[Cites 21, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Sunil Jatav vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 17 February, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR GUPTA
ON THE 17th OF FEBRUARY, 2026
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 5160 of 2026
SUNIL JATAV AND OTHERS
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Daya Nath Pandey- Advocate for petitioners.
Shri Satendra Singh Sikarwar- PP for the State.
Shri Imran Qureshi- Advocate for the respondent No.3.
....................................................................................................................................................................
Reserved on - 05.02.2026
Delivered on - 17.02.2026
ORDER
This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has
been preferred by the petitioners seeking quashment of judgment of
conviction and sentence dated 26/12/2025 passed in RCT No. 28/2021
arising out of Crime No. 18/2020 registered at Police Station Pichhore,
District Shivpuri, as partly modified by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Pichhore in Criminal Appeal No. 16/2026 vide order dated
27/01/2026, and for their acquittal under Sections 498-A, 324 IPC and
Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act on the basis of compromise.
Briefly stated facts of the case are that the Trial Court convicted the
petitioners by judgment dated 26/12/2025. Being aggrieved, they preferred
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Criminal Appeal No. 16/2026 before the learned Appellate Court. During
pendency of the appeal, a compromise application was filed. The learned
Appellate Court partly accepted the compromise and acquitted the petitioners
for offences under Sections 323/34 and 506 Part-II IPC, however, maintained
the conviction under Sections 498-A, 324 IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act against the concerned petitioners. The appeal is still pending
consideration on merits before the appellate court. An application for
suspension/stay of conviction preferred by petitioner No.1-Sunil has also
been rejected by the Appellate Court.
The principal contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that
the dispute is matrimonial in nature; complainant Vidya is the wife of
petitioner Sunil and the parties have amicably settled their disputes and are
living together. Therefore, the continuation of conviction would adversely
affect petitioner Sunil's service as he is posted as Sub-Inspector and has been
served with a show cause notice for termination. It is further argued that in
view of the compromise, this Court should exercise inherent powers to quash
the remaining conviction to secure ends of justice. Reliance has been placed
upon Ramgopal & Anr. v. State of M.P. , Criminal Appeal No. 1489/2012;
Jayabai Kurmi v. State of M.P. ; Hemraj v. State of M.P. ; Matadin v. State of
M.P.; Naveen v. State of M.P. and Hasib Khan v. State of M.P.
Per contra, learned Government Advocate submits that the petition is
not maintainable in view of the fact that the conviction has already been
recorded and the appeal is pending. It is contended that Section 482 Cr.P.C.
cannot be invoked to bypass the statutory remedy of appeal.
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Learned counsel for the respondent No.3 supported the contention of
the learned counsel for the petitioner.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
It is not in dispute that the petitioners stand convicted by the Trial
Court and their appeal is pending before the Appellate Court. The Appellate
Court has already considered the compromise and partly allowed the same,
acquitting the petitioners for certain minor offences, but has consciously
declined to interfere with the conviction under Sections 498-A, 324 IPC and
Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
At this stage, it is apposite to note that once a competent criminal court
has recorded a finding of guilt after full-fledged trial, the criminal
proceedings culminate into a judgment. The remedy provided under the Code
against such conviction is an appeal under Chapter XXIX Cr.P.C. The
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised as a
substitute for appellate jurisdiction.
The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State
of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, held that though the High Court possesses
inherent power to quash criminal proceedings on the basis of compromise,
such power must be exercised sparingly and with caution. The Court
emphasized that serious and non-compoundable offences having societal
impact should not be quashed merely on the basis of settlement.
I n Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab , (2014) 6 SCC 466, guidelines
were laid down for quashing on compromise and it was observed that such
power is ordinarily exercised at a stage when the matter is pending before the
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Trial Court . Similarly, in State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan , (2019) 5 SCC
688, it has been held that offences under Section 498-A IPC and other
serious offences cannot be quashed mechanically on compromise.
Though the Supreme Court in Ramgopal v. State of M.P. , (2021) 6
SCC 705 and Gopal v. State of M.P. , (2021) 16 SCC 77 has, in peculiar
facts, exercised power even at the post-conviction stage, the same has been
described as an exception and not the rule . The said power is to be invoked
only in rare cases where the offence is overwhelmingly private in nature and
does not have serious societal impact.
Heavy reliance has been placed on the judgement of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the cases Ramgopal & Anr. v. State of M.P. , Criminal Appeal No.
1489/2012 with Krishnappa & Ors Vs. State of Karnataka, Criminal Appeal
No.1488/2012. The necessary facts of these cases are that:-
Criminal Appeal No. 1489/2012:-
3. The Appellants assailed their conviction before the Court of
Additional Sessions Judge, Ambah. During the pendency of that
Appeal, the Appellants and the Complainant reconciled
their difference(s) and a compromise ensued between them on 13
September 2006. Learned Sessions Judge took notice of the
settlement, moved jointly by the parties, and compounded the
offences under Sections 294 and 323 read with 34 IPC. acquitting
the Appellants of the same. The Court, nevertheless, maintained
their conviction under Section 326 read with 34 IPC, since the said
offence is non-compoundable within the scheme of Section 320
Cr.P.C. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, taking into
consideration the settlement between the parties, reduced the
quantum of sentence from Rigorous Imprisonment of three years
to one year. Still aggrieved, the Appellants preferred a Criminal
Revision before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior
Bench, challenging their conviction and sentence. Alternatively,
they sought compounding of offence under Section 326 IPC in
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light of the compromise. However, such a prayer was not acceded
to by the High Court, re-iterating that the offence is 'non-
compoundable'. The High Court, even so, further reduced the
duration of imprisonment to the period already undergone by the
Appellants. The Appellants are now before this Court, seeking
compounding of their Actus Reus under Section 326 IPC in view
of the settlement between parties.
Criminal Appeal No.1488/2012-
5. The Appellants, together with Accused Nos. 5 and 7 were tried
and convicted under Sections 143, 144, 147, 148, 342, 324 and
326 read with 149 IPC and the maximum sentence awarded to
them was two years simple imprisonment under Section 326 IPC.
The trial against Accused No. 6 was split after filing of the
chargesheet, since he remained absconding. The Appellants along
with the co-accused, approached the High Court of Karnataka,
challenging their conviction and sentence. The High Court
acquitted Accused Nos. 5 & 7 finding insufficient evidence to
sustain their involvement in the subject crime, but maintained the
conviction and sentence qua the Appellants. In his case as well, the
parties entered into a compromise. The sald compromise was,
however, not placed on record before the Trial Court or the High
Court. The Appellants are now seeking 'compounding of the
offences and their consequential acquittal on the basis of the
compromise reached between them and the Complainant-victim.
In both of these cases, the accused persons preferred their appeals after
the appellate/Sessions Court had given its final verdict over the matter the
cases were disposed from that state already. It is also worth mentioning that
in both these cases, the accused persons while preferring the appeals
challenged their conviction also. But, in the present case, the petition has
been filed only for quashing of the FIR on the basis of the compromise.
Even, the case is still pending at the appellate/Sessions stage. No petition has
been filed by the accused persons for looking into the merit of the case or
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challenging the legality of the conviction. Hence, citation relied upon by the
counsel for the petitioner is distinguishable on the facts.
Further, the aforesaid cases have been decided by the Hon'ble Apex
Court while exercising its power conferred under Article 142 of the of
Constitution of India. The relevant part is reproduced herein-
19. We thus sum-up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 Cr.P.C.
where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in
respect of offences 'compoundable within the statutory framework, the extra-
ordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or
vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked
beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 Cr.P.C. Nonetheless, we
reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully
in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature
and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society: (ii) Seriousness of
the injury, if any ; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused
and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the
occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations.
In the present case, the offences which survive are under Section 498-
A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The offence relating to
cruelty for dowry demand is not merely a private dispute between two
individuals but has a serious social dimension. The Dowry Prohibition Act is
a social welfare legislation intended to curb a deep-rooted social evil.
Therefore, such offences cannot be lightly quashed solely on the ground that
parties have entered into compromise.
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Further, the appeal against conviction is already pending before the
competent Appellate Court. The Appellate Court has applied its mind to the
compromise and partly allowed the same. Entertaining the present petition
would amount to sitting in appeal over the order of the Appellate Court and
converting inherent jurisdiction into a parallel appellate forum, which is
impermissible in law.
The contention that petitioner-Sunil may suffer service consequences
cannot be a ground to invoke inherent jurisdiction to annul a conviction
recorded after due trial. Service repercussions are a collateral consequence of
conviction and cannot override the statutory scheme of criminal adjudication.
The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners are
distinguishable on facts. In those cases, either the offences were minor in
nature or the appellate court itself exercised power in peculiar circumstances.
All these cases were presented before the respective courts challenging the
conviction/for setting aside the conviction and also the petitioners therein
sought the merits of the cases/sentence to be examined. None of the
authorities lay down a proposition that after conviction and during pendency
of appeal, the High Court must quash the conviction under Section 482
Cr.P.C. merely on the basis of compromise.
16. Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of State of Haryana and others
Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, AIR 1992 SC 604 laid down the different
exigencies under which interference under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can be
made. Following exigencies are as under:
"(a) where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the
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complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused;
(b) where the allegations in the First Information Report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable
offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)of
the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2)of the Code;
(c) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or 'complaint
and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused;
(d) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2)of the Code;
(e) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd
and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever
reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against
the accused;
(f) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings
and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party;
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(g) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide
and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive
for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge."
The present case does not fall under the anyone of the categories
mentioned above also. It is well settled that inherent powers cannot be
exercised in contravention of express statutory provisions nor to bypass the
remedy of appeal. In absence of any exceptional circumstance warranting
interference, this Court is not inclined to exercise jurisdiction under Section
482 Cr.P.C.
Consequently, the petition being devoid of merit and not maintainable
at this stage, stands dismissed.
No order as to costs.
(RAJESH KUMAR GUPTA )
JUDGE
Vishal
