Madras High Court
N.R.Krishnamoorthy Raja vs The District Registrar (Admin) on 22 December, 2023
Author: N.Anand Venkatesh
Bench: N.Anand Venkatesh
W.P.(MD)No.19582 of 2021
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
DATED : 22.12.2023
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.ANAND VENKATESH
W.P.(MD)No.19582 of 2021
N.R.Krishnamoorthy Raja ... Petitioner
Vs.
1.The District Registrar (Admin),
Virudhunagar District, Virudhunagar.
2.The Sub Registrar,
Rajapalayam Sub Registrar Office,
Rajapalayam,
Virudhunagar District,
3.V.N.Ramasamy Raja
4.P.B.Ganesh Singh Raja
5.R.S.Raju ... Respondents
PRAYER: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India for issuance of Writ of certiorarified mandamus, by calling for the
records relating to the impugned order of the 1st respondent in Na.Ka.No.
1453/Aa4/2020 dated 18.08.2021 and quash the same and to further direct
the 1st respondent to enquire and take action on the complaint dated
1/32
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W.P.(MD)No.19582 of 2021
03.06.2020 given by petitioner as directed by this Court in W.P.(MD)No.
14075/2020 dated 09.10.2020.
For Petitioner : Mr.S.Natarajan
Senior Counsel
for Ms.Viayakumari Natarajan
For R-1 & R-2 : Mr.K.S.Selva Ganesan,
Additional Government Pleader
For R-3 & R-5 : Mr.R.Ramadurai
For R-4 : No Appearance
ORDER
This Writ Petition has been filed challenging the impugned
proceedings of the first respondent in Na.Ka.No.1453/Aa4/2020 dated
18.08.2021 and for a consequential direction to the first respondent to take
action based on the complaint given by the petitioner on 03.06.2020.
2. Heard the learned counsel on either side.
3. The case of the petitioner is that the fourth respondent
through a sale deed dated 08.06.2015 registered as Document No.2157 of
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2015 on the file of the second respondent, executed a fraudulent deed in
favour of the fifth respondent and conveyed the subject property.
According to the petitioner, the third respondent originally claimed that he
is entitled for five cents of land in T.S.No.24 and he attempted to interfere
with the possession and enjoyment of the property. A suit was filed in
O.S.No.329 of 1995 before the Additional District Munsif Court,
Srivilliputhur. This suit was filed by the petitioner and five others seeking
for the relief of declaration of title and for permanent injunction. In that
suit, one of the issue that was dealt with by the Court was as to whether the
third respondent herein has any right over five cents of land which he was
claiming to be the owner. While deciding this issue, the Civil Court
categorically held that the third respondent herein does not have any right
over five cents of land and he was not even in possession and enjoyment of
the same. Ultimately, the suit filed by the petitioner and others was
dismissed and it was confirmed up to this Court in the Second Appeal.
4. In spite of the adverse finding given against the third
respondent, he proceeded further to execute a sale deed in favour of the
fourth respondent dated 20.12.2007 and in turn, the fourth respondent
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executed a sale deed in favour of the fifth respondent on 08.06.2015 and
according to the petitioner, all these documents are fraudulent documents.
5. The petitioner states that the third respondent in spite of
suffering an adverse finding before a competent Civil Court, proceeded to
deal with those five cents of land and hence, the petitioner gave a
complaint before the first respondent to take action against the private
respondents. Since no action was taken, the petitioner filed W.P.(MD).No.
14075 of 2020 before this Court. This Writ Petition was disposed of by an
order dated 09.10.2020 and the relevant portion in the order is extracted
hereunder:
“4. Considering the facts and
circumstances of the case and without expressing
any opinion on the merits of the matter, this Court
is inclined to pass the following order:
“The first respondent is directed to consider
the Complaint of the petitioner dated 03.06.2020
and pass orders in accordance with law,
particularly, by taking note of Section 68(2) of the
Registration Act, 1908, and thereafter, the
concerned authority may invoke Section 83 of the
said Act. The said exercise shall be done within a
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period of four moths from the date of receipt of a
copy of this order.”
6. Pursuant to the above order, the enquiry was conducted by
the first respondent and the first respondent through the impugned order
dated 18.08.2021, rejected the complaint. Aggrieved by the same, the
present Writ Petition has been filed before this Court.
7. The learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioner submitted that as against the adverse finding rendered against
the third respondent, no appeal was filed by him and the finding has
become final. In spite of the same, the third respondent has proceeded to
deal with the property and created a document which is fraudulent. As a
consequence, further sale deed that was executed by the fourth respondent
in favour of the fifth respondent must also be construed as fraudulent. The
learned Senior Counsel submitted that the tenability of this document must
be seen in the light of the finding that was rendered by the competent Civil
Court and that the petitioner is certainly entitled to question the same.
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8. The learned Senior Counsel further contended that the relief
that was sought for by the petitioner before the first respondent was not for
cancellation of the document and he had only sought for taking action
against the private respondents for having created fraudulent documents.
However, the first respondent has proceeded as if the petitioner has sought
for the cancellation of the document and this finding of the first respondent
is on the face of it illegal.
9. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner
further contended that the petitioner had produced all the relevant
documents before the first respondent. But, however, the first respondent
has rendered a finding as if the petitioner has not placed any documents
and on that ground also, the complaint given by the petitioner was rejected.
The learned Senior Counsel in order to substantiate his submission, relied
upon the Judgment passed by this Court in the case of J.Jayaniithaa Vs.
The Inspector General of Registration and others reported in 2021 (1)
CTC 839.
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10. This Court has carefully considered the submissions made
on either side and the materials available on record.
11. The short issue that arises for consideration in the present
case is as to whether the petitioner has the locus standi to question the
document that was executed by the third respondent in favour of the fourth
respondent and the further sale deed that was executed by the fourth
respondent in favour of the fifth respondent, on the ground that the
competent Civil Court had rendered an adverse finding that the third
respondent does not have any right over the five cents of land and this
finding had attained finality.
12. It must be borne in mind that the petitioner along with six
others had filed the suit in O.S.No.329 of 1995 before the Additional
District Munsif Court, Srivilliputhur, seeking for the relief of declaration
of title and permanent injunction. The declaration was sought for a larger
extent of property which also included the five cents of land which was
dealt with by the third respondent. While dealing with the claim made by
the respective parties, the trial Court had framed issues and one of the issue
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that was framed by the trial Court was as to whether the third respondent
(fourth defendant in the suit) had any right over the five cents of land and
was in possession and enjoyment of the same. While dealing with this
issue, the trial Court at Paragraph No.32 of the Judgment has held as
follows:
“vdNt jhth nrhj;J 4tJ
gpujpthjpf;F 5 nrz;L ghj;jpak; vd;Wk;
$wpAs;s NghjpYk; ru;Nt vz;.297/1y; cs;sJ
vd;W gp.rh.2 $wpAs;shu;. mjw;fhd vy;iyfs;
vd;d vd;gJ njupahJ vd;gJk; xj;Jf;
nfhs;sg;gLfpwJ. mJ Fwpj;J Mizau;
epakdk; nra;aNth vjpu;NfhUupik Nfl;L kD
jhf;fy; nra;atpy;iy vd;gjpypUe;J gpuhJ
jgrpy; nrhj;J 4tJ gpujpthjpf;Fg;
ghj;jpag;gl;lJ vd;gJ ep&gpf;fg;glhj NghJ
mJ 1tJ gpujpthjpapd; mDgtj;jpy; ,y;iy
vd;W 2tJ vOtpdhtpw;F
tpilaspf;fg;gLfpwJ.”
13. The trial Court has ultimately dismissed the suit filed by
the petitioner and others and this Judgment and Decree was confirmed up
to this Court in the Second Appeal. The main contention that was put forth
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by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner is that
an adverse finding was rendered against the third respondent to the effect
that the third respondent was not in possession and enjoyment of the
property and did not prove his right over the property and in spite of the
same, the third respondent has dealt with the very same property by
executing a fraudulent sale deed in favour of the fourth respondent.
14. It is now a settled law that an Appeal will not lie against a
mere finding of a Court. After the amendment made to the Code of Civil
Procedure in the year 1976, a Cross Objection will be maintainable against
an adverse finding under Order 41 Rule 22 of C.P.C., and a party will be
entitled to support the Decree in his favour and in the Cross Objection, he
can agitate the adverse finding against him. The necessity to file a Cross
Objection will arise only when the impugned Decree is partly in favour and
partly against. Where a Decree is entirely in favour of a party, though
there is an adverse finding against the party, he need not file a Cross
Appeal or a Cross Objection. In fact, he will be entitled to question the
adverse finding in the Appeal that is filed by the other side, who has lost in
the suit. Useful reference can be made to the Judgment of the Hon’ble
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Apex Court in the case of Saurav Jain and Others Vs. A.B.P.Design and
Others reported in 2022 (1) CTC 235. Useful reference can also be made
to the Judgment of this Court in the case of Suresh Kumar kankariya Vs.
K.Jigibai reported in 2022 2 LW 799.
15. In the instant case, there is no doubt that there was an
adverse finding as against the third respondent (fourth defendant in the
suit) touching upon his right over the five cents of land. This finding was
rendered in a suit that was filed by the petitioner, wherein, the petitioner
and others had sought for a declaration for a larger extent of land including
the five cents which was claimed by the third respondent. Ultimately, it
was found that the petitioner and others are not entitled for the relief for
the entire extent of lands including the five cents. Therefore, the question
boils down as to whether the petitioner in spite of losing in the civil
proceedings can question the document that was executed by the third
respondent in favour of the fourth respondent on the ground that there was
an adverse finding against the third respondent. It must be kept in mind
that the finding rendered in the civil proceedings will ultimately merge
with the final decision that is taken by the Court while decreeing or
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dismissing the suit. The finding rendered by the Civil Court cannot
independently hang in the air and it will have the same fate that the suit
suffers. Hence, it will be too difficult to keep holding to an adverse
finding in the civil proceedings where ultimately the suit itself was
dismissed and it was confirmed up to the High Court.
16. The next question is regarding the locus standi of the
petitioner. It is now too settled that a person who is invoking the
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India must show that
his personal or individual right has been affected in order to maintain a
Writ Petition. The only exception for this Rule is where a writ has been
filed for issuance of Habeas Corpus or for Quo Warranto or where a Writ
Petition has been filed in Public Interest. Useful reference can be made to
the Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vinoy Kumar Vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in AIR 2001 SC 1739. Useful
reference can also be made to the Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in
the case of Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan Vs. State of Maharashtra and
others reported in (2012) 8 MLJ 679 at page 683. A Division Bench of
this Court also had an occasion to deal with the term as to who is an
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aggrieved person for maintaining a Writ Petition. This Judgment was in
the case of P.H.C.M.Gandhi, President, Rica Employees Union (AICTU),
(Registration No.953/NAT), Mnaithaneyakoodam 17, Sindhu Garden
Gandhi Nagar, Vellore-632 006 Vs. Chairman, Board of Management of
the Academy of Prisons and Correctional Administrations, Thorapadi,
Vellore-632 002 Tamil Nadu and Others reported in (2017) 2 MLJ 1.
The relevant portions are extracted hereunder:-
“115. In the light of the rules, approved by
the participating states, it is our considered view
that, the Board of Management, is empowered to
decide, as to which of the service conditions,
followed in each of the participating state should
be adopted. APCA is a society registered under
the Societies Registration Act, 1975. If the
condition of the petitioner is accepted, then the
age of superannuation, 56 years, as fixed by
Government of Kerala, both for inferior and
superior service, could have been accepted by
APCA, but that is not the case on hand. Even
taking it for granted, there is a disparity in the
age of retirement for superior or inferior service,
as the case may be, the petitioner cannot be said
to be the person aggrieved, by the order,
relieving some of the employees from service, on
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attaining the age of retirement at 58 years, and
hence, cannot maintain a writ petition. At this
juncture, it is worthwhile to consider a decision
in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai vs Roshan Kumar,
Haji Bashir Ahmed reported in 1976 (1) SCC
671, as to who is an aggrieved person. In Jasbhai
Motibhai Desai's case (cited supra), the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has carved out the meaning for
the words, "person aggrieved" or "aggrieved
person", from English Judgements and other
Apex Court judgments and the same are extracted
hereunder:
"12. According to most English decisions,
in order to have the locus standi to invoke
certiorari jurisdiction, the petitioner should be an
"aggrieved person" and, in a case of defect of
jurisdiction, such a petitioner will be entitled to a
writ of certiorari as a matter of course, but if he
does not fulfil that character, and is a "stranger",
the Court will, in its discretion, deny him this
extraordinary remedy, save in very special
circumstances.
13. This takes us to the further question:
Who is an "aggrieved person" and what are the
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qualifications requisite for such a status? The
expression "aggrieved person" denotes an elastic,
and, to an extent, an elusive concept. It cannot be
confined within the bounds of rigid, exact and
comprehensive definition. At best, its features can
be described in a broad, tentative manner. Its
scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable
factors such as the content and intent of the
statute of which contravention is alleged, the
specific circumstances of the case, the nature and
extent of the petitioner's interest, and the nature
and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by
him. English Courts have sometimes put a
restricted and sometimes a wide construction on
the expression "aggrieved person". However,
some general tests have been devised to ascertain
whether an applicant is eligible for this category
so as to have the necessary locus standi or
'standing' to invoke certiorari jurisdiction.
14. We will first take up that line of cases
in which an "aggrieved person" has been held to
be one 114 who has a more particular or peculiar
interest of his own beyond that of the general
public, in seeing that the law is properly
administered. The leading case in this line in
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Queen v. Justices of Surrey [(1870) 5 QB 466]
decided as far back as 1870. There, on the
application by the highway board the Justices
made certificates that certain portions of three
roads were unnecessary. As a result, it was
ordered that the roads should cease to be
repaired by the parishes.
15. E, an inhabitant of one of the parishes,
and living in the neighbourhood of the roads,
obtained a rule for a certiorari to bring up the
orders and certificates for the purpose of
quashing them on the ground that they were void
by reason of the notices not having been affixed
at the places required by law. On the point of
locus standi (following an earlier decision Hex v.
Taunton St. Mary [(1815) 3 M & S 465 : 105 ER
685], the Court held that though a certiorari is
not a writ of course, yet as the applicant had by
reason of his local situation a peculiar grievance
of his own, and was not merely applying as one of
the public, he was entitled to the writ ex debito
justitiae.
16. It is to be noted that in this case was
living in the neighbourhood of the roads were to
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be abandoned as a result of the certificates issued
by the Justices. He would have suffered special
inconvenience by the abandonment. Thus had
shown a particular grievance of his own beyond
some inconvenience suffered by the general
public. He had a right to object to the grant of the
Certificate. Non-publication of the notice at all
the places in accordance with law, had seriously
prejudice him in the exercise of that legal right.
17. The ratio of the decision in Queen v.
Justices of Surrey (supra) was followed in King v.
Groom and ors. Ex Parte [(1901) 2 KB 157 : 70
LJKB 637]. There, the parties were rivals in the
liquor trade. The applicants (brewers) had
persistently objected to the jurisdiction of the
justices to grant the ` license to one J. K. White in
a particular month. It was held that the
applicants had a sufficient interest in the matter
to enable them to invoke certiorari jurisdiction.
18. A distinguishing feature of this case
was that unlike the appellants in the present case
who did not, despite public notice, raise any
objection before the District Magistrate to the
grant of the No-objection Certificate, the brewers
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were persistently raising objections in
proceedings before the Justices at every stage.
The law gave them a right to object and to see
that the licensing was done in accordance with
law. They were seriously prejudiced in the
exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of
the jurisdiction on the part of the Justices.
19. The rule in Groom's case was followed
in The King v. Richmond Confirming Authority,
Ex parte Howitt [(1971) 1 KB 248]. There, also,
the applicant for a certiorari was a rival in the
liquor trade. It is significant that in coming to the
conclusion that the applicant was a 'person
aggrieved', Earl of Reading C.J. laid stress on the
fact that he had appeared and objected before the
Justices and joined issue with them, though
unsuccessfully, "in the sense that they 116 said
they had jurisdiction when he said they had not".
20. In R. Toames Magistrate Court Ex
parte Greenbaum [(1957) 55 LGR 129, 135 &
136 extracted in Yardley's book of English
Administrative Law. 2nd Edn. at p. 228.] there
were two traders in Goulston St., Stepney. One of
them was Gritzman who held a license to trade on
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pitch No.4 for 5 days in the week an pitch No.8
for the other two days. The other was
Greenbaum, who held a licence to sell on Pitch
for the other days of the week. A much better
pitch, pitch No.2, in Gulston St. became vacant.
Thereupon, both Gritzman and Greenbaum
applied for the grant of a licence, each wanted o
to give up his own existing licence and get a new
licence for pitch No.2. The Borough Council
considered and decided in favour of Greenbaum
and refused Gritzman who was left with his
pitches 4 and 8.
21. Gritzman appealed to the magistrate.
He could not appeal against the grant of a licence
to Greenbaum, but only against the refusal to
grant a licence to himself. Before the magistrate,
the Borough Council opposed him. The
magistrate held that the Council were wrong to
refuse the licence of pitch No. 2 to Gritzman. The
Council thereupon made out a licence for
Gritzman for pitch No. 2 and wrote to
Greenbaum saying that his licence had been
wrongly issued. Greenbaum made an application
for certiorari to court . The court held that the
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magistrate had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
An objection was taken that Greenbaum had no
locus standi. Rejecting the 117 contention, Lord
Denning observed:
"I should have thought that in this case
Greenbaum was certainly a person aggrieved,
and not a stranger. He was affected by the
magistrate's orders because the magistrate
ordered another person to be put on his pitch. It
is a proper case for the intervention of the Court
by means of Certiorari.”
22. It is to be noted that the Council had
duly allotted pitch No. 2 to J'' Greenbaum in the
exercise of their administrative power. The
Magistrate's order pursuant to which the Council
cancelled the allotment. and re-allotted that pitch
to Gritzman, was without jurisdiction By this
illegal cancellation and reallotment Greenbaum's
interest to trade on pitch No. 2, which had been
duly licensed out to him was directly and
prejudically affected by the impugned action.
23. R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee
[1952) 2 W.B.D. 413], is another case belonging
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to this group. lt was held that the applicants
therein were "persons aggrieved" because they
were grieved by the failure of the Legal Aid
Committee to give them prior notice and hearing
to which they were entitled under Regulation
15(2). Thus it could be said that they had suffered
a legal wrong.
24. In Regina v. Liverpool Corporation, Ex
parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet operators' Association
[[1972] 2 Q.B.299.], the City Council in exercise
of its powers under the Town Police Clauses Act,
1847, limited the number of licences to be issued
for hackney carriages to 300. The Council gave
an undertaking to the associations representing
the 300 existing licence 118 holders not to
increase the number of such licence holders
above 300 for a certain period. The Council,
disregarding this undertaking, resolved to
increase the number. An Association representing
the existing licence-holders moved the Queens'
Bench for leave to apply for orders of
Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari. The
Division Bench refused. In the Court of Appeal,
allowing the Association's appeal, Lord Denning
M. R. Observed ar pp. 308, 309:
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"The taxicab owners' association come to
this Court for relief and I think we should give it
to them. The writs of prohibition and certiorari
lie on behalf of any person who is a "person
aggrieved" and that includes any person whose
interests may be pre judicially affected by what is
taking place. It does not include a mere busybody
who is interfering in things which do not concern
him; but it includes any person who has a
genuine grievance because something has been
done or may be done which affects him: See
Attorney-General of Gambia v. N' Jie [1961] A.C.
617 and Maurice v. London County Council
[1964] 2 Q.B. 362, 378. The taxicab owners'
association here have certainly a locus standi to
apply for relief."
25. It may be noted that in this case, the
whole question turned on the effect in law of the
undertaking, and whether the applicants had been
treated fairly.
26. Emphasising the "very special
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circumstances" of the case, the court read into
the statute, a duty to act fairly in accordance with
the principles of natural justice. Thus, a
corresponding right to be treated fairly was also
imported, by implication, in favour of the' 119
applicants. Viewed from this standpoint, the
applicants had an interest recognised in law,
which was adversely affected by the impugned
action. They had suffered a wrong as a result of
the unfair treatment on the part of the
corporation.
27. In Regina v. Paddington Valuation
Officer, Ex Parte Peachy Property Corporation
Ltd., [1966]1 Q.B. 880, ratepayers were held to
have the locus standi to apply for certiorari,
notwithstanding the fact that it could not be said
that the actual burdens to be borne by the
applicants fell more heavily on them than on
other members of the local community.
28. In Bar Council of Maharashtra v.
M.V.Dabholkar [(1975) 2 SCC 702], Bench of
seven learned Judges of this Court considered the
question whether the Bar Council of a State was a
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'person aggrieved' to maintain an appeal under s.
38 of the Advocates' Act, 1961. Answering the
question in the affirmative, this Court, speaking
through Ray C.J., indicated how the expression
"person aggrieved" is to be interpreted in the
context of a statute, thus:
"The meaning of the words "a person
aggrieved" may vary according to the context of
the statute. One of the meanings is that a person
will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that
decision is materially adverse to him. Normally,
one is required to establish that one has been
denied or deprived of something to which one is
legally entitled in order to make one "a person
aggrieved". Again a person is aggrieved if a legal
burden is imposed on him. The meaning of the
120 words "a person aggrieved" is sometimes
given a restricted meaning in certain statutes
which provide remedies for the protection of
private legal rights. The restricted meaning
requires denial or deprivation of legal rights. A
more liberal approach is required in the back
ground of statutes which do not deal with
property rights but deal with professional
conduct and morality. The role of the Bar Council
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under the Advocates' Act is comparable to the
role of a guardian in professional ethics. The
words "person aggrieved" in Sections 37 and 38
of the Act are of wide import and should not be
subjected to a restricted inter pretation of
possession or denial of legal rights or burdens or
financial interests.
29. In Rex v. Butt and anr. Ex Parte
Brooke [Vol. XXXVIII(1921-22) Times Law
Reports 537] , a person who was merely a
resident of the town, was held entitled to apply
for certiorari. Similar is the decision in Regina v.
Brighton Borough Just ices Ex Parte Jarvis
(1954)1,Weekly Law Reports 203.
30. Typical of the cases in which a strict
construction was put on the expression "person
aggrieved", is Buxton and ors. v. Minister of
Housing and Local Government [1961] 1 Q.B.D.
278]. There, an appeal by a Company against the
refusal of the Local Planning Authority of
permission to develop land owned by the
Company by digging chalk, was allowed by the
Minister. Owners of adjacent property applied to
the High Court under s. 31(1) of the Town and
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Country Planning Act, 1959 to quash the decision
of the Minister on the ground that the proposed
operations by 121 the company would injure their
land, and that they were 'persons aggrieved' by
the action of the Minister. It was held that the
expression 'person aggrieved' in a statute meant a
person who had suffered a legal grievance;
anyone given the right under s.37 of the Act of
1959 to have his representation considered by the
Minister was a person aggrieved, thus, Section 31
applied, if those rights were infringed; but the
applicants had no right under the statute, and no
legal rights had been infringed and therefore they
were not entitled to challenge the Minister's
decision. Salmon J. quoted with approval these
observations of James T. J. in In Re Sidebothem
[1880] 14Ch.D.458,at p.465.
"The words 'person aggrieved' do not
really means a man who is disappointed of a
benefit which he might have received if some
other order had been made. A 'person aggrieved'
must be a man who has suffered a legal
grievance,`a man against whom a decision has
been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived
him of something, or wrong fully refused him
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something, or wrongfully affected his title to
something."
31. Ex Parte Stott [1916] 1K B.7, is
another illustration of a person who had no legal
grievance, nor had he sufficient interest in the
matter. A licensing authority under the
Cinematography Act, 1901, granted to a theatre
proprietor a licence for the exhibition of
cinematograph films at his theatre. The licence
was subject to the condition that the licensee
should not exhibit any film if, he had notice that
the licensing authority objected to it. A firm who
had 122 acquired the sole right of 1 exhibition of
a certain film in the district in which the theatre
was situated entered into an agreement with the
licensee for the exhibition of the film at his
theatre. The licensing authority having given
notice to the licensee that it objected to the
exhibition of the film, the film applied for a writ
of certiorari to bring up the notice to be quash ed
on the ground that the condition attached to the
licence was unreasonable and void, and that they
were aggrieved by the notice as 'being destructive
of their property. It was held that whether the
condition was unreasonable or not, the
applicants were not persons who were aggrieved
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
by the notice and had no locus standi to maintain
the application.
32. Similarly, King v. Middlesex Justices
(1832) 37 R. R. 594-(1832) 3 & Ad. 938, it was
held that the words "person who shall think
himself aggrieved" appearing in the statute
governing the grant of licences to innkeepers
mean a person immediately aggrieved as by
refusal of a licence to himself, and not one who is
consequently aggrieved, and that though the
Justices had granted a licence to a party to open
a public house, not before licensed, within a very
short distance of a licensed public house, the
occupier of the latter house could not appeal
against such grant.
33. Other instances of a restricted
interpretation of the expression "person
aggrieved" are furnished by R. v. Bradford on-
Avon Urban District Council Ex Parte Boulton
(1964) 2 All. E. R. 492; Gregory v.Camden
London Borough Council 123 [(1966) 1 WLR
899]; R. v. London O.S. Ex parte West-Minister
Corporation [(1951) 2 KB 508]; Regina v.
Cardiff Justices Ex parte Cardiff Corporation
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[(1962) 2 QB 436]."
17. In the instant case, the petitioner was not having any right
or title over the suit property which also included the five cents of land
that has now been dealt with by the third respondent in favour of the fourth
respondent and in turn by the fourth respondent in favour of the fifth
respondent. In view of the same, the petitioner does not have the locus
standi to question the sale deed that was executed by the third respondent
in favour of the fourth respondent and in turn, by the fourth respondent in
favour of the fifth respondent. The simple test to understand this issue is
as to whether the petitioner will be entitled to file a civil suit against the
third respondent and seek for a declaration that the document executed by
him in favour of the fourth respondent is null and void and non-est in the
eye of law. The answer is pretty straight forward and the petitioner cannot
maintain such a suit, since the petitioner will be barred by the principles of
res judicata. This is in view of the fact that the petitioner was held not to
be entitled for the entire extent of land including five cents and therefore,
the petitioner cannot once again agitate this issue insofar as the five cents
of land that was dealt with by the third respondent.
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18. In the considered view of this Court, the first respondent
could not have gone into this issue in exercise of his jurisdiction under
Section 68(2) of the Registration Act, 1908. Ultimately, the first
respondent is also bound to keep in mind the Decree that was passed by the
Civil Court and the first respondent cannot pass an order by declaring the
document to be fraudulent and such a finding will go contrary to the
Decree that was passed by the Civil Court.
19. There is an other way for looking at this issue. Even
assuming that the sale deed that was executed by the third respondent in
favour of the fourth respondent and in turn, the sale deed executed by the
fourth respondent in favour of the fifth respondent, does not confer any
right or title to the parties concerned, the question is as to who should
challenge this document. Certainly, the petitioner cannot challenge this
document, since the petitioner is bound by the earlier Decree that was
passed by the competent Civil Court. When that is the case, there is no
question of the first respondent going into this issue and holding that the
document executed by the third and fourth respondents are fraudulent and
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illegal.
20. In the light of the above discussions, this Court has to
certainly uphold the order passed by the first respondent and there is no
ground to interfere with the same.
21. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. No costs.
22.12.2023
NCC:yes/no
Index:yes/no
Internet:yes/no
TSG
To
1.The District Registrar (Admin),
Virudhunagar District,
Virudhunagar.
2.The Sub Registrar,
Rajapalayam Sub Registrar Office,
Rajapalayam,
Virudhunagar District.
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
N.ANAND VENKATESH, J.
TSG
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
22.12.2023
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
