[Cites 65, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Vinod Chandra Sahay vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 15 January, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANDEEP N. BHATT
ON THE 15 th OF JANUARY, 2026
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 52058 of 2025
VINOD CHANDRA SAHAY
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Appearance:
Shri Sankalp Kochar - Advocate for the applicant.
Shri A Rajeshwar Rao - Advocate for the respondent.
ORDER
This is first application filed by the applicant under Section 483 of BNSS
for grant of regular bail in relation to Crime No.102/2025 registered at Police
Station - Economic Offences Wing, Bhopal (M.P.) for the offences punishable
under Sections 120-B, 409, 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC and 66-D of the
IT Act. The applicant is in custody since 02.07.2025.
2. According to the story of prosecution as enunciated in the FIR dated
21.06.2025, the genesis of the case is a complaint submitted by one Pratap Singh
Lodhi, an agriculturist and resident of Village Dhaneta, Tehsil Patan, District
Jabalpur. The complainant alleged that he was in need of a loan and approached
co-accused N.K. Khare alias Vinod Kumar Sahay, who induced him by stating
that only a small loan could be availed on agricultural land, but a larger loan could
be secured if he formed a proprietorship firm and obtained GST registration in the
name of the said firm. Acting on this inducement and false assurance, the
complainant registered a firm in the name of Maa Narmada Traders for which
documents such as Aadhaar, PAN, bank statements, land records and loan books
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were handed over to the co-accused. It is further alleged that without the
complainant's consent, the co-accused got registered an email ID
[email protected] in the GST records and also registered the complainant's
son's mobile number for GSTOTP verifications. That subsequently, GST
Registration No.23ALLPL1056B1ZM was issued in the name of Maa Narmada
Traders. However, the complainant never carried out any business through the
said registration. Later, when GST authorities visited the complainant, he was
informed that tax dues to the tune of Rs 72,66,408/- were outstanding against the
said firm. This came as a shock to the complainant, as bogus transactions of crores
of rupees had been shown in the name of Maa Narmada Traders without his
knowledge or involvement. It is further stated that, co-accused N.K. Khare and
Satyam Soni had fraudulently filed GST returns in respect of Maa Narmada
Traders by misusing OTPs and documents of the complainant. Further probe
disclosed that apart from Maa Narmada Traders, several other bogus firms were
floated, namely Namami Traders, Maa Rewa Traders, and Abhijeet Traders, all
allegedly used to generate fake GST returns and fraudulent transactions. It is
further stated that, through these bogus firms, the accused persons, including the
present applicant, carried out fictitious transactions in collusion with various
entities, such as K.D. Sales Corporation, Dilip Traders, Ankita Steel & Maa
Jagdamba Coal Carriers, Mahak Enterprises, Koraj Technic, Mahamaya Traders,
Ambar Coal Depot, and Anam Traders. Forged documents were used to support
these fraudulent GST returns, causing a wrongful loss of approximately Rs 33.80
Crores to the State exchequer.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the applicant submits that various High
Courts have considered the matter pertaining to Section 132 of the GST Act and
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have held that if the amount involved is more than Rs.5 Crores then maximum
punishment prescribed is five years and there is no embargo under the GST Act
for consideration of application for grant bail. It is contended that considering the
chain of events and considering the fact that GST authority have also resorted for
offences punishable under the IPC, such practice adopted by the GST authorities
is not approved by various High Courts and even some of the complaints have
been quashed.
4. It is put forth that in the case of Akram Pasha v. Senior Intelligence
Officer (Crl. Pet. No.15066/2025, High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru), the
facts of that case are almost identical to the facts of the present case and
considering the nature of allegation that the applicant has taken wrong benefit of
Input Tax Credit, the case of the applicant is required to be considered.
5. In support of his submissions, counsel for the applicant has placed
reliance on the decisions in the cases of Sharat Babu Digumarti v. Government of
NCT of Delhi, (2017) 2 SCC 18; Deepak Singhal v. Union of India , WP
No.21641/2024; Sushil Kumar Singla v. State of UT Chandigarh, CRM - M
28701/2023 (O & M); Shalini Singhal v. State of MP , (M.Cr.C. No.5759/2024
decided on 09.02.2024). By referring to these decisions, it is contended that the
applicant should be released on bail keeping in view his custody period as GST is
itself a self contained Code and necessary procedure shall be followed as per that
Code itself.
6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has opposed
the contentions raised by the counsel for the applicant and by referring to Section
131 of the GST Act submits that offences are serious in nature. It is also
contended that investigation in the matter is going on in respect of co-accused
persons and further interrogation may reveal many more scam and fraud which
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might have been committed by the present applicant and other co-accused
persons. It is further contended that figure of such fraudulent amount may increase
with further interrogation. It is vehemently urged that provisions of GST Act
generates asset for the nation and these activities carried out by the persons like
the present applicant jeopardize the national interest on that count also the Court
should take a serious view in such matters and should not exercise discretion in
favour of the applicant especially looking to the fact that prima facie case is made
out against the applicant.
7. I have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for
the parties at the Bar.
8. It is relevant to note that various High Courts as well as the Apex
Court have considered similar types of matters in favour of the applicants therein.
In this context it is appropriate to refer to certain relevant decisions in the field:
In the case of Sharat Babu Digumarti (supra) in paragraphs 32 and 33 it has
been held by Apex Court as follows:
"32. Section 81 of the IT Act also specifically provides that the
provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything
inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in
force. All provisions will have their play and significance, if the alleged
offence pertains to offence of electronic record. It has to be borne in
mind that IT Act is a special enactment. It has special provisions.
Section 292 IPC makes offence sale of obscene books, etc. but once the
offence has a nexus or connection with the electronic record the
protection and effect of Section 79 cannot be ignored and negated. We
are inclined to think so as it is a special provision for a specific purpose
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and the Act has to be given effect to so as to make the protection
effective and true to the legislative intent. This is the mandate behind
Section 81 of the IT Act. The additional protection granted by the IT
Act would apply.
33. In this regard, we may refer to Sarwan Singh v. Kasturi
Lal [Sarwan Singh v. Kasturi Lal , (1977) 1 SCC 750] . The Court was
considering Section 39 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and
Clearance) Act, 1956 which laid down that the provisions of the said
Act and the Rules made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding
anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law. The Delhi
Rent Control Act, 1958 also contained non obstante clauses.
Interpreting the same, the Court held : (SCC pp. 760-61, para 20)
"20. ... When two or more laws operate in the same field and
each contains a non obstante clause stating that its provisions will
override those of any other law, stimulating and incisive problems of
interpretation arise. Since statutory interpretation has no conventional
protocol, cases of such conflict have to be decided in reference to the
object and purpose of the laws under consideration. A piquant situation,
like the one before us, arose in Ram Narain v. Simla Banking &
Industrial Co. Ltd. [Ram Narain v. Simla Banking & Industrial Co.
Ltd., AIR 1956 SC 614] the competing statutes being the Banking
Companies Act, 1949 as amended by Act 52 of 1953, and the
Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951. Section 45-A of the
Banking Companies Act, which was introduced by the amending Act
of 1953, and Section 3 of the Displaced Persons Act, 1951 contained
each a non obstante clause, providing that certain provisions would
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have effect "notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained
in any other law for the time being in force ...". This Court resolved the
conflict by considering the object and purpose of the two laws and
giving precedence to the Banking Companies Act by observing : (AIR
p. 622, para 7)
'7. ... It is, therefore, desirable to determine the overriding effect
of one or the other of the relevant provisions in these two Acts, in a
given case, on much broader considerations of the purpose and policy
underlying the two Acts and the clear intendment conveyed by the
language of the relevant provisions therein.'
As indicated by us, the special and specific purpose which
motivated the enactment of Section 14-A and Chapter III-A of the
Delhi Rent Act would be wholly frustrated if the provisions of the Slum
Clearance Act requiring permission of the competent authority were to
prevail over them. Therefore, the newly introduced provisions of the
Delhi Rent Act must hold the field and be given full effect despite
anything to the contrary contained in the Slum Clearance Act."
9. Indore Bench of this Court in the case of Deepak Singhal (supra) has
held in paragraphs 9 and 10 as follows:
"9. In the considered opinion of this court, GST Act, 2017 is a
special legislation which holistically deals with procedure, penalties
and offences relating GST and at the cost of repetition this court cannot
emphasise more that the GST Authorities cannot be permitted to bypass
procedure for launching prosecution under GST Act, 2017 and invoke
provisions of Indian Penal Code only without pressing into service
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penal provisions from GST Act and that too without obtaining sanction
from commissioner under Section 132(6) of GST Act especially when
the alleged actions squarely fall within the precincts of offence as
enumerated under GST Act, 2017. This would defeat the very purpose
of enacting a special statute such as GST Act, 2017, as the GST
Authorities instead of conducting search and seizure and conducting
proceedings as prescribed under GST Act, 2017 themselves would be
delegating the same to local police authorities which cannot be said to
be the intent of the legislature while enacting GST Act, 2017.
10. In view of the above, this court has no hesitation in holding
that GST Authorities cannot bypass procedure prescribed under GST
Act for launching prosecution by simply invoking penal provisions
under IPC without invoking penal provisions under GST Act especially
when the allegations so revealed as a result of search and seizure
conducted by GST Authorities constituted offence covered under the
penal provisions of GST Act as that would amount to bypassing
procedural safeguards as provided under Section 132(6) of GST Act
which requires sanction of the commissioner prior to initiation of
prosecution, which is to the prejudice of the petitioner herein. Letting
GST Authorities to adopt such course of action would amount to abuse
of process of law which cannot be permitted by this court."
10. In this context it is apposite to refer to the judgment of High Court
of Karntataka in the case Akram Pasha (supra) on which heavy reliance is placed
by counsel for the applicant. In paragraphs 18 to 20 of the said judgment, High
Court of Karnataka has held thus:
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"18. Sections 69 and 70 of the CGST Act are reproduced
hereunder:
"69. Power to Arrest.-(1) Where the Commissioner has reasons
to believe that a person has committed any offence specified in clause
(a) or clause (b) or clause (c) or clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section
132 which is punishable under clause (i) or (ii) of sub-section (1), or
sub-section (2) of the said section, he may, by order, authorise any
officer of Central tax to arrest such person.
(2) Where a person is arrested under sub-section (1) for an
offence specified under sub-section (5) of section 132, the officer
authorised to arrest the person shall inform such person of the grounds
of arrest and produce him before a magistrate within twenty-four hours.
(3) Subject to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 174), -
(a) where a person is arrested under sub-section (1) for any
offence specified under sub-section (4) of section 132, he shall be
admitted to bail or in default of ball, forwarded to the custody of the
magistrate;
b) in the case of a non-cognizable and bailable offence, the
Deput Commissioner or the Assistant Commissioner shall, for the
purpose of releasing an arrested person on bail or otherwise, have the
same powers and be subject to the same provisions as an officer-in-
charge of a police station.
70. Power to summon persons to give evidence and produce
documents.-(1) The proper officer under this Act shall have power to
summon any person whose attendance he considers necessary either to
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give evidence or to produce a document or any other thing in any
inquiry in the same manner, as provided in the case of a civil court
under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908."
19. Chapter XIV of the CGST Act deals with inspection, search,
seizure and arrest. It consists of sections 67 to 72. Section 70 deals with
power to summon persons to give evidence and produce documents.
As per sub-section (1), the proper officer under the CGST Act has the
power to summon any person whose attendance he considers necessary
either to give evidence or to produce a document or any other thing in
any enquiry in the same manner as provided in the case of a civil court
under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. Thus, section
70 (1) confers the power on the proper officer to summon any person
whose attendance he considers necessary to either tender evidence or to
produce documents, etc., in any enquiry. Exercise of such a power is
similar to the powers exercised by a civil court under the Civil
Procedure Code, 1908. Sub-section (2) further clarifies that every
inquiry in which summons are issued for tendering evidence or for
production of documents is to be deemed to be a judicial proceeding
within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Penal Code, 1860.
20. There is no embargo under the CGST Act restraining the
petitioner from seeking pre-arrest bail. Economic offences such as tax
evasion, money laundering, etc., affect the economy of the country and
thus are considered grave in nature. To deter persons from indulging in
such economic offences, criminal sanctions are required to be imposed.
One of the most prominent criminal sanctions imposed with regard to
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economic offences is that of arrest. It is widely acknowledged that
arrests result in deprivation of liberty of a person. Thus, while it is
imperative to maintain law and order in society, the power to arrest
must also always be subject to necessary safeguards. Against this
backdrop, analysing the arrest provisions under the goods and services
tax law, with a view to study the adequacy of the safeguards and
authorisation built into the text of the statute, the interplay between
these provisions and the standards of arrest has to be established
through judicial precedents, as well as other sources such as the
Constitution of India and general statutes such as the Code of Criminal
Procedure."
11. In Sushil Kumar Singla (supra) in paragraphs 18 to 21 it has been
held as under:
"18. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772, the
question before the Apex court was whether the provisions contained in
Section 21, 22 and other sections of Mines and Minerals (Development
and Regulation) Act 1957 (MMDR Act) operate as bar against
prosecution of a person who has been charged with allegation under
Section 379 of IPC? The Apex court after reading the act in a minute
manner has held that if an offence which is mentioned in MMDR Act is
executed by the accused, then such offence can be tried only under
such act by the procedure laid under the said act. However, if an act or
offence which constitutes an offence under IPC, then the provisions of
MMDR Act shall not stand in a way to stop the applicability of IPC
and such offence can be prosecuted under IPC without waiting or
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following the procedure under the MMDR Act.
19. In the case of Institute of Chartered Accountants of India
vs. Vimal Kumar Surana and another, (2011) 1 SCC 534, the Apex
Court has elaborately dealt with the provision under the Chartered
Accountants Act,949. In that case, the respondent, who passed the
Chartered Accountant examination but was not a member of the
appellant's Institute of Chartered Accounts, allegedly represented
before the Income Tax Department and the authorities constituted
under the Madhya Pradesh Trade Tax Act on the basis of power of
attorney or as legal representative and submitted documents such as
audit reports and certificates required to be issued by the Chartered
Accountants by preparing forged seals and thereby impersonated
himself as Chartered Accountant. He was accordingly prosecuted and
charge was framed against him under Sections 419, 468, 471 and 472,
IPC. The respondent challenged the order by filing revision under
Section 397 CrPC The Additional Sessions Judge set aside the order of
the Magistrate and remanded the case to the trial court with a direction
to decide whether there are sufficient grounds for framing charges
under Sections 419, 468, 471 and 473, IPC read with Sections 24 and
26 of the C.A. Act. After remand, the trial court passed an order
holding that there was no basis for framing any charge against
respondent under the IPC. The Magistrate further held that cognizance
of offences under Sections 24 and 26 of the C.A. Act cannot be taken
because no complaint had been filed by or under the order of the
Council before the Magistrate. The High Court while referring to
Sections 2, 4, 5 and Section 195(1), Cr.P.C. held that in the absence of
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a complaint the Magistrate was not competent to frame charges against
the respondent and in view of the special mechanism contained in the
C.A. Act for prosecution of a person violating Sections 24, 24A and 26
of the Act, he cannot be prosecuted under the IPC. When the matter
finally came to the Supreme Court, wherein after considering a catena
of judgments, it was held as under:-
24. Such an unintended consequence can be and deserves to be
avoided in interpreting Sections 24-A, 25 and 26 keeping in view the
settled law that if there are two possible constructions of o statute, then
the one which leads to anomaly or absurdity and makes the statute
vulnerable to the attack of unconstitutionality should be avoided in
preference to the other which makes it rational and immune from the
charge of unconstitutionality. That apart, the court cannot interpret the
provisions of the Act in a manner which will deprive the victim of the
offences defined in Sections 416, 463, 464, 468 and 471 of his right to
prosecute the wrongdoer by filing the first information report or
complaint under the relevant provisions of CrPC."xxxxxxxxxx
42. The submission of Shri Gupta that the respondent cannot be
prosecuted for the offences defined under IPC because no complaint
had been filed against him by the court concerned or authority as per
the requirement of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC sounds attractive but
lacks merit. The prohibition contained in Section 195 CrPC against
taking of cognizance by the court except on a complaint in writing
made by the court concerned before which the document is produced or
given in a proceeding is not attracted in the case like the present one
because the officers of the Income Tax Department and the authorities
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constituted under the Madhya Pradesh Trade Tax Act, 1995 before
whom the respondent is alleged to have acted on the basis of power of
attorney or as legal representative or produced audit report do not fall
within the ambit of the term "court" as defined in Section 195(3) CrPC.
Such officer/authorities were neither discharging the functions of a
civil, revenue or criminal court nor could they be treated as tribunal
constituted by or under the Central or State Act, which is declared to be
a court for the purpose of Section 195."
In case of Sharat Babu Digumarti vs. Govt. Of NCT of Delhi
AIR 2017 SC 150 the facts were different. It is the case in which the
Magistrate had taken cognizance against the Director of a company for
offences punishable under Sections 292 and 294 of IPC and Section 67
of IT Act It was in such background, the Supreme Court was of the
view that Section 67 read with Section 67A and 678 of the IT Act were
a complete code and for the sune set of allegations, the provisions of
Section 292 of IPC cannot be invoked.
(21) A close reading of the above cited case laws would lead to
only the conclusion that the offence alleged against the petitioner is one
punishable under the UTGST Ac/CGST Act, which are the special
statutes and are a complete code in itself and in view of the special
mechanism contained in Chapter XIX of the CGST Act which clearly
provides for offences and penalties, for prosecution of a person
violating 122 & 132 of the Act, the petitioner cannot be prosecuted
under the general provisions of IPC especially in view of the facts that
in the FIR itself it has been stated that the resort has already been taken
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for recovery of the tax by assessing tax and imposing interest and
penalty thereon. Since as per the mechanism under the GST legislations
has been pressed into aid, continuation of the proceedings under the
general penal provisions of IPC and subject the petitioner to face trial
thereunder would amount to double jeopardy under Article 20(2) of the
Constitution of India. Furthermore, there is non-compliance of
mandatory provision of Section 132(6) of the CGST Act as no previous
sanction of the Commissioner has been taken."
12. Indore Bench of this High Court in the case of Shalini Singhal
(supra) after considering the following submissions of the parties in paragraphs 4
and 5, in paragraph 6 held that custodial interrogation is not required. The
aforesaid paragraphs reads as follows:
"4. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the
applicant has been falsely implicated in the case. It is alleged that the
applicant is a Director of the Agrawal Soya Extract Pvt. Ltd. along with
co-accused persons and all of them entered into a criminal conspiracy
and prepared bogus invoice, bill T and Soybean DOC in order to
demonstrate sale and purchase of soyabean on paper in order to get the
benefit of GST Input Tax Credit on sham transactions. It is further
alleged that the bank account of the aforesaid company was opened in
IndusInd Bank, Indore which was being operated by co-accused
Navneet Garg which is evident from the letter issued by the bank. All
the cheques were issued under the signature of co-accused Navneet
Garg. Learned counsel for the applicant contended that the applicant is
the wife of co-accused Deepak Singhal and is a dormant partner in the
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company who has nothing to do with the day-to-day affairs of the
company. The applicant is ready to cooperate in the investigation.
There is no likelihood of applicant's absconsion or tampering with the
prosecution evidence if she is released on anticipatory bail. She is
ready to abide by the terms and conditions as may be imposed by this
Court. With the aforesaid submissions prayer for grant of anticipatory
bail is made.
5. Per contra, learned Government Advocate has opposed the
bail application and submitted that the applicant as well as other co-
accused persons are active directors of the company and are involved in
various cases of such nature and are in the habit of issuing forged bills
for getting false benefits of input tax credit. Applicant has committed
white-collar crime. Investigation is pending and custodial interrogation
may be required. Therefore, the applicant may not be enlarged on
anticipatory bail and the application deserves to be dismissed.
6. The crime appears to have been committed prior to/during the
year 2020 whereafter the revenue authorities have conducted a detailed
investigation and thereafter lodged FIR. Therefore, it appears that
custodial interrogation is not required."
13. In the case at hand, there is no doubt that the offence is essentially
punishable under Section 132 of the GST Act but there are provisions of CGST
Act, 2017 which can be considered as complete Code itself. Section 132 of the
Act reads as under:
"132. Punishment for certain offences.--(1) [Whoever commits,
or causes to commit and retain the benefits arising out of, any of the
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following offences], namely:--
(a) supplies any goods or services or both without issue of any
invoice, in violation of the provisions of this Act or the rules made
thereunder, with the intention to evade tax;
(b) issues any invoice or bill without supply of goods or services
or both in violation of the provisions of this Act, or the rules made
thereunder leading to wrongful availment or utilisation of input tax
credit or refund of tax;
(c) avails input tax credit using the invoice or bill referred to in
clause (b) or fraudulently avails input tax credit without any invoice or
bill;
(d) collects any amount as tax but fails to pay the same to the
Government beyond a period of three months from the date on which
such payment becomes due;
(e) evades tax *** or fraudulently obtains refund and where such
offence is not covered under clauses (a) to (d);
(f) falsifies or substitutes financial records or produces fake
accounts or documents or furnishes any false information with an
intention to evade payment of tax due under this Act;
*
(h) acquires possession of, or in any way concerns himself in
transporting, removing, depositing, keeping, concealing, supplying, or
purchasing or in any other manner deals with, any goods which
he knows or has reasons to believe are liable to confiscation under this
Act or the rules made thereunder;
(i) receives or is in any way concerned with the supply of, or in
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any other manner deals with any supply of services which he knows or
has reasons to believe are in contravention of any provisions of this Act
or the rules made thereunder;
*
*
(l) attempts to commit, or abets the commission of any of the
offences mentioned in [clauses (a) to (f) and clauses (h) and (i)] of this
section, shall be punishable--
(i) in cases where the amount of tax evaded or the amount of
input tax credit wrongly availed or utilised or the amount of refund
wrongly taken exceeds five hundred lakh rupees, with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and with fine;
(ii) in cases where the amount of tax evaded or the amount of
input tax credit wrongly availed or utilised or the amount of refund
wrongly taken exceeds two hundred lakh rupees but does not
exceed five hundred lakh rupees, with imprisonment for a term which
may extend to three years and with fine;
(iii) in the case of [an offence specified in clause (b), where the
amount of tax evaded or the amount of input tax credit wrongly availed
or utilised or the amount of refund wrongly taken exceeds one hundred
lakh rupees but does not exceed two hundred lakh rupees, with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year and with fine;
(iv) in cases where he commits or abets the commission of an
offence specified in clause (f) ***, he shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine
or with both.
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(2) Where any person convicted of an offence under this section
is again convicted of an offence under this section, then, he shall be
punishable for the second and for every subsequent offence
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and with
fine.
(3) The imprisonment referred to in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of
sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) shall, in the absence of special and
adequate reasons to the contrary to be recorded in the judgment of
the Court, be for a term not less than six months.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), all offences under this Act, except the
offences referred to in sub-section (5) shall be non-cognizable
and bailable.
(5) The offences specified in clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c)
or clause (d) of sub-section (1) and punishable under clause (i) of that
sub-section shall be cognizable and non-bailable.
(6) A person shall not be prosecuted for any offence under this
section except with the previous sanction of the Commissioner.
Explanation -- For the purposes of this section, the term "tax"
shall include the amount of tax evaded or the amount of input tax credit
wrongly availed or utilised or refund wrongly taken under the
provisions of this Act, the State Goods and Services Tax Act, the
Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory Goods
and Services Tax Act and cess levied under the Goods and Services Tax
(Compensation to States) Act."
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14. The applicant is an accused of wrongful utilisation of input tax
credit. Considering the allegation in the FIR that a total sum of about Rs.10 Crores
is involved and if the alleged amount is more than Rs.5 Crores, then maximum
sentence which can be awarded, is five years. There is also provision under
Section 138 of the Act which provides for compounding of offences before or
after prosecution. Therefore, possibility of compounding can also not be ruled out.
Today this Court has granted anticipatory bail to co-accused Dheeraj Gupta in
M.Cr.C. No.40741/2025. The present applicant is in custody since 02.07.2025 and
further detaining of the applicant will adversely affect the business of the
applicant. Accordingly, this Court is inclined to allow this application under
Section 483 of the BNSS (Section 439 of the Cr.P.C) and release the applicant on
bail.
15. It is directed that applicant be released on bail on his furnishing a
personal bond in the sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lacs only) with two
solvent sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial Court, for his
regular appearance before the trial Court during trial with a condition that he shall
remain present before the concerned Court on all the dates fixed by it during trial.
He shall abide by all the conditions enumerated under Section 480(3) of BNSS. In
addition to the above, the applicant shall also comply with the following
conditions:
(i) He shall not indirectly or indirectly make any inducement, threat, or
promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case;
(ii) He shall provide his mobile number and keep it operational at all times:
(iii) He shall drop a PIN on google map to ensure that his location is
available to the investigating officer.
(iv) He shall commit no offence during the period he is on bail;
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:4147
20 MCRC-52058-2025
(v) He shall surrender his passport before the investigating
officer/apprehending authority and under no circumstances leave India without
prior permission of the Court and, if he does not possess any passport, he shall file
an affidavit to that effect before the concerned trial Court.
It is being made clear that in case of bail jump and in violation of any of
conditions imposed herein above, this order shall become ineffective and
Investigation Officer/Trial Court shall be at liberty to proceed against the
applicant as per law.
16. Accordingly, the M.Cr.C. is allowed and disposed of.
Certified copy as per rules.
(SANDEEP N. BHATT)
JUDGE
ks
