Madras High Court
A.Govindan (Died) vs K.S.Jayanthakumar on 10 January, 2022
SA NO.338 OF 2017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED : 10.01.2022
CORAM
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE M.GOVINDARAJ
SA NO.338 OF 2017
AND CMP NO.7936 OF 2017
A.Govindan (Died)
2.G.Prasanth
3.G.Maragatham
4.G.Kathiravan
Appellant Nos.2 to 4 b/r as LRs'
of the deceased sole appellant viz.,
A.Govindan vide Court order dated
10.11.2021 made in CMP No.16232/2021
in SA No.338/2017) ... Appellants
VS.
K.S.Jayanthakumar ... Respondent
PRAYER: Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure
Code against the judgment and decree of the learned Additional District
Judge, Dharmapuri, dated 22.11.2016 made in A.S.No.6 of 2016
reversing that of the learned Subordinate Judge, Dharmapuri, dated
27.11.2015 made in O.S.No.175 of 2010.
For Appellants : Mr.I.Abrar Md. Abdullah
For Respondent : Mr.V.Raghavachari
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JUDGMENT
The defendant is the appellant in the Second Appeal.
Aggrieved over the reversal of the decree and judgment of the Trial
Court, he preferred the above Second Appeal.
2.According to the plaintiff, the defendant borrowed a sum
of Rs.6,50,000/- (Rupees Six Lakhs Fifty Thousand Only) for the
purpose of development of his Mango business on 14.10.2007 in cash
and agreed to pay interest @ Rs.2/- per month and promised to repay the
loan. In spite of repeated demands, the defendant failed to repay the same
and hence, he issued a legal notice on 10.08.2010. He replied the same
on 16.08.2010 on untenable allegations. Hence, the plaintiff filed the Suit
for recovery of money.
3.In the written statement, the defendant denied the
averments made in the plaint and stated that he borrowed only
Rs.50,000/- due to urgency on 25.07.1997 and signed blank promissory
note. The said debt was discharged on 01.08.1998. When he sought for
return of the promissory note, the plaintiff replied that he misplaced the
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same and given a copy of that to him. Since he repeatedly asked to return
the original, there was some quarrel between them. Due to that, the
plaintiff with the aid of his relative and with malafide intention filed the
Suit, as if he borrowed a sum of Rs.6,50,000/- on 14.10.2007 by
fabricating the pro note. Since he discharged the debt of Rs.50,000/-
borrowed on 25.07.1997, he is not liable to pay any amount and there is
no relationship as lendor - lendee between them. There is no cause of
action for filing the Suit.
4.The Trial Court framed appropriate issues and dismissed
the Suit. The First Appellate Court set aside the findings of the Trial
Court and decreed the Suit by allowing the appeal. Aggrieved over the
same, the defendant has preferred the above Second Appeal.
5.This Court admitted the Second Appeal on 11.02.2021 on
the following substantial questions of law:
"i. Whether the Lower Appellate Court was right
in reversing the judgment of the trial court without
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going into the validity of the documents filed by the
defendant and the evidence let in by the defendant and
plaintiff?
ii. Whether the Lower Appellate Court was right
in holding that the presumption under Section 118 and
20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 has not been
rebutted even though substantial evidence has been let
in by the defendant with respect to non-passing of
consideration ?
iii. Whether the presumption would still lie in
favour of the plaintiff after the same having been
rebutted by the defendant through oral and
documentary evidence ?
iv. Whether the defendant has rebutted the
presumption and satisfied the requirements of Section
118 of the Act ?"
6.Heard the submissions made on either side and perused the
materials available on record.
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7.The Suit is filed on the basis of a promissory note dated
14.10.2007 for recovery of a sum of Rs.6,50,000/- along with interest.
The defendant denied the execution of promissory note on 14.10.2007 as
alleged and passing off consideration. On the other hand, he would plead
that he executed an unfilled promissory note on 25.07.1997 for
borrowing a sum of Rs.50,000/-. As such, the signature in the promissory
note is admitted. Whether it was executed on 14.10.2007 or 25.07.1997
and as to whether the consideration passed on that date is the crucial
issue. Since the defendant has taken a stand that he discharged the debt
as early as on 01.08.1998, for which he signed promissory note, the
burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the promissory note was executed
by the defendant for the purpose of borrowing a sum of Rs.6,50,000/- on
14.10.2007. The plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and reiterated what
was stated in the plaint. He would admit that the first witness of the
promissory note belonged to his community and that he deposed as a
witness in another case in O.S.No.51 of 2010 on the file of District
Munsif Court, Dharmapuri, in his favour. Likewise, the scribe was also
an another witness in the very same case. He would further admit about
the pendency of the civil cases filed by him against the other borrowers
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and that the pendency of criminal cases against him for illegal acts in
respect of money transactions. From this, it is established that the
plaintiff is a seasoned money lender and filed lot of cases for recovery of
money. He would further admit that the very same witnesses used to
depose in his favour in few cases and also he had filed cases through
them for recovery of money. However, he has not disclosed the
transaction in his income-tax returns. P.W.2, who is one of the witnesses
in the promissory note would state that the plaintiff is related to him and
that he and other witnesses used to depose in favour of the plaintiff in
Court as plaintiff's witnesses. They used to sign as witnesses in all the
documents made by the plaintiff and his brothers family. Therefore, the
evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 clearly shows that the witnesses in the
promissory note were acting as stock witnesses in all financial
transactions made by the plaintiff.
8.The defendant deposed as D.W.1 and marked Exs.B1 to
B16. All these documents are certified copies of the Court proceedings
filed by her against the plaintiff. Ex.B14 is the reply notice and Ex.B15 is
the xerox copy of the promissory note executed by him in favour of the
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plaintiff. In the cross examination, it was affirmed by the defendant that
he did not borrow Rs.6,50,000/- on 14.10.2007 and on the other hand, he
borrowed only Rs.50,000/- on 25.07.1997 on the basis of the said
promissory note and discharged the debt on 01.08.1998. No useful
information was extracted from him to discredit his rebuttal. D.W.2 is a
common friend of the plaintiff and the defendant and who facilitated the
borrowal of Rs.50,000/- from the plaintiff to the defendant on
25.07.1997. He would fairly state that he used to borrow from the
plaintiff and as such, he has borrowed thrice from him and that he knew
him for 17 years. The defendant borrowed a sum of Rs.50,000/- on
25.07.1997 and discharged the debt of Rs.50,000/- along with interest of
Rs.18,000/- on 01.08.1998 and that he witnessed the same. He would
also depose during cross examination that the defendant asked for return
of promissory note and the plaintiff's stated that he had misplaced the
same. Thereafter, he has given a xerox copy through the Boy working in
his shop. In spite of continuous request, the plaintiff has not returned the
original promissory note. This evidence of D.W.2 clearly establish the
defense set-up by the defendant and the promissory note was actually
executed on 25.07.1997 and not as alleged by the plaintiff on 14.10.2007
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and for a consideration of Rs.50,000/- and not for the alleged sum of
Rs.6,50,000/- and loan was discharged by the defendant. Thus the burden
stands shifted to plaintiff to prove the transactions as alleged by him.
9.From the evidence of D.W.2, a strong rebuttal to the case
of the plaintiff was raised and in fact, it clearly disprove the case of the
plaintiff. In this background, if the gist is analysed, it is very clear that
the plaintiff has not discharged the burden cast upon him. The oral
evidence and documentary evidence, does not prove passing of
consideration as claimed by him on 14.10.2007. The presumption stood
disproved. The Trial Court has rightly considered the evidence and found
that the plaintiff has failed to prove the borrowal of amount by the
defendant, whereas the First Appellate Court reversed the finding on the
ground of presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881. It erroneoulsy proceeded on the basis that since the signature
in the promissory note is admitted, it automatically proves passing of
consideration and there is no rebuttal of the presumption and in one line,
held that the evidence led by the defendant in that regard was not
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acceptable. It further held that in the absence of disproving the existence
of the consideration, burden could not be shifted to the plaintiff. This
finding that the defendant has not discharged the onus of proof showing
directly or proposing non-existence of consideration is perverse. On the
other hand, the defendant had discharged the onus through oral evidence
as well as documentary evidence. The conduct of the plaintiff proves that
he is the seasoned money lender and had involved in several cases
whereas P.W.2 and other witnesses, scribe, closely related to him and
acting as stock witnesses. Therefore, their evidence lacks credibility and
in fact, does not establish the passing of consideration.
10.The Hon'ble Supreme Court in BHARAT BARREL &
DRUM MANUFACTURING COMPANY VS. AMIN CHAND
PAYRELAL [1999 (3) SCC 35] has observed as under:
"11.Section 118 of the Act deals with the
presumptions as to negotiable instruments. One of such
presumptions is,
"that every negotiable instrument was made or
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drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument
when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or
transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or
transferred for consideration."
This presumption is based upon a principle and is
not a mere technical provision. The principle incorporated
being, inferring of a presumption of consideration in the
case of a negotiable instrument. A Full Bench of the
Rajasthan High Court in Heerachand Vs. Jeevraj and
Anr. (AIR 1959 Raj. 1) held that,
"presumption, therefore, as to consideration is the
very ingredient of negotiability and in the case of
negotiable instrument, presumption as to consideration
has to be made."
A Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court
is G. Vasu Vs. Syed Yaseen Sifuddin Quadri (AIR 1987
Andhra Pradesh 139) while dealing with the words "until
the contrary is proved" held that it was permissible for the
Court to look into the preponderance of the probabilities
and the entire circumstances of the particular case. After
referring to Sections 3,4 and 101 to 104 of the Evidence
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Act, the Court held that while dealing with the absence
of consideration, the Court shall have to consider not only
whether it believed that consideration did not exist but
also whether it considered the non-existence of the
consideration so probable that a reasonable man would,
under the circumstance of a particular case, could act
upon the supposition that the consideration did not exist.
Once the defendant showed either by direct evidence or
circumstantial evidence or by use of the other
presumptions of law or fact that the promissory note was
not supported by consideration in the manner stated
therein, the evidentiary burden would shift to the
plaintiff and the legal burden reviving his legal burden to
prove that the promissory note was supported by
consideration and at that stage, the presumption of law
covered by Section 118 of the Act would disappear,
Merely because the plaintiff came forward with a case
different from the one mentioned in the promissory note it
would not be correct to say that the presumption
under Section 118 did not apply at all. Such a
presumption applies once the execution of the promissory
note is accepted by the defendant. The circumstances that
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the plaintiff's case was at a variance with the once
contained in the promissory note could be relied by the
defendant for the purpose of rebutting the presumption of
shifting the evidential burden to the plaintiff. After
referring to the catena of authorities on the point, the
Full Bench held:-
"Having referred to the method and manner in
which the presumption under Section 118 is to be
rebutted and as to how, it thereafter 'disappears' we shall
also make reference to three principles which are relevant
in the context. The first one is connected with the
practical difficulties that beset the defendant for proving
a negative, namely that no other conceivable
consideration exists. We had occasion to refer to this
aspect earlier. Negative evidence is always in some sort
circumstantial or indirect, and the difficulty or proving a
negative lies in discovering a fact or series of facts
inconsistent with the fact which we seek to disprove
(Gulson, Philosophy of Proof, 2nd Edition, P. 153
quoted in Cross on Evidence, 3rd Edition, page 78 Fn).
In such situations, a lesser amount of proof than is
usually required may avail. In fact, such evidence as
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renders the existence of the negative probable may shift
the burden on to the other party (Jones, quoted in A
Sarkar on Evidence, 12th Edition, p.870). The second
principle which is relevant in the context is the one stated
in S. 196 of the Evidence Act. That section states that
when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any
person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. It is
very generally stated that, where the party who does not
have the evidential burden, such as the plaintiff in this
case, possesses positive and complete knowledge
concerning the existence of fact which the party having
the evidential burden, such as the defendant in this case,
is called upon the negative or has peculiar knowledge or
control of evidence as such matters, the burden rests on
him to produce the evidence, the negative averment being
taken as true unless disapproved by the party having such
knowledge or control. The difficulty or proving a negative
only relieves the party having the evidential burden from
the necessity of creating a positive conviction entirely by
his own evidence so that, when he produces such evidence
as it is in his power to produce, its probative effect is
enhanced by the silence of the opponent (Corpus Juris,
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Vol. 31, Para 113). The third principle that has to be
borne in mind in the one that when both parties have led
evidence, the onus of proof loses all importance and
becomes purely academic. Referring to this principles, the
Supreme Court stated in Narayan Vs. Gopal, AIR 1960
SC 100 as follows:
"The burden of proof is of importance only where
by reason of not discharging the burden which was put
upon it, a party must eventually fail, where, however,
parties have joined issue and have led evidence and the
conflicting evidence can be weighed to determine which
way the issue can be decided, the abstract question of
burden of proof becomes academic."
We have referred to these three principles as they
are important and have to be borne in mind by the Court
while deciding whether the initial 'evidential burden'
under As. 118 of the Negotiable instruments Act has
been discharged by the defendant and the presumption
'disappeared' and whether the burden has shifted and
later whether the plaintiff has discharged the 'legal
burden' after the same was restored.
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For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that
where, in a suit on a promissory note, the case of the
defendant as to the circumstances under which the
promissory note was executed is not accepted, it is open
to the defendant to prove that the case set up by the
plaintiff on the basis of the recitals in the promissory
note, or the case set up in suit notice or in the plaint is
not true and rebut the presumption under S.118 by
showing a preponderance of probabilities in his favour
and against the plaintiff. He need not lead evidence on
all conceivable modes of consideration for establishing
that the promissory note is not supported by any
consideration whatsoever. The words 'until the contrary
is proved' in S.118 do not mean that the defendant must
necessarily show that the document is not supported by
any form of consideration but the defendant has the
option to ask the court to consider the non-exestence of
consideration so probable that a prudent man ought,
under the circumstances of the case, to fact upon the
supposition that consideration did not exist. Though the
evidential burden is initially placed on the defendant by
virtue of S.118 it can be rebutted by the defendant by
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showing a preponderance of probabilities that such
consideration as stated in the pronote, or in the suit
notice or in the plaint does not exist and once the
presumption is so rebutted, the said presumption
'disappears'. For the purpose of rebutting the initial
evidential burden, the defendant can rely on direct
evidence or circumstantial evidence or on presumptions of
law or fact. Once such convincing rebuttal evidence is
adduced and accepted by the Court, having regard to all
the circumstances of the case and the preponderance of
probabilities, the evidential burden shifts back to the
plaintiff who has also the legal burden. Thereafter, the
presumption under S.118 does not again come to the
plaintiff's rescue. Once both parties have adduced
evidence, the Court has to consider the same and the
burden of proof loses all its importance.
Before leaving the discussion on these aspects we
would like to make it clear that merely because the
plaintiff comes forward with a case different from the
one mentioned in the promissory note it will not be
correct to say that the presumption under S.118 does not
apply at all. In our view the presumption applies once the
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execution of the promissory note is accepted by the
defendant but the circumstance that the plaintiff's case is
at variance with the one contained in the promissory note
or the notice can be relied upon by the defendant for the
purpose of rebutting the presumption and shifting the
evidential burden to the plaintiff who has also the legal
burden. To the above extent, we agree with the view of
the Bombay High Court in Taramhomed's case (AIR 1949
Bombay 257 (supra). Our dissent is only to the extent of
the principle laid down in that case that even when the
case of the plaintiff and that of the defendant is
disbelieved still the suit is to be decreed on the basis of
the presumption under As. 118 of the Negotiable
instruments Act.
We, therefore, respectfully follow the decision of
the Supreme Court is Kundanlal's case. (AIR 1961 SC
1316) (supra) and dissent from the judgment of the
Bombay High Court in Tarmahomed vs. Syed Ebrahim in
so far as it held that even after the plaintiff's version and
the defendants version are disbelieved, still the
presumption under S.118 operates, We also dissent from
the judgments of the Kerala High Court in Alex Mathew
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vs. Philip, AIR 1973 Ker 210, as also from the judgment
of the Allahabad High Court in Lal Girwarlal vs. Daul
Dayal, AIR 1935 All 509; pf the Nagpur High Court
in Prem Raj vs. Nathumal, AIR 1936 Nag 130; of the
Calcutta High Court in Ramani Mohan vs. Surjya
Kumar Dhan, AIR 1943 Cal. 22; of the Patna High
Court in Barham Deo Singh Vs. Kari Singh, AIR 1936
Pat 498 and of the views of Abdur Rahim, J. in
Venkataraghavalu Chetty Vs. Sabapathy Chetti, (1911)
21 Mad LJ 1013 of the Madras High Court. We
accordingly overrule the decision of our High Court in M.
Janaka Lakshmi Vs. Madhava Rao, (AIR 1973 Andhra
Pradesh 103).
On the contrary, we follow the views of
Varadachariar J. in the decisions of the Madras High
Court in Narasamma Vs. Veerraju, (AIR 1935 Mad 769)
and Lakshmanaswamy Vs. Narasimha Rao, AIR 1937
Mad 223 of the views of Wanchoo, C.J. (as he then was)
in Heerachand Vs. Jeevraj case, (AIR 1959 Raj 1(FB),
Rajasthan High Court and of Teckchand, J. of the
Punjab High Court in Chandanlal Vs. Amin Chand, AIR
1960 Punj 500 and the lahore High Court in Sundar Lal
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SIngh vs. Klushi Singh, AIR 1927 Lah 864 rendered by
Teckchand, J. of thee Allahabad High Court in Md. Shafi
vs. Md. Moazzam Ali, AIR 1923 ALL 214 of Pandey
and A.P. Sen, JJ. of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in
Indermal Vs. Ram Prasad, AIR 1970 Madhya Pradesh
40 and of Honnaiah and E.S. Venkataramiah, JJ. of the
Mysore High Court in Sharada Bai vs. Syed Abdul Hai,
(971) 2 Mysore LJ 407; We approve of the views
expressed by our High Court in Maddam Lingaiah Vs.
Hasan."
This Court in Kundan Lal Rallaaram vs.
Custodian Evacuee Property, Bombay (AIR 1961 SC
1316) declared the Section 118 of the Act lays down a
prescribed special rule of evidence applicable to negotiable
instruments. The presumption contemplated there under
is one of law which obliges the Court to presume, inter
alia, that the negottiable instruments or the endorsement
was made or endorsed for consideration and the burden of
proof of failure of consideration is thrown on the maker
of the note or the endorser as the case may be. Relying
upon the law laid down in Rameshwar Singh Vs. Bajit
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Lal (AIR 1929 PC 95) approved by this Court in Hiralal
Vs. Badkulal (AIR 1953 SC 225)., it was held:-
"This section lays down a special rule of evidence
applicable to negotiable instruments. The presumption is
one of law and thereunder a court shall presume, inter
alia that the negotiable instrument or the endorsement
was made or endorsed for consideration. In effect it
throws the burden of proof of failure of consideration on
the maker of the note or the endorser, as the case may be.
The question is, how the burden can be discharged? The
rules of evidence pertaining to burden of proof are
embodied in Chapter VII of the Evidence Act. The phrase
'burden of proof' has two meanings - one the burden of
proof as a matter of law and pleading and the other the
burden of establishing a case, the former is fixed as a
question of law on the basis of the pleadings and is
unchanged during the entire trial, whereas the latter is
not constant but shifts as soon as a party adduces
sufficient evidence to raise a presumption in his favour.
The evidence required to shift the burden need not
necessarily be direct evidence, i.e., oral or documentary
evidence or admissions made by opposite party it may
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comprise circumstantial evidence or presumptions of law
or fact. To illustrate how this doctrine works in practice,
we may take a suit on a promissory note. Under S.101 of
the Evidence Act, "Whoever desires any court to give
judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on
the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that
those facts exist." Therefore, the burden initially rests on
the plaintiff who has to prove that the promissory note
was executed by the defendant. As soon as the execution
of the promissory note is proved, the rule of presumption
laid down in S.118 of the Negotiable instruments Act
helps him to shift the burden to the other side. The burden
of proof as a question of law rests, therefore, on the
plaintiff; but as soon as the execution is proved, S.118 of
the Negotiable instruments Act imposes a duty on the
Court to raise a presumption in his favour that the said
instrument was made for consideration. This presumption
shifts the burden of proof in the second sense, that is the
burden of establishing a case shifts to the defendant. The
defendant may adduce direct evidence to prove that the
promissory note was not supported by consideration, and,
if he adduced acceptable evidence the burden again shifts
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to the plaintiff, and so on. The defendant may also rely
upon circumstantial evidence and, if the circumstances so
relied upon are compeling, the burden may likewise shift
again to the plaintiff. He may also rely upon
presumptions of fact, for instance those mentioned in
S.114 and other Section of the Evidence Act.
Under Section 114 and other Sections of the Evidence
Act. Under section 114 of the Evidence Act "The Court
may presume the existence of any fact which it think
likely to have happened, regard being had to the common
course of natural events human conduct and public and
private business, in their relation to the facts of the
particular case." Illustration
(g) to that Section shows that the Court may
presume that evidence which could be and is not produced
would, if produced, be unfavorable to the person who
withholds it. A plaintiff, who says that he had sold
certain goods to the defendant and that a promissory note
was executed as consideration for the goods and that he is
in possession of the relevant account books to show that
he was in possession of the goods sold and that the sale
was effected for a particular consideration, should
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produce the said account books, for he is in possession of
the same and the defendant certainly cannot be expected
to produce his documents. In those circumstances, if such
a relevant evidence is withhold by the plaintiff, S.114
enables the Court to draw a presumption to the effect
that, if produced, the said accounts would be unfavorable
to the plaintiff. This presumption, if raised by a court can
under certain circumstances rebut the presumption of law
raised under S.118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
Briefly stated, the burden of proof may be shifted by
presumptions of law or fact, and presumptions of law or
presumptions of fact may be rebutted not only by direct
or circumstantial evidence but also by presumptions of
law or fact. We are not concerned here with irrebuttable
presumptions of law."
Again in K.P.O. Maideenkutty Hajee Vs. Pappu
Manjooran and Anr. (1996) 8 SCC 586) this Court
declared that when the suit is based on a pronote which is
proved to have been executed, Section 118 (a) raises a
presumption, until the contrary is proved, that the
promissory note was made for consideration. Initial
presumption raised under the Section becomes unavailable
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when the plaintiff himself pleads in the plaint different
consideration. If the plaintiff pleads that the promissory
note is supported by a consideration as is recited in the
instrument, the burden is on the defendant to disprove
that the promissory note is not supported by
consideration or different consideration, other than the
one as cited in the promissory note did pass. If that
consideration is not valid in law nor enforceable the court
would consider whether the instrument is supported by
by valid and legally enforceable consideration. The
position of law was thus summarised;
"It would thus be clear that when the suit is based
on pronote, and promissory note is proved to have been
executed, Section 118(a) raises the presumption, until the
contrary is proved, that the promissory note was made for
consideration. That initial presumption raised
under Section 118(a) becomes unavailable when the
plaintiff himself pleads in the plaint considerations. If he
pleads that the promissory note is supported by a
consideration as recited in the negotiable instrument and
the evidence adduced in support thereof, the burden is on
the defendant to disprove that the promissory note is not
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supported by consideration or different consideration
other than one recited in the promissory note did pass, if
that consideration is not valid in law nor enforceable in
law, the court would consider whether the suit pronote is
supported by valid consideration or legally enforceable
consideration. Take for instance, a pronote executed for a
time barred debt. It is still a valid consideration. The
falsity of the plea of the plea of the plaintiff also would
be a factor to be considered by the Court. The burden of
proof is of academic interest when the evidence was
adduced by the parties. The court is required to examine
the evidence and consider whether the suit as pleaded in
the plaint has been established and the suit requires to be
decreed or dismissed."
11.In the instant case, both parties have let in evidence. If a
party fails to discharge the burden put on him, must eventually fail. The
further evidence let in by both the parties were determined the case in
favour of the defendant. The defendant has let in convincing rebuttal
evidence to establish the preponderance of probability in his favour.
Once such rebuttal is discharged, the presumption under Section 118 of
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the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, does not come to the aid of the
plaintiff's case. As such, the burden of proof lost all its importance and
the issue had become more academic.
12.From the perusal of the weightage of evidence, this Court
has no second opinion that the plaintiff had miserably failed to prove
passing off consideration. Therefore, the questions of law raised by the
appellant are answered in favour of them and accordingly, the judgment
and decree dated 22.11.2016 made in A.S.No.6 of 2016 by the learned
Additional District Judge, Dharmapuri, reversing the judgment and
decree dated 27.11.2015 made in O.S.No.175 of 2010 by the learned
Subordinate Judge, Dharmapuri is set aside and the decree of the Trial
Court stands restored.
13.In fine, the Second Appeal is allowed. No costs.
Consequently, connected civil miscellaneous petition is closed.
10.01.2022
Index : Yes/No
Internet : Yes/No
TK
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
SA NO.338 OF 2017
To
1.The Additional District Judge
Dharmapuri.
2.The Subordinate Judge
Dharmapuri.
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
SA NO.338 OF 2017
M.GOVINDARAJ, J.
TK
SA NO.338 OF 2017
10.01.2022
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
