[Cites 21, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Sunita Trivedi vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 12 March, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:8759
1 WP. No. 1913 of 2017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
ON THE 12th OF MARCH, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 1913 of 2017
SUNITA TRIVEDI
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri S. K. Sharma - learned counsel for the petitioner.
Shri Siraj Qureshi - learned Government Advocate for the respondents/State.
ORDER
This petition, under Article 226 of Constitution of India, has been filed
seeking the following relief (s):
"(i) That, the impugned order dated 19.08.2016 Annex. P/8 may
kindly quashed further the adverse part confirm by the respondent
no.2 be held illegal and be quashed.
(ii) That, the all service benefit be extended to the petitioner.
(iii) That, any other relief which this Hon'ble High Court may deem
fit, with cost of the petition."
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is a resident
of Madhya Pradesh and he is working as an Assistant Teacher in the Education
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Department. She is presently posted at Government Primary School,
Mahavirpura, District Guna. Despite knowing that petitioner was a teacher,
respondents, by order dated 30.04.2016, engaged her as a member in the Gram
Uday Se Bharat Uday programme. In compliance with the said order, petitioner
joined the training of the programme on 04.05.2016 and her presence is duly
reflected in the attendance record maintained by the respondents. During the
training period, petitioner was not provided with the necessary material and was
informed that the team leader would communicate regarding the collection of
required articles. However, the team leader, Smt. Mradula Saxena, did not
communicate any such information to petitioner until 24.05.2016. On the evening
of 24.05.2016, petitioner was informed that she had been placed under Team
No.61 by order dated 23.05.2016 and was directed to collect the required articles.
Petitioner complied with the directions and completed the assigned work without
any irregularity. It is further submitted that due to similarity in names, the team
leader mistakenly contacted another teacher, namely Sudha Trivedi of Middle
School Mahavirpura, instead of petitioner Sunita Trivedi. Owing to this
misunderstanding, an adverse report was sent to respondent No.3 on the basis of
which petitioner was placed under suspension by order dated 01.06.2016, which
is without jurisdiction. Petitioner immediately clarified the matter and submitted
representations explaining that she had never avoided her duties. The team leader
also informed the District Project Coordinator, District Education Centre, Guna,
by letter dated 02.06.2016 that the issue had occurred due to confusion in the
name of member and that petitioner had duly performed her duties. Petitioner
also submitted representations to the District Education Officer along with
relevant documents. However, respondent No.3, ignoring the aforesaid
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correspondence issued a show-cause notice dated 26.07.2016 alleging
misconduct. Petitioner submitted a detailed reply on 29.07.2016 explaining the
true facts. Despite the material available on record, respondent No.3, without
properly considering the explanation and without conducting any proper enquiry,
passed the impugned order dated 19.08.2016 imposing the penalty of
withholding of one increment without cumulative effect and also forfeited the
salary for the suspension period. Being aggrieved, petitioner preferred an appeal
before respondent No.2. However, respondent No.2, without properly examining
the facts and circumstances of the case, dismissed the appeal by order dated
17.01.2017, merely modifying the order to the extent of releasing the salary for
the suspension period. Learned counsel for petitioner further submits that the
impugned orders have been passed arbitrarily, without jurisdiction and in
violation of the principles of natural justice. Petitioner had duly performed all
duties assigned to her and the alleged lapse occurred only due to a mistake in
communication by the authorities. Therefore, the impugned orders deserve to be
quashed.
3. Learned counsel for respondent/State submits that the present petition has
been filed by the petitioner being aggrieved by the order dated 19.08.2016 passed
by respondent No.3, whereby the penalty of withholding of one increment
without cumulative effect has been inflicted and the salary for the suspension
period has also been forfeited without following the principles of natural justice
or giving a proper opportunity of hearing. It is further submitted that on filing the
appeal, respondent No.2 modified the order only to the extent of directing
payment of salary for the suspension period and affirmed the order of respondent
No.3. Thus, without availing the statutory remedy of second appeal, the
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present writ petition is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.
4. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
5. Now the only question for consideration is as to whether this Court can
dismiss the petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy or not?
6. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and another v.
Uttar Pradesh Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam Sangharsh Samiti and another,
reported in (2008) 12 SCC 675 has held as under:
"37. We have given most anxious and thoughtful consideration to the
rival contentions of the parties. So far as preliminary objection raised
by the Corporation before the High Court is concerned, in our
considered view, the same was well founded and ought to have been
upheld. It was urged before the High Court on behalf of the
Corporation and the State Government that the writ petition was
premature inasmuch as no retrenchment had been affected. Several
disputed questions of fact were involved in the petition. If the
contention of the Samiti was that there was illegal closure of
undertaking or there was non-payment of wages by the employer,
appropriate proceedings could have been initiated under industrial law.
In fact, one of the Judges of the Division Bench upheld the contention
and observed that the employees could have claimed closure
compensation under Section 25- FFF of the Act or could have
approached prescribed authority under the Payment of Wages Act
relying upon Section 33-C(2) of the Act or Section 6-H(2) of the U.P.
Industrial Disputes Act. The other Single Judge of the Division Bench,
however, held that the writ petition had been entertained and interim
orders were also passed. Relying upon Suresh Chandra Tewari [AIR
1992 All 331], the learned Judge held that "the petition cannot be
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dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy if the same has been
entertained and interim order has been passed".
(emphasis supplied)
38. With respect to the learned Judge, it is neither the legal position
nor such a proposition has been laid down in Suresh Chandra Tewari
[AIR 1992 All 331] that once a petition is admitted, it cannot be
dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. It is no doubt correct
that in the headnote of All India Reporter (p. 331), it is stated that
"petition cannot be rejected on the ground of availability of alternative
remedy of filing appeal". But it has not been so held in the actual
decision of the Court. The relevant para 2 of the decision reads thus:
(Suresh Chandra Tewari case [AIR 1992 All 331], AIR p. 331)
"2. At the time of hearing of this petition a threshold question,
as to its maintainability was raised on the ground that the
impugned order was an appealable one and, therefore,
before approaching this Court the petitioner should have
approached the appellate authority. Though there is much
substance in the above contention, we do not feel inclined to
reject this petition on the ground of alternative remedy having
regard to the fact that the petition has been entertained and an
interim order passed."
(emphasis supplied)
Even otherwise, the learned Judge was not right in law. True it is that
issuance of rule nisi or passing of interim orders is a relevant
consideration for not dismissing a petition if it appears to the High
Court that the matter could be decided by a writ court. It has been so
held even by this Court in several cases that even if alternative
remedy is available, it cannot be held that a writ petition is not
maintainable. In our judgment, however, it cannot be laid down as
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a proposition of law that once a petition is admitted, it could never
be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. If such bald
contention is upheld, even this Court cannot order dismissal of a writ
petition which ought not to have been entertained by the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution in view of availability of
alternative and equally efficacious remedy to the aggrieved party,
once the High Court has entertained a writ petition albeit wrongly and
granted the relief to the petitioner."
7. The Supreme Court in the case of Genpact India Private Limited v.
Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and another, reported in 2019 SCC
Online SC 1500 decided on 22.11.2019 in Civil Appeal No.8945/2019 has held
as under:
"23. We now turn to the question whether the High Court was justified
in refusing to entertain the writ petition because of availability of
adequate appellate remedy. The law on the point is very clear and was
summarised in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Dass
Agarwal AIR (2014) 1 SCC 603] as under:--
"11. Before discussing the fact proposition, we would
notice the principle of law as laid down by this Court. It
is settled law that non-entertainment of petitions under
writ jurisdiction by the High Court when an efficacious
alternative remedy is available is a rule of self-imposed
limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience
and discretion rather than a rule of law. Undoubtedly, it
is within the discretion of the High Court to grant relief
under Article 226 despite the existence of an alternative
remedy. However, the High Court must not interfere
if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy
available to the petitioner and he has approached the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:8759
High Court without availing the same unless he has
made out an exceptional case warranting such
interference or there exist sufficient grounds to
invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article
226. (See State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh [AIR 1958 SC
86], Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa
[(1983) 2 SCC 433 : 1983 SCC (Tax) 131], Harbanslal
Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [(1983) 2 SCC 433 :
1983 SCC (Tax) 131] and State of H.P. v. Gujarat
Ambuja Cement Ltd. [(2005) 6 SCC 499])
12. The Constitution Benches of this Court in K.S.
Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation
Commission [AIR 1954 SC 207], Sangram Singh v.
Election Tribunal [AIR 1955 SC 425], Union of India v.
T.R. Varma [AIR 1957 SC 882], State of U.P. v. Mohd.
Nooh [AIR 1958 SC 86] and K.S. Venkataraman and Co.
(P) Ltd. v. State of Madras [AIR 1966 SC 1089] have
held that though Article 226 confers very wide powers in
the matter of issuing writs on the High Court, the remedy
of writ is absolutely discretionary in character. If the
High Court is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have
an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere, it can refuse to
exercise its jurisdiction. The Court, in extraordinary
circumstances, may exercise the power if it comes to the
conclusion that there has been a breach of the principles
of natural justice or the procedure required for decision
has not been adopted. [See N.T. Veluswami Thevar v. G.
Raja Nainar [AIR 1959 SC 422], Municipal Council,
Khurai v. Kamal Kumar [AIR 1965 SC 1321 : (1965) 2
SCR 653], Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das
[(1984) 2 SCC 436 : 1984 SCC (Tax) 133], S.T.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:8759
Muthusami v. K. Natarajan [(1988) 1 SCC 572],
Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant [(1995) 5 SCC 75 :
1995 SCC (L&S) 1207 : (1955) 31 ATC 110], Kerala
SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil [(2000) 6 SCC 293], A.
Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan [(2000) 7 SCC
695], L.L. Sudhakar Reddy v. State of A.P. [(2001) 6
SCC 634], Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri
Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha v. State of
Maharashtra [(2001) 8 SCC 509], Pratap Singh v. State
of Haryana [(2002) 7 SCC 484 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 1207 :
(1995) 31 ATC 110] and GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd.
v. ITO21 [(2003) 1 SCC 72]] ...
15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has
recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative
remedy i.e. where the statutory authority has not acted in
accordance with the provisions of the enactment in
question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of
judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the
provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been
passed in total violation of the principles of natural
justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal
case [AIR 1964 SC 1419], Titaghur Paper Mills case
[(1983) 2 SCC 433 : 1983 SCC (Tax) 131] and other
similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an
effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved
person or the statute under which the action complained
of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for
redressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore,
when a statutory forum is created by law for
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redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be
entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation."
24. Recently, in Authorised Officer, State Bank of Travancore v.
Mathew K.C. [(2018) 3 SCC 85], the principles laid down in Chhabil
Dass Agarwal [(2014) 1 SCC 603] were reiterated as under:
"The discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 is not
absolute but has to be exercised judiciously in the given
facts of a case and in accordance with law. The normal
rule is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution ought not to be entertained if alternate
statutory remedies are available, except in cases falling
within the well-defined exceptions as observed in CIT v.
Chhabil Dass Agarwal [(2014) 1 SCC 603]..."
25. We do not, therefore, find any infirmity in the approach adopted
by the High Court in refusing to entertain the Writ Petition. The
submission that once the threshold was crossed despite the
preliminary objection being raised, the High Court ought not to have
considered the issue regarding alternate remedy, may not be correct.
The first order dated 25.01.2017 passed by the High Court did record
the preliminary objection but was prima facie of the view that the
transactions defined in Section 115QA were initially confined only to
those covered by Section 77A of the Companies Act. Therefore,
without rejecting the preliminary objection, notice was issued in the
matter. The subsequent order undoubtedly made the earlier interim
order absolute. However, the preliminary objection having not been
dealt with and disposed of, the matter was still at large.
26. In State of U.P. v. U.P. Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam Sangharsh
Samiti [(2008) 12 SCC 675] this Court dealt with an issue whether
after admission, the Writ Petition could not be dismissed on the
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ground of alternate remedy. The submission was considered by this
Court as under:
"38. With respect to the learned Judge, it is neither the
legal position nor such a proposition has been laid down
in Suresh Chandra Tewari [AIR 1992 All 331] that once
a petition is admitted, it cannot be dismissed on the
ground of alternative remedy. It is no doubt correct that
in the headnote of All India Reporter (p. 331), it is stated
that "petition cannot be rejected on the ground of
availability of alternative remedy of filing appeal". But it
has not been so held in the actual decision of the Court.
The relevant para 2 of the decision reads thus: (Suresh
Chandra Tewari case, AIR p. 331)
"2. At the time of hearing of this petition a
threshold question, as to its maintainability was
raised on the ground that the impugned order was
an appealable one and, therefore, before
approaching this Court the petitioner should have
approached the appellate authority. Though there
is much substance in the above contention, we do
not feel inclined to reject this petition on the
ground of alternative remedy having regard to the
fact that the petition has been entertained and an
interim order passed."
(emphasis supplied)
Even otherwise, the learned Judge was not right in law.
True it is that issuance of rule nisi or passing of interim
orders is a relevant consideration for not dismissing a
petition if it appears to the High Court that the matter
could be decided by a writ court. It has been so held even
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:8759
by this Court in several cases that even if alternative
remedy is available, it cannot be held that a writ petition
is not maintainable. In our judgment, however, it
cannot be laid down as a proposition of law that once
a petition is admitted, it could never be dismissed on
the ground of alternative remedy. If such bald
contention is upheld, even this Court cannot order
dismissal of a writ petition which ought not to have been
entertained by the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution in view of availability of alternative and
equally efficacious remedy to the aggrieved party, once
the High Court has entertained a writ petition albeit
wrongly and granted the relief to the petitioner.
27. We do not, therefore, find any error in the approach of and
conclusion arrived at by the High Court. It is relevant to mention that
the concessions given on behalf of the Revenue as recorded in the
directions issued by the High Court also take care of matters of
prejudice, if any. Consequently, the appellant, as a matter of fact, will
have a fuller, adequate and efficacious remedy by way of appeal
before the appellate authority.
28. Certain issues raised during the course of hearing touching upon
the aspects whether the appellant is liable under Section 115QA of the
Act or whether the transaction of buy back of shares in the present
matter would come within the statutory contours of said Section
115QA or not, are issues which will be gone into at the appropriate
stages by the concerned authorities; and as such we have refrained
from dealing with those issues."
8. The petitioner has not denied the fact that an alternative remedy is
available to him to approach the appropriate forum by filing rejoinder.
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9. In view of the foregoing discussion and taking into consideration the entire
facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court is of the considered view
that no case is made out warranting interference.
10. Ex. Consequenti, petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
11. However, liberty is granted to petitioner to prefer second appeal/ mercy
appeal before the appropriate appellate authority.
(Anand Singh Bahrawat)
Judge
Ahmad
