Madras High Court
N.Raja vs The State Of Tamilnadu on 10 January, 2022
W.P.No.30369 of 2018
and W.M.P.No.35447 of 2018
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED : 10.01.2022
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.S.RAMESH
W.P.No.30369 of 2018
and W.M.P.No.35447 of 2018
N.Raja
Agricultural Officer,
O/o.Assistant Director of Agriculture,
Pesticide Testing Laboratory,
Thondi Road,
Sivagangai. ... Petitioner
Vs.
1.The State of Tamilnadu
represented by its
Agricultural Production Commissioner cum Principal Secretary,
Fort St.George, Secretariat,
Chennai – 600 009.
2.Commissioner of Agriculture,
Ezhilagam,
Chepauk,
Chennai – 600 005. ... Respondents
PRAYER: This Writ Petition has been filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India praying to issue a writ of certiorarified mandamus to
call for the records on the file of the first respondent in connection with
the impugned order of punishment passed in G.O.(3D).No.129
Agriculture (Ve.Ni.8) Department, dated 27.09.2018 and quash the same
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as illegal and arbitrary and consequently direct the respondent to sanction
all service and monetary benefits within the time limit that may be
stipulated by this Court.
For Petitioner : Mr.R.Jayaprakash
For Respondents : Mr.C.Selvaraj
Additional Government Pleader
ORDER
Arising out of the same set of allegations contained in the charge
memo dated 29.09.2008, the petitioner along with one J.Murugabharathi,
were proceeded with the departmental action predominantly on the
allegations that he had failed to conduct Farmers Field School training for
farmers under the Integrated Seeds Development Programme in some
villages during the years 20032-2003, 2003-2004 & 2004-2005 and also
that he had failed to verify the genuineness of the training conducted in
the year 2003-2004 before signing the relevant vouchers or bills.
2.Pursuant to the charge memo an enquiry was conducted and
ultimately the petitioner was imposed with the punishment of “stoppage
of increment for a period of one year” through order dated 27.09.2018.
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Aggrieved over the same, the writ petition has been filed.
3.When the identically placed employee had challenged charge
memo before this Court in W.P.(MD).No.18206 of 2019, in the case of
J.Murugabharathi Vs. The Agricultural Production Commissioner and
Principal Secretary to Government, Agricultural Department,
Secretariat, Chennai 600 009, dated 01.04.2021, this Court had passed
detailed order quashing the charge memo and the relevant portion of the
order reads as follows:
6. Insofar as ground (a) of 'Bias' raised by the
petitioner is concerned, the petitioner in his additional
affidavit, had stated that the Enquiry Officer viz.
Mr.A.Muthukrishnan, while holding the post of Assistant
Director of Agriculture, had caused financial losses to the
Department and this was pointed out by the petitioner to the
Government in his report, dated 06.09.2010. Consequently,
the Joint Director of Agriculture, Sivagangai, in his
proceedings dated 09.05.2013 has issued an order of
recovery against the Enquiry Officer and accordingly the
amount of Rs.81,570/- was also recovered on 15.05.2013.
The only objection raised by the respondents is that this
ground of 'bias' was not raised by the petitioner during the
course of inquiry. The learned counsel however, would state
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that the factum of his complaint against the Enquiry Officer
was not known when the enquiry was pending and was
revealed only after the present writ petition was filed.
7. Be that as it may, the fact that the recovery from
the Enquiry Officer of the financial losses, was pursuant to
the report of the also petitioner, which fact, is not disputed.
A cumulative appraisal of the facts commencing from the
petitioner's recommendation/ report against the Enquiry
Officer that culminated into recovery of the financial loss
from Enquiry Officer is sufficient to create an impression
that there was a real likelihood of bias and such
apprehension of the petitioner that the Enquiry Officer
would have acted in a prejudicial manner, is more than
sufficient for this Court to infer the possibility of Bias, as
held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
S.Parthasarathi vs. State of Andhra Pradhesh reported in
(1974) 3 SCC 459, in the following manner:-
“13. The letter written by the Medical Officer
(Ex.B-8) would indicate that Manvi wanted to get rid
of the services of the appellant on the ground of his
mental imbalance and it was for that purpose that he
tried to get a certificate to the effect that the appellant
was mentally unsound. We are of the opinion that the
cumulative effect of the circumstances stated above
was sufficient to create in the mind of a reasonable
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man the impression that there was a real likelihood of
bias in the inquiring officer. There must be a "real
likelihood" of bias and that means there must be a
substantial possibility of bias. The court will have to
judge of the matter as a reasonable man would judge
of any matter in the conduct of as own business (see R.
v. Sunderland JJ.)(1).
14. The test of likelihood of bias which has
been applied in a number of cases is based on the
"reasonable apprehension" of a reasonable man fully
cognizant of the facts. The courts have quashed
decisions on the ,strength of the reasonable suspicion
of the party aggrieved without having made any
finding that a real likelihood of bias in fact existed
[see R. v. Huggins(2)]; R. v. Sussex JJ., ex. p.
McCarthy(3); Cottle v. Cottle(4); R. v. Abingdon JJ.
ex. p. Cousins(5). But in R. v. Camborne ff., ex. p.
Pearce(6), the Court, after a review of the relevant
cases held that real likelihood of bias was the proper
test and, that a real likelihood of bias had to be made
to appear not only from the materials in fact
ascertained by the party complaining, but from such
further facts as he might readily have ascertained and
easily verified in the course of his inquiries.
15. The test of likelihood of bias which has
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been applied in a number of cases is based on the
"reasonable apprehension" of a reasonable man fully
cognizant of the facts. The courts have quashed
decisions on the, strength of the reasonable suspicion
of the party aggrieved without having made any
finding that a real likelihood of bias in fact existed
[see R. v. Huggins(2)]; R. v. Sussex JJ., ex. p.
McCarthy(3); Cottle v. Cottle(4); R. v. Abingdon JJ.
ex. p. Cousins(5). But in R. v. Camborne ff., ex. p.
Pearce(6), the Court, after a review of the relevant
cases held that real likelihood of bias was the proper
test and, that a real likelihood of bias had to be made
to appear not only from the materials in fact
ascertained by the party complaining, but from such
further facts as he might readily have ascertained and
easily verified in the course of his inquiries.
16. The tests of "real likelihood" and
"reasonable suspicion" are really inconsistent with
each other. We think that the reviewing authority must
make a determination on the basis of the whole
evidence before it whether a reasonable man would in
the circumstances infer that there is real likelihood of
bias. The court must look at the impression which
other people have. This follows from the principle that
justice must not only be done but seen to be done. If
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right minded persons would think that there is real
likelihood of bias on the part of an inquiring officer,
be must not conduct the enquiry; nevertheless, there
must be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or
conjecture would not be enough. There must exist
circumstances from which reasonable men would
think it probable or likely that the inquiring officer
will be prejudiced against the delinquent. The court
will not inquire whether he was really prejudiced. If a
reasonable man would think on the basis of the
existing circumstances that. he is likely to be
prejudiced, that is sufficient to quash the decision [see
per Lord Denning, M.R. in Metropoli- tan Properties
Co, (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon and Others, etc.(1)]. We
should not, however, be understood to deny that the
court might with greater propriety apply the
"reasonable suspicion" test in criminal or in
proceedings analogous to criminal proceedings.
17. As there was real likelihood of bias in the
sense explained above, think that the inquiry and the
orders based on the inquiry were bad. The decision of
this Court in the State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad
Nooh(2) makes it clear that if an inquiring officer
adopts a procedure which is contrary to the rules of
natural justice, the ultimate decision based on his
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report of inquiry is liable to be quashed. We see no
reason for not applying the same principle here as we
find that the inquiring officer was biased.”
8. It is also a settled principle that the Disciplinary
Authority must be impartial and without any bias. In Union
of India and others vs Sanjay Jethi and another, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court had enunciated the principle of bias
in the following manner:
“45. The plea of bias it is to be scrutinised on
the basis of material brought on record whether
someone makes wild, irrelevant and imaginary
allegations to frustrate a trial or it is in consonance
with the thinking of a reasonable man which can meet
the test of real likelihood of bias. The principle cannot
be attracted in vacuum.
46. In State of Gujarat and Anr. v. Justice
R.A. Mehta (Retired) and Ors. a two-Judge Bench
dealing with "bias" has observed thus:
“58.....Bias is one of the limbs of
natural justice. The doctrine of bias emerges
from the legal maxim nemo debet esse judex in
propria causa. It applies only when the interest
attributed to an individual is such so as to tempt
him to make a decision in favour of, or to
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further his own cause. There may not be a case
of actual bias, or an apprehension to the effect
that the matter most certainly will not be
decided or dealt with impartially but where the
circumstances are such so as to create a
reasonable apprehension in the minds of others
that there is a likelihood of bias affecting the
decision, the same is sufficient to invoke the
doctrine of bias. ”
47. In the said R.A.Mehta case, it has been
further observed that:-
“59. in the event that actual proof of
prejudice is available, the same will naturally
make the case of a party much stronger, but the
availability of such proof is not a necessary
precondition, for what is relevant, is actually
the reasonableness of the apprehension in this
regard in the mind of such party. In case such
apprehension exists the trial/judgment/order,
etc. would stand vitiated for want of
impartiality and such judgment/order becomes
a nullity. The trial becomes coram non judice.”
48. At this juncture, we think it apt to refer to
the pronouncements in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of
India and Ors. and Major G.S. Sodhi v. Union of
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India. In Ranjit Thakur's case the Court was dealing
with justifiability of an order of dismissal passed by
the summary Court martial of which one of the
members was the Respondent No. 4 therein. The said
Respondent had sentenced the Appellant to suffer
sentence of 28 days rigorous imprisonment for
violating the norms for representation to higher
authorities and the representation that was sent to the
higher authorities pertained to the ill-treatment at the
hands of the Respondent No. 4. Keeping the said
factual backdrop in view the Court referred to the
procedural safeguards provided Under Section 130 of
the Act and opined that the proceedings of summary
Court martial was infirm in law. Thereafter, the
learned Judges proceeded to deal with the second
limb of arguments also. It related to bias on the part
of the Respondent No. 4 therein. In that context, the
Court observed as follows:
“16. It is the essence of a judgment
that it is made after due observance of the
judicial process; that the Court or tribunal
passing it observes, at least the minimum
requirements of natural justice; is composed of
impartial persons acting fairly and without bias
and in good faith. A judgment which is the
result of bias or want of impartiality is a nullity
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and the trial "coram nonjudice". (See
Vassiliades v. Vassiliades ) ”
49. The Court in Ranjit Thakur case referred
to the decisions in Allinson v. General Council of
Medical Education and Registration, Metropolitan
Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon, Public
Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia v.
Pollak and Regina v. Liverpool City Justices, ex parte
Topping and, eventually, concluded that the
inescapable conclusion was that the participation of
Respondent No. 4 had rendered the court-martial
proceedings coram non-judice.
50. In Major G.S. Sodhi (supra), the Court
did not accept the alleged plea of bias or mala fide as
Lt. Col. S.K. Maini, who had ordered summary of
evidence against the Petitioner therein, was inimical
towards him because of certain prior incidents. It was
also alleged that he had not acceded to certain
requests made by the Petitioner during the inquiry.
The Court did not accept the same on the ground that
the Respondent Lt. Col. S.K.Maini was only concerned
with the preliminary inquiry and it was for the Court
martial to try the case and give its verdict and mere
allegation of bias and mala fide against him did not
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affect the Court martial proceedings. That apart, the
Court observed that the allegations against the said
Maini had not been really substantiated and even they
are perceived from the point of view of the Petitioner
therein, it could not be held that it was not reasonable
on his part to apprehend that the said officer would
act in a biased and partisan manner. Emphasis was
laid on the fact that he was only responsible for
holding a preliminary enquiry.
51. The principle that can be culled out from
the number of authorities fundamentally is that the
question of bias would arise depending on the facts
and circumstances of the case. It cannot be an
imaginary one or come into existence by an
individual's perception based on figment of
imagination. While dealing with the plea of bias
advanced by the delinquent officer or an accused a
Court or tribunal is required to adopt a rational
approach keeping in view the basic concept of
legitimacy of interdiction in such matters, for the
challenge of bias, when sustained, makes the whole
proceeding or order a nullity, the same being coram
nonjudice. One has to keep oneself alive to the
relevant aspects while accepting the plea of bias. It is
to be kept in mind that what is relevant is actually the
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reasonableness of the apprehension in this regard in
the mind of such a party or an impression would go
that the decision is dented and affected by bias. To
adjudge the attractability of plea of bias a tribunal or
a Court is required to adopt a deliberative and logical
thinking based on the acceptable touchstone and
parameters for testing such a plea and not to be
guided or moved by emotions or for that matter by
one's individual perception or misguided intuition.”
9. The objections raised by the respondents on this
ground of 'Bias'
is that the petitioner herein had not raised the same during
the initial stages of inquiry and since he had subjected
himself to the disciplinary action until the imposition of
punishment, the plea of Bias cannot be raised belatedly. It is
no doubt true that the plea of bias, was raised by the
petitioner only in this writ petition. It is stated that the fact
that the petitioner was instrumental in subjecting the
Enquiry Officer to Recovery proceedings, was discovered
only when this writ petition was pending.
10. Such an objection has been dealt with by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rattan Lal Sharma vs Managing
Committee, Dr.Hari Ram (Co-Education) Higher
Secondary School and others reported in (1993) 4 SCC 10
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whereby it was held that such a plea of Bias, even though
belatedly raised before the High Court in the writ
proceedings for the first time, could be substantiated. The
relevant portion of the order reads thus:
“12. In the facts of the case, there was not
only a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the
appellant about the bias of one of the members of the
enquiry committee, namely, the said Shri Maru Ram
but such apprehension became real when the said Shri
Maru Ram appeared as a witness against the
appellant to prove the said charge and thereafter
proceeded with the enquiry proceeding as a member
of the enquiry committee to uphold the correctness of
his deposition as a Judge. The learned Single Judge
considering the aforesaid facts came to the finding
that the participation of Shri Maru Ram as a member
of the enquiry committee has vitiated the enquiry
proceeding because of flagrant violation of the
principles of natural justice. Unfortunately, the
Division Bench set aside such judgment of the learned
Single Judge and dismissed the Writ Petition
improperly, to say the least, on a technical ground
that plea of bias of Shri Maru Ram and his acting as a
Judge of his own case by being a member of the
enquiry committee was not specifically taken before
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the Deputy commissioner and also before the
appellate authority, namely, the Commissioner by the
appellant and as such the said plea should not be
allowed to be raised in writ proceeding, more so,
when the case of prejudice on account of bias could
be waived by the person suffering such prejudice.
General] v, a point not raised before be tribunal or
administrative authorities may not be allowed to be
raised for the first time in the writ proceeding more so
when the interference in the writ jurisdiction which is
equitable and discretionary is not of course or must as
indicated by this Court in A.M. Allison versus State of
Assam, AIR 1957 SC 227 particularly when the plea
sought to be raised for the first time in a Writ
proceeding requires investigation of facts. But if the
plea though not specifically raised before the
subordinate tribunals or the administrative and quasi-
judicial bodies, is raised before the High Court in the
writ proceeding for the first time and the plea goes to
the root of the question and is based on admitted and
uncontroverted facts and does not require any further
investigation into a question of fact, the High Court is
not only justified in entertaining the plea but in the
anxiety to do justice which is the paramount
consideration of the Court, it is only desirable that
litigant should not be shut out fromraising such plea
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which goes to the root of the lis involved. The
aforesaid view has been taken by this Court in a
number of decisions and a reference may be made to
the decisions in A.S. Arunachalam Pillai v. M/s.
Southern Roadways Ltd. And another [1960] AIR SC
1191, The Cantonment Board, Ambala v.
Pyarelal[1963] 3 SCR 341. In our view, the learned
Single Judge has very rightly held that the Deputy
Commissioner was under an obligation to consider
the correctness and propriety of the decision of the
Managing Committee based on the report of the
enquiry committee which since made available to him,
showed on the face of it that Shri Ramu Ram was
included and retained in the enquiry committee
despite objection of the appellant and the said Shri
Maru Ram became a witness against the appellant to
prove one of the charges. It is really unfortunate that
the Division Bench set aside the decision of the
learned Single Bench by taking recourse to
technicalities that the plea of bias on account of
inclusion of Shri Maru Ram in the enquiry committee
and his giving evidence on behalf of the department
had not been specifically taken by the appellant before
the Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner. The
Division Bench has also proceeded on the footing that
as even apart from Charge No. 12, the Deputy
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Commissioner has also considered the other charges
on consideration of which along with Charge No. 12,
the proposed order of dismissal was made, no
prejudice has been caused to the appellant. Such view,
to say the least, cannot be accepted in the facts and
circumstances of the case. The learned Single Judge,
in our view, has rightly held that the bias of Shri Maru
Ram, one of the members of the enquiry committee
had percolated throughout the enquiry proceeding
thereby vitiating the principles of natural justice and
the findings made by the enquiry committee was the
product of a biased and prejudiced mind. The
illegality committed in conducting the departmental
proceedings has left an indelible stamp of infirmity on
the decision of the Managing Committee since
affirmed by the Deputy Commissioner and the
Commissioner. The observatiory of S.R. Das, C.J.in
Mohd nooh's case (ibid) may be referred to
in this connection:
'Where the error, irregularity or illegality
touching jurisdiction or procedure committed by
an inferior court or tribunal of first instance is so
patent and loudly obstrusive that it leaves on its
decision an indelible stamp of infirmity or vice
which cannot be obliterated or cured on appeal or
revision. If an inferior court or tribunal of first
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instance acts wholly without jurisdiction or
patently in excess of jurisdiction or manifestly
conducts the proceedings before it in a manner
which is contrary to the rules of natural justice and
all accepted rules of procedure and which offends
the superior court's sense of fair play, the superior
court may, we think, quite properly exercise its
power to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari to
correct the error of the court or tribunal of first
instance, even if an appeal to another inferior
court or tribunal was available and recourse was
not had to it or if recourse was had to it, it
confirmed what ex-facie was a nullity for reasons
aforementioned '.
13. We have, therefore, no hesitation in
allowing the appeal by setting aside the impugned
judgment of the Division Bench of Punjab and
Haryana High Court and the order of dismissal of the
appellant passed by the Managing Committee of the
School confirmed by the Deputy Commissioner and
affirmed in appeal by the Commissioner. This
decision, however, will not preclude the Managing
Committee. however, from proceeding a fresh with the
departmental proceedings from the stage of issuance
of charge sheet. It is, however, made clear that if a
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fresh enquiry proceeding is initiated it should be
ensured that the enquiry committee is not composed
with any of the members of the previous enquiry
committee and such proceeding should be completed
within a period of four months from today.”
By applying the aforesaid ratio, which approves belated
plea of Bias at the stage of writ proceedings, even though
not raised during the entire course of disciplinary action, the
objection of the learned Additional Government Pleader in
this regard, cannot be sustained.
11. Insofar as ground (b) with regard to
independent appraisal of the facts by the Disciplinary
Authority is concerned, it is seen that pursuant to the
enquiry report dated 29.05.2013, the petitioner had given
his further representation on 07.02.2015. The respondents
herein had thereafter, relied on the opinion of the TNPSC
dated 08.05.2019 and imposed the punishment of
compulsory retirement on the petitioner, through the
impugned order dated 17.07.2019.
12. The petitioner herein was proceeded with the
departmental action under Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu
Civil Service (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Rules'). As per Sub rule(ii), the
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Disciplinary Authority is mandated to consider the evidences
adduced during the enquiry, as well as the objections raised
in the further representation of the delinquent and
thereafter, impose the punishment. Further, when the advice
of the TNPSC is sought for, such advice shall be taken into
consideration before making an order imposing any such
penalty.
13. Most of the aforesaid procedures, as
contemplated under section 17(B) of the Rules, have been
given a go-by in the instant case. A perusal of the impugned
order reveals that the respondents herein had extracted the
findings of the Enquiry Officer, as well as the advice of the
TNPSC and without any discussion, had imposed the major
punishment. Though the impugned order of punishment runs
to about 9 pages, the findings of the Disciplinary Authority
is found only in the penultimate paragraph of the order.
Even therein, there is absolutely no findings, for except for a
solitary sentence that the Government had decided to impose
the punishment of compulsory retirement on the petitioner.
The impugned orders therefore, is a non-speaking order,
passed without any application of mind, which is in total
violation of the procedure contemplated under Rule 17(b) of
the Rules.
14. The impugned order also places reliance on the
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advice of the TNPSC, dated 08.05.2019. The petitioner has
raised a ground that a copy of the TNPSC's advice, was not
served on him. This statement is not disputed. On the other
hand, the impugned order ratifies the by nonfurnishing of
the advice report, by serving a copy of the TNPSC report,
along with the impugned order of punishment. This
procedure has been held to be impermissible in various
decisions of this Court, including the order of an Hon'ble
Division Bench of this Court in Union of India, Ministry of
Defence and another vs. the Registrar, Central
Administrative Tribunal, Chennai and another reported in
(2005) 2 5 MLJ 154, wherein it was held that the delinquent
employee would be entitled to a copy of the report of the
Public Service Commission, before passing of an order of
punishment. Further, non-furnishing of the report would
also disable the delinquent officer to give an effective
objection, since he would be deprived of knowing the
contents of the report. Thus, the manner in which the
disciplinary proceedings had culminated into the impugned
punishment, Regulations and scaled proportion is contrary
to the Regulations and settled propositions of law.
15. The third and last ground (c) raised by the
learned counsel for the petitioner is the latches in
conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. The entire
disciplinary proceedings initiated with the charge memo on
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29.09.2008. After the enquiry report dated 29.05.2013 and
the petitioner's further representation dated 07.02.2015,
there was no much progress and therefore, the petitioner
had filed a writ petition in W.P. (MD) No.11969 of 2018
seeking for issuance of a writ of Mandamus, directing the
Authorities to pass final orders to the disciplinary action. By
an order dated 06.06.2018, a learned Single Judge of this
Court had directed the respondents herein to pass final
orders the disciplinary proceedings, within a period of four
weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of that order.
Though this Court had stipulated the time for conclusion of
the disciplinary proceedings, the respondents had chosen to
seek the advice of the TNPSC only on 08.02.2019 i.e. after
eight months from the High Court's order. The TNPSC had
rendered its advice on 08.05.2019 and the impugned order
of punishment came to be passed on 17.07.2019. Thus, it is
seen that the there has occurred an inordinate delay in the
disciplinary proceedings from the inception, till the
punishment. Such an inordinate delay could be fatal to the
entire action as held in various decisions of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court as well as this Court. More so, when this
Court had specifically directed the respondents to complete
the disciplinary action within four weeks, there was a
mandatory duty cast upon the respondents to comply with
such a direction passed in the writ petition.
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16. The Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the
case of State of Tamil Nadu, Personnel and Administrative
Reforms Department, Chennai and another vs.
T.Ranganathan had held that, such inaction to comply with
the time limit fixed by the Court would be fatal to the
disciplinary action. The relevant portion of the order reads
thus:
“We are conscious of the fact that if there is
noncooperation of the delinquent officer to comply
with the time limit fixed by the Court/Tribunal to
complete the enquiry and pass final orders in
disciplinary proceedings, the Department cannot be
blamed. In such contingency it is for the Department
to point out the noncooperation on the part of the
delinquent officer in finalising the proceeding and the
hardships faced by the Department in not strictly
adhering to the time schedule due to the fault of the
delinquent officer or for any valid reason and get
appropriate orders seeking extension of time. At this
juncture, it is relevant to point out that even if the time
granted originally to complete the enquiry is over,
nothing prevented the Department from filing
appropriate application after expiry of the time. It is
now well settled in law that application seeking
extension of time can be filed and the Court are
having inherent powers to grant further time, even
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
W.P.No.30369 of 2018
and W.M.P.No.35447 of 2018
though the original time granted got expired, based
on the principles of invoking inherent powers to meet
the ends of justice. In this case, there is no whisper
about the non-cooperation of the petitioner in
conducting the enquiry and completing the enquiry
within the time. Hence the Department is bound to
comply with the directions issued by the Tribunal in
O.A.No.1535 of 2003.”
17. The aforesaid observation of the Hon'ble
Division Bench is self-explanatory. As held therein, the
respondents herein had not sought for any further extension
of time from this Court for completing the disciplinary
action nor any reason has been adduced in the counter
affidavit filed before this Court for such an inordinate delay.
Thus, the latches on the part of the respondents would
accrue in favour of the petitioner.
18. In normal circumstances, when the order of
punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority is found
to be a non-speaking order or that it suffers from non-
application of mind, this Court would generally remand the
matter back for reconsideration. However, the petitioner has
succeeded on the other two grounds viz. that there was bias
in the conduct of the enquiry itself and the delay in
concluding the disciplinary action was also inordinate,
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W.P.No.30369 of 2018
and W.M.P.No.35447 of 2018
which does not deserve consideration. The disciplinary
action has been pending for the past 12 years and therefore,
if the matter is sought to be remanded back for at this point
of time reconsideration at this point of time, serious
prejudice would be caused to the petitioner herein. As such,
this Court is of the considered view that such remand is
unwarranted in the instant case. Consequently, the
petitioner would be entitled to succeed in this writ petition.”
4.Since the case of J.Murugabharathi, supra is the same as that
of the petitioner herein and the charges are also similar, the petitioner
herein is also entitled to succeed. Consequently, the impugned order
dated 27.09.2018 passed in G.O.(3D).No.129 Agriculture (Ve.Ni.8)
Department is quashed. In view of the quashing of the writ petition, the
petitioner shall be entitled for all the service and monetary benefits, which
were deprived to him owing to the impugned punishment. Accordingly,
this Writ Petition stands allowed. Consequently, connected
miscellaneous petition is closed. No costs.
10.01.2022
Dua
Internet:Yes
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
W.P.No.30369 of 2018
and W.M.P.No.35447 of 2018
M.S.RAMESH, J.
Dua
To
1.Agricultural Production Commissioner cum Principal Secretary,
The State of Tamilnadu
Fort St.George, Secretariat,
Chennai – 600 009.
2.Commissioner of Agriculture,
Ezhilagam,
Chepauk,
Chennai – 600 005.
W.P.No.30369 of 2018
and W.M.P.No.35447 of 2018
10.01.2022
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
