[Cites 21, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Veeresh Kumar Tyagi vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 6 January, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:309
1 WP. No. 641 of 2015
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
ON THE 6th OF JANUARY, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 641 of 2015
VEERESH KUMAR TYAGI
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Pratip Visoriya - Advocate for petitioner.
Shri Rajendra Jain - Government Advocate for respondents/State.
ORDER
This petition, under Article 226 of Constitution of India, has been filed
seeking the following relief (s):
"1. That, the order dated 31.12.2014 passed by respondent No.4
(Annexure P/1) may kindly be quashed and petitioner be permitted to
continue on the post in question.
2. That, cost of the petition may kindly be granted.
3. That, order dt. 31.1.2015 (Annexure P/1) may kindly be
quashed."
2. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that petitioner was appointed on the
post of Cashier on 26.10.2006. Thereafter, petitioner was transferred to Datia. It
is further submitted that petitioner has performed his duties sincerely and
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:309
honestly and they were extended time to time. It is further submitted that
respondent No. 4, who was personally biased against the petitioner, issued a
show-cause notice dated 15.12.2014 with an ulterior and oblique motive, as his
illegal demands were not satisfied by the petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner
submitted the reply and denied all the allegations mentioned in the show-cause
notice. Without considering the reply submitted by petitioner and without
conducting a regular departmental inquiry, the concerned authority passed the
order dated 31.12.2014, which is non-speaking and unreasoned.
It is further submitted by learned counsel for petitioner that the impugned
order Annexure P-1 dated 31.12.2014 is stigmatic in nature and that has been
passed without considering the reply of petitioner, however, the stigmatic order
cannot be issued without holding a regular departmental enquiry. Learned
counsel for petitioner raised other grounds also.
3. Per contra, learned Government Advocate, while vehemently opposing the
submissions put forth by learned counsel for petitioner, submitted that as per
condition mentioned in appointment order, the services of petitioner who has
been appointed on contractual basis for a particular period may be terminated
even before expiry of contractual period and even without giving any notice.
4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
5. The impugned order dated 31.12.2014 (Annexure P/1) is a stigmatic order,
relevant extract of which is reproduced below for ready reference and
convenience:-
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:309
**vkids dk;ZO;ogkj
ds laca/k esa fujUrj f'kdk;rsa çkIr gksus ds dkj.k]
vkidh lafonk vof/k o"kZ 2014&15 ds uohuhdj.k ds lEca /k esa *vuohuhdj.k
¼uohuhdj.k u djus½** dk fu.kZ; fy;k x;k gSA
lafonk 'krZ ds vuqlkj fnukad 23@12@2014 dks vkidks O;fäxr lquokbZ dk volj
çnku fd;k x;k FkkA O;fäxr lquokbZ ds nkSjku çLrq r çfrosnu esa mYys
f[kr rF;
lek/kkudkjd u gksus ds dkj.k lafonk 'krZsa@vuqca/k ds vk/kkj ij vkidks lafonk lekfIr
gsrq 1 ekg dk vfxze uksfVl çnk; fd;k tkrk gSA**
6. Before issuing impugned order dated 31.12.2014 Annexure P-1, the
respondent has neither consider the reply to show-cause notice to petitioner nor
regular department enquiry has been conducted and by stigmatic order services
of petitioner have been terminated.
7. The services of petitioner have been terminated without holding any
enquiry. Since impugned order Annexure P-1 dated 31.12.2014 is stigmatic in
nature, therefore, regular departmental enquiry ought to have been held by
respondents. The judgment passed by Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in WP
No.23267/2019 (Omprakash Gurjar vs. Panchayat and Rural Development
& Ors.), also the order dated 12.09.2023 passed in WP No.19117/2022
(Hukumchand Solanki vs. Panchayat and Rural Development & Ors.) and
the order dated 19.07.2023 passed in WP No.14663/2022 (Arvind Malviya vs.
State of MP & Ors.) are worth mentioning.
8. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rahul Tripathi Vs.
Rajeev Gandhi Shiksha Mission, Bhopal & Others reported in 2001(3) MPLJ
616 and Jitendra Vs. State of M.P. & Others reported in 2008(4) MPLJ 670
has rightly held that the order of termination is stigmatic in nature as the same
entails serious consequences on future prospects of respondent and therefore, the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:309
same ought to have been passed after holding an inquiry. This Court is further
supported in its view by the judgment passed by Division Bench of this Court in
the case of Malkhan Singh Malviya Vs. State of M.P. reported in ILR(2018)
MP 660. The Apex Court while deciding the case of Khem Chand vs. The
Union of India and Ors. reported in 1958 SC 300, had an occasion to
summarize the concept of reasonable opportunity, relevant para of which reads as
under:-
"(19) To summarize: the reasonable opportunity envisaged by the
provision under consideration includes-
(a) An opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his
innocence, which he can deny only do if he is told what the
charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which
such charges are based;
(b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross-examining the
witnesses produced against him and by examining himself or
any other witnesses in support of his defence;
(c) an opportunity to make his representation as to why the
proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him, which he
can only do if the competent authority, after the enquiry is
over and after applying his mind to the gravity or otherwise of
the charges proved against the government servant tentatively
proposes to inflict one of the three punishments and
communicates the same to the government servant."
9. From the aforesaid, it is clear that impugned order is stigmatic in nature,
therefore, without conducting regular departmental enquiry impugned order
cannot be issued. The impugned termination order has been issued without
conducting regular departmental enquiry. From the language of impugned order,
it is clear that it is a stigmatic termination order.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:309
10. It is settled position that if the order of termination is stigmatic in nature,
the same entails serious consequences on future prospects of the petitioner and
therefore the same ought to have been passed after holding a regular
departmental enquiry. In Arvind Malviya (supra), it is held as under:-
"3) After hearing learned counsel for the parties and taking into
consideration the fact that the present petition is covered by the order
dated 25/4/2022 passed in WP No.23267/2019 (Omprakash Gurjar
(supra)), the present petition is allowed. The impugned order is hereby
set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in
service with 50% backwages within a period of 2 months from the
date of communication of the order. However, liberty is granted to the
respondents to proceed against the petitioner afresh in accordance
with law, if so advised. The said order passed in W.P. No.23267/2019
shall apply mutatis mutandis to the present case."
11. The Division Bench of this Court, at Principal Seat, Jabalpur, in the case of
Rajesh Kumar Rathore vs. High Court of M.P. and another (W.P. No.18657
of 2018) vide order dated 23/11/2021 has held as under:-
"6. The short question of law involved in the present case is as to
whether the services of an employee under the Rules relating to
Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Contingency Paid (District
and Sessions Judge Establishment) Employees Rules, 1980, can be
terminated without conducting a departmental enquiry when an order
of termination casts stigma on the employee.
7. We are in full agreement with the legal position expounded in
various judgments cited by the learned counsel appearing for the
respondent. However, in the instant case, the question that arise for
consideration, as stated above, is squarely covered by the decision of
co-ordinate bench of this Court in the case of Krishna Pal Vs. District
& Sessions Judge, Morena (supra). In the present case, it is an
admitted fact that neither charge-sheet was issued nor departmental
enquiry was conducted and order of termination attributes dereliction
of duty amounting to misconduct, and hence, the same is clearly
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:309
stigmatic order. The petitioner's services are admittedly governed
under the Rules of 1980. If the facts and situation of the present case
is examined in the context of the facts and situation of the case of
Krishna Pal (supra), it is found that this Court had taken a view (para-
5 of the said judgment) that Normally when the services of a
temporary employee or a probationer or contingency paid employee is
brought to an end by passing innocuous order due to unsatisfactory
nature of service or on account of an act for which some action is
taken, but the termination is made in a simplicitor manner without
conducting of inquiry or without casting any stigma on the employee,
the provisions of Rule 9 of the Rules 1980 can be taken aid of.
However, when the termination is founded on acts of commission or
omission, which amounts to misconduct. Such an order casts stigma
on the conduct, character and work of the employee and hence, the
principle of natural justice, opportunity of hearing and inquiry is
requirement of law.
8. In view of the aforesaid pronouncement of law, we are not inclined
to take a different view, therefore, in view of the aforesaid, the
impugned order dated 06.06.2017 (Annexure-P-6) and order dated
20.06.2018 (Annexure-P-9) are set aside."
12. The co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 02.02.2024 passed in
WP.5856/2020 [Devkaran Patidar Vs. State of M.P. And others (Indore
Bench)] has also decided the similar issue in the following manner:
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned
orders are illegal and arbitrary. He further submits that the respondent
no.4 without considering the provisions of 15.01, 15.02 and 16 of the
scheme according to which the respondent no.4, is not empowered to
terminate the service of the petitioner, and the aforesaid impugned
order Annexure-P/1 has been wrongly uphold. He further submits that
the respondents have acted in high handed manner and without
following the instructions/guidelines issued by the Higher
Authorities, issued the impugned termination order. Thus, the action
of the respondents is unjust and arbitrary. In the present case, neither
any charge-sheet has been issued against the petitioner nor any
enquiry has been conducted before passing of the impugned stigmatic
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:309
order. In such circumstances, he prays that the impugned orders be
set aside. He further relied on the judgment passed by this Court in
the case of Rahul Tripathi vs. Rajeev Gandhi Shiksha Mission,
Bhopal 2001 (3) MPLJ 616 and Prakash Chandra Kein vs. State of
M.P. and others 2010 (3) MPLJ 179.
5. The respondents have filed the reply and has submitted that a
number of complaints has been received against the petitioner. After
receiving the complaints a Committee was constituted for conducting
an enquiry against the petitioner and on the basis of the enquiry report
submitted by the Committee a show cause notice was issued to the
petitioner and after giving opportunity to the petitioner to file reply,
the respondent has terminated the services. In such circumstances, the
petition deserves to be dismissed.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
7. In the present case, admittedly, the petitioner is working on the
post of Gram Rojgar Sahayak and neither any charge-sheet has been
issued to the petitioner at any point of time nor any enquiry was
conducted with the participation of the petitioner. This Court has
passed the judgment in the case of Ramchandra vs. State of M.P.
and others decided in W.P. No.16572/2014 on 02/08/2017 and
several other writ petitions on the subject are under consideration
before this Court.
8. In the light of the aforesaid as no charge-sheet was issued to
the petitioner and no enquiry has been conducted, the impugned
orders dated 12.06.2017(Annexure-P/1) and 27.08.2016(Annexure-
P/2), passed by the respondents deserves to be quashed and are
accordingly, quashed. The respondents are directed to reinstate the
petitioner in service; however a liberty is granted to proceed against
the petitioner in accordance with law, in case if need so arises in
future.
13. The co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 18.10.2019 in Writ
Petition No.7916/2019 [Mahesh Kumar Maru S/o Bhagirah Maru Vs. State
of M.P. and others - Indore Bench] has held as under:
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:309
6. In the present case, admittedly, the petitioner is working on
the post of Gram Rojgar Sahayak and neither any chargesheet has
been issued to the petitioner at any point of time nor any enquiry was
conducted with the participation of the petitioner. This Court in the
case of Ramchandra vs. State of M.P. and others decided in W.P.
No.16572/2014 on 02/08/2017 several other writ petition on the
subject under consideration before this Court in the present petition.
7. So far availability of the alternative remedy is concerned, the
impugned stigmatic order of termination has been passed contrary to
the settled law and without following the principle of natural justice.
Hence, as per the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of
Whirlpool Corporation and other vs. RegistrarTrade Mark and others
reported in AIR 1999 SC 22 alternative remedy is no bar for filing a
petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India.
8. In the light of the aforesaid as no charge-sheet was issued to
the petitioner and no enquiry has been conducted, the impugned
order dated 22/02/2019 (Annexure-P/1) passed by the respondents
deserves to be quashed and is accordingly, quashed. The respondents
are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service; however a liberty is
granted to proceed against the petitioner in accordance with law, in
case if need so arises in future.
14. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in M/s Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. and
another vs. Masood Ahmed Khan and others reported in [(2010) 9 SCC
496], has emphasized the need of assigning reasons in administrative, quasi-
judicial and judicial proceedings. The relevant portion reads as under :-
"47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:
(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in
administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.
(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its
conclusions.
(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle
of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done
as well.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:309
(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible
arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative
power.
(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-
maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.
(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a
decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by
judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.
(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and
constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on
relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making
justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as
the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one
common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant
factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining
the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial
accountability and transparency.
(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about
his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the
person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of
incrementalism.
(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A
pretence of reasons or "rubber-stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a
valid decision-making process.
(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint
on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only
makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes
them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of
Judicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-37].)
(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad
doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now
virtually a component of human rights andwas considered part of
Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553]
EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford [2001 EWCA Civ
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:309
405 (CA)] , wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European
Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent
reasons must be given for judicial decisions".
(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting
up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law,
requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is
virtually a part of "due process"."
15. It is well settled law that when a power is conferred upon an authority that
authority alone has to exercise that power as has been held in Commissioner of
Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji AIR 1952 SC 16.
16. In view of aforesaid enunciation of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme
Court and the High Court, it is evident that the impugned order has not been
passed by the competent authority and therefore, the same cannot be sustained in
the eyes of law.
17. In light of aforesaid discussion, it is seen that no charge-sheet was issued
to petitioner and no regular departmental enquiry has been conducted and the
impugned stigmatic order has been passed.
18. The mere non-mention of the background situation or the show-cause
notice in the order dated 31.12.2014 (Annexure P/1) cannot, by itself, be
determinative of the nature of the order. As held by this Court in Samsher Singh
v State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 8315 and Anoop Jaiswal v Government of
India, (1984) 2 SCC6, the form of an order is not its final determinant and the
Court can find out the real reason and true character behind
terminating/removing an employee.
19. It is profitable to refer to what five learned Judges of this Court laid down
in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v Union of India, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 5:
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:309
"28. The position may, therefore, be summed up as follows:
Any and every termination of service is not a dismissal,
removal or reduction in rank. A termination of service brought
about by the exercise of a contractual right is not per se
dismissal or removal, as has been held by this Court in Satish
Chander Anand v. Union of India [(1953) 1 SCC 420: (1953)
SCR 655]. Likewise the termination of service by compulsory
retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating the conditions
of service is not tantamount to the infliction of a punishment
and does not attract Article 311(2), as has also been held by
this Court in Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1955) 1
SCR 26]. In either of the two abovementioned cases the
termination of the service did not carry with it the penal
consequences of loss of pay, or allowances under Rule 52 of
the Fundamental Rules. It is true that the misconduct,
negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the
motive or the inducing factor which influences the
Government to take action under the terms of the contract of
employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a
right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the
service the motive operating on the mind of the Government
is, as Chagla, C.J., has said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of
India [LR 58 Bom 673 : AIR (1956) Bom 455] wholly
irrelevant. In short, if the termination of service is founded on
the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima
facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it
no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. But
even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the
right to terminate the employment without going through the
procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of
dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government
may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the
termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct,
negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a
punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be
complied with. As already stated if the servant has got a right
to continue in the post, then, unless the contract of
employment or the rules provide to the contrary, his services
cannot be terminated otherwise than for misconduct,
negligence, inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. A
termination of the service of such a servant on such grounds
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:309
must be a punishment and, therefore, a dismissal or removal
within Article 311, for it operates as a forefeiture of his right
and he is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay and
allowances. It puts an indelible stigma on the officer affecting
his future career. A reduction in rank likewise may be by way
of punishment or it may be an innocuous thing. If the
government servant has a right to a particular rank, then the
very reduction from that rank will operate as a penalty, for he
will then lose the emoluments and privileges of that rank. If,
however, he has no right to the particular rank, his reduction
from an officiating higher rank to his substantive lower rank
will not ordinarily be a punishment. But the mere fact that the
servant has no title to the post or the rank and the Government
has, by contract, express or implied, or under the rules, the
right to reduce him to a lower post does not mean that an
order of reduction of a servant to a lower post or rank cannot
in any circumstances be a punishment. The real test for
determining whether the reduction in such cases is or is not by
way of punishment is to find out if the order for the reduction
also visits the servant with any penal consequences. Thus if
the order entails or provides for the forfeiture of his pay or
allowances or the loss of his seniority in his substantive rank
or the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of
promotion, then that circumstance may indicate that although
in form the Government had purported to exercise its right to
terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to a lower
rank under the terms of the contract of employment or under
the rules, in truth and reality the Government has terminated
the employment as and by way of penalty. The use of the
expression "terminate" or "discharge" is not conclusive. In
spite of the use of such innocuous expressions, the court has to
apply the two tests mentioned above, namely, (1) whether the
servant had a right to the post or the rank, or (2) whether he
has been visited with evil consequences of the kind
hereinbefore referred to? If the case satisfies either of the two
tests then it must be held that the servant has been punished
and the termination of his service must be taken as a dismissal
or removal from service or the reversion to his substantive
rank must be regarded as a reduction in rank and if the
requirements of the rules and Article 311, which give
protection to government servant have not been complied
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:309
with, the termination of the service or the reduction in rank
must be held to be wrongful and in violation of the
constitutional right of the servant."
20. Considering the aforesaid pronouncements, entire gamut of the matter and
also the fact that the present petition is covered by order dated 25.04.2022 passed
in W.P.No.23267/2019 (Omprakash Gurjar Vs. Panchayat and Rural
Development & Ors.), the impugned termination order dated 31.12.2014
(Annexure P/1) is hereby set aside. As the petitioner has been continuing on the
strength of interim order dated 30.1.2015, there is no need to direct the
respondents to reinstate the petitioner. However, respondent/State would be at
liberty to proceed against petitioner in accordance with law, in case if need so
arises.
21. With the aforesaid, present petition stands disposed of.
22. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is disposed of.
(Anand Singh Bahrawat)
Judge
ahmad
