[Cites 15, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Jitendra vs Ashok on 27 January, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE PAVAN KUMAR DWIVEDI
ON THE 27th OF JANUARY, 2026
SECOND APPEAL No. 3359 of 2025
JITENDRA AND OTHERS
Versus
ASHOK AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri A.S.Garg, learned senior counsel with Shri Bhavya Garg, learned
counsel for the appellants.
Shri Mohan Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents on caveat.
ORDER
This appeal under Section 100 CPC by the defendants against the
concurrent findings of facts as recorded by the trial Court vide judgment
dated 24.12.2024 in RCS No.129A/2019 and affirmed by the first appellate
Court vide judgment dated 29.11.2025 in RCA No.16/2025.
2. The plaintiffs filed a suit for eviction, recovery of arrears of rent and
mesne profits against appellants with respect to a shop/property situated at
Bagicha No.104, Luniya Pura, Mhow, District Indore. The said property was
purchased by the plaintiffs through registered sale deed dated 24.2.2018
Ex.P/1. It was averred in the plaint that after purchasing said property the
plaintiffs sent a notice on 14.3.2018 (Ex.P/3) to the defendants/appellants,
thereby informing that now the tenancy is attorned between the plaintiffs and
defendants from 24.2.2018. As such, the rent was directed to be paid
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accordingly and request for execution of new rent agreement was made. It
was also averred in the plaint that in response to the said notice no reply was
given by the defendants. Thus, separately a notice was sent on 8.5.2018 and
even after receiving both the abovesaid notices rent was not paid by the
defendants, instead a notice was sent by them through their counsel on
incorrect facts. It is further averred in the plaint that initially the notice was
sent to defendant No.1, however, when the reply was sent saying that the
defendant No.2 is tenant in the suit premises. Notice was sent to the
defendant No.2 also. It is also averred in the plaint in response to the notice
for payment of rent the reply was sent on 23.2.2018 in which it was claimed
that the defendants are the owners of the suit premises. Thus, title of the
plaintiffs was denied. Thus, it was averred that on the ground of nuisance a
decree of eviction in terms of Section 12(1)(f) of the M.P.Accommodation
Control Act also deserves to be granted.
2.1 As it was averred that despite demand the rent was not paid, thus
the decree on the ground of Section 12(1)(a) of the Act was also requested.
Apart from this, the plaintiffs/respondents also averred in the plaint that they
are in bonafide need of the rented premises for starting a business of their
elder son Amit Verma, who is a Computer Science Graduate and completed
M.B.A.and is unemployed at present. Thus, a shop relating to Computer etc.
and office relating to same is required to be open for him at the rented
premises by merging the same with other shop, which is in possession of the
plaintiff No.1.
2.2 The defendants filed their written statement, thereby denying
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plaint averments. Alongwith the written statement a counter claim was also
filed, thereby it was claimed that the defendant No.1 had executed rent
agreement on 1.4.1991 for the suit property for a rent of Rs.500/- per month.
The defendant No.2 while taking on rent the said shop had also paid an
amount of Rs.1,25,000/- to Seth Dholumal in front of witnesses on a
condition that in future the same shall be sold to the defendant No.2
preferentially. It was also averred in the counter claim and written statement
that after the death of Dholumal his legal heirs Ishwaribai (wife), Rita
(daughter), Rajesh and Ravi (sons) became owners of the property of late
Dholumal situated at Bagicha No.4, Luniya Pura, Mhow, District Indore
having area of 10,000/- sq.ft., which includes residential houses, shop No.3,
out of this property the daughter of Dholumal namely; Rita had already
alienated her 1/4th share to different persons on 22.4.2018 by executing
registered sale deeds. Thus, she was not having any right to alienate Shop
No.3 to the plaintiffs. It was also stated that the said shop was sold by Rita
based on a Power of Attorney, which was executed by other heirs of
Dholumal in Dubai (UAE) on 7.7.2017 and 12.2.2018. However, the same is
not registered. In absence of which the sale deed executed by Rita in favour
of plaintiffs was not valid as the same is without having any authority.
2.3 The trial Court based on the pleadings for the rival parties framed
as many as 12 issues. The trial Court while recording its conclusions
observed that the title dispute cannot be raised by the tenants as it is a dispute
between the persons, who have executed Power of Attorney and the person
in favour of whom Power of Attorney was executed. A third party cannot
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raise dispute about the same. As such, by discarding this objection the trial
Court observed in para 20 to 22 that plaintiffs are the owners of the property
for the purpose of M.P.Accommodation Control Act. The Court also found
in para 33 to 37 that the plaintiffs are in bonafide need of the rented
premises. However, the issue of nuisance and decree for default of rent was
not granted. As such, based on bonafide need the suit was decreed vide
judgment dated 24.12.2024, thereby directing the appellants/defendants to
handover vacant possession of the suit property to the respondents/plaintiffs
alongwith arrears of rent @ Rs.2,200/-. The appellants being aggrieved by
the same filed regular civil appeal before the first appellate Court, which
affirmed the judgment of the trial Court vide its judgment dated 25.11.2025.
Hence the decree of eviction was affirmed. While affirming the decree of the
trial Court the appellate Court also granted decree on the ground of nuisance
under Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P.Accommodation Control Act. In such
circumstances the instant appeal has been filed by the appellants/tenants.
3. Learned senior counsel submits that the appellate Court has erred in
not considering the fact that Dholumal was the original owner of the rented
premises and the appellants/tenants never admitted that the plaintiffs are their
landlords. Thus, even if the title of the respondents were denied by the
appellants, then also it will not amount to creating nuisance and for this
reason decree of eviction could not be passed. The trial Court did not pass
decree of eviction based on the provisions of Section 12(1)(c) of the Act
only on the ground that appellants have denied title of the plaintiffs in their
written statement and counter claim. However, according to learned senior
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counsel the same was done for setting up defence against the claim of
bonafide need as raised by the plaintiffs in their suit and when a decree of
eviction based on bonafide need is sought, then it is permissible to deny the
title. For this purpose learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of
this Court in the case of Bhorjaj Rameshchandra Vs. Ghanshyam Das
Agrawal, 2000(II) MPJR 355 .
3.1 Learned senior counsel further submits that in the present case
plaintiffs are having derivative title because the original title holder was
Dholumal, who inducted the appellants as tenants. Later on, plaintiffs
purchased the said property from Dholuram. In such circumstances plaintiffs
are having only derivative title and the appellants never admitted that
plaintiffs are their landlord, thus estoppel in terms of Section 116 of the
Evidence Act will not operate against them and decree under Section 12(1)
(c) of the Act for eviction cannot be passed against them. For this proposition
he has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Jyoti
Sharma (Smt.) Vs. Vishnu Goyal and another, reported in 2024(4) JLJ 205
and Khuman Singh Vs. Nathuram, reported in 1991 JLJ 348 .
3.2 As regards the bonafide need of the son of plaintiffs, learned
counsel submits that the claim was that their son Amit Verma has a bonafide
need of the rented premises. However, he was not brought to the witness box
and in absence of his evidence, adverse inference has to be drawn against
him and for this proposition he has placed reliance on the judgment of this
Court in the case of Purushottam Vs. Sajanbai, reported in 1987 MPWN 10
and Girdharilal Vs. Mangilal, reported in 1977 WN 129 .
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3.3 It has also been argued by learned counsel that concealment of
availability of alternative accommodation was also raised in as much as the
plaintiff No.1 Ashok Verma did not disclose in his Court statement about the
alternative accommodation and there was no pleading about the same. As
such, the claim of bonafide need was not bonafide. He has also placed
reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Deena
Nath Vs. Pooran Lal, reported in (2001) 5 SCC 705 . Learned senior counsel,
thus submits that in view of the above proposition of law and the facts of the
present case, the same involves substantial question of law and deserves to
be admitted.
4. Heard learned for the appellant on the question of admission;
perused the record.
5. For the first issue regarding bonafide need the contention raised by
learned counsel is that there was no specific pleading regarding alternative
accommodation. A perusal of the plaint would show that the plaintiffs have
pleaded in para 4(c) of the plaint that the rented suit property is situated in
main commercial area and regarding other shops it was averred that eviction
proceedings instituted against other tenants also for the bonafide need of
plaintiffs themselves. Apart from this, in the statement before the Court in
para 5 it was stated by the plaintiff No.1 that his son is unemployed and the
portion behind the rented premises is in possession of him. However, there is
no way to approach the same and it is also not on the main road and his son
will start his shop by removing the wall between two portions. It is also
stated in para 6 of the statement that other shops, which are rented, need for
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bonafide need of other son Deva and his wife Shobha. It is, thus clear that the
plaintiff has properly disclosed about the availability of alternative
accommodation and how they are not suitable, it has also been explained.
6. As regards the issue of ownership the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Sheela Vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, reported in (2002) 3
SCC 375, observed thus:-
"While seeking an ejectment on the ground of bona fide
requirement under clause (f) abovesaid the landlord is
required to allege and prove not only that he is a
'landlord' but also that he is the 'owner' of the premises.
The definition of 'landlord' and 'tenant' as given in
clauses (b) and (i) of Section 2 of the Act make it clear
that under the Act the concept of landlordship is
different from that of ownership. A person may be a
'landlord' though not an 'owner' of the premises. The
factor determinative of landlordship is the factum of his
receiving or his entitlement to receive the rent of any
accommodation. Such receiving or right to receive the
rent may be on the own account of the landlord or on
account of or for the benefit of any other person. A
trustee, a guardian and a receiver are also included in
the definition of landlord. Such landlord would be
entitled to seek an eviction of the tenant on one or more
of such grounds falling within the ambit of Section
12(1) of the Act which do not require the landlord to be
an owner also so as to be entitled to successfully
maintain a claim for eviction. Clause (f) contemplates a
claim for eviction being maintained by an owner-
landlord and not a landlord merely. Though of course,
we may hasten to add, that the concept of ownership in
a landlord-tenant litigation governed by Rent Control
Law has to be distinguished from the one in a title suit.
Ownership is a relative term the import whereof
depends on the context in which it is used. In Rent
Control Legislation, the landlord can be said to be
owner if he is entitled in his own legal right, as
distinguished from for and on behalf of someone else,
to evict the tenant and then to retain, control, hold and
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use the premises for himself. What may suffice and hold
good as proof of ownership in a landlord tenant
litigation probably may or may not be enough to
successfully sustain a claim for ownership in a title suit.
In M.M. Quasim Vs. Manoharlal Sharma (1981) 3 SCC
36, it was held that an 'owner-landlord' who can seek
eviction on the ground of his personal requirement is
one who has a right against the whole world to occupy
the building in his own right and exclude anyone
holding a title lesser than his own. In Dilbagrai Punjabi
Vs. Sharad Chandra, (1988) Supp SCC 710 , this Court
held that it was essential to sustain a claim of eviction
under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act to establish that the
plaintiff was the owner of the premises. However, the
Court upheld the ownership of the landlord having been
proved on the basis of an admission of the ownership of
the plaintiff made by the defendant in reply to notice
given before the institution of the suit and the recital of
the name of the plaintiff as the owner of the property
contained in the receipts issued by the landlord to the
tenant over a period of time. Thus, the burden of
proving ownership in a suit between landlord and tenant
where the landlord-tenant relationship is either admitted
or proved is not so heavy as in a title suit and lesser
quantum of proof may suffice than what would be
needed in a suit based on title against a person setting
up a contending title while disputing the title of the
plaintiff. Nevertheless pleading and proving ownership,
in the sense as it carries in Rent Control Law, is one of
the ingredients of the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of
the Act."
7. This issue was considered by this Court in the case of Asif Ali Vs.
Rahamdomal, 1985 SCC OnLine MP 14. The Court in para 12, 13 and 14
held as under:-
"Thus, whether the words used in the relevant Clauses
relating to eviction of tenants on the ground of bona-
fide requirement of the landlord were 'if he is the owner
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thereof' as was the position in the M.P. Act or they
were 'in this clause the word "landlord" shall not
include an agent referred to In Clause (d) of Section 2'
as was the position in the Bihar Act, it is clear from the
abovesaid observations of the Supreme Court in M.M.
Quasim's case (supra) that the basic idea behind using
the said words was to make it clear in view of very wide
definition of the word 'landlord' contained in the rent
Acts that right to evict a tenant on the ground of bona-
fide requirement would be available only to such
landlord who was receiving or was entitled to receive
rent on his own account i.e. the person who in the event
of reversion of tenancy of the tenant bad the right to
occupy the accommodation in his own right. While
using the words in the abovesaid Clauses it was not
intended that the person concerned i.e. the landlord
must necessarily be the 'absolute owner' of the plot of
land on which the accommodation stood.
In the above connection, it may be pointed out that a
similar need to resolve the language of the Clause
relating to eviction of tenants in the light of widely
worded definition of the word 'landlord' used in the
definition Clause had arisen before a Division Bench of
this Court in Mohammad Nurul Huda v. Kikabhoy
[AIR 1953 Nag 251.] under the old C.P. and Berar
Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949. The
word 'landlord' was defined in Clause 2(4) of the said
Order. The Clause relating to eviction of tenants was
Clause 13(1). It is tree that the words 'if he is the owner
thereof' were not used in Clause 13(1). But, then it is
interesting to note how even in the absence of the said
words it became necessary for the Court to proceed to
interpret the two provisions in a, reasonable way. In the
said regard, the relevant observations of the Division
Bench were as follows
"It is, no doubt, true that the word 'landlord' as defined
in clause 2(4), Rent Control Order, would include a
person like the petitioner 'who manages the property of
some one else and collects rent thereof. In our opinion,
however, the tern 'landlord' as used in Clause 13(1)
cannot be given such an extended meaning and that that
term must mean only a lesser or a person in whom the
reversion of the lease has actually vested If the
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contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner were
to be accepted and the word 'landlord' given the
meaning accorded to it by the definition, then it would
also be open to the agent of the landlord to set out his
own need for terminating the tenancy of the tenant.
Quite clearly, that is not the object of the clause at all.
The needs in the Sub-clause are necessarily the needs of
the lesser or someone else who is dependent upon the
lesser and not those of the agent."
In the opinion of this Court, from the abovesaid
discussion it is clear that the words 'if he is the owner
thereof' as used in Clauses (e) and (f) of Section 12(1)
of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 do not
mean that apart from being a landlord the plaintiff
seeking eviction of his tenant under the said Clauses
must necessarily be the 'absolute owner' of the
accommodation or of the land on which the
accommodation stands. It may be that the absolute
ownership of the accommodation or of the land on
which the accommodation stands vests in another
person and the plaintiff himself is only a tenant of the
said person. It may be that the person having absolute
ownership may be in a position to disposes the plaintiff
on the basis of his title or on the basis of any breach of
the lease. Yet, as against the defendant i.e. his tenant,
the plaintiff remains the 'owner' in case he is receiving
or entitled to receive rent from the defendant on his
own account i.e. in case be is the person who in the
event of reversion of tenancy of the defendant has the
right to occupy the accommodation in his own right."
8. It is, thus clear that for bonafide need absolute ownership is not
required to be established. The requirement is that only a better title, than the
owner has to be shown. The Hon'ble apex Court has considered the same in
above quoted case. As such, when the appellants themselves admitted that
Dholumal was their landlord and he himself had purchased the rented
premises by the registered sale deed and then the same was sold by daughter
of Dholumal to respondents/plaintiffs. The appellants cannot raise issue of
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ownership against the respondents. The notice regarding attornment of
tenancy was already sent.
9. In view of the above facts, once the appellants accepted title of
Dholumal without any demure they could not raise any objection on the title
of the respondents/plaintiffs. The respondents/plaintiffs purchased the
tenanted premises from Rita vide registered sale deed. The said person had
executed sale deed based on a Power of Attorney, which was executed by
other heirs of Dholumal in Dubai. As already stated above the ownership for
the purposes of bonafide need is not required to be proved as absolute
ownership, as required to be proved in a title suit, but only a better title has
to be established. In the present case neither it was in dispute that Power of
Attorney was executed nor it was in dispute that Rita one of the legal heirs of
Dholumal as Power of Attorney holder has executed the registered sale deed
of the disputed property in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents, once it is
established then the appellants cannot raise dispute regarding title of the suit
property. The validity of the sale deed on a technical ground that Power of
Attorney was not registered is not available to the appellants, who being a
tenant is completely stranger to the said transaction of execution of the sale
deed. This objection may have been available to other heirs of Dholumal, but
certainly not to the appellants.
10. As regards absence of examination of Amit Verma the judgments
as cited by learned senior counsel are of no help to him for the reason that in
those cases facts were slightly different. In the case of Girdharilal (supra) the
trial Court non-suited the plaintiff on the ground that it has come on record
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that plaintiff has made incorrect statement with regard to accommodation in
his possession on the ground floor coupled with this the absence of mother
was taken into consideration. However, in the present case plaintiff being
father of Amit Verma has clearly deposed that accommodation is needed for
starting business for his son, which in the considered opinion of this Court is
sufficient to fulfill the requirement of proving bonafide need. Similarly, in
the case of Purushottam (supra) the Court found that daughter-in-law is a
material witness in view of the fact that strained relations between the
daughter-in-law and the plaintiff was pleaded. However, the same were not
proved.
11. As regards the decree of nuisance in the considered view of this
Court the appellate Court has correctly reversed the findings of the trial
Court with respect to issue of nuisance in terms of Section 12(1)(c) of the
Act because after purchasing the rented premises by registered sale deed
Ex.P/1 a notice was sent vide Ex.P/3 by the plaintiffs/respondents to the
appellants/defendants. Thus, the tenancy was attorned and after attornment of
the tenancy still they refused to accept title of the respondents and asserted
their title by way of a counter claim, thus it was not a case where the
ownership was set up as a defence against decree of eviction on the ground
of bonafide need, but in fact tenancy itself was denied by asserting title based
on premises that the earlier landlord Dholuram, who the appellants claimed
to have paid an amount of Rs.1,25,000/-, which in fact was not found proved
by the appellate Court as well as by the trial Court. As such, the judgment as
cited by learned senior counsel in this behalf will not come to his rescue. The
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Hon'ble Apex Court considered this aspect in the case of Apollo Zipper India
Limited Vs. W.Newman and Company Limited, reported in (2018) 6 SCC
744 and has held in para 51 and 52 as under:-
"51. First, when the appellant sent a quit notice dated
17.05.2012 to the respondent under Section 106 of the
TP Act determining the tenancy and calling upon the
respondent to pay the arrears of rent and vacate the suit
premises, despite receipt of the quit notice, they did not
reply to it.
52. In our view, the respondent ought to have replied to
the notice at the first available opportunity, which they
failed to do so. It amounts to waiver on their part to
challenge the invalidity or infirmity of the quit notice
including the ownership issue raised therein."
12. In the present case also appellants instead of replying to notice on
attornment of tenancy have tried to assert their title in the suit premises. As
such, it was not a defence raised against the bonafide need, but even the
tenancy itself was denied.
13. In view of the above analysis, in the considered view of this Court,
there is no perversity in the findings of facts recorded by both the Courts
below and there is no substantial question of law involved in the present
appeal. Hence, the same is dismissed. No order as to costs.
(PAVAN KUMAR DWIVEDI)
JUDGE
patil
