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Madhya Pradesh High Court
Sukhlal Garde vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 15 January, 2026
Author: Maninder S. Bhatti
Bench: Maninder S. Bhatti
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:4274
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MANINDER S. BHATTI
ON THE 15th OF JANUARY, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 19859 of 2017
SUKHLAL GARDE
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Ms. Kaushiki Sharma - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Akshansh Shrivastava - Panel Lawyer for the respondents/State.
ORDER
This petition is filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India seeking the following reliefs: -
"(i) Summon the entire relevant records from the
possession of the respondent No.1, for its kind perusal;
(ii) Set aside the impugned punishment order dated
24.12.2012 Annexure P/1 and the appellate order dated
10.03.2015 Annexure P/2;
(iii) Command the respondents to release all
consequential benefits as if the impugned orders
aforesaid are never passed;
(iv) Any other order/direction which deems fit and
proper may also be passed;
(v) Award cost of the litigation to the petitioners."
2. The facts of the case in a nutshell are that the petitioner was initially
appointed to the post of Forest Guard and thereafter was promoted to the post
of Forester. The petitioner was placed under suspension and issued a charge-
sheet dated 20.07.2009, contained in Annexure P/3, alleging that the
petitioner, when was posted as Regional Assistant (Beat Guard, Lalbarra)
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was intrusted with Elite Seclection work of bamboo plantation and while
being so posted he released an excess payment of Rs. 1,71,124/- without
actual work and intentionally embezzled the amount of Rs. 1,85,420/-, which
amounted to misconduct as per Rule 3 of M.P. Civil Services (Conduct)
Rules, 1965. The petitioner submitted a detailed reply to the said charge-
sheet, but eventually he was served with the order of punishment dated
24.12.2012 contained in Annexure P/1 by which a penalty of recovery of Rs.
51,337/- along with a punishment of stoppage of one increment with
cumulative effect was inflicted upon the petitioner and also the period of
suspension i.e. 26.06.2009 to 15.10.2009 was to be treated as suspension for
all purposes. The petitioner assailed the said order of punishment before the
Appellate Authority, but it was turned down by the Appellate Authority vide
order dated 10.03.2015 contained in the Annexure P/2. Aggrieved by the
above orders, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of this petition.
3. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order of
punishment was passed in violation of principles of natural justice as the
report of the enquiry officer was never provided to the petitioner, which
debarred the petitioner from defending himself properly in the course of the
disciplinary proceedings. The petitioner contends that the disciplinary
authority passed the impugned order of punishment solely based on the
evidence presented with the report of the Enquiry Officer, without
considering the points raised by the petitioner in his representation. It is
further contended by the petitioner that the Appellate Authority failed to
appreciate that the prosecution brief, along with the enquiry report, was not
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supplied to the petitioner during the disciplinary proceedings, and in the
absence of the same, the petitioner was not in a position to submit an
effective defence and hence seeks quashment of the impugned orders.
Counsel in support of her contention has placed reliance on the decisions of
the Apex Court in Iswarlal Mohanlal Thakkar v. Paschim Gujarat Vij Co.
Ltd., reported in (2014) 6 SCC 434, a n d State of Uttar Pradesh through
Principal Secretary, Department of Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram
Prakash Singh passed in Civil Appeal No. 14724/2024 .
4. Per contra, the counsel for the State submits that the petition filed
by the petitioner deserves to be dismissed. It is contended by the counsel that
the charge-sheet, along with a list of witnesses and documents were duly
supplied to the petitioner, and after a full-fledged inquiry in accordance with
law and after considering the reply of the petitioner and the gravity of the
charges so levelled against the delinquent, the punishment was passed. The
Counsel further contends that in the present case onus was on the petitioner
to establish that on account of the non-supply of the enquiry report, prejudice
was caused to the petitioner. It is contended by the counsel that mere non-
supply of the enquiry report ipso facto does not vitiate the inquiry
proceedings. The delinquent is required to demonstrate and establish that, on
account of non supply of the enquiry report, serious prejudice was caused to
him. In support of his contention, the counsel placed reliance on the decision
of the Apex Court passed in the case of Sarva Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank
vs. Manoj Kumar Sinha reported in 2010 (3) SCC 556 .
5. It is the further contention of the counsel that the interference with
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the disciplinary proceedings is permitted only under exceptional
circumstances. This Court cannot sit as an Appellate Authority to appreciate
the findings arrived at by the Authorities in the course of disciplinary
proceedings, therefore, submits that the present petition deserves to be
dismissed. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex
Court in the case of Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayan reported in
(1999) 5 SCC 768.
6. Parties have not pressed or argued any other point.
7. Heard rival submissions of the parties and perused the record.
8. In the present case it is undisputed that the petitioner was never
supplied with the inquiry report as the same was admitted by the respondents
in para 15 of their return. Now, the only question which remains to be
adjudicated is that whether the non-supply of the enquiry report to the
delinquent employee before imposing penalty vitiates the departmental
proceedings or not?
9. To deal with the aforesaid question, it will be fruitful here to
consider the decision passed by the Apex Court in the Case of ECIL v. B.
Karunakar reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727, wherein the Court in paragraphs
26, 27, 29, and 61 held as under: -
"26. The reason why the right to receive the report of
the enquiry officer is considered an essential part of the
reasonable opportunity at the first stage and also a
principle of natural justice is that the findings recorded
by the enquiry officer form an important material before
the disciplinary authority which along with the evidence
is taken into consideration by it to come to its
conclusions. It is difficult to say in advance, to what
extent the said findings including the punishment, if
any, recommended in the report would influence the
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disciplinary authority while drawing its conclusions.
The findings further might have been recorded without
considering the relevant evidence on record, or by
misconstruing it or unsupported by it. If such a finding
is to be one of the documents to be considered by the
disciplinary authority, the principles of natural justice
require that the employee should have a fair opportunity
to meet, explain and controvert it before he is
condemned. It is negation of the tenets of justice and a
denial of fair opportunity to the employee to consider
the findings recorded by a third party like the enquiry
officer without giving the employee an opportunity to
reply to it. Although it is true that the disciplinary
authority is supposed to arrive at its own findings on the
basis of the evidence recorded in the inquiry, it is also
equally true that the disciplinary authority takes into
consideration the findings recorded by the enquiry
officer along with the evidence on record. In the
circumstances, the findings of the enquiry officer do
constitute an important material before the disciplinary
authority which is likely to influence its conclusions. If
the enquiry officer were only to record the evidence and
forward the same to the disciplinary authority, that
would not constitute any additional material before the
disciplinary authority of which the delinquent employee
has no knowledge. However, when the enquiry officer
goes further and records his findings, as stated above,
which may or may not be based on the evidence on
record or are contrary to the same or in ignorance of it,
such findings are an additional material unknown to the
employee but are taken into consideration by the
disciplinary authority while arriving at its conclusions.
Both the dictates of the reasonable opportunity as well
as the principles of natural justice, therefore, require
that before the disciplinary authority comes to its own
conclusions, the delinquent employee should have an
opportunity to reply to the enquiry officer's findings.
The disciplinary authority is then required to consider
the evidence, the report of the enquiry officer and the
representation of the employee against it.
27. It will thus be seen that where the enquiry officer is
other than the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary
proceedings break into two stages. The first stage ends
when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions
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on the basis of the evidence, enquiry officer's report and
the delinquent employee's reply to it. The second stage
begins when the disciplinary authority decides to
impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. If the
disciplinary authority decides to drop the disciplinary
proceedings, the second stage is not even reached. The
employee's right to receive the report is thus, a part of
the reasonable opportunity of defending himself in the
first stage of the inquiry. If this right is denied to him,
he is in effect denied the right to defend himself and to
prove his innocence in the disciplinary proceedings.
******
29. Hence it has to be held that when the enquiry officer
is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent
employee has a right to receive a copy of the enquiry
officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives
at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence
of the employee with regard to the charges levelled
against him. That right is a part of the employee's right
to defend himself against the charges levelled against
him. A denial of the enquiry officer's report before the
disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges,
is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to
prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of
natural justice.
******
61. It is now settled law that the proceedings must be
just, fair and reasonable and negation thereof offends
Articles 14 and 21. It is well-settled law that the
principles of natural justice are integral part of Article
14. No decision prejudicial to a party should be taken
without affording an opportunity or supplying the
material which is the basis for the decision. The enquiry
report constitutes fresh material which has great
persuasive force or effect on the mind of the
disciplinary authority. The supply of the report along
with the final order is like a post-mortem certificate
with putrefying odour. The failure to supply copy
thereof to the delinquent would be unfair procedure
offending not only Articles 14, 21 and 311(2) of the
Constitution, but also, the principles of natural justice.
The contention on behalf of the
Government/management that the report is not evidence
adduced during such inquiry envisaged under proviso to
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Article 311(2) is also devoid of substance. It is settled
law that the Evidence Act has no application to the
inquiry conducted during the disciplinary proceedings.
The evidence adduced is not in strict conformity with
the Indian Evidence Act, though the essential principles
of fair play envisaged in the Evidence Act are
applicable. What was meant by 'evidence' in the
proviso to Article 311(2) is the totality of the material
collected during the inquiry including the report of the
enquiry officer forming part of that material. Therefore,
when reliance is sought to be placed by the disciplinary
authority, on the report of the enquiry officer for proof
of the charge or for imposition of the penalty, then it is
incumbent that the copy thereof should be supplied
before reaching any conclusion either on proof of the
charge or the nature of the penalty to be imposed on the
proved charge or on both."
10. Further, the Apex Court in the case of Ram Prakash Singh (Supra)
held as under:-
"26. Having regard to the statement of law in S.K.
Sharma (supra), certain questions fall for answers, viz.
what would be the effect and impact of non-furnishing
the report of enquiry by the disciplinary authority to a
delinquent employee before he is punished? Does he
have to plead and prove 'prejudice'? Is it in all or
specific circumstances that the courts would insist on
the delinquent employee to demonstrate 'prejudice'? Is
furnishing of the report of enquiry merely a procedural
step in the disciplinary proceedings or something more?
We may proceed to find the answers to these questions
referring to B. Karunakar (supra).
******
43. Interpretation of B. Karunakar (supra), particularly
bearing in mind the shifting trend towards the
'prejudice' principle and the insistence on the pleading
and proof of 'prejudice', may have unintended
consequences for delinquent employees which have not
been visualized hitherto, therefore, having the potential
of rendering the law laid down by the Constitution
Bench a dead letter.
44. To recapitulate, B. Karunakar (supra) has
unequivocally held that non-furnishing of the enquiry
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report would deprive the employee of the opportunity
and disable him to demonstrate before the disciplinary
authority the perversity in such report by filing a
representation. The object that is sought to be achieved
by furnishing of the enquiry report is this. If the report
were furnished, the delinquent employee could persuade
the disciplinary authority to hold that either he is
innocent and/or that he does not deserve any
punishment, or may be let off with a minor punishment.
Providing a delinquent employee with an opportunity to
respond to the enquiry report is, thus, a crucial
procedural step that must precede disciplinary action.
Failure to do so, such as imposing punishment without
furnishing the report, could severely handicap the
employee's ability to effectively question or challenge
the decision in an appeal/appropriate proceedings, as he
would be unaware of the materials against him. In such
a case, at best, nothing more than a plain and simple
plea can be urged that non-furnishing of the enquiry
report has deprived him of reasonable opportunity to
counter the findings of guilt without, however, he being
able to demonstrate prejudice. It is axiomatic that
without reading the enquiry report, there cannot be an
effective and meaningful challenge to the findings
contained therein.
******
51. ...Attempting to clear the confusion arising out of
different understandings of the ratio decidendi of the
decision in B. Karunakar (supra), we proceed to focus
on the proper course for the tribunal/court to adopt
when the issue reaches it for adjudication. In our
opinion, whenever a challenge is mounted to an order of
punishment on, inter alia, the ground that the report of
enquiry has not been furnished, the tribunal/court
should require the employer (Government, public or
private) to justify non- furnishing of such report. This is
a course, which again experience has shown, is seldom
followed. If no valid explanation is proffered and the
tribunal/court suspects unfair motives (report has not
been furnished as part of a strategic ploy or to advance
an unholy cause or prompted by extraneous reasons) or
carelessness, without much ado and without insisting
for 'prejudice' to be demonstrated, the order of
punishment should be set aside and the proceedings
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directed to resume from the stage of offering
opportunity to the delinquent employee to respond to
the enquiry report. Irrespective of 'prejudice' being
demonstrated, no employer or for that matter anyone
should be permitted to steal a march and gain any
benefit by violating the law. In case the tribunal/court is
satisfied that real effort was made by the employer but
such effort remained abortive because the report could
not be furnished to the employee for reason(s) beyond
its control, or some other justification is placed on
record, which is acceptable to the tribunal/court, the test
of 'prejudice' is open to be applied but only after
ensuring service of a copy of the enquiry report on the
employee. In a case where the employee either
expressly or by his conduct appears to have waived the
requirement of having access to the report, it would be
open to the tribunal/court to deal with the situation as
per its discretion. However, the simplicitor application
of the 'prejudice' test absent a query to the employer, as
indicated above, in our opinion, would be in the teeth of
the law laid down in B. Karunakar (supra).
52. We now sum up our understanding of the law
declared in B. Karunakar (supra) and answer the four
questions delineated in paragraph 26 (supra)
compositely. Reading the declaration of law by the
Constitution Bench regarding the imperative need to
furnish the report of enquiry to the delinquent employee
even when: (i) the relevant statutory rules are silent or
against it, (ii) the punishment to be imposed is other
than the punishment referred to in clause (2) of Article
311 of the Constitution, (iii) the employee does not ask
for it, and (iv) the burden is cast on a private employer
too, and the law requiring furnishing of the report being
made to operate prospectively from the date the
decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra) was rendered,
thereby reinforcing the legal position that prevailed after
the GoI Act was enacted but became unsettled later,
there can be no two opinions that on and from 20th
November, 1990 [i.e., when Mohd. Ramzan Khan
(supra) was decided] it is the mandatory requirement of
law that the report of enquiry has to be furnished to the
delinquent employee. Taking a cue from S. K. Sharma
(supra), we are inclined to the view that the requirement
o f furnishing the report of enquiry, though procedural,
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is of a mandatory character and the bogey argument of
the employer to apply the test of 'prejudice' when the
report of enquiry is not furnished cannot be of any avail
to thwart the challenge of the delinquent employee.
Such test could call for application, if from the facts and
circumstances, it can be established that the delinquent
employee waived his right to have the report furnished.
Should satisfactory explanation be not proffered by the
employer for its failure/omission/neglect to furnish the
enquiry report, that ought to be sufficient for
invalidating the proceedings and directing resumption
from the stage of furnishing the report. No proof of
prejudice for breach of a statutory rule or the principles
of natural justice and fair play need be proved, unless
there is a waiver, either express or by conduct, to of the
right to receive the report. And, it is only in specific and
not in all circumstances that proof of 'prejudice' ought
to be insisted upon."
11. In view of the aforesaid decisions and considering the fact that
admittedly, the petitioner was never supplied with the report of the inquiry
officer, this Court is of the view that non-supply of the enquiry report to the
petitioner violates the principles of natural justice as it disables the petitioner
from effectively representing his side and defending his case against the
charges so levelled. Also, nowhere in the records, the respondents were able
to demonstrate that they ever made any effort to supply the enquiry report to
the petitioner, nor did they provide any justification for not supplying the
same to the petitioner and therefore, the 'principle of prejudice' would be of
no avail to the respondents in light of the aforesaid decisions of the Apex
Court.
12. Thus, this Court is of the considered opinion that non-supply of the
enquiry report to the petitioner vitiates the order of punishment passed by the
respondents/authority.
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13. Accordingly, the petition is allowed, and the impugned orders
dated 24.12.2012 (Annexure P/1) and 10.03.2015 (Annexure P/2) stand
quashed. Benefits withheld on the basis of impugned orders be disbursed in
favour of the petitioner within 60 days from the date of production of the
certified copy of this order.
(MANINDER S. BHATTI)
JUDGE
Rohit/PB
