Raghuveer Singh Gurjar vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 16 January, 2026

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            IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                           AT GWALIOR
                               BEFORE
           HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ASHISH SHROTI
                 ON THE 16th OF JANUARY, 2026
                 WRIT PETITION No.3347 of 2022
                     RAGHUVEER SINGH GURJAR
                                Versus
       THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS


Appearance:
      Shri Siddharath Sharma - learned counsel for the petitioner.
      Shri Dharmendra Nayak- learned Government Advocate for the
respondents/State.

                               ORDER

1. The petitioner has invoked the Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the order, dated 20.02.2019 (Annexure P/1) passed by respondent no.5, whereby he has been held unsuitable for appointment on the post of Constable on account of his involvement in the criminal case.

2. The facts necessary for decision of this case are that the petitioner participated in the Police Constable Recruitment Test-2013. He was declared selected for appointment on the post of Constable (GD) and was allotted posting in 2 nd Battalion, SAF, Gwalior. However, his appointment was subject to his character verification.

3. The petitioner submitted his attestation form wherein he

disclosed information about registration of a criminal case against him by Police Station Banmore, District- Morena for the offences punishable under Section 327, 323/34, 324/34, 341, 294, 506-B of IPC. The petitioner also disclosed that he has been acquitted in the said criminal case vide judgement dated 25.02.2009 (Annexure P/4) passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Morena in Criminal Case No.5551/2006.

4. The matter was thereafter placed before the screening committee. Based upon the petitioner's involvement in criminal case, he was found unsuitable for appointment on the post in question. Accordingly, he was not allowed to join pursuant to the appointment order. The petitioner filed W.P. No.1063 of 2014. This Court vide order, dated 20.02.2018, remitted the matter to respondents for reconsideration in view of Apex Court judgment rendered in the case of Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India & another reported in (2016)8 SCC 471 and Bhupendra Yadav vs. State of M.P & ors. reported in W.A. No.46/2018 as also of this Court in the case of Ashutosh Pawar vs. High Court of M.P. & another passed in W.P. No.5865/2016. This order was affirmed in W.A. No.1173/2018 filed by State of M.P.

5. Upon reconsideration, the petitioner has been again declared unsuitable for the post on account of his involvement in aforesaid case vide order, dated 20.02.2019. The petitioner is accordingly again before this Court.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that once the petitioner is acquitted in the criminal case, he cannot be held unsuitable for appointment on the post only because of his

involvement in the criminal case. He submitted that the screening committee failed to appreciate the facts of the case and has passed the impugned order mechanically without application of mind. He also submitted that the petitioner has been honourably acquitted in criminal case and, therefore, cannot be denied appointment because of the same. The learned counsel also referred to the judgement passed in criminal case and submitted that the petitioner has been acquitted which shows that there was no evidence available against the petitioner. The learned counsel also submitted that the manner in which the impugned order has been passed only shows hostility of respondents towards the candidate against whom a criminal case is registered. He thus prayed for setting aside the impugned order and the direction to the respondents to reinstate the petitioner on the post of Constable.

7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents supported the impugned order and submitted that the petitioner was found involved in the criminal case. His acquittal, in the said case was not honourable and was only based upon the compromise between the parties. He submitted that the Screening Committee was competent to judge the petitioner's suitability looking to the allegations made against him in the criminal case and the other material and merely because he is acquitted in criminal case would not make him suitable for appointment. He, therefore, submitted that the Screening Committee was entitled to consider the petitioner's conduct while judging his suitability for the post. The learned counsel also placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of

Commissioner of Police, New Delhi & another Vs. Mehar Singh reported in (2013)7 SCC 685, State of M.P. & others Vs. Parvez Khan reported in (2015)2 SCC 591, as also in the case of State of M.P. & others Vs. Bhupendra Yadav reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 1181. He, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.

8. Considered the argument and perused the record.

9. The petitioner was involved in the criminal case for the offences punishable under Section 327, 323/34, 324/34, 341, 294, 506-B of IPC. It is not in dispute that the case in regard to all offences, except the one under Section 327of IPC, was compromised between the parties. In relation to offence under Section 327 of IPC, the complainant as also his father turned hostile and other witnesses were not examined by prosecution. Therefore, the petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal case. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the petitioner has been given clean chit in the criminal case. Pertinently, in the FIR, there is specific allegation made against the petitioner that he alongwith co-accused persons demanded money from the complainant and caused injury to him. However, since, the matter was later on compromised, the petitioner was acquitted in offences. Thus, it cannot be said that the petitioner had not committed the offence.

10. The issue for considering the candidature of a candidate for appointment in view of his involvement in the criminal case has been considered, time and again, by the Apex Court as also by this Court. Similar issue was considered by the Apex Court in the case of Mehar Singh (Supra). It was also a case where the incumbent was acquitted based upon compromise. The Court held that it is still open to the

Screening Committee to examine the suitability of the candidate and take a decision. The Court held in paragraphs 22, 23, 33, 34 & 35 as under:-

"22. Clause (3) of the comprehensive policy delineated in the Standing Order is material for the present case. It refers to the Screening Committee comprising high police officers. After a candidate, who has disclosed his involvement, is acquitted or discharged, the Committee has to assess his/her suitability for appointment. Clause (6) states that those against whom serious offences or offences involving moral turpitude are registered and who are later on acquitted by extending benefit of doubt or because the witnesses have turned hostile due to fear of reprisal by the accused person shall not generally be considered suitable for government service. However, all such cases will be considered by the Screening Committee manned by senior officers. In our opinion, the word "generally" indicates the nature of discretion. As a matter of rule, such candidates have to be avoided.

Exceptions will be few and far between and obviously must be substantiated with acceptable reasons.

23. A careful perusal of the policy leads us to conclude that the Screening Committee would be entitled to keep persons involved in grave cases of moral turpitude out of the police force even if they are acquitted or discharged if it feels that the acquittal or discharge is on technical grounds or not honourable. The Screening Committee will be within its rights to cancel the candidature of a candidate if it finds that the acquittal is based on some serious flaw in the conduct of the prosecution case or is the result of material witnesses turning hostile. It is only experienced officers of the Screening Committee who will be able to judge whether the acquitted or discharged candidate is likely to revert to similar activities in future with more strength and vigour, if appointed, to the post in a police force. The Screening Committee will have to consider the nature and extent of such person's

involvement in the crime and his propensity of becoming a cause for worsening the law and order situation rather than maintaining it. In our opinion, this policy framed by the Delhi Police does not merit any interference from this Court as its object appears to be to ensure that only persons with impeccable character enter the police force.

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33. So far as respondent Mehar Singh is concerned, his case appears to have been compromised. It was urged that acquittal recorded pursuant to a compromise should not be treated as a disqualification because that will frustrate the purpose of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. We see no merit in this submission. Compromises or settlements have to be encouraged to bring about peaceful and amiable atmosphere in the society by according a quietus to disputes. They have to be encouraged also to reduce arrears of cases and save the litigants from the agony of pending litigation. But these considerations cannot be brought in here. In order to maintain integrity and high standard of police force, the Screening Committee may decline to take cognizance of a compromise, if it appears to it to be dubious. The Screening Committee cannot be faulted for that.

34. The respondents are trying to draw mileage from the fact that in their application and/or attestation form they have disclosed their involvement in a criminal case. We do not see how this fact improves their case. Disclosure of these facts in the application/attestation form is an essential requirement. An aspirant is expected to state these facts honestly. Honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of the police force. The respondents should not, therefore, expect to score any brownie points because of this disclosure. Besides, this has no relevance to the point in issue. It bears repetition to state that while deciding whether a person against whom a criminal case was registered and who was later on acquitted or discharged should be appointed to a post in the police force, what is relevant is the nature of the offence, the extent of his involvement, whether the acquittal was a

clean acquittal or an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt because the witnesses turned hostile or because of some serious flaw in the prosecution, and the propensity of such person to indulge in similar activities in future. This decision, in our opinion, can only be taken by the Screening Committee created for that purpose by the Delhi Police. If the Screening Committee's decision is not mala fide or actuated by extraneous considerations, then, it cannot be questioned.

35. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the great responsibility of maintaining law and order and public order in the society. People repose great faith and confidence in it. It must be worthy of that confidence. A candidate wishing to join the police force must be a person of utmost rectitude. He must have impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged in the criminal case, that acquittal or discharge order will have to be examined to see whether he has been completely exonerated in the case because even a possibility of his taking to the life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of the police force. The Standing Order, therefore, has entrusted the task of taking decisions in these matters to the Screening Committee. The decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is mala fide. In recent times, the image of the police force is tarnished. Instances of police personnel behaving in a wayward manner by misusing power are in public domain and are a matter of concern. The reputation of the police force has taken a beating. In such a situation, we would not like to dilute the importance and efficacy of a mechanism like the Screening Committee created by the Delhi Police to ensure that persons who are likely to erode its credibility do not enter the police force. At the same time, the Screening Committee must be alive to the importance of the trust reposed in it and must treat all candidates with an even hand."

11. Reiterating the same legal principle, the Apex Court again in the case of Parvez Khan (Supra), held as under:-

"13. From the above observations of this Court, it is clear that a candidate to be recruited to the police service must be worthy of confidence and must be a person of utmost rectitude and must have impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed that he was completely exonerated. Persons who are likely to erode the credibility of the police ought not to enter the police force. No doubt the Screening Committee has not been constituted in the case considered by this Court, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent, in the present case, the Superintendent of Police has gone into the matter. The Superintendent of Police is the appointing authority. There is no allegation of mala fides against the person taking the said decision nor the decision is shown to be perverse or irrational. There is no material to show that the appellant was falsely implicated. Basis of impugned judgment [Parvez Khan v. State of M.P., Writ Appeal No. 262 of 2010, decided on 20-3-2012 (MP)] is acquittal for want of evidence or discharge based on compounding."

12. The Apex Court reiterated the same legal proposition in the case of Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration & others Vs. Pradeep Kumar & another reported in (2018)1 SCC 797 held in para-13 as under:-

"13. It is thus well settled that acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle him for appointment to the post. Still it is open to the employer to consider the antecedents and examine whether he is suitable for appointment to the post. From the observations of this Court in Mehar Singh and Parvez Khan cases, it is clear that a candidate to be recruited to the police service must

be of impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed that he was honourably acquitted/completely exonerated. The decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is shown to be mala fide. The Screening Committee also must be alive to the importance of the trust repose in it and must examine the candidate with utmost character."

13. In view of the aforesaid legal pronouncement of law by the Apex Court, it is now settled that the jurisdiction to judge the suitability of a candidate for appointment, lies with the Screening Committee only. The Apex Court in para 22 of Mehar Singh case, held that as a rule such candidates should be avoided. It is further held in para 33, that the decision of the Screening Committee can be interfered with only when the same is malafide or is actuated with some extraneous consideration. Further, in para 35, the Apex Court held that the decision of Screening Committee has to be accepted unless it is malafide. Looking to the facts of present case, it is found that the petitioner has not shown any malafide against the Screening Committee. Thus, the discretion exercised by the Screening Committee needs to be accepted.

14. In the first round, this Court directed the respondents to reconsider the petitioner's case keeping into account order passed by Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bhupendra Yadav Vs. State of M.P & ors. reported in W.A. No.46/2018. This judgment was taken to Apex Court by the State of M.P. The Apex Court set aside the Division Bench judgment in the case of State of M.P. vs. Bhupendra Yadav reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 1181 wherein in similar

circumstances, the Court has approved the decision of the Screening Committee in cancelling the candidature of the candidate who was acquitted in criminal case on the basis of compromise. In the said case also, the candidature was cancelled based upon the compromise between the parties. The Apex Court held as under:-

"16. As can be discerned from the above decision, an employer has the discretion to terminate or condone an omission in the disclosure made by a candidate. While doing so, the employer must act with prudence, keep in mind the nature of the post and the duties required to be discharged. Higher the post, more stringent ought to be the standards to be applied. Even if a truthful disclosure has been made, the employer is well within its right to examine the fitness of a candidate and in a concluded criminal case, keep in mind the nature of the offence and verify whether the acquittal is honourable or benefit has been extended on technical reasons. If the employer arrives at a conclusion that the incumbent is of a suspect character or unfit for the post, he may not be appointed or continued in service."

15. The Full Bench of this Court has also considered the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere in such matters in the case of Ashutosh Pawar Vs. State of M.P. reported in 2018(2) MPLJ 419, wherein in para 32 & 40, it has been held as under:-

"32. Therefore, in respect of the Questions No. 1, 4 and 5 we hold that decision of Criminal Court on the basis of compromise or an acquittal cannot be treated that the candidate possesses good character, which may make him eligible, as the criminal proceedings are with the view to find culpability of commission of offence whereas the appointment to the civil post is in view of his suitability to the post. The test for each of them is

based upon different parameters and therefore, acquittal in a criminal case is not a certificate of good conduct to a candidate. The competent Authority has to take a decision in respect of the suitability of candidate to discharge the functions of a civil post and that mere acquittal in a criminal case would not be sufficient to infer that the candidate possesses good character. Division Bench judgment of this Court in W.P.No.5887/2016 (Arvind Gurjar vs. State of M.P.) is overruled. Another Division Bench judgment in W.A. No.367/2015 (Sandeep Pandey vs. State of M.P. and others) is also overruled. Jurisdiction of the High Court in a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is to examine the decision-making process than to act as Court of appeal to substitute its own decision. In appropriate case, if the Court finds decision making process is arbitrary or illegal, the Court will direct the Authority for reconsideration rather than to substitute the decision of the competent Authority with that of its own.

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40. In view of the law laid down in above said judgments, there is no doubt that in exercise of power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court only examines the decision-making process and does not substitute itself as a Court of appeal over the reasons recorded by the State Government. We find that the decision of the State Government holding that the petitioner is not suitable, is just, fair and reasonable keeping in view the nature of the post and the duties to be discharged."

16. In view of the aforesaid legal position settled by the Apex Court as also by this Court, it is loud and clear that the interference in such matters can be made only on the ground of malafides. Further, this Court can examine only the decision making process and not the merits of the case unless vital facts have been overlooked by the authority. The jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case lies within

the exclusive domain of the Screening Committee. Further, as a rule, decision of Screening Committee needs to be accepted unless it is shown to be malafide or based on some extraneous consideration.

17. In view of aforesaid discussion, if the facts of this case are considered, it is clear that a criminal offence was registered against the petitioner wherein specific allegation of demanding money and assaulting the complainant was made against the petitioner in the FIR. The petitioner was acquitted on account of subsequent compromise between the parties. However, there is no reason to believe that the Police would falsely implicate the petitioner in the case. Under these circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Screening Committee has reached to a just decision after considering the petitioner;s involvement and role in criminal incident. In absence of any malafide and/or involvement of any extraneous consideration, the decision of Screening Committee does not warrant interference by this Court.

18. Consequently, the petition fails and is accordingly, dismissed.

(ASHISH SHROTI) JUDGE

rahul RAHUL

DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

2.5.4.20=eac942476567cd1b39b3da46068403462f

SINGH df82ab676d0cde4dee473fe77953f5, ou=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH AT GWALIOR,CID - 7063520, postalCode=474001, st=Madhya Pradesh,

PARIHAR serialNumber=0275c4f803f94c47998be5c534e21b ded910fd4ab9d159b55575e814d05b2eed, cn=RAHUL SINGH PARIHAR Date: 2026.01.20 18:58:54 +05'30'