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Madhya Pradesh High Court
Narendra Singh Raghuvanshi vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh Thr on 23 February, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:6942
1 WP. No. 3113 of 2016
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
ON THE 23rd OF FEBRUARY, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 3113 of 2016
NARENDRA SINGH RAGHUVANSHI
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Dharmendra Singh Raghuvanshi - Advocate for petitioner.
Smt. Smrati Sharma - Government Advocate for respondent/State.
ORDER
This petition, under Article 226 of Constitution of India, has been filed
seeking the following relief (s):
"(i) That, the present petition filed by the petitioner may kindly be
allowed;
(ii) That, the impugned order dated 17.11.2015 Annexure P/1 and
the order dated 24.12.2014 Annexure P/2 passed by the respondents
may kindly be directed to be set aside. It may be held that the
impugned order inflicting penalty of recovery to the tune of
Rs.7,94,408/- is without jurisdiction and same be set aside.
(iii) That, it may be held that no such recovery should have been
ordered against the petitioner.
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(iv) That, any other just, suitable and proper relief, which this
Hon'ble Court deems fit, may also kindly be granted to the
petitioner. Costs be also awarded in favour of the petitioner."
2. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that by order dated 24.12.2014
without any basis and without following the due process of law and without
considering that no financial loss has been caused to the Government, the
recovery to the tune of Rs.7,94,408/- has been ordered against petitioner. It is
submitted that neither any regular departmental enquiry was conducted nor was
any charge-sheet issued to petitioner which is contrary to Rule 14 of MP Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (for brevity "Rules,
1966"). It is submitted that once the allegations were denied by petitioner, it was
mandatory on the part of the respondents to have conducted regular departmental
enquiry by issuing charge-sheet and by appointing enquiry officer and presenting
officer. Learned counsel for petitioner further submits that even alleged charge
mentioned against petitioner is not a misconduct and only charge mentioned
against petitioner is that petitioner had made payment from one head instead of
another head. It is further submitted that without ascertaining the loss, the
impugned order has been issued and without providing an opportunity of being
heard to assess the loss, the recovery to the tune of Rs.7,94,408/- has been
imposed upon petitioner. The aforesaid aspect has not been considered by the
Appellate Authority and the appeal has been rejected by order dated 17.11.2015.
3. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent/State
submits that procedure as adopted by the respondents is that every officer of
PWD, WRD & PHE works as per PWD Work Manual in which provisions are
that before issuing work order/purchasing of material estimates should be
prepared and approval is got from competent authority and after getting approval
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from the competent authority payment is made in the particular head as per law.
It is further submitted that petitioner and other officers purchased material of Rs.
74,32,000/- which had no use and prima facie it was found that this purchase was
illegal and against the provisions of PWD Manual. For the period of 14.07.2006
to 20.7.2006 petitioner called tender for supply of material for construction work
of Marg Hatpipalya Bourasa without approval which is Rs.15,88,817/-. After
issuance of charge-sheet, petitioner submitted reply on 29.6.2011 and thereafter a
decision was taken by the Government and as per Rule 16 of Rules, 1966
proceedings were initiated against those persons including petitioner and after
obtaining approval and permission of PSC and other competent authority it was
found that the reply of the petitioner was not satisfactory and prima facie
petitioner was found guilty and it was found that recovery of Rs.7,94,408/- had to
be issued and same was issued against petitioner and other officers. It is
submitted that the appeal preferred thereagainst has also rightly been rejected by
the Appellate Authority. On these grounds, learned counsel for State prays for
dismissal of instant petition.
4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
5. From perusal of record, it appears that by order dated 24.12.2014 without
any basis and without following the due process of law and without considering
that no financial loss has been caused to the Government, the recovery to the tune
of Rs.7,94,408/- has been ordered against petitioner. No regular departmental
enquiry was conducted as Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were not
appointed which is contrary to Rule 14 of Rules, 1966. Once the allegations were
denied by petitioner, it was mandatory on the part of the respondents to have
conducted regular departmental enquiry by appointing enquiry officer and
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presenting officer. Even alleged charge mentioned against petitioner is not a
misconduct and only charge mentioned against petitioner is that petitioner had
made payment from one head instead of another head. Without ascertaining the
loss, the impugned order has been issued and without providing an opportunity of
being heard to assess the loss, the recovery to the tune of Rs.7,94,408/- has been
imposed upon petitioner. The aforesaid aspect has not been considered by the
Appellate Authority and the appeal has been rejected by order dated 17.11.2015.
6. Relevant portion of order impugned dated 24.12.2014 (Annexure P-2) is
quoted below for ready reference and convenience:
mijksDr dkj.k crkvks lwpuk i= ds laca/k esa vipkjh vf/kdkjh ls izkIr mRrj ij
izeq[k vfHk;ark dk vfHker pkgk x;k gSA izeq[k vfHk;ark ls izkIr vfHker ds ifjizs{; esa izdj.k
ds ijh{k.k esa ;g ik;k x;k gS fd vipkjh vf/kdkfj;ksa }kjk :i;s 74]47]831@& jksM+ lkbZu
ckMZ ,oa vU; en esa [kpZ dh xbZ tks fd dsanz 'kklu }kjk Lohd`r izkDdyu esa lfEefyr ugh
FkhA bl izdkj mDr vf/kdkfj;ksa }kjk 'kklu dh fcuk Lohd`fr ds lkexzh Ø; ij O;; dh xbZ
ftlls ewy Lohd`r dk;Z lEikfnr ugha gks ldkA mDr d`R; ls 'kklu dks gqbZ gkfu vipkjh
vf/kdkfj;ksa ls olwyh dk fu.kZ; fy;k x;k gSA pwafd mDr dk;Z eas fcuk 'kklu vuqefr ds O;;
dh vuqefr nsus okys rFkk vuqefr izkIr djus okys nksuks vf/kdkfj;ksa nks"kh gSA vr% gkfu dh
jkf'k dh olwyh dk fu/kkZj.k fd;k tkdj iz'kkldh; vuqeksnu izkIr fd;k x;k fd fuEukuqlkj
jkf'k lacaf/kr vipkjh vf/kdkfj;ksa ls olwYkh dh tkosA
Øa- vipkjh vf/kdkjh uke ,oa in olwYkh fd;s tkus okyh jkf'k
1 Jh ch-ds- pkSgku] rRdk- izHkkjh eq[; vfHk;ark] :-16]58]997@& ¼:- lksyg Ykk[k
mTTkSu@RkRdk- v/kh{k.k ;a=h] e.My mTTkSu vkV~Bkou gtkj UkkS LkkS lRRkkuos½
2 Jh /kus'oj iapksyh] rRdk- dk;Zikyu ;a=h :-45]66]800@& ¼:- iSrkyhl Ykk[k
fN;klB gtkj vkB lkS½
3 Jh ds-ih- flag] rRdk- dk;Zikyu ;a=h :-4]27]623@& ¼:- pkj Ykk[k lRrkbZl
gtkj NS% lkS rsbZl½
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:6942
4 Jh ujsUnz flag j?kqoa'kh] rRdk- dk;Zikyu ;a=h :-7]94]408@& ¼:- lkr Ykk[k pkSjkuos
gtkj pkj lkS vkB½
7. Perusal of impugned order reveals that without considering the detailed
reply, it has been passed by the Disciplinary Authority which is non-speaking
and unreasoned.
8. From perusal of the punishment order issued by the Disciplinary Authority
dated 24.12.2014, it is clear that the Disciplinary Authority while passing the
order imposing punishment upon petitioner is exercising quasi judicial powers
and even the quasi judicial order must be speaking one. The Disciplinary
Authority must apply its mind to the entire facts and circumstances and record
valid and justifiable reasons and all grounds in support of its conclusion.
However, in the present case, the impugned punishment order does not appear to
be a speaking order.
9. It is a settled position in law that when a discretion is vested in an authority
to exercise a particular power, the same is required to be exercised with due
diligence, and in reasonable and rational manner. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
catena of decisions has reiterated time and again the necessity and importance of
giving reasons by the authority in support of its decision. It has been held that the
face of an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority or even by an administrative
authority affecting the rights of parties must be speaking one. The affected party
must know how his/her case or defence was considered before passing the
prejudicial order.
10. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab
vs. Bandip Singh and others reported in (2016) 1 SCC 724 is relevant to quote.
In the said decision, it had been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that every
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decision of an administrative or executive nature must be a composite and self-
sustaining one, in that it should contain all the reasons which prevailed on the
official taking the decision to arrive at his conclusion.
11. In the same judgment in paragraph 7, the Hon'ble Supreme Court clarifies
that the Government does not have carte blanche to take any decision it chooses
to; it cannot take a capricious, arbitrary or prejudiced decision. Its decision must
be informed and impregnated with reasons. Paragraph 7 of the said decision is
quoted as under:-
"7. The same principle was upheld more recently in Ram Kishun v.
State of U.P. (2012) 11 SCC 511 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 382.
However, we must hasten to clarify that the Government does not
have a carte blanche to take any decision it chooses to; it cannot take
a capricious, arbitrary or prejudiced decision. Its decision must be
informed and impregnated with reasons.
This has already been discussed threadbare in several decisions of
this Court, including in Sterling Computers Ltd. v. M & N
Publications Ltd (1993) 1 SCC 445, Tata Cellular v. Union of India
(1994) 6 SCC 651, Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport
Ltd. (2000) 2 SCC 617, B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd. v. Nair Coal
Services Ltd. (2006) 11 SCC 548 and Jagdish Mandal v. State of
Orissa (2007) 14 SCC 517".
12. Also the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kranti
Associates Pvt. Ltd. and another v/s Masood Ahmed Khan and others
reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496 highlights this point. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
in paragraph 15 opined that the face of an order passed by a quasi judicial
authority or even an administrative authority affecting the rights of parties, must
speak. It must not be like the inscrutable face of a sphinx. In paragraph 47 the
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Honb'le Supreme Court summarized its discussion. The relevant sub-paragraphs
of the said summary are quoted as under:-
"47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:
(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a
component of a decision making process as observing
principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and
even by administrative bodies.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to
rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of
reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually
the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the
principle that reason is the soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be
as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them.
All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to
demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been
objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the
litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.
(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from
the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said
requirement is now virtually a component of human rights
and was considered part of Stasbourg Jurisprudence. See
Ruiz torija v. Spain (1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29
and Anya v. University of Oxford 2001 EWCA Civ 405
(CA), wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the
European Convention of Human Rights which
requires,"adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for
judicial decisions".
13. As disciplinary authority has issued a non-speaking and unreasoned order,
therefore, absence of reason in the punishment order cannot be compensated by
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disclosure of reason in the appellate order, therefore, the argument of counsel for
respondent is not sustainable that the appellate order is reasoned and speaking
order. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case Oryx Fisheries Pvt.Ltd vs Union
Of India & Ors reported in (2010) 13 SCC 427 has held as under:-
"41. In M/s Kranti Associates (supra), this Court after
considering various judgments formulated certain principles
in para 51 of the judgment which are set out below
a. In India the judicial trend has always been to record
reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions
affect anyone prejudicially.
b. A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support
of its conclusions.
c. Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the
wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done
it must also appear to be done as well.
d. Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on
any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial
or even administrative power.
e. Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by
the decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding
extraneous considerations.
f. Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a
component of a decision making process as observing
principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and
even by administrative bodies.
g. Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by
superior Courts.
h. The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to
rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of
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reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually
the life blood of judicial decision making justifying the
principle that reason is the soul of justice.
i. Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be
as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them.
All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to
demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been
objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the
litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.
j. Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial
accountability and transparency.
k. If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid
enough about his/her decision making process then it is
impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful
to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of
incrementalism.
l. Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and
succinct. A pretence of reasons or `rubber-stamp reasons' is
not to be equated with a valid decision making process.
m. It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua
non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency
in decision making not only makes the judges and decision
makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to
broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial
Candor (1987) 100 Harward Law Review 731-737).
n. Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from
the broad doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said
requirement is now virtually a component of human rights
and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See
(1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29 and Anya vs.
University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405, wherein the
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Court referred to Article 6 of European Convention of
Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent
reasons must be given for judicial decisions".
o. In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital
role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for
development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the
decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "Due
Process".
42. In the instant case the appellate order contains reasons.
However, absence of reasons in the original order cannot be
compensated by disclosure of reason in the appellate order.
43. In Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K.
Ratna and others,(1986) 4 SCC 537, it has been held:
"......after the blow suffered by the initial
decision, it is difficult to contemplate complete
restitution through an appellate decision. Such a
case is unlike an action for money or recovery of
property, where the execution of the trial decree
may be stayed pending appeal, or a successful
appeal may result in refund of the money or
restitution of the property, with appropriate
compensation by way of interest or mesne profits
for the period of deprivation. And, therefore, it
seems to us, there is manifest need to ensure that
there is no breach of fundamental procedure in
the original proceeding, and to avoid treating an
appeal as an overall substitute for the original
proceeding."
44. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court quashes the show
cause notice as also the order dated 19.03.2008 passed by
the third respondent. In view of that, the appellate order has
no legs to stand and accordingly is quashed."
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14. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of O.K. Bhardwaj vs. Union of
India & Ors. reported in (2001) 9 SCC 180, has held as under:-
"3. While we agree with the first proposition of the High
Court having regard to the rule position which expressly
says that "withholding increments of pay with or without
cumulative effect" is a minor penalty, we find it not
possible to agree with the second proposition. Even in the
case of a minor penalty an opportunity has to be given to
the delinquent employee to have his say or to file his
explanation with respect to the charges against him.
Moreover, if the charges are factual and if they are denied
by the delinquent employee, an enquiry should also be
called for. This is the minimum requirement of the
principle of natural justice and the said requirement cannot
be dispensed with."
15. Even in the case of a minor penalty an opportunity has to be given to the
delinquent employee to have his say or to file his explanation with respect to the
charges against him. Moreover, if the charges are factual and if they are denied
by the delinquent employee, an enquiry should also be called for. This is the
minimum requirement of the principle of natural justice and the said requirement
cannot be dispensed with. As disciplinary authority has issued a non-speaking
and unreasoned order, therefore, absence of reason in the punishment order
cannot be compensated by disclosure of reason in the appellate order, and
charges are factual and they are denied by the delinquent/petitioner, an enquiry
should also be called for and as there is no enquiry regular departmental enquiry
has been conducted before awarding the minor punishment.
16. Even the charges levelled against petitioner do not come under the
definition of misconduct. Petitioner merely failed to follow the guidelines. At
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best, act of petitioner may fall in the category of carelessness or negligence and
the allegations levelled against petitioner even do not amount to misconduct.
Another aspect of the matter warrants consideration. The irregularity which has
been found against petitioner is only with regard to non-following certain
procedure and the allegation levelled against petitioner does not come under the
definition of misconduct as there is no mens rea alleged against petitioner and
only allegation is there that the petitioner had made the payment from different
head. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of S.D. Bind Vs. Union of
India and Others reported in 2015(1) M.P.L.J. 74 has held as under:
"15. That apart, another aspect of the matter warrants consideration.
The irregularities which is found against the petitioner is only non-
following of certain procedure in the matter of awarding contract. The
question is as to whether such an irregularity in the matter of following
the procedure can be termed as a misconduct. The Supreme Court has
considered the aforesaid aspect in the case of Union of India v. J.
Ahmed, (1979) 2 SCC 286 : AIR 1979 SC 1022 which has been
followed again by the Supreme Court in the case of Inspector Prem
Chand v. Govt, of National Capital Territory of Delhi, (2007) 4 SCC
566, wherein it has been held by the Supreme Court that merely lack of
efficiency, failure to attain the highest standard of administrative ability
or negligent or careless want of dealing with a matter on one isolated
may not constituted a misconduct for which punishment can be
imposed.
16. In the present case apart from the fact that the Division Bench
has made the observations as reproduced hereinabove and interfered
with the imposition of cost, it found that there was certain discrepancy
in the guidelines laid down and, therefore, in paragraph 9 fresh
guidelines for future action was issued. Once this is the factual scenario
then merely because the petitioner failed to follow the guidelines for
once, it cannot be said that the petitioner has committed misconduct in
the matter. At best action of the petitioner may fall in the category of
careless or negligence in the matter of dealing with the case once an
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isolated occasion and if the principles laid down by the Supreme Court
as indicated in the case of J. Ahmed (supra) is applied, we are of the
considered view that allegations levelled even do not amount to
misconduct for which action can be taken."
17. In view of the foregoing discussion and taking into consideration the facts
and circumstances of the case, present petition stands disposed of in the
following manner:
(i) Impugned punishment order dated 24.12.2014 (Annexure P-2)
so far as it relates to petitioner only and appeal rejection order dated
17.11.2015 (Annexure P-1) are hereby quashed;
(ii) The respondents are directed to give all consequential benefits
and the recovery amount to petitioner along with interest at the rate
of 6% per annum from the date of entitlement till actual payment,
within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified
copy of this order; and
(iii) As petitioner has already stood retired, no liberty is granted to
respondents to take a fresh action.
18. Pending interlocutory applications (if any) are disposed of.
(Anand Singh Bahrawat)
Judge
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