[Cites 17, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Ankur Bhatnagar vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 16 February, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:5954
1 WP-44126-2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ASHISH SHROTI
ON THE 16th OF FEBRUARY, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 44126 of 2025
ANKUR BHATNAGAR
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Petitioner is present in person.
ORDER
Lawyers are abstaining from work due to shoot out case of a lawyer at
Shivpuri (M.P.). The petitioner appeared in person and requested for hearing
of the case inasmuch as much time has already lapsed.
2. The petitioner has filed this writ petition challenging the order dated
22/10/2025, Annexure P-1, passed by respondent no.4, whereby he has been
declared unsuitable for appointment on the post of Constable on account of
his involvement in a criminal case. The petitioner has prayed for a direction
to the respondents to issue an appointment order in his favour with all
consequential benefits.
3. The facts necessary for decision of this case are that the petitioner
participated in the Police Constable Recruitment Process - 2023 as a
candidate under the EWS category. He successfully passed the written test as
also the physical test and was allotted posting at SRP Indore. In the process
of appointment, during verification of his criminal antecedents, it was found
that a criminal case was registered against him by Police Station Prem Nagar,
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:5954
2 WP-44126-2025
Jhansi (U.P.), for offense punishable under Section 498-A, 323, 504 IPC and
Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. The petitioner was subsequently
acquitted in the said case on 17/10/2023.
4 . The matter was placed before the Screening Committee in its
meeting held on 10/09/2025. The committee opined that the offense under
Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act alleged against the petitioner involves
moral turpitude and as per instructions issued by the State Government vide
circular dated 24/07/2018 (Annexure P-8), he is unsuitable for appointment.
Accordingly, the respondent no.4 passed the impugned order dated
22/10/2025 declaring the petitioner as unsuitable for appointment.
5 . Challenging the impugned order, the petitioner submitted that he
was falsely implicated in the criminal case, which was lodged by his sister-
in-law (brother's wife) in connection with their inter-se matrimonial
disputes. He submitted that the petitioner, along with his parents, resides at
Gwalior, while his brother was residing with his wife at Shivpuri. He also
pointed out that his sister-in-law left the house of his brother, as a result of
which his brother filed an application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage
Act for restitution of conjugal rights. As a counterblast, the FIR was
registered by the complainant after a lapse of about eight months of her
leaving the house. The also submitted that by making omnibus allegations,
the entire family was roped in the criminal case. Later on, the marital tie was
mutually dissolved. The petitioner, as also other family members, were
acquitted in the criminal case. The petitioner also referred to his mark-sheets
brought on record to say that he has a good academic record and because of
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:5954
3 WP-44126-2025
the solitary incidence of his false implication in the aforesaid criminal case,
he is deprived of his chance of employment. The petitioner, therefore, prayed
for setting aside of the impugned order and for direction to the respondents
to issue appointment order in his favour.
6. The respondents have filed the reply wherein they have stated that
admittedly the petitioner was involved in the criminal case for offence
involving moral turpitude. They have relied upon the Circular dated
24.07.2018 to say that the offence under Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition
Act is included as an offence involving moral turpitude. It is their case that
the petitioner, who is aspiring for appointment in Police force, is required to
have a good character and reputation. Because of criminal case registered
against him, it cannot be said that he carries good reputation. It is their case
that the petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal case by giving benefit of
doubt and, therefore, mere acquittal in the criminal case would not entitle
him for appointment. The respondents have also placed reliance upon the
judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Police,
New Delhi & another Vs. Mehar Singh reported in (2013)7 SCC 685 as also
in the case of State of M.P. & others Vs. Parvez Khan reported in (2015)2
SCC 591.
7. Considered the petitioner's arguments and perused the record.
8. The petitioner has been declared unsuitable for appointment on the
post in question based upon his involvement in the criminal case. Therefore,
the facts of criminal case needs to be looked into. It is seen from the records
that the petitioner's brother was married to the complainant on 23.11.2016. A
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:5954
4 WP-44126-2025
child was born out of this wedlock. On account of certain matrimonial
disputes, the complainant left her husband's house in the year 2020. The
husband (petitioner's brother) filed an application under Section 9 of Hindu
Marriage Act for restitution of conjugal rights. Thereafter, after about 08
months of leaving the house, the complainant lodged the FIR in question
wherein not only her husband but also the petitioner and his parents were
implicated. Subsequently, on 13.02.2023, the complainant and the
petitioner's brother submitted an application under Section 13-B of Hindu
Marriage Act for dissolution of marriage by mutual consent. This application
was allowed on 22.09.2023 (Annexure P/6). Subsequently, vide order dated
17.10.2023 (Annexure P/7) passed by JMFC - 1, Jhansi, the petitioner and
other family members were acquitted in the criminal case.
9. The petitioner was involved in the aforesaid criminal case being the
brother of the complainant's husband. It is seen from the impugned order,
there was an omnibus allegation made against the petitioner and his parents
regarding demand of dowry of Rs. Five Lakhs. Pertinently, this has
happened after lapse of about 07 years of marriage.
10. From the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court
it appears that there was a matrimonial dispute between petitioner's brother
and his wife which ended in settlement and the complainant did not support
the case of the prosecution and the other prosecution witness(s) were not
examined in the case to corroborate the prosecution story. The marriage was
also dissolved with mutual consent.
1 1 . The respondent no.4 while passing the impugned order has
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:5954
5 WP-44126-2025
observed against the petitioner as under:
"सहायक पुिलस महािनर क (चयन/भत ) पुिलस मु यालय,
भोपाल का प कमांक-पुम/ु 2-चयन/स-5/868-ए/2025 भोपाल,
दनांक 30.09.2025 ा हुआ जसम लेख कया गया है क
करण छानबीन सिमित के सम दनांक 10.09.2025 को तुत
कया गया है । छानबीन सिमित का अिभमत िन नानुसार है :-
1. च र स यापन के दौरान पाया गया क अ यथ अंकुर
भटनागर पु ी महे कुमार भटनागर के व थाना ेमनगर
जला झांसी उ. . म अपराध . 222/2021 धारा 498-ए, 323, 504
भाद व एवं 3/4 दहे ज ितषेध अिधिनयम का करण पंजीब हुआ,
जसका ववरण िन नानुसार है :-
I. फ रया दया या भटनागर दारा रपोट दज कराई
क उसक शाद दनांक 23.11.2016 को
सौरभअ हरवार के साथ हुई थी। सगाई से लेकर शाद
तक कुल 7 लाख पए नगद एवं गृह थी का सामान
दया गया। फ रया दया क ननद यंका भटनागर, एवं
दे वर अंकुर भटनागर, सांस सुषमा ने कई बार कहा क
तु हारे पता ने दहे ज म 5 लाख पए कम दए है । शाद
के कुछ दन बाद फ रया दया ने अपने पता को सभी
बात बताई तो पता ने और दहे ज दे ने का मना कर
दया। इसी बात को लेकर पित, सांस, दे वर दारा
ू रतापूण यवहार कर आए दन गाली गलौच व
मारपीट क गई।
II. करण म अपर मु य याियक म ज े ट झासी
दारा संदेह का लाभ दे कर दोषमु कया गया।
2. उ करण छानबीन सिमित म पर ण हे तु बैठक दनांक
10.09.2025 को रखा गया, पर ण उपरांत सिमित ने पाया क
अ यथ दारा अपने प रवार के सद य के साथ िमलकर अपनी
भाभी को दहे ज के िलए मानिसक एवं शार रक प से ता डत
कया गया एवं उसके साथ मरपीट क गई।
3. उ करण के पर ण उपरांत सिमित ने पाया क शासन के
िनदश मांक एफ-17-01/2002/17/दो दनांक 24.07.2018 के
अनुसार अ यथ पर पंजीब अपराध क धारा 3/4 दहे ज ितषेध
अिधिनयम नैितक अधोपतन णे ी क होकर गंभीर कृ ित क है ।"
1 2 . It is thus seen that even though he has been acquitted in the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:5954
6 WP-44126-2025
criminal case, a finding has been record in para-2 of the impugned order that
the petitioner has caused mental and physical harassment to the complainant
along with his family members. There is no discussion as to on what basis
this finding has been recorded. Paragraph-3 thereafter records that the
offence under Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act involves moral turpitude
as per Circular dated 24.07.2018. The entire order thereafter only deals with
the conduct which a Policeman should carry, however, the facts of the
criminal case are not discussed.
13. At this stage, it is profitable to refer to the Division Bench
judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Rohit Singh Raghuvanshi Vs.
State of M.P. & Ors. in W.A. No.7/2020 wherein the Division Bench opined
that while considering the candidature of a candidate, the Screening
Committee is required to consider the nature of allegations, overt act alleged
against the candidate, criminal antecedents and his overall reputation in the
society. The observations made by the Division Bench in para - 12 & 13,
being relevant, are reproduced as under:
"12. Thus what comes out loud and clear from the above
discussion is that appointing authority while assessing suitability
of a candidate to enter public employment has a heavy
responsibility of considering lot many factors. Mere registration of
offence which according to the appointing authority involves
moral turpitude especially when the Court of competent
jurisdiction has not pronounced judgment on merits, is not per se
good enough to declare a candidate unfit for public employment.
12.1 Employer in discharge of this onerous responsibility is
required to inter alia consider following factors:-
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:5954
7 WP-44126-2025
(i) The nature of allegations;
(ii) Overt act alleged against candidate;
(iii) Whether the allegations are solely against
individual candidate or have been alleged with the aid
of section 34/149 of IPC;
(iv) The criminal antecedents of the candidate;
(v) Overall reputation of the candidate in his
locality/society etc.
13. The aforesaid factors are illustrative and not exhaustive. There
can be other relevant factors which the Competent Authority can
consider. The concern of this Court is that it is seen time and again
that the appointing authorities are not discharging this onerous
duty while considering candidature of persons seeking public
employment. The appointing authority often adopts cursory and
perfunctory approach. The appointing authority ought to
remember that it is dealing with prospects of employment of a
citizen of the country, which if not dealt with appropriately in
accordance with the rule of law, can jeopardize the entire future of
a candidate and render her/him demoralized."
14. The Apex Court in the case of Pawan Kumar v/s Union of India &
Others reported in (2023)12 SCC 317 has also considered the similar issue. It
has been held that all the matters cannot be put in a straitjacket and the
degree of flexibility and discretion vests with the authorities, must be
exercised with care and caution taking all the facts and circumstances into
consideration, including the nature and type of lapse. Para - 17 of the said
judgment is reproduced below:
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:5954
8 WP-44126-2025
"17. One distinguishing factor, as noticed above, is that the
criminal complaint/FIR in the present case was registered post
submission of the application form. We have also taken into
account the nature of the allegations made in the criminal case and
that the matter was of trivial nature not involving moral turpitude.
Further, the proceedings had ended in a clean acquittal. As is clear
from para 38 in Avtar Singh [Avtar Singh v. Union of India,
(2016) 8 SCC 471 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 425], all matters cannot
be put in a straitjacket and a degree of flexibility and discretion
vests with the authorities, must be exercised with care and caution
taking all the facts and circumstances into consideration, including
the nature and type of lapse."
15. The Apex Court again considered the issue in the case of Avtar
Singh v. Union of India reported in (2016)8 SCC 471 wherein the Court held
as under:
"38.4.3. If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving
moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical
ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of
reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all
relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take
appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee."
16. Besides the aforesaid judicial pronouncement, the Government of
Madhya Pradesh through Home Department has issued instructions vide
circular dated 24.07.2018 (Annexure-P/4) laying down the instructions to
deal with such matters. Clause 6(I)(a) provides as under:-
"6. शासक य सेवा के िलये चयिनत अ यिथयो ारा च र स यापन हे तु भरे गए
अनु माणन फाम म आपरािधक पृ भूिम यायालयीन करण तथा उसम
दोषमु या दोषिस क जानकार जानबूझकर अथवा ु टवश अथवा
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:5954
9 WP-44126-2025
अ ानतावश िछपाये जाने से शासक य सेवा म िनयु हे तु अ जत होने वाली
अहता के वषय पर सम प से वचार कर रा य शासन ारा त काल भाव से
िन नानुसार नीितगत िनणय िलए गये है :-
I- *** *** ***
a. य द अ यथ के व पंजीब करण म नैितक अ ोपतन का आयाम
शािमल है और उसे नैितक अ ोपतन क धारा म यायालय ारा दोषमु कया
गया है । अ यथ ारा इसका उ लेख अनु माणन फॉम म कया गया हो अथवा
नह ऐसे करणो म अपराध क कृ ित एवं दोषमु क अव था तथा अ यथ
क पृ भूिम को दे खते हुये शासक य सेवा के िलये यो य अयो य है , के संबंध म
िनयो ा ारा िनणय िलया जावेगा।"
17. Further, clause 6(II)(a) of the circular provides that if the offence
alleged is simple in nature and the candidate has been acquitted, he be
considered as suitable for appointment in Govt. employment.
18. In view of the aforesaid, it is settled that mere implication of a
candidate in criminal case, even for offence involving moral turpitude,
would not ipso-fact render him unsuitable for the post. The Screening
Committee is having an onerous duty to examine the entire matter
meticulously before taking any decision in the matter.
19. The offence under Section 498-A of IPC is not included in the list
for offences involving moral turpitude. The petitioner has been deprived of
appointment only because of involvement of offence under Section 3/4 of
Dowry Prohibition Act. As seen from the records of this case, there appears
to be no material to support that the petitioner ever demanded dowry from
the complainant. On the contrary, from the judgment of criminal case, the
complainant as well as her father categorically stated that the petitioner never
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:5954
10 WP-44126-2025
demanded dowry.
20. Thus, looking to the act alleged against the petitioner, the
Screening Committee was required to consider as to whether there is any
material to show that the petitioner has committed offence constituting moral
turpitude. Prima facie it would not. However, the committee was led away
with the fact that offence under Section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act is
categorised as offence involving moral turpitude and mechanically held
petitioner unsuitable for appointment without considering the nature of
allegation made against him.
21. As has been held by Courts many a times, mere allegation against
the candidate would not be sufficient to hold him unsuitable for appointment.
The Screening Committee was required to consider the facts in totality while
taking a decision with regard to petitioner's suitability for appointment.
However, a bare perusal of the impugned order goes to show that except by
observing that the offence alleged against the petitioner was a serious one
involving moral turpitude, no consideration is made so far as the facts of the
case are concerned. It is thus seen that the Screening Committee failed in
discharging the onerous duty cast on it by virtue of Apex Court judgment in
the case of Avtar Singh (supra) and the circular, dated 24.07.2018.
22. The respondents have averred that employer is having a right to
consider the suitability of a candidate for appointment in Government service
and relied upon Mehar Singh & Parvez Khan (supra). This discretion of
employer can never be doubted. However, this Court can examine the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:5954
11 WP-44126-2025
manner in which the discretion is exercised by the authority. If the facts of
the present case are seen, learned Trial Court has already acquitted the
petitioner. Merely because the petitioner has been acquitted by giving benefit
of doubt, that by itself would not absolve the Screening Committee of its
obligation to consider the suitability of candidate appreciating various factors
as pointed out by Division Bench in the case of Rohit Singh Raghuvanshi
(supra). The committee was dealing with prospects of employment of a
citizen of the country, which if not dealt with appropriately in accordance
with the rule of law, can jeopardize the entire future of a candidate and
render him demoralized. It is thus found that the committee has adopted
cursory and perfunctory approach.
23. At this stage, it is profitable to refer Apex Court judgment rendered
in the case of Mohammed Imran Vs. State of Maharashtra & others reported
in (2019)17 SCC 696 . It was a case where the Apex Court was considering
denial of appointment to the petitioner in judicial services. The Apex Court
held in para 5, 6 & 9 as under:
"5. Employment opportunities are a scarce commodity in our
country. Every advertisement invites a large number of aspirants
for limited number of vacancies. But that may not suffice to
invoke sympathy for grant of relief where the credentials of the
candidate may raise serious questions regarding suitability,
irrespective of eligibility. Undoubtedly, judicial service is very
different from other services and the yardstick of suitability that
may apply to other services, may not be the same for a judicial
service. But there cannot be any mechanical or rhetorical
incantation of moral turpitude, to deny appointment in judicial
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:5954
12 WP-44126-2025
service simplicitor. Much will depend on the facts of a case. Every
individual deserves an opportunity to improve, learn from the past
and move ahead in life by self-improvement. To make past
conduct, irrespective of all considerations, an albatross around the
neck of the candidate, may not always constitute justice. Much
will, however depend on the fact situation of a case.
6. That the expression "moral turpitude" is not capable of precise
definition was considered in Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana
[Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, opining : (SCC p. 21, para 12)
"12. "Moral turpitude" is an expression which is used in
legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which
is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any
connection showing."
*** *** ***
9. In the present proceedings, on 23-3-2018, this Court had called
for a confidential report of the character verification as also the
antecedents of the appellant as on this date. The report received
reveals that except for the criminal case under reference in which
he has been acquitted, the appellant has a clean record and there is
no adverse material against him to deny him the fruits of his
academic labour in a competitive selection for the post of a
judicial officer. In our opinion, no reasonable person on the basis
of the materials placed before us can come to the conclusion that
the antecedents and character of the appellant are such that he is
unfit to be appointed as a judicial officer. An alleged single
misadventure or misdemeanour of the present nature, if it can be
considered to be so, cannot be sufficient to deny appointment to
the appellant when he has on all other aspects and parameters been
found to be fit for appointment. The law is well settled in this
regard in Avtar Singh v. Union of India [Avtar Singh v. Union of
India, (2016) 8 SCC 471 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 425]. If
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:5954
13 WP-44126-2025
empanelment creates no right to appointment, equally there can be
no arbitrary denial of appointment after empanelment."
24. In the case in hand also, apart from the facts stated above, the
Screening Committee could have verified other antecedents of petitioner
while reaching to a conclusion. The academic record of the petitioner also
would have been relevant consideration. It is seen that the petitioner passed
High School examination with 66.6% marks with distinction in three
subjects. Further, in the Higher Secondary School Certificate examination,
he secured 61.77% marks and distinction in English subject. He could not
have been ousted on the basis of solitary instance of alleged offence under
Section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act without considering as to whether such
offence is made out against him and would amount to moral turpitude. The
Committee was required to record reasons after discussing the facts of the
case. However, except implication of petitioner in criminal case, nothing has
been stated in the impugned order. The Committee has failed to discharge its
onerous duty while considering petitioner's suitability for appointment.
25. Learned counsel for the respondents is correct in submitting that
mere acquittal in the criminal case would not be sufficient to hold the
petitioner suitable for the post in question. However, it is equally correct that
holding him unsuitable only because of the aforesaid criminal case without
considering the facts of the case, would also be unfair and unreasonable. In
fact, it is impermissible in view of the judicial pronouncement cited
hereinbefore as also as per the policy of 2018.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:5954
14 WP-44126-2025
26. In view of the aforesaid, it is found that the Screening Committee
has failed to properly appreciate the facts of the case and has mechanically
cancelled the petitioner's candidature for appointment on the post of
Constable. The Screening Committee got influenced by the factum of
registration of the aforesaid case which involved moral turpitude. However,
the committee failed to appreciate the relevant facts of the case.
Consequently, the orders dated 22.10.2025 (Annexure P/1) is set-aside. The
respondents are directed to offer appointment to the petitioner pursuant to his
selection, if there is no other impediment.
27. Let the decision be taken in this regard within a period of 90 days'
from the date of submission of the certified copy of this order. With the
aforesaid observations, this writ petition is disposed of.
(ASHISH SHROTI)
JUDGE
vpn/-
