakurichi. The First Appellate Court came to the conclusion
that consent deed pleaded by respondents was not valid in law and the suit sale
agreement, Ex.A1 was valid and binding. However, the first Appellate Court
came to the conclusion that readiness and willingness of 1 st appellant to complete
the sale transaction was not proved and hence dismissed the appeal by
confirming the decree for return of advance granted by Trial Court. Aggrieved by
the same, the plaintiffs are before this Court.
7. This Court at the time of admission formulated the following substantial
questions of law vide order dated 02.11.2023 and the same reads as follows:-
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“(i) Whether the Courts below are correct in law in
its application of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act
especially when the appellants have proved their
readiness and willingness by issuing legal notice calling
upon the respondents to execute the sale deed well
within the period provided under Ex.A1, sale
agreement ?;
(ii) Whether the Lower Appellate Court is correct
in law in refusing to exercise its discretion to grant
decree for specific performance especially when the
appellants have proved their valid execution of Ex.A1
sale agreement and their readiness to have the sale
deed executed?”
8. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that
the 1st appellant proved her continuous readiness and willingness by issuing pre-
suit notice calling upon the defendants to receive the balance amount and
complete the sale transaction well within the time stipulated in agreement and
the respondents failed to give any reply to the said pre-suit notice. Therefore, the
continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the 1 st appellant was very
well proved and the same has not been properly considered by the First
Appellate Court. In support of his contentions, the learned Senior Counsel had
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taken this Court to evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 and also admissions of D.W.1.
9. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that except the
averment in the plaint that 1st appellant was always ready and willing to perform
her part of the contract, there is no evidence available on record to prove
continuous readiness and willingness from the date of agreement down to the
date of filing of the suit. Therefore, the first appellate Court was justified in
coming to the conclusion that readiness and willingness was not proved by the
plaintiffs. The learned counsel further submitted that in order to prove readiness
and willingness, the 1st appellant/1st plaintiff not even entered witness box and
subjected herself to cross-examination. Therefore, adverse inference shall be
drawn against the plaintiffs. The learned counsel by taking this Court to the
evidence of D.W.2, another attestor to the Ex.A1 sale agreement, submitted that
evidence of D.W.2 proved another sale agreement between the parties in the
name of consent deed for a higher consideration. The plaintiffs failed to disclose
the same before the Court. Therefore, they are not entitled to discretionary relief
of specific performance.
10. The learned counsel further submitted that admittedly agreement
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mentioned property belonged to 1st respondent's husband Velusamy and on his
death, the property will devolve on respondents/defendants and also mother of
Velusamy and the mother of Velusamy was not made as a party to this suit.
When respondents are not having right over the entire agreement mentioned
property, a decree for specific performance of their share in the agreement
mentioned property is not maintainable in the absence of prayer for partition. In
support of his contentions, the learned counsel relied on following judgments :-
1. Kamal KumarVs Premlata Joshi and others reported in 2019 (3)
SCC 704.
2. Mehboob-Ur-Rehman(Died) through legal representatives Vs
Ashanul Ghani reported in 2019 (19) SCC 415.
3. C.S.Venkatesh Vs A.S.C.Murthy reported in 2020 (3) SCC 280.
4. Shenbagam and others Vs K.K.Rathinavel reported in AIR 2022 SC
1275.
5.U.N.Krishnamurthy (since deceased) through legal representatives
Vs A.M. Krishnamurthy reported in AIR 2022 SC 3361.
6. Jaswinder Kaur(now deceased) through her legal representatives
and others Vs Gurmeet Singh and others reported in 2017 (12) SC 810.
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7.Shanmughasundaram and Others Vs Diravia Nadar( dead) by L.R's
and another reported in 2005 (10) SCC 728.
8. Citadel Fine Pharmaceuticals Vs Ramaniyam Real Estates Private
limited and another reported in 2011 (9) SCC 147.
9. M.Jayaprakash Narayanan Vs Santhammal and others reported in
2018 (1) CTC 701 DB.
10. N.Sundaramurthy Vs Suseeladevi reported in 2017 SCC OnLine
Mad 13557:AIR 2017 Mad 250.
11. Ritu Saxena Vs.J.S.Grover and another reported in 2019 (9) SCC
132.
11. In reply, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants
submitted that under Section 22 of Specific Relief Act, the Court can grant a
relief of specific performance in respect of the share of the vendors and after
getting the sale deed executed in respect of a share of the vendors, the vendee
can very well file a separate suit seeking partition. In support of his contentions,
the learned Senior Counsel relied on the following judgments.
i) Karthar Singh Vs Harjinder Singh and Others reported in (1990) 3
SCC 517.
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ii) P.C.Varghese Vs Devaki Amma Balambika Devi and others reported
in 2005 AIR SCW 5622.
iii) Kammana Sambamurthy (deceased by L.R.'s) Vs Kalipatnapu
Atchutamma (deceased by L.R) and Others reported in 2010 AIR SCW 6219.
12. As far as execution of Ex.A1 is concerned, it is an admitted fact that
the execution of Ex.A1 is clearly admitted by D.W.1 in cross-examination. Even
in the pleadings, the execution of Ex.A1, suit sale agreement is admitted . The
suit sale agreement is a registered agreement dated 05.05.2005 where under, the
respondents agreed to convey their 1/3rd interest in the agreement mentioned
property in favour of 1st appellant for sale consideration of Rs.1 lakh. As per the
terms of agreement, a sum of Rs.30,000/- was paid as an advance. The time
fixed for performance was till 14.03.2006. Even prior to expiry of the time fixed
in the agreement, notice was issued by 1st appellant under Ex.A2 dated
01.03.2006 calling upon the 1st respondent to receive the balance amount and
execute the sale deed. The said notice was received by 1st respondent under
Ex.A3. However, for the reasons best known to her, she had not replied to the
notice. Then, the suit was filed by the 1st appellant immediately on 17.03.2006
within three days from the date of expiry of time fixed for performance. With
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regard to the financial status of the 1st appellant to pay balance amount due
under the agreement, there is no serious dispute. The 1st respondent failed to
issue any reply to the pre-suit notice issued by the 1 st appellant denying her
financial status or her readiness and willingness to perform her part of the
contract. Likewise, even in the written statement filed by the defendants, the
financial status of the 1st appellant to pay balance amount was not at all
disputed. The main defence raised by the respondents was, on the date of Ex.A1
suit sale agreement, there was a separate transaction where under, the appellants
agreed to purchase the suit property for a higher sale consideration of
Rs.1,60,000/- and a consent deed was executed mentioning the higher sum.
However, the consent deed allegedly executed on the date of suit sale agreement
was not marked. When 2nd appellant was examined as P.W.1, the consent deed
was shown to him. He admitted the signature and the thumb impression of 1 st
appellant available in the consent deed. However, he denied the contents of the
document. The Trial Court only marked the signature and thumb impression as
Ex.A2 and Ex.A3. The entire consent deed has not been marked before the Trial
Court. The respondents, at least during examination of 1st respondent/D.W.1 or
examination of other attestor as D.W.2, could have marked the consent deed
through them. However, no attempt was made to mark the entire consent deed
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before the Court. Therefore, this Court is not in a position to refer to the contents
of the consent deed other than the signature and thumb impression which were
marked. In fact, the Trial Court mistakenly considered the contents of the
consent deed which was not marked and came to the conclusion that there was a
separate transaction on the date of suit sale agreement and therefore, the
appellants were not entitled to specific performance. However, the First
Appellate Court after considering the evidence of D.W.2 came to the conclusion
that the consent deed relied on by the respondents was not valid. In the written
statement, the respondents contended that under the consent deed the appellants
agreed to pay a sum of Rs.1,60,000/-. The attestor to Ex.A1 who was examined
as D.W.2 deposed as if under the terms of consent deed, the appellants agreed to
pay Rs.2 lakhs. The attestor to said consent deed has not been examined by the
respondents. By taking into consideration all these factual aspects, the First
Appellate Court came to the conclusion that consent agreement pleaded by the
respondents was not valid and only the suit sale agreement, Ex.A1 was valid
document. The said factual conclusion reached by the first appellate Court is
based on appreciation of entire evidence available on record and the same need
not be interfered in the absence of any perversity.
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13. As far as readiness and willingness is concerned, the First Appellate
Court came to the conclusion that 1st appellant failed to prove her continuous
readiness and willingness. In the case on hand, the financial capacity of the
appellants to pay balance sum of Rs.70,000/- has not been seriously disputed. In
fact, when D.W.1 was examined, she clearly admitted that 1st appellant called
her over phone and requested her to complete the sale transaction by receiving
the balance sale consideration. Apart from that, even before expiry of time limit
fixed under agreement (14.03.2006), the 1st appellant issued a pre-suit notice on
01.03.2006 calling upon the respondents to complete the sale transaction by
receiving the balance amount. For the pre-suit notice issued by the 1st appellant,
the 1st respondent failed to issue any reply. Thereafter, the suit was filed on
17.03.2006 within three days from the date of expiry of time fixed for
performance. In these circumstances, the 1st appellant had shown her continuous
readiness and willingness to perform her part of the contract from the inception
of the agreement to the date of filing of the suit. It is settled law that plaintiff
who seeks specific performance need not show the coin before the Court. If he is
able to prove, at the relevant point of time, he was in a position to mobilise the
funds to pay balance consideration that is sufficient. In the case on hand, well
prior to the expiry of the time, the 1 st appellant called the 1st respondent to
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receive the balance sale consideration and complete the sale transaction. She also
issued a legal notice well within a time and the 1st respondent failed to issue any
reply for the said legal notice. In these circumstances, the conclusion reached by
the First Appellate Court that 1st appellant failed to prove her continuous
readiness and willingness to perform her part of the contract is contrary to the
evidence available on record and the same is liable to be set aside. Hence, both
the substantial questions of law framed at the time of admission are answered in
favour of appellants and against the respondents.
14. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that respondents are
not entitled to convey the entire 1/3rd share of the Velusamy in the agreement
mentioned property when Velusamy's mother was alive. In this regard, it would
be appropriate to refer to the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Karthar Singh Vs Harjinder Singh and Others reported in (1990) 3 SCC 517.
The relevant observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the specific
performance of share of the vendor in the agreement mentioned property reads
as follows:-
“6. As regards the difficulty pointed out by the
High Court, namely, that the decree of specific
performance cannot be granted since the property
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will have to be partitioned, we are of the view that
this is not a legal difficulty. Whenever a share in the
property is sold the vendee has a right to apply for
the partition of the property and get the share
demarcated. We also do not see any difficulty in
granting specific performance merely because the
properties are scattered at different places. There is
no law that the properties to be sold must be situated
at one place. As regards the apportionment of
consideration, since admittedly the appellant and
respondent's sister each have half share in the
properties, the consideration can easily be reduced
by 50 per cent which is what the first appellate Court
has rightly done”.
15. In A.Abdul Rashid Khan(Dead) and Others Vs P.A.K.A.Shahul
Hamid and Others reported in 2000 (10) SCC 636 =MANU/SC/2734/2000, the
Hon'ble Apex Court observed as follows:-
"15. Thus we have no hesitation to hold, even
where any property is held jointly, and once any party to
the contract has agreed to sell such joint property
agreement, then, even if other co-sharer has not joined
at least to the extent of his share, he is bound to execute,
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the sale deed. However, in the absence of other co-
sharer there could not be any decree of any specified
part of the property to the partitioned and possession
given. The decree could only be to the extent of
transferring the share of the appellants in such property
to other such contracting party. In the present case, it is
not in dispute that the appellants have 5/6 share in the
property. So, the plaintiffs suit for specific performance
to the extent of this 5/6th share was rightly decreed by
the High Court which requires no interference"
16. In Narayanan Vs Kuppan and others reported in 2011 (2) MWN
(Civil) 548, this Court observed as follows:-
“9. A mere poring over and perusal of the
aforesaid judgments would amply make the point
clear that even undivided shares could be the subject
matter of Agreement to Sell and the only remedy open
for such agreement holder is to get the specific share
of the proposed seller carved out from the joint
property and obtain Sale Deed in respect of the same.
As such, I am of the considered view that the First
Appellate Court was not right in simply holding that
the said Agreement to Sell is bad in law and the First
Appellate Court was not justified in reversing the
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judgment and decree of the Trial Court in ordering
specific performance”.
17. In view of the law settled by Hon'ble Apex Court and this Court in the
above mentioned case laws, there is no embargo on the court to grant specific
performance of undivided share of the vendor. It is always open to the vendee to
get the sale deed executed as per the decree for specific performance and then
file a suit for partition. The passing of decree for specific performance in respect
of undivided share gives a cause of action for agreement vendee to file a suit for
partition. Because, mere agreement of sale will not create any interest in the
property. Only after passing of decree for specific performance in respect of
undivided share, he acquires interest in the property and consequently, entitled to
maintain a prayer for partition. Therefore, the objection raised by the learned
counsel for the appellants that the decree for specific performance cannot be
granted in respect of undivided share of vendors is also not acceptable to this
Court. In the case on hand, the respondents agreed to convey 1/3rd share of
Velusamy under suit sale agreement. Velusamy died leaving behind respondents
(wife and children) and his mother. The mother of Velusamy, who is having 1/15
(1/5 of 1/3) share in the suit property not joined as contracting party. Her share
represents only a small fraction in the subject matter of agreement. Hence, as per
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decision referred above a specific performance decree can be granted in respect
of respondents' 4/15 share in the property (4/5 of subject matter of agreement).
18. Regarding the plea raised by the respondents/defendants that sale
agreement entered into by 1st respondent would not bind the minor respondents
is concerned, in the sale agreement itself it was specifically mentioned that 1st
respondent entered into agreement so as to bind other respondents, who are her
heirs. When 1st respondent was examined as DW.1, she clearly admitted that
after death of her husband, she has been maintaining minor respondents in her
capacity as mother and she entered into suit sale agreement taking into
consideration future of her minor children. She specifically admitted that suit
sale agreement was entered into to meet her medical expenses and also the
maintenance expenses of her children (minor respondents). The relevant portion
of her admission in cross examination reads as follows:-
“vd; fztu; fhykhdJ gpd; vd; FHe;ijfspd; vjpu;fhyj;ij
Kd;dpl;L jhthtpy; cs;s xg;ge;jj;ij vGjpbfhLj;Js;nsd; vd;why;
rupjhd;////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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nkYk; vd; itj;jpa brytpw;F gzk; njitg;gl;ljhy; xg;ge;jk;
Vw;gLj;jpndd;/ vdf;F kUj;Jt bryt[ ghu;gg; jw;F vd; FHe;ijfspd;
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guhkupgg; pwf; hft[k;jhd; jhth xg;ge;jj;ij Vw;gLj;jp bfhLj;njd;/ vdJ
tpUg;gj;jpdn; gupy;jhd; jhth xg;ge;jk; Vw;gl;lJ vd;whYk; mjid
vGjpbfhLf;f jahuhf cs;nsdh vd;whYk; vdJ kUj;Jt
brytpw;fhft[k; vdJ FHe;ijfspd; guhkupgg; pw;fhft[k; xg;ge;jk;
Vw;gLj;jpndd;///////////////////////////////////////////////”
19. From the evidence of 1st respondent as DW.1, it is clear she entered
into suit sale agreement to meet her medical expenses and the maintenance
expenses of her minor respondents. Therefore, the suit sale agreement was
entered into by 1st respondent in her capacity as Manager of Hindu joint family
for legal necessity. From the evidence of 1st respondent, it is clear after death of
her husband, her children, who are minors are in her custody. She also admitted
that even during pendency of the suit, the minor respondents are living along
with her. In such circumstances, it can be safely presumed that after death of 1 st
respondent husband, she is acting as Manager of Hindu Joint Family consisting
herself and her minor children. It is settled law mother can act as family manager
of the hindu joint family in the absence of any other adult male member. It is
also very well settled the Manager of the Hindu Joint Family can sell the interest
of the minors in the joint family property to meet legal necessity. In this regard,
useful reference may be made to the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex
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Court.
20. In Sri Narayan Bal and Others Vs Sridhar Sutar and Others
reported in (1996) 8 SCC 54, the Hon'ble Apex Court, while dealing with the
applicability of Section 8 of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956
observed as follows:-
“5. With regard to the undivided interest of the
Hindu minor in joint family property, the provisions afore-
culled are beads of the same string and need be viewed in
a single glimpse, simultaneously in conjunction with each
other. Each provisions, and in particular Section 8, cannot
be viewed in isolation. If read together the intent of the
legislature in this beneficial legislation becomes manifest.
Ordinarily the law does not envisage a natural guardian
of the undivided interest of a Hindu minor in joint family
property. The natural guardian of the property of a Hindu
minor, other than the undivided interest in joint family
property, is alone contemplated under Section 8,
whereunder his powers and duties are defined. Section 12
carves out an exception to the rule that should there be no
adult member of the joint family in management of the
joint family property, in which the minor has an undivided
interest, a guardian may be appointed; but ordinarily no
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guardian shall be appointed for such undivided interest of
the minor. The adult member of the family in the
management of the Joint Hindu Family property may be a
male or a female, not necessarily the Karta. The power of
the High Court otherwise to appoint a guardian, in
situations justifying, has been preserved. This is the
legislative scheme on the subject. Under Section 8 a
natural guardian of the property of the Hindu minor,
before he disposes of any immovable property of the
minor, must seek permission of the court. But since there
need be no natural guardian for the minor's undivided
interest in the joint family property, as provided under
sections 6 and 12 of the Act, the previous permission of
the Court under Section 8 for disposing of the undivided
interest of the minor in the joint family property is not
required. The joint Hindu family by itself is a legal entity
capable of acting through its Karta and other adult
members of the family in management of the joint Hindu
family property. Thus section 8 in view of the express
terms of Sections 6 and 12, would not be applicable where
a joint Hindu family property is sold/disposed of by the
Karta involving an undivided interest of the minor in the
said joint Hindu family property. The question posed at
the outset therefore is so answered”.
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21. In Raj Kumar Raghubanchmani Prasad Narain Singh Vs Ambica
Prasad Singh (Dead) by Lawyers and Others reported in 1970 (3) SCC 350,
the Hon'ble Apex Court, while dealing with the power of alienation available to
the Manager of Hindu joint family observed as follows:-
"In any event, an alienation by the Manager of the
Hindu joint family even without legal necessity is voidable
and not void".
22. Therefore, it is settled law that the Manager of the Hindu joint family
is entitled to sell the property of the Hindu joint family including the share of
minor members for legal necessity and for benefit of the family. In the case on
hand, the admission of 1st respondent as D.W.1 clearly establish the sale
agreement was entered into to meet her medical expenses and maintenance of
the minor respondents. In such circumstances, there is no difficulty in coming to
the conclusion that sale agreement was entered into for legal necessity and for
benefit of the joint family. Therefore, the sale agreement is valid and it is binding
on the minor respondents. It is also settled law that Section 8 of Hindu Minority
and Guardianship Act, 1956 is not applicable to the interest of the minor in
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Hindu joint family.
23. Even assuming Section 8 of said Act is applicable to the case on hand,
still, if the property of the minor is alienated by natural guardian (Mother in this
case, in the absence of father) without permission of the Court, the consequence
would be the sale transaction is voidable at the option of minor and not void. In
the case on hand, till date the minor respondents have not exercised their option
of avoiding sale transaction. The plea raised by the 1st respondent in the written
statement filed on behalf of minors would not amount to exercise of option by
the minors. The law requires minor shall exercise option after attaining majority
within three years. In the absence of such exercise of option by the minors, the
sale transaction entered into by 1st respondent is binding on the minor's shares.
Therefore, the plea raised by the 1st respondent as if the sale agreement will not
bind share of minors is without any substance and the same is liable to be
rejected.
24. In view of the answers given to the substantial questions of law
framed at the time of admission, the second appeal stands allowed.
a) by setting aside the judgment and decree dated 30.06.2014 passed in
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A.S.No.52 of 2012 on the file of Sub-Ordinate Judge at Kallakurichi confirming
the judgment and decree dated 18.01.2012 passed in O.S.No.226 of 2006 on
the file of I Additional District Munsif Court, Kallakurichi.
b) the suit is decreed in respect of main relief for specific performance in
so far as interest of respondents over the agreement mentioned property namely
4/15 share instead of 1/3(5/15) as agreed in the agreement.
c) In the above facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order
as to costs.
d) Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.
22.12.2023
Index : Yes
Internet : Yes
Neutral Citation Case : Yes
nr
To
1.The learned Sub-Ordinate Judge, Kallakurichi
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2.The learned I Additional District Munsif Judge, Kallakurichi.
S.SOUNTHAR, J.
nr
and
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22.12.2023
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