[Cites 11, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Gajraj Singh Bhawar vs Smt. Ranjana Sharma on 26 March, 2026
Author: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
Bench: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:8347
1 MCRC-13821-2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR
ON THE 26th OF MARCH, 2026
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 13821 of 2026
GAJRAJ SINGH BHAWAR
Versus
SMT. RANJANA SHARMA
Appearance:
Shri Gurumeet Singh Dang, advocate for the petitioner.
ORDER
1. This petition under Section 528 of The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023 is filed feeling aggrieved by the order dated 18.03.2026 passed
by III Additional Sessions Judge Ujjain, District Ujjain, in criminal revision
No. 38/2026, whereby the application filed by the accused/petitioner before
the Judicial Magistrate First Class Ujjain in SCNIA No. 1357/2023 under
Section 39(1) of BNSS has been rejected vide order dated 18.2.2026.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in addition to the facts and grounds
mentioned in the petition, submits that the accused had filed an application
before the Judicial Magistrate First Class under Section 39(1) of the BNSS
for examination of handwriting of cheque. The said application was rejected
by the JMFC vide order dated 18.2.2026 on the ground that the matter is at
the final hearing stage and accused could have submitted a report by getting
the signature and handwriting examined at the stage of defense
evidence. The learned revisional Court vide impugned order dated 18.3.2026
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has rejected the revision on the ground that the accused did not raise any
objection with regard to his signature on the disputed cheque while
submitting reply to demand notice (Ex.D-02) given by the complainant.
Learned counsel contends that the proposed evidence is necessary for
defence of accused. The accused deserves proper opportunity to setup his
defence.
3. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record.
4. The trial at SCNIA No. 1357/2023 was pending for final arguments, as
revealed by the impugned orders. The accused submitted three separate
applications on 12.2.2026. The first application under Section 39(1) of
Bharatiya Saksha Adhiniyam requesting examination of handwriting of
cheque. The second application under Section 94 of BNSS,2023 requesting
production of income tax statement and bank statement of the complainant
and his son and third application for requisitioning the bank statement from
Bank of India, Branch Freeganj, Ujjain. All three applications were
dismissed by the trial Court. The present petition relates to dismissal of first
application under Section 39(1) of Bharatiya Saksha Adhiniyam.
5. Dealing with the presumptions contained in section 20, 87 and 139 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the Supreme Court in case of Oriental
Bank of Commerce Vs. Prabodh Kumar Tiwari (2022) 7 SCR 72 , observed
as under:-
4. The respondent admits that he signed and handed over a cheque to
the appellant. According to the respondent a signed blank cheque was
handed over by him. The question which arises in the appeal is whether
the High Court was correct in permitting the respondent to engage a
hand-writing expert to determine whether the details that were filled in
the cheque were in the hand of the respondent. For the reasons set out
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below, we have allowed this appeal against the order of the High Court
for the reason that Section 139 of the NI Act raises a presumption that a
drawer handing over a cheque signed by him is liable unless it is proved
by adducing evidence at the trial that the cheque was not in discharge of
a debt or liability. The evidence of a hand-writing expert on whether the
respondent had filled in the details in the cheque would be immaterial
to determining the purpose for which the cheque was handed over.
Therefore, no purpose is served by allowing the application for
adducing the evidence of the hand-writing expert.
********
14. In Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar (2019) 4 SCC 197, after
discussing the settled line of precedent on this issue, a two Judge
Bench held:
33. A meaningful reading of the provisions of the Negotiable
Instruments Act including, in particular, Sections 20, 87 and
139, makes it amply clear that a person who signs a cheque
and makes it over to the payee remains liable unless he
adduces evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheque
had been issued for payment of a debt or in discharge of a
liability. It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled
in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly
signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the
penal provisions of Section 138 would be attracted.
34. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a
payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill up the
amount and other particulars. This in itself would not
invalidate the cheque. The onus would still be on the accused
to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or
liability by adducing evidence.
[...]
36. Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and
handed over by the accused, which is towards some
payment, would attract presumption under Section 139
of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any
cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued
in discharge of a debt.
(emphasis supplied)
The above view was recently reiterated by a three-Judge Bench of
this Court in Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian.
15. A drawer who signs a cheque and hands it over to the payee, is
presumed to be liable unless the drawer adduces evidence to rebut
the presumption that the cheque has been issued towards payment
of a debt or in discharge of a liability. The presumption arises
under Section 139.
16. In Anss Rajashekar v. Augustus Jeba Ananth, (2020) 15 SCC
348, a two Judge Bench of this Court, of which one of us (D.Y.
Chandrachud J.) was a part, reiterated the decision of the three-
Judge Bench of this Court in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan (2010) 11
SCC 441, on the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act.
The court held:
12. Section 139 of the Act mandates that it shall be
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presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a
cheque received it, in discharge, in whole or in part, of a
debt, or liability.
The expression "unless the contrary is proved" indicates that the
presumption under Section 139 of the Act is rebuttable. Terming
this as an example of a "reverse onus clause" the three-Judge
Bench of this Court in Rangappa held that in determining whether
the presumption has been rebutted, the test of proportionality must
guide the determination. The standard of proof for rebuttal of the
presumption under Section 139 of the Act is guided by a
preponderance of probabilities. This Court held thus:
"28. In the absence of compelling justifications,
reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary
burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this
in view, it is a settled position that when an
accused has to rebut the presumption under
Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is
that of "preponderance of probabilities".
Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable
defence which creates doubts about the existence
of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the
prosecution can fail. As clarified in the citations,
the accused can rely on the materials submitted by
the complainant in order to raise such a defence
and it is conceivable that in some cases the
accused may not need to adduce evidence of
his/her own." (emphasis supplied)
17. For such a determination, the fact that the details in
the cheque have been filled up not by the drawer, but by
some other person would be immaterial. The
presumption which arises on the signing of the cheque
cannot be rebutted merely by the report of a hand-
writing expert. Even if the details in the cheque have
not been filled up by drawer but by another person, this
is not relevant to the defense whether cheque was
issued towards payment of a debt or in discharge of a
liability.
6. The petitioner has not denied signature on the cheque in question. In
view of the provision of Section 20 of the Act of 1881, the inchoate
negotiable instruments are also valid and legally enforceable. The
presumption in favour of the holder of cheque would not be rebutted merely
by the report of handwriting expert stating that the entries on the cheque are
filled in by another person. Although, the accused is entitled for the
opportunity to submit his defense, the examination of the entries on the
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cheque by the handwriting expert is immaterial and unnecessary for the
trial. The proposed evidence does not appear to be necessary for just decision
of the matter. Learned counsel for the petitioner was at loss to explain why
the application could not be submitted during trial or at the stage of
examination of the accused or even at the stage of defence evidence. The
reason for delay assigned by learned counsel does not appear to be proper
and sufficient that at the time of preparing the matter for final arguments, he
came to know about this aspect of matter. Apparently, t he accused made an
attempt in despair to delay the trial by filing the application u/S 39(1) of
BNSS, 2023 requesting examination of handwriting on the cheque . Both the
Courts considered the necessity of the examination by hand writing expert
and the conduct of the petitioner/accused and committed no error in rejecting
the application as well as the revision.
7. Considering all aspects of the matter, this Court is of the considered
opinion that there is no impropriety, illegality or perversity in the impugned
orders. No case is made out to invoke inherent jurisdiction.
8. Consequently, this petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 is dismissed.
C.C. as per rules.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR)
JUDGE
BDJ
