[Cites 35, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Suresh Kumar Baghel vs Madhya Pradesh Madhya Kshetra Vidyut ... on 4 May, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:14319
1 WP. No. 23978 of 2018
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
ON THE 4th OF MAY, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 23978 of 2018
SURESH KUMAR BAGHEL
Versus
MADHYA PRADESH MADHYA KSHETRA VIDYUT VITRARAN
COMPANY LTD. THR. AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri J.S. Rathore - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Narrotam Sharma - Advocate for the respondent no.3.
________________________________________________________________
ORDER
This petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been
preferred by petitioner seeking following relief(s):
"(i) That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
allow this writ petition.
(ii) That, the respondents may kindly be directed to make
compassionate appointment of petitioner.
(iii) That, Any other writ order and direction, which is
found just, suitable and proper in favour of petitioner, may
kindly be granted to the petitioner."
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2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the father of petitioner
died on 08/07/2002 while discharging official duty. The petitioner's mother has
submitted the Writ Petition No.2079/2003 for compassionate appointment,
which was disposed of on 28/11/2007. Learned counsel for petitioner further
submitted that as per the direction given by this Court on 28/11/2007, the
petitioner submitted an application for compassionate appointment. The
respondents issued a policy dated 23/09/2013, but the case of the petitioner was
not considered by the respondents. Thereafter, the respondent issued another
policy dated 13/4/2016, and the application of petitioner has been dismissed on
28/2/2017.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that petitioner is eligible for
the post of Security Guard, which was not vacant at the time of rejection of the
representation. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that, vide
order dated 19.09.2016, the respondents directed to petitioner to give consent in
the form of affidavit regarding benefit under the compassionate appointment
policy, subject to giving undertaking to completing the necessary qualification
within a period of 03 years. However, the respondents rejected the
representation of the petitioner vide order dated 28/02/2017.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the
representation of the petitioner had been considered earlier as well. Vide order
dated 19/09/2016, the petitioner was directed to give an undertaking to
complete the required minimum qualifications within a period of 3 years;
however, the petitioner did not submit any undertaking in this regard. It was
further submitted that the petitioner is demanding compassionate appointment
to the post of Security Guard, but the said post has already been abolished by
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the respondents, and they are now filling the aforesaid posts through
outsourcing. He further submitted that the deceased expired in 2002, and more
than 23 years have already elapsed, which defeats the very purpose of
compassionate appointment. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted
that the petitioner cannot claim compassionate appointment to a particular post
of his choice.
5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
6. The Supreme Court in the case of Indian Bank v. Promila, reported in
(2020) 2 SCC 729 has held as under :
"18. The question of applicability of any subsequent Scheme
really does not apply in view of the judgment of this Court in
Canara Bank. Thus, it would not be appropriate to examine the
case of the respondents in the context of subsequent Schemes,
but only in the context of the Scheme of 4-4-1979, the terms of
which continued to be applicable even as per the new Scheme
of 5-11-1985 i.e. the Scheme applicable to the respondents.
There is no provision in this Scheme for any ex gratia payment.
The option of compassionate appointment was available only if
the full amount of gratuity was not taken, something which was
done. Thus, having taken the full amount of gratuity, the option
of compassionate appointment really was not available to the
respondents."
7. The Supreme Court in the case of Secretary to Govt. Deptt. Of
Education (Primary) Vs. Bheemesh reported in 2021 SCC Online 1264 has
held as under :
12. But we do not consider it necessary to do so. It is no doubt true
that there are, as contended by the learned senior Counsel for the
respondent, two lines of decisions rendered by Benches of equal
strength. But the apparent conflict between those two lines of
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decisions, was on account of the difference between an amendment
by which an existing benefit was withdrawn or diluted and an
amendment by which the existing benefit was enhanced. The
interpretation adopted by this Court varied depending upon the
nature of the amendment. This can be seen by presenting the
decisions referred to by the learned senior counsel for the
respondent in a tabular column as follows:
Citation Scheme in force Modified Scheme Decision of this
on the date of which came into Court
death of the force after death
Government
servant
State Bank of The Scheme of the The 1996 Scheme Rejecting the
India v. Jaspal year 1996, which was subsequently claim of the wife
Kaur (2007) 9 made the financial modified by policy of the deceased
SCC 571 [a two condition of the issued in 2005, employee, this
member Bench] family as the main which laid down Court held that the
criterion, was in few parameters for application of the
force, on the date determining dependant made in
of death of the penury. One of the the year 2000,
employee in the parameters was to after the death of
year 1999. see if the income the employee in
of the family had the year 1999,
been reduced to cannot be decided
less than 60% of on the basis of a
the salary drawn Scheme which
by the employee at came into force in
the time of death. the year 2005.
Therefore, the
wife of the
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deceased
employee claimed
the consideration
of the application
on the basis of
parameters laid
down in the policy
of the year 2005.
State Bank of The employee But with effect This Court held
India v. Raj died on 1.10.2004 from 04.08.2005 a that the
Kumar (2010) 11 and the new Scheme for application could
SCC 661 [a two applications for payment of be considered only
member Bench] compassionate exgratia lump-sum under the new
appointment were was introduced in Scheme, as it
made on the place of the contained a
6.06.2005 and old Scheme. The specific provision
14.06.2005. On new Scheme relating to pending
the date of death contained a applications.
and on the date of provision to the
the applications, a effect that all
Scheme known as applications
compassionate pending under the
appointment old Scheme will
Scheme was in be dealt with only
force. in accordance with
the new Scheme.
MGB Gramin The employee However, a new This Court took
Bank v. Chakrawa died on Scheme dated the view that the
rti Singh (2014) 19.04.2006 and 12.06.2006 came new Scheme alone
13 SCC 583 [a the application for into force on would apply as it
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two member appointment made 6.10.2006, contained a
Bench] on 12.05.2006. A providing only for specific provision
scheme for ex gratia payment which mandated
appointment on instead of all pending
compassionate compassionate applications to be
grounds was in appointment. considered under
force on that date. the new Scheme.
Canara The employee The 1993 Scheme This Court
Bank v. M. died on was substituted by dismissed the
Mahesh 10.10.1998 and a Scheme for appeals filed by
Kumar (2015) 7 the application for payment of ex the Bank on
SCC 412 [a two appointment on gratia in the year account of two
member Bench] compassionate 2005. But by the important
grounds, was time the 2005 distinguishing
made under the Scheme was features,
Scheme of the issued, the namely, (i) that the
year 1993. It was claimant had application for
rejected on already appointment on
30.06.1999. The approached the compassionate
1993 Scheme was High Court of grounds was
known as "Dying Kerala by way of rejected in the
in Harness writ petition and year 1999 and the
Scheme." succeeded before rejection order
the learned Single was set aside by
Judge vide a the High Court in
Judgment dated the year 2003
30.05.2003. The much before the
Judgment was compassionate
upheld by the appointment
Division Bench in Scheme was
the year 2006 and substituted by an
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the matter landed ex gratia Scheme
up before this in year 2005;
Court thereafter. and (ii) that in the
In other words, the year 2014, the
Scheme of the original scheme
year 2005 came for appointment
into on compassionate
force : (i) after the grounds stood
rejection of the revived, when the
application for civil appeals were
compassionate decided.
appointment under
the old scheme;
and (ii) after the
order of rejection
was set aside by
the Single Judge
of the High Court
Indian The employee A new Scheme In the light of the
Bank v. Promila ( died on was brought into decision
2020) 2 SCC 15.01.2004 and force on in Canara
729 [a two the application for 24.07.2004 after Bank v. M.
member Bench] appointment was the death of the Mahesh Kumar,
made by his minor employee. Under this Court held
son on this Scheme an ex that the case of the
24.01.2004. On gratia claimant cannot be
these dates, a compensation was examined in the
circular bearing provided for, context of the
No. 56/79 dated subject to certain subsequent
4.04.1979 which conditions. After Scheme and that
contained a the coming into since the family
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Scheme for force of the new had taken full
appointment on Scheme, the gratuity under the
compassionate claimant was old scheme, they
grounds was in directed by the were not entitled
force. But the bank to submit a to seek
Scheme provided fresh application compassionate
for appointment, under the new appointment even
only for those who Scheme. The under the old
do not opt for claimant did not Scheme.
payment of apply under the
gratuity for the new Scheme, as he
full term of was interested
service of only in
employee who compassionate
died in harness. appointment and
not monetary
benefit.
N.C. Under the existing But by virtue of an After taking note
Santosh v. State of Scheme referable amendment to the of a reference
Karnataka (2020) to Rule 5 of the proviso to Rule 5, made in State
7 SCC 617 (a Karnataka Civil a minor dependant Bank of
three Member Services should apply India v. Sheo
Bench) (Appointment on within one year Shankar Tewari to
Compassionate from the date of a larger bench, a
Grounds) Rules, death of the three member
1999, a minor Government Bench of this
dependant of a servant and must Court held in N.C.
deceased have attained the Santosh that the
Government age of 18 years on norms prevailing
employee may the date of making on the date of
apply within one the application. consideration of
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year from the date Applying the the application
of attaining amended should be the basis
majority. provisions, the for consideration
appointment of of the claim for
persons already compassionate
made on appointment. The
compassionate Bench further held
grounds, were that the dependant
cancelled by the of a government
appointing employee, in the
authority which absence of any
led to the vested right
challenge before accruing on the
this Court. date of death of
the government
employee, can
only demand
consideration of
his application and
hence he is
disentitled to seek
the application of
the norms
prevailing on the
date of death of
the government
servant.
13. Apart from the aforesaid decisions, our attention was also drawn
to the decision of the three member Bench in State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Amit Shrivas. But that case arose out of a claim made by
the dependant of a deceased Government servant, who was originally
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appointed on a work charged establishment and who later claimed to
have become a permanent employee. The Court went into the
distinction between an employee with a permanent status and an
employee with a regular status. Despite the claim of the dependant
that his father had become a permanent employee, this Court held in
that case that as per the policy prevailing on the date of death, a work
charged/contingency fund employee was not entitled to
compassionate appointment. While holding so, the Bench reiterated
the opinion in Indian Bank v. Promila.
14. The aforesaid decision in Amit Shrivas (supra) was followed by a
two member Bench of this Court in the yet to be reported decision in
the State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ashish Awasthi decided on
18.11.2021.
15. Let us now come to the reference pending before the larger
Bench. In State Bank of India v. Sheo Shankar Tewari (supra), a two
member Bench of this Court noted the apparent conflict between
State Bank of India v. Raj Kumar and MGB Gramin Bank on the one
hand and Canara Bank v. M. Mahesh Kumar on the other hand and
referred the matter for the consideration of a larger Bench. The order
of reference to a larger Bench was actually dated 8.02.2019.
16. It was only after the aforesaid reference to a larger Bench that
this Court decided at least four cases, respectively in (i) Indian Bank
v. Promila; (ii) N.C. Santhosh v. State of Karnataka; (iii) State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Amit Shrivas; and (iv) State of Madhya Pradesh
v. Ashish Awasthi. Out of these four decisions, N.C. Santosh (supra)
was by a three member Bench, which actually took note of the
reference pending before the larger Bench.
17. Keeping the above in mind, if we critically analyse the way in
which this Court has proceeded to interpret the applicability of a new
or modified Scheme that comes into force after the death of the
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employee, we may notice an interesting feature. In cases where the
benefit under the existing Scheme was taken away or substituted with
a lesser benefit, this Court directed the application of the new
Scheme. But in cases where the benefits under an existing Scheme
were enlarged by a modified Scheme after the death of the employee,
this Court applied only the Scheme that was in force on the date of
death of the employee. This is fundamentally due to the fact that
compassionate appointment was always considered to be an
exception to the normal method of recruitment and perhaps looked
down upon with lesser compassion for the individual and greater
concern for the rule of law.
18. If compassionate appointment is one of the conditions of service
and is made automatic upon the death of an employee in harness
without any kind of scrutiny whatsoever, the same would be treated
as a vested right in law. But it is not so. Appointment on
compassionate grounds is not automatic, but subject to strict scrutiny
of various parameters including the financial position of the family,
the economic dependence of the family upon the deceased employee
and the avocation of the other members of the family. Therefore, no
one can claim to have a vested right for appointment on
compassionate grounds. This is why some of the decisions which we
have tabulated above appear to have interpreted the applicability of
revised Schemes differently, leading to conflict of opinion. Though
there is a conflict as to whether the Scheme in force on the date of
death of the employee would apply or the Scheme in force on the
date of consideration of the application of appointment on
compassionate grounds would apply, there is certainly no conflict
about the underlying concern reflected in the above decisions.
Wherever the modified Schemes diluted the existing benefits, this
Court applied those benefits, but wherever the modified Scheme
granted larger benefits, the old Scheme was made applicable.
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19. The important aspect about the conflict of opinion is that it
revolves around two dates, namely, (i) date of death of the employee;
and (ii) date of consideration of the application of the dependant. Out
of these two dates, only one, namely, the date of death alone is a
fixed factor that does not change. The next date namely the date of
consideration of the claim, is something that depends upon many
variables such as the date of filing of application, the date of attaining
of majority of the claimant and the date on which the file is put up to
the competent authority. There is no principle of statutory
interpretation which permits a decision on the applicability of a
rule, to be based upon an indeterminate or variable factor. Let us
take for instance a hypothetical case where 2 Government servants
die in harness on January 01, 2020. Let us assume that the
dependants of these 2 deceased Government servants make
applications for appointment on 2 different dates say 29.05.2020 and
02.06.2020 and a modified Scheme comes into force on June 01,
2020. If the date of consideration of the claim is taken to be the
criteria for determining whether the modified Scheme applies or not,
it will lead to two different results, one in respect of the person who
made the application before June 1, 2020 and another in respect of
the person who applied after June 01, 2020. In other words, if two
employees die on the same date and the dependants of those
employees apply on two different dates, one before the modified
Scheme comes into force and another thereafter, they will come in
for differential treatment if the date of application and the date of
consideration of the same are taken to be the deciding factor. A rule
of interpretation which produces different results, depending upon
what the individuals do or do not do, is inconceivable. This is why,
the managements of a few banks, in the cases tabulated above, have
introduced a rule in the modified scheme itself, which provides for
all pending applications to be decided under the new/modified
scheme. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the
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interpretation as to the applicability of a modified Scheme should
depend only upon a determinate and fixed criteria such as the date of
death and not an indeterminate and variable factor.
8. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs.
Ashsish Awasthy by Judgment dated 18-11-2021 Passed in C.A. No. 6903
of 2021 has held as under :
"4. The deceased employee died on 08.10.2015. At the time of death,
he was working as a work charge employee, who was paid the salary
from the contingency fund. As per the policy/circular prevalent at the
time of the death of the deceased employee, i.e., policy/circular No.C-
3- 12/2013/1-3 dated 29.09.2014 in case of death of the employee
working on work charge, his dependents/heirs were not entitled to the
appointment on compassionate ground and were entitled to Rs. 2
lakhs as compensatory amount. Subsequently, the policy came to be
amended vide circular dated 31.08.2016, under which even in the
case of death of the work charge employee, his heirs/dependents will
be entitled to the appointment on compassionate ground. Relying
upon the subsequent circular/policy dated 31.08.2016, the Division
Bench of the High Court has directed the appellants to consider the
case of the respondent for appointment on compassionate ground. As
per the settled preposition of law laid down by this Court for
appointment on compassionate ground, the policy prevalent at the
time of death of the 4 deceased employee only is required to be
considered and not the subsequent policy. 4.1 In the case of Indian
Bank and Ors. Vs. Promila and Anr., (2020) 2 SCC 729, it is
observed and held that claim for compassionate appointment must be
decided only on the basis of relevant scheme prevalent on date of
demise of the employee and subsequent scheme cannot be looked into.
Similar view has been taken by this Court in the case of State of
Madhya Pradesh and Ors. Vs. Amit Shrivas, (2020) 10 SCC 496. It is
required to be noted that in the case of Amit Shrivas (supra) the very
scheme applicable in the present case was under consideration and it
was held that the scheme prevalent on the date of death of the
deceased employee is only to be considered. In that view of the
matter, the impugned judgment and order passed by the Division
Bench is unsustainable and deserves to be quashed and set aside."
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9. It is well established principle of law that the delay defeats equity.
Further more, the appointment on compassionate ground is for helping out the
dependents of the deceased employee, so that they can face the financial crisis
which may have occurred on account of loss of sole bread-winner.
Appointment of compassionate ground is not an alternative mode of regular
source of employment. If a family of a deceased employee can survive for a
longer period, then it cannot be said that there was any immediate need for
providing appointment on compassionate ground by by-passing the regular
mode of appointment.
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. Vs.
Gouri Devi by judgment dated 18.11.2021 passed in Civil Appeal
No.6910/2021 has held that delay in pursuing claim and approaching the court
would militate against claim for compassionate appointment as very objective
of providing immediate amelioration to family would stand extinguished. In the
case of State of J & K and others Vs. Sajad Ahmed Mir reported in (2006)
5 SCC 766, the Supreme Court has held that: -
"11. We may also observe that when the Division Bench of the High
Court was considering the case of the applicant holding that he had
sought 'compassion', the Bench ought to have considered the larger
issue as well and it is that such an appointment is an exception to the
general rule. Normally, an employment in Government or other
public sectors should be open to all eligible candidates who can
come forward to apply and compete with each other. It is in
consonance with Article 14 of the 5 Constitution. On the basis of
competitive merits, an appointment should be made to public office.
This general rule should not be departed except where compelling
circumstances demand, such as, death of sole bread earner and
likelihood of the family suffering because of the set back. Once it is
proved that in spite of death of bread earner, the family survived and
substantial period is over, there is no necessity to say 'goodbye' to
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normal rule of appointment and to show favour to one at the cost of
interests of several others ignoring the mandate of Article 14 of the
Constitution.
12. In State of Haryana and Ors. v. Rani Devi and Anr., it was held
that the claim of applicant for appointment on compassionate ground
is based on the premise that he was dependent on the deceased
employee. Strictly this claim cannot be upheld on the touchstone of
Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution. However, such claim is
considered reasonable as also allowable on the basis of sudden crisis
occurring in the family of the employee who had served the State and
died while in service. That is why it is necessary for the authorities to
frame rules, regulations or to issue such administrative instructions
which can stand the test of Articles 14 and 16. Appointment on
compassionate ground cannot be claimed as a matter of right.
13. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha Ramchandra
Ambekar (Mrs.) and Anr., it was indicated that High Courts and
Administrative Tribunals cannot confer benediction impelled by
sympathetic considerations to make appointments on compassionate
grounds when the regulations framed in respect thereof do not cover
and contemplate such appointments.
14. In Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana and Ors., it was
ruled that public service appointment should be made strictly on the
basis of open invitation of applications and on merits. The
appointment on compassionate ground cannot be a source of
recruitment. It is merely an exception to the requirement of law
keeping in view the fact of the death of employee while in 6 service
leaving his family without any means of livelihood. In such cases, the
object is to enable the family to get over sudden financial crisis. Such
appointments on compassionate ground, therefore, have to be made
in accordance with rules, regulations or administrative instructions
taking into consideration the financial condition of the family of the
deceased. This favorable treatment to the dependent of the deceased
employee must have clear nexus with the object sought to be
achieved thereby, i.e. relief against destitution. At the same time,
however, it should not be forgotten that as against the destitute
family of the deceased, there are millions and millions of other
families which are equally, if not more, destitute. The exception to the
rule made in favour of the family of the deceased employee is in
consideration of the services rendered by him and the legitimate
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expectation, and the change in the status and affairs of the family
engendered by the erstwhile employment, which are suddenly
upturned.
15. In Smt. Sushma Gosain and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. it
was observed that in claims of appointment on compassionate
grounds, there should be no delay in appointment. The purpose of
providing appointment on compassionate ground is to mitigate the
hardship due to death of the bread-earner in the family. Such
appointments should, therefore, be provided immediately to redeem
the family in distress.
16. Recently, in Commissioner of Public Instructions and Ors. v. K.R.
Vishwanath, one of us (Pasayat, J.) had an occasion to consider the
above decisions and the principles laid down therein have been
reiterated.
17. In the case on hand, the father of the applicant died in March,
1987. The application was made by the applicant after four and half
years in September, 1991 which was rejected in March, 1996. The
writ petition was filed in June, 1999 which was dismissed by the
learned single Judge in July, 2000. When the Division Bench decided
the matter, more than fifteen years had 7 passed from the date of
death of the father of the applicant. The said fact was indeed a
relevant and material fact which went to show that the family
survived in spite of death of the employee. Moreover, in our opinion,
the learned single Judge was also right in holding that though the
order was passed in 1996, it was not challenged by the applicant
immediately. He took chance of challenging the order in 1999 when
there was inter-departmental communication in 1999. The Division
Bench, in our view, hence ought not to have allowed the appeal."
(Underline Supplied)
11. Since, petitioner has made a representation against the rejection of his
claim, therefore, the respondents can be directed to decide his representation.
12. The Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Jal Nigam Vs. Jaswant Singh
reported in (2006) 11 SCC 464 has held as under :
"12. The statement of law has also been summarised in
Halsbury's Laws of England, para 911, p. 395 as follows: "In
determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to
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laches, the chief points to be considered are: (i) acquiescence on
the claimant's part; and (ii) any change of position that has
occurred on the defendant's part. Acquiescence in this sense does
not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress,
but assent after the violation has been completed and the
claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant
a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might
fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his
conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put
the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable
to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In
such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these
considerations rests the doctrine of laches."
12. The Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Lal Vs. State of Haryana
reported in (1997) 6 SCC 538 has held as under :
"18. That apart, as this Court has repeatedly held, the delay
disentitles the party to the discretionary relief under Article 226
or Article 32 of the Constitution."
13. The Supreme Court in the case of NDMC Vs. Pan Singh reported in
(2007) 9 SCC 278 has held as under :
17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ
petition should be filed within a reasonable time. (See Lipton India
Ltd. v. Union of India and M.R. Gupta v. Union of India.)
18. In Shiv Dass v. Union of India this Court held: (SCC p. 277, paras
9-10)
"9. It has been pointed out by this Court in a number of cases
that representations would not be adequate explanation to take
care of delay. This was first stated in K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty
v. State of Mysore. There is a limit to the time which can be
considered reasonable for making representations and if the
Government had turned down one representation the making of
another representation on similar lines will not explain the
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delay. In State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray making of
repeated representations was not regarded as satisfactory
explanation of the delay. In that case the petition had been
dismissed for delay alone. (See also State of Orissa v. Arun
Kumar Patnaik.)
10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues
from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to
overlook delay in filing the petition. It would depend upon the
fact of each case. If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period
say three years normally the Court would reject the same or
restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable
period of about three years. The High Court did not examine
whether on merit the appellant had a case. If on merits it would
have found that there was no scope for interference, it would
have dismissed the writ petition on that score alone."
19. We, therefore, are of the opinion that it was not a fit case where
the High Court should have exercised its discretionary jurisdiction in
favour of the respondents herein.
14. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan
Singh Bhandari reported in (2013) 12 SCC 179 has held as under :
19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that even if the
court or tribunal directs for consideration of representations relating
to a stale claim or dead grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause
of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix.
Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the competent
authority does not arrest time.
* * * *
28. Remaining oblivious to the factum of delay and laches and
granting relief is contrary to all settled principles and even would not
remotely attract the concept of discretion. We may hasten to add that
the same may not be applicable in all circumstances where certain
categories of fundamental rights are infringed. But, a stale claim of
getting promotional benefits definitely should not have been
entertained by the Tribunal and accepted by the High Court.
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15. The Supreme Court in the case of C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and
Mining reported in (2008) 10 SCC 115 has held as under :
"10. Every representation to the Government for relief, may not be
replied on merits. Representations relating to matters which have
become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground
alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In regard to
representations unrelated to the Department, the reply may be only to
inform that the matter did not concern the Department or to inform the
appropriate Department. Representations with incomplete particulars
may be replied by seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such
representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a stale
or dead claim."
16. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. M.K. Sarkar
reported in (2010) 2 SCC 59 has held as under :
"15. When a belated representation in regard to a 'stale' or 'dead'
issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction
by the court/tribunal to do so, the date of such decision cannot be
considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the 'dead'
issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or delay and
laches should be considered with reference to the original cause of
action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed
in compliance with a court's direction. Neither a court's direction to
consider a representation issued without examining the merits, nor a
decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the
limitation, or erase the delay and laches."
17. The Supreme Court in the case of State of T.N. v. Seshachalam reported
in (2007) 10 SCC 137 has held as under :
"16. ... filing of representations alone would not save the period of
limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant factor for a court of law to
determine the question as to whether the claim made by an applicant
deserves consideration. Delay and/or laches on the part of a
government servant may deprive him of the benefit which had been
given to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would not, in a
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:14319
situation of that nature, be attracted as it is well known that law leans
in favour of those who are alert and vigilant."
18. The Supreme Court in the case of Fertilizers and Chemicals
Travancore Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Anusree K.B. reported in 2022 LiveLaw (SC)
819 has held as under:-
"9.Thus, as per the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid
decisions, compassionate appointment is an exception to the general
rule of appointment in the public services and is in favour of the
dependents of a deceased dying in harness and leaving his family in
penury and without any means of livelihood, and in such cases, out of
pure humanitarian consideration taking into consideration the fact
that unless some source of livelihood is provided, the family would
not be able to make both ends meet, a provision is made in the rules
to provide gainful employment to one of the dependants of the
deceased who may be eligible for such employment. The whole object
of granting compassionate employment is, thus, to enable the family
to tide over the sudden crisis. The object is not to give such family a
post much less a post held by the deceased.
9.1 Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid
decisions to the facts of the case on hand and considering the
observations made hereinabove and the object and purpose for which
the appointment on compassionate ground is provided, the
respondent shall not be entitled to the appointment on compassionate
ground on the death of her father, who died in the year 1995. After a
period of 24 years from the death of the deceased employee, the
respondent shall not be entitled to the appointment on compassionate
ground. If such an appointment is made now and/or after a period of
14/24 years, the same shall be against the object and purpose for
which the appointment on compassionate ground is provided.
9.2 Under the circumstances, both, the learned Single Judge as well
as the Division Bench of the High Court have committed a serious
error in directing the appellants to reconsider the case of the
respondent for appointment on compassionate ground. The impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court is unsustainable."
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19. In view of the aforesaid, this Court finds that the respondents had duly
considered the petitioner's representation on an earlier occasion. It is evident
from the record that, vide order dated 19/09/2016, the petitioner was explicitly
directed to submit an undertaking to acquire the required minimum
qualifications within a period of three years; however, the petitioner failed to
comply and did not submit any such undertaking. Furthermore, the petitioner's
insistence on being appointed specifically to the post of Security Guard is
misconceived. The post has already been abolished by the respondent
authorities, and the ensuing duties are presently being managed through
outsourcing; hence, no appointment can be directed against a non-existent post.
Crucially, the deceased employee passed away in the year 2002. A period of
more than 23 years has since elapsed. It is a well-settled legal principle that the
very objective of compassionate appointment is to provide immediate financial
succor to the bereaved family to tide over a sudden crisis. Such an inordinate
delay entirely defeats the core purpose of compassionate employment.
Moreover, a dependent cannot claim compassionate appointment to a particular
post of his own choice as a matter of right. In view of the aforesaid facts and
circumstances, the claim of the petitioner is devoid of merit. Accordingly, the
petitions fails and is hereby, dismissed.
20. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, are also disposed of.
(ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT)
JUDGE
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