[Cites 11, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Kuldeep vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 29 January, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:8491
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE RAJENDRA KUMAR VANI
ON THE 29 th OF JANUARY, 2026
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 5690 of 2017
KULDEEP
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Appearance:
Shri Rajnish Kumar Pandey - Advocate for appellant.
Shri Aditya Choubey - Public Prosecutor for State.
JUDGMENT
This appeal has been filed by the present appellant under Section 374(2) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 being aggrieved by the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence dated 08.11.2017 passed by the learned Special
Judge SC/ST Act), Betul (M.P.) in SC ATR No.200093 of 2013 whereby the
present appellant/accused has been convicted under Section 354 of the Indian
Penal Code and sentenced to undergo two years RI and fine of Rs.25,000/- with
default stipulation.
2. The case of the prosecution, in brief is that on 16.10.2013, the victim, aged
about 16 years, submitted a written complaint (Ex. P-1) at Police Station Chicholi
stating that she is a resident of village Godhna and a student of Class XII,
attending school at Ratanpur. It was alleged that on 15.10.2013, while she was
proceeding from her house to Ratanpur in her school uniform, the
appellant/accused, a resident of village Godhna intercepted her on the way, caught
hold of her hand, covered her mouth and attempted to drag her. It was further
alleged that the appellant/accused pressed her breast, loosened the string of her
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salwar and attempted to commit an indecent act. Upon this, the victim managed to
free herself by pushing the appellant/accused and ran away, whereupon the
appellant/accused threatened to kill her. It is further alleged that while returning,
the victim met the school peon Pappu Dabale and one Ganesh, resident of the
village, to whom she narrated the incident. Later, upon reaching home, she
disclosed the incident to her family members. On the basis of the said complaint,
Crime No.233/2013 was registered at Police Station Chicholi against the
appellant/accused for the offences punishable under Section 354-A of the Indian
Penal Code, Section 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act,
2012 and Section 3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act.
3. During the course of investigation, the complainant was sent to Community
Health Centre, Chicholi for medical examination. The statements of witnesses
were recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. The appellant/accused was
arrested. Upon completion of investigation, the charge-sheet was filed before the
learned Judicial Magistrate having jurisdiction, who, in turn, committed the case
to this Court for trial in accordance with law.
4. Charges were framed against the appellant/accused under Section 354 of the
Indian Penal Code in alternate Section 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual
Offences Act, 2012 and Section 3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, which were read over and explained to the
appellant/accused. The appellant/accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
5. In order to bring home the charges, the prosecution examined as many as 04
witnesses, namely victim (PW-1), Shivkala Mehra (PW-2), Smt. Vimla
Choudhary (PW-3) and R.S. Rajput (PW-4) and placed the documents Ex.P-1 to
P-5. In defence, the appellant/accused did not choose to examine any witness.
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6. The learned trial Judge after appreciating and marshalling the evidence vide
impugned judgment has acquitted the appellant Section 8 of the Protection of
Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and Section 3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, but convicted him for
the commission of offence punishable under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code
and passed the order of sentence as mentioned above. In this manner, the present
appeal has been filed by the appellant.
7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has pointed out that, the
learned trial Court on the anvil of evidence on record has erroneously convicted
the present appellant and sentenced him. It is contended that one Pappu Dabale,
the school peon, was an eyewitness to the alleged incident; however, he has not
been examined by the prosecution, nor has any explanation been offered for such
omission. It was further submitted that the victim herself was the material witness
in the case, whereas Shivkala Mehra (PW-2) is a hearsay witness. The FIR in the
present case was lodged after a delay of one day and no plausible explanation for
such delay has been furnished by the prosecution. The victim (PW-1), in her
cross-examination, has admitted that she and the appellant were studying in the
same school and used to go to school together. It was also brought on record that
the alleged place of incident is a public pathway where passersby are usually
present and that there were houses as well as agricultural fields situated nearby.
Despite this, no independent witness has been examined by the prosecution. On
these grounds, it was argued that the conviction of the appellant is erroneous and
liable to be set aside.
8. Per contra, learned counsel for the State has vehemently opposed the appeal
and submitted that the prosecution has adduced ample, cogent and reliable
evidence in the form of the testimony of the victim (PW-1) and her mother
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Shivkala Mehra (PW-2). Though, Shivkala Mehra (PW-2) is a hearsay witness,
the statement of the victim has remained unrebutted and inspires confidence. It
was, therefore, submitted that no case for interference is made out and the appeal
deserves to be dismissed.
9. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
10. The victim (PW-1) has supported the prosecution story and deposed that the
appellant/accused caught hold of her hand, attempted to drag her, squeezed her
breast, loosened the string of her salwar and attempted to commit an indecent act.
She further deposed that she resisted the appellant and thereafter returned. She met
the school peon, Pappu Dabale and informed him about the incident, whereafter
she apprised her parents and a complaint (Ex.P-1) was lodged at the Police
Station. The testimony of PW-1 has been supported by her mother Shivkala Mehra
(PW-2). However, except these two witnesses, no independent witness has been
examined by the prosecution. As per the prosecution story and the testimony of
PW-1, the school peon Pappu Dabale was the first person informed about the
incident and was, therefore, a material witness. Despite this, the prosecution has
neither examined him nor assigned any reason for his non-examination.
11. The complaint (Ex.P-1) does not bear any date nor does it contain any
endorsement or receipt of the Police Station In-charge, which creates doubt as to
the exact date and time when it was submitted to Police. FIR (Ex.P-2), registered
on the basis of Ex.P-1, reveals that the incident allegedly occurred on 15.10.2013
at about 12:00 noon, whereas the information was given to the police on
16.10.2013 at 16:10 hours, i.e., after a delay of more than 24 hours. No plausible
explanation for such delay has been offered by the prosecution witnesses. Though
paragraph 8 of Ex.P-2 mentions that the FIR was lodged belatedly as no one was
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present at home, the victim (PW-1) has categorically stated that upon reaching
home she immediately informed her parents and thereafter the complaint was
filed. In view of this contradiction, the delay in lodging the FIR assumes
significance and the benefit thereof undoubtedly goes to the appellant/accused.
12. The victim (PW-1), in her cross-examination, admitted that she and the
appellant/accused were studying in the same school and sometimes used to go to
school together. She further admitted that the place of incident is an open and
public pathway where passersby are generally present, and that houses and fields
are situated nearby. Shivkala Mehra (PW-2) also admitted in her cross-
examination that the appellant and the prosecutrix were studying in the same
school and used to go to school together. She further admitted that on the date of
the incident, the victim reached home along with the school peon.
13. It is trite law that the victim (PW-1) is an important witness and her
testimony cannot be discarded merely on the ground that no independent witness
has supported the prosecution case. However, when the victim is a juvenile, her
testimony, in the absence of independent corroboration, is required to be subjected
to careful and cautious scrutiny. It is equally well settled that an accused is
presumed to be innocent and that the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Where two views are possible on
the evidence adduced, the view favourable to the accused must prevail. Suspicion,
however grave, cannot take the place of proof. In light of the aforesaid settled
principles of criminal law, the testimony of the victim is required to be evaluated
to ascertain whether it inspires the confidence of the Court.
14. Keeping in view the facts revealed from the cross-examination of victim
(PW-1) and Shivkala Mehra (PW-2), the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR and
the non-examination of the independent and material witness Pappu Dabale, the
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sole testimony of the victim (PW-1) cannot be said to be wholly reliable. In such
circumstances, the appellant/accused is clearly entitled to the benefit of doubt. By
overlooking these material aspects, the learned Trial Court has erroneously
convicted and sentenced the appellant. Therefore, the conviction and sentence
awarded by the learned Trial Court are not sustainable in the eyes of law and
deserve to be set aside.
15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pradeep Kumar vs. State of
Chhattisgarh reported in 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 239 has held as under:-
"24. It is important to note that the cardinal principles in the
administration of criminal justice in cases where heavy reliance is
placed on circumstantial evidence, is that where two views are
possible, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other
towards his innocence, the one which is favourable to the accused
must be adopted. [Kali Ram v. State of H.P. (1973) 2 SCC 808].
25. In the present case, we state that the circumstances present
before us, taken together, do not establish conclusively only one
hypothesis, that being the guilt of the accused, Pradeep Kumar. The
presumption of innocence remains in favour of the accused unless
his guilt is proven beyond all reasonable doubts against him. [Babu
v. State Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189]. The cherished principles or
golden threads of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs
through the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly which
was done by the Courts below.
26. In the present case, we find neither the chain of circumstances
to have been completely established nor the guilt of the accused
alone, having committed the crime to be proven, much less beyond
reasonable doubt. This Court has stated essential conditions that
must be fulfilled before an accused can be convicted in a case
revolving around circumstantial evidence in the landmark case of
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Mahrashtra, (1984) 4 SCC
116:
"153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the
following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an
accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be
drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this
Court indicated that the circumstances concerned "must or should"
and not "may be" established. There is not only a grammatical but a
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legal distinction between "may be proved" and "must be or should
be proved" as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v.
State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 :
1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the observations were made: [SCC para
19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047]
"Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and
not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental
distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague
conjectures from sure conclusions."
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not
be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is
guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to
be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave
any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the
innocence of the accused and must show that in all human
probability the act must have been done by the accused."
16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further in the case of Raghunatha and another
vs. The State of Karnataka in SLP (Criminal) No.6112 of 2022) has held as
under:-
"9. It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it may be,
cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An
accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter
how strong it is. An accused is presumed to be innocent unless
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
17. In the conspectus of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and
the ratio of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in aforesaid cases, the
appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. Accordingly, while extending the
benefit of doubt to the appellant/accused, the conviction under Section 354 of the
IPC and sentence of two years' rigorous imprisonment with fine deserves to be set
aside. The appellant deserves to be acquitted of the said offence.
18. Ex consequenti, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned
judgment of conviction and order of sentence is hereby set aside and the appellant
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- Kuldeep is acquitted from the charge punishable under Section 354 of the IPC.
The appellant is on bail, his bail bond shall stand discharge. The fine amount, if
deposited by appellant, be refunded to him.
19. Record of the trial Court be sent back along with copy of the judgment.
(RAJENDRA KUMAR VANI)
JUDGE
THK
