Madras High Court

Mr. Chandrasekaran vs M/S. Raga Foundation Pvt. Ltd on 13 April, 2022

                                                                               O.S.A.Sr.No.123051 of 2019

                                    IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
                                                      DATED: 13.04.2022
                                                            CORAM:
                                   THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.DURAISWAMY
                                                               and
                                  THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE T.V THAMILSELVI


                                                   O.S.A.Sr.No. 123051 of 2019
                                                              and
                                                     C.M.P.No. 5194 of 2022

                     1. Mr. Chandrasekaran
                     2. Mr. Sanjeev Kumar
                     3. Mr. S.C. Vijaya Kumar
                     4. M/s. V.N.S. Leather Exports Pvt. Ltd.,
                        No. 6/25, C.M. Gramani Street,
                        Periamet,
                        Chennai - 600 003.
                                                                            ... Appellants

                                                             Vs
                     M/s. Raga Foundation Pvt. Ltd.,
                     No. 23/12, Desika Road,
                     Alwarpet,
                     Chennai 600 004

                                                                            ... Respondent

                                  Appeal filed to set aside the order dated 01.02.2019 passed in

                     O.P.No. 1063 of 2018.

                                  For Appellants     : Mr. R. Thiagarajan


                     1/12
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
                                                                              O.S.A.Sr.No.123051 of 2019

                                                          JUDGMENT

(Judgment of the Court was made by M.DURAISWAMY, J.)

The petition has been filed by the appellants seeking condonation of

the delay of 296 days in filing the appeal.

2. Mr. K.V. Babu, learned counsel appearing for the respondents

submitted that the petition filed by the appellants seeking condonation of the

delay is not maintainable, in view of the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in the judgment reported in (2021) 6 SCC 460, Government

of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) vs Borse Brothers

Engineers & Constructors Pvt. Ltd., wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court

held as follows:

56. Given the object sought to be achieved under both the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that is, the speedy resolution of disputes, the expression “sufficient cause” is not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the period provided by the appeal provision itself. Besides, the expression “sufficient cause” is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. This Court, in Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81, has held:

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“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the 62 word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow

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the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953] , Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 :

AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] .)

10. In Arjun Singh v.

Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”.

11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis O.S.A.Sr.No.123051 of 2019

furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v.

Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)

12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.

13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim

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being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:

“605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations 64namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.”

An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches.

(See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC

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2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)

14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v.

State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR 1992 SC 1701] .

15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be

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decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislation.

60. Also, it must be remembered that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of a given case, there is no right in the appellant to have delay condoned. This was felicitously put in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762 as follows: “It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right.The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the

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discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the Court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the Court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Section 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of s. 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14.

61. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under section 37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what

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may now be lost by the first party’s inaction, negligence or laches

63. Apart from this, there is a long delay of 131 days beyond the 60- day period provided for filing an appeal under section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act. There is no explanation worth the name contained in the condonation of delay application, beyond the usual file-pushing and administrative exigency. This appeal is therefore dismissed.

67. In the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) Diary No. 18079 of 2020, there is a huge delay of 227 days in filing the appeal, and a 200- day delay in refiling. The facts of this case also show that there was no sufficient cause whatsoever to condone such a long delay. The impugned judgment of the High Court of Delhi dated 15.10.2019 cannot be faulted on this score and this appeal is consequently dismissed.

3. The ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court squarely applies

to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Following the same, the

petition seeking condonation of delay is liable to be rejected. Accordingly

the same is dismissed. No costs. Consequently O.S.A. Sr. 123051 of 2019

is also rejected.

4. Since the appeal has been rejected, the Registry is directed to

refund the court fee paid by the appellants.

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis O.S.A.Sr.No.123051 of 2019

(M.D.,J.) (T.V.T.S.,J.)

13.04.2022 Index: Yes/no mrn

M.DURAISWAMY, J and T.V.THAMILSELVI, J

(mrn)