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Madhya Pradesh High Court
Shamim Ali vs State Of Madhya Pradesh on 6 March, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:7962
1 WP. No. 39 of 2009
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
ON THE 6th OF MARCH, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 39 of 2009
SHAMIM ALI
Versus
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Devendra Sharma - Advocate for petitioner.
Shri Rinkesh Goyal - Government Advocate for respondent/State.
ORDER
This petition, under Article 226 of Constitution of India, has been filed
seeking the following relief (s):-
"i- Annexure P/1 and P/2 may kindly be quashed.
Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems fit in the facts and
circumstances of the case."
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that at the relevant point of
time, petitioner was posted as Office Assistant Grade-II. Charge sheet was issued
by the disciplinary authority and petitioner submitted the reply to the charge
sheet. Thereafter, an inquiry was conducted by the Inquiry Officer behind the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:7962
back of petitioner and he also proposed the punishment of removal of the
petitioner from service. The Inquiry Officer has mentioned certain facts which
were not part of the charge sheet and conducted the inquiry beyond the charges
framed against petitioner. It is further submitted that a copy of inquiry report was
never supplied to petitioner and for the first time the same has been filed before
this Court along with the reply (Annexure R/1). It is also submitted that the
disciplinary authority did not issue any show-cause notice before passing the
impugned punishment order. It is further submitted that the punishment of
withholding two annual increments with cumulative effect has been imposed
upon the petitioner by the disciplinary authority. Thereafter, petitioner preferred
an appeal before the Appellate Authority; however, the Appellate Authority also
failed to consider the aforesaid aspects and rejected the appeal by passing a non-
speaking and unreasoned order. It is further submitted that a major punishment
has been imposed upon the petitioner without supplying a copy of the inquiry
report and without calling for his reply to the findings of the inquiry report. Thus,
the action of the disciplinary authority is contrary to the provisions of the M.P.
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 and the said
aspect has also not been considered by the Appellate Authority.
3. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/State, on the other hand,
opposed the prayer made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, stating that
looking to the charges, the impugned punishment order has rightly been issued
against the petitioner and the appeal preferred by the petitioner has also rightly
been rejected by the Appellate Authority.
4. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:7962
5. Perusal of the record reveals that at the relevant time the petitioner was
posted as Office Assistant Grade-II. A charge sheet was issued by the disciplinary
authority, and the petitioner submitted his reply. Thereafter, the Inquiry Officer
conducted the inquiry behind the back of the petitioner and even proposed the
punishment of removal from service while also travelling beyond the charges
mentioned in the charge sheet. The copy of the inquiry report was not supplied to
the petitioner and has been filed for the first time before this Court along with the
reply. The disciplinary authority passed the impugned punishment order without
issuing any show-cause notice and imposed the punishment of withholding two
annual increments with cumulative effect. The petitioner preferred an appeal;
however, the Appellate Authority dismissed the same by passing a non-speaking
and unreasoned order without considering the aforesaid aspects. Thus, the action
of the disciplinary authority is contrary to the provisions of the M.P. Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966.
6. In the reply also the respondent has mentioned as under:
" Enquiry Officer conducted inquiry and submitted report on 20-4-
2004 to disciplinary authority and reported that charges labeled
against petitioner is found proved. Having agreed with report of
enquiry officer, disciplinary authority respondent No.3 imposed
punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect and
debar posting of petitioner in Establishment Section during period of
service and regularized period of suspension by treating it as duty by
order dated 10-11-2004, Annexure P-2."
In the reply, the respondents themselves have stated that after receiving the
copy of the inquiry report, the disciplinary authority imposed the punishment of
withholding two annual increments with cumulative effect. However, in the reply
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:7962
they have not stated that the copy of the inquiry report was supplied to the
petitioner or that any reply was called for from the petitioner.
7. On 16.1.2026 this Court has passed the following order:
"Perusal of record reveals that on 25.03.2019, the State counsel was
directed to keep the record of the enquiry proceedings available before
the Court at the time of final adjudication. Thereafter, on 16.12.2025,
this Court again directed compliance with the Court order dated
25.03.2019; however, till date, the record of the enquiry proceedings
has not been produced/filed.
In view of the aforesaid, by way of last indulgence, four weeks' time is
granted to produce the record of the enquiry proceedings.
List the matter after four weeks.
It is made clear that on the next date of hearing, the case shall be
decided on the basis of documents available on record."
Despite the aforesaid direction, the record of the inquiry proceedings has
not been produced before this Court. This Court had already clearly mentioned in
its earlier order that if the record was not made available on the next date of
hearing, the case would be decided on the basis of the documents available on
record.
8. As the respondents themselves have mentioned in the reply that the
disciplinary authority issued the punishment order agreeing with the inquiry
report, the matter is being considered accordingly.
9. Even otherwise, the Inquiry Officer has not conducted the inquiry in a
proper manner, as he has also proposed the punishment in the inquiry report,
which is contrary to the settled position of law. The inquiry has been conducted
in the following manner:
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:7962
**Jherh y{eh rksej ,0,u0,e0 tks bl izdj.k dh eq[; Hkwfedk esa gS 'kkldh;
lsok dks ek= ,d gYds Lrj ls ys jgh gS ;g vius drZO; ds izfr dHkh xEHkhj ugh
jgh gS bUgksus viuh 'kkldh; lsok dh vf/kdka'k vof/k dks vuqifLFkr jgdj O;rhr
fd;k gSA ,sls 'kkldh; lsod dks eSa 'kklu ij cks> le>rk gwaA vkSj eSa 'kklu ls
vuqjks/k djrk gwa fd budks fd;k x;k vuqfpr Hkqxrku 'kkldh; fu;ekuqlj olwy
fd;k tkos ,oa budks lsok ls izFkd djus gsrq dk;Zokgh dh tkosA vfHkys[kksa ds
vk/kkj ij eq>s Kkr gqvk gS fd bUgksus LoSfPNd lsok fuo`fRr gsrq vkosnu fn;k gS
ysfdu dqy lsok vof/k dk voyksdu djus ij eSa bl fu"d"kZ ij igqapk gwa fd LoSfPNd
lsokfuo`fRr gsrq vgZrk vof/k bUgksus iw.kZ ugha dh gS D;ksafd bUgksus vf/kdka'k le;
'kkldh; lsok ls vuqifLFkr jgus esa gh O;rhr fd;k gSA vr% 'kklu buds izdj.k esa
'kh?kz dk;Zokgh djsaA**
10. The Inquiry Officer stated that the services of petitioner ought to be
terminated and also made reference to the application for voluntary retirement
submitted by the petitioner. This clearly shows that the Inquiry Officer acted
beyond his jurisdiction. Consequently, the impugned punishment order dated
19.11.2004 has been passed, which is non-speaking and unreasoned.
11. The impugned order dated 19.11.2004 (Annexure P/2) is reproduced as
under:
**dk;kZy; vkns'k dzekad@LFkk0@2003@11840 fnukad 234-08-04 }kjk Jh
'kehe vyh lgk;d xzsM 2 LFkkuh; dk;kZy; dks fuyafcr fd;k x;k gS mUgsa vij
lapkyd ¼f'kdk;r½ lapkyuky; LokLF; lsok,s e0iz0 Hkksiky ds i= dzekad
4@f'kdk;r@Mh0bZ0 1@04@5066 Hkksiky fnukad 08-11-04 esa fn;s x;s funsZ'kkuqlkj
rRdky izHkko ls ogky fd;k tkrk gS] rFkk mUgsa Jherh y{eh rksej e0Lok0dk;ZdrkZ
lkeq0Lok0 dsUnz iksgjh dk vukf/kd`r :i ls 3000gtkj ls vf/kd fnol dk vodk'k
Lohd`r djus laca/kh izdj.k esa nks"kh ik;s tkus ds dkj.k n.M Lo:i mudh nks okf"kZd
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:7962
osru o`f);k lap;h izHkko ls jksdh tkrh gS rFkk mUgsa lsokdky rd ys[kk ,oa LFkkiuk
laca/kh dk;Z ls oafpr j[kk tk;sxk mudh fuyacu vof/k drZO; vof/k ekU; dh tkrhA**
12. From perusal of the punishment order issued by the Disciplinary authority
dated 19.11.2004 (Annexure P/2), it is clear that the Disciplinary Authority while
passing an order imposing punishment upon the petitioner, is exercising quasi
judicial power and even the quasi judicial order must be a speaking order. The
Disciplinary Authority must apply its mind to the entire facts and circumstances
and record valid and justifiable reason and all grounds in support of its
conclusion.
13. On perusal of the punishment order, it does not appear to be a speaking
one.
14. It is a settled position in law that when a discretion is vested in an authority
to exercise a particular power, the same is required to be exercised with due
diligence, and in reasonable and rational manner. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
catena of decisions has reiterated time and again the necessity and importance of
giving reasons by the authority in support of its decision. It has been held that the
face of an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority or even by an administrative
authority affecting the rights of parties must speak. The affected party must know
how his case or defence was considered before passing the prejudicial order.
15. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab
v/s. Bandip Singh and others reported in (2016) 1 SCC 724 is relevant to
quote. In the said decision it had been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that
every decision of an administrative or executive nature must be a composite and
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:7962
self-sustaining one, in that it should contain all the reasons which prevailed on
the official taking the decision to arrive at his conclusion.
16. In the same judgment in paragraph 7, the Hon'ble Supreme Court clarifies
that the Government does not have carte blanche to take any decision it chooses
to; it cannot take a capricious, arbitrary or prejudiced decision. Its decision must
be informed and impregnated with reasons. Paragraph 7 of the said decision is
quoted as under:-
"7. The same principle was upheld more recently in Ram Kishun v.
State of U.P. (2012) 11 SCC 511 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 382. However,
we must hasten to clarify that the Government does not have a carte
blanche to take any decision it chooses to; it cannot take a capricious,
arbitrary or prejudiced decision. Its decision must be informed and
impregnated with reasons.
This has already been discussed threadbare in several decisions of this
Court, including in Sterling Computers Ltd. v. M & N Publications
Ltd (1993) 1 SCC 445, Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC
651, Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. (2000) 2 SCC
617, B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd. v. Nair Coal Services Ltd. (2006) 11
SCC 548 and Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa (2007) 14 SCC 517"
17. Also the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kranti
Associates Pvt. Ltd. and another v/s Masood Ahmed Khan and others cited in
(2010) 9 SCC 496 highlights this point. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph
15 opined that the face of an order passed by a quasi judicial authority or even an
administrative authority affecting the rights of parties, must speak. It must not be
like the inscrutable face of a sphinx. In paragraph 47 the Honb'le Supreme Court
summarized its discussion. The relevant subparagraphs of the said summary are
quoted as under:-
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:7962
"47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:
(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in
administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.
(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its
conclusions.
(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle
of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done
as well.
(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible
arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative
power.
(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-
maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.
(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a
decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by
judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.
(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and
constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on
relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making
justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as
the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one
common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant
factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining
the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial
accountability and transparency.
(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about
his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the
person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of
incrementalism.
(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A
pretence of reasons or "rubber-stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a
valid decision-making process.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:7962
(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint
on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only
makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes
them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of
Judicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-37].)
(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad
doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now
virtually a component of human rights andwas considered part of
Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553]
EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford [2001 EWCA Civ
405 (CA)] , wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European
Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent
reasons must be given for judicial decisions".
(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting
up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law,
requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is
virtually a part of "due process"."
18. As disciplinary authority has issued a non-speaking and unreasoned order;
therefore, in absence of reason in the punishment order cannot be compensated
by disclosure of reason in the appellate order, therefore, the argument of counsel
for respondent is not sustainable that the appellate order is reasoned and speaking
order. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case Oryx Fisheries Pvt.Ltd vs Union
Of India & Ors; (2010) 13 SCC 427 has held as under:-
"41. In M/s Kranti Associates (supra), this Court after considering
various judgments formulated certain principles in para 51 of the
judgment which are set out below
a. In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even
in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone
prejudicially.
b. A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its
conclusions.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:7962
c. Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider
principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also
appear to be done as well.
d. Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any
possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even
administrative power.
e. Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision
maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous
considerations.
f. Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a
decision making process as observing principles of natural justice by
judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.
g. Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior Courts.
h. The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law
and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based
on relevant facts. This is virtually the life blood of judicial decision
making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.
i. Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as
different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these
decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by
reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This
is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery
system.
j. Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability
and transparency.
k. If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about
his/her decision making process then it is impossible to know whether
the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to
principles of incrementalism.
l. Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct.
A pretence of reasons or `rubber-stamp reasons' is not to be equated
with a valid decision making process.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:7962
m. It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of
restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision making
not only makes the judges and decision makers less prone to errors but
also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in
Defence of Judicial Candor (1987) 100 Harward Law Review 731-
737).
n. Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad
doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said requirement is now
virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of
Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See (1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29
and Anya vs. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405, wherein the
Court referred to Article 6 of European Convention of Human Rights
which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for
judicial decisions". o. In all common law jurisdictions judgments play
a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for
development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is
of the essence and is virtually a part of "Due Process".
42. In the instant case the appellate order contains reasons. However,
absence of reasons in the original order cannot be compensated by
disclosure of reason in the appellate order.
43. In Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna and
others,(1986) 4 SCC 537, it has been held:
"......after the blow suffered by the initial decision, it is
difficult to contemplate complete restitution through an
appellate decision. Such a case is unlike an action for
money or recovery of property, where the execution of
the trial decree may be stayed pending appeal, or a
successful appeal may result in refund of the money or
restitution of the property, with appropriate compensation
by way of interest or mesne profits for the period of
deprivation. And, therefore, it seems to us, there is
manifest need to ensure that there is no breach of
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fundamental procedure in the original proceeding, and to
avoid treating an appeal as an overall substitute for the
original proceeding."
44. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court quashes the show cause
notice as also the order dated 19.03.2008 passed by the third
respondent. In view of that, the appellate order has no legs to stand
and accordingly is quashed."
19. In view of the above discussions and the facts and circumstances of the
case, I am left with no choice but to set aside impugned punishment order dated
19.11.2004 (Annexure P/2) and appeal rejection order dated 15.10.2008
(Annexure P/1) and I accordingly do so.
20. Consequently, the respondents are directed to grant all consequential
benefits to the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of receipt
of the certified copy of this order. Since the petitioner has already retired, no
liberty is granted to the respondents to take any action against the petitioner.
21. With the aforesaid observation and directions, this petition is hereby
disposed of.
22. Pending interlocutory application, if any, are disposed of.
(Anand Singh Bahrawat)
Judge
Ahmad
