Sheikh Ahmad Hanfi vs Dr. Aparajita Sharma on 9 February, 2026

                                                             1                                CR-980-2024
                             IN     THE     HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                                                  AT JABALPUR
                                                        BEFORE
                                             HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK JAIN
                                               ON THE 9 th OF FEBRUARY, 2026
                                                CIVIL REVISION No. 980 of 2024
                                                  SHEIKH AHMAD HANFI
                                                         Versus
                                           DR. APARAJITA SHARMA AND OTHERS
                          Appearance:
                                  Shri Harsh Vardhan Soni - Advocate appeared for petitioner.
                                  Shri Enosh George Carlo and Shri Deepak Kumar Raghuwanshi -
                          Advocates for the respondent Nos.1 and 2.

                                                                 ORDER

By way of present petition, challenge is made to the impugned order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority ('RCA' for short), thereby rejecting the application/plaint of the petitioner for eviction of respondents on the grounds that the matter is cognizable by the Commercial Court and since the property has been let out for commercial purpose, therefore, the Courts will not have jurisdiction to entertain the application for eviction.

2. It is not in dispute that under M.P. Accommodation Control Act 1961, for certain special categories of landlords on some specific grounds, eviction petitions are entertained by RCA while for regular categories of landlords, regular civil suits are filed before the regular Civil Courts. Since the present petitioner claims to be a special category of landlord being retired government servant and senior citizen, therefore, as a special category of

2 CR-980-2024 landlord, he had filed application/plaint before the RCA for eviction of the respondents on the grounds of bona fide need of himself and his sons and daughter to open a nursing home in the suit premises.

3. It is not in dispute that the premises have been let out for commercial purpose and the present respondents are running a nursing home in the suit premises, whereas the plaintiff landlord, who is the petitioner before this Court is also a doctor and was previously in government service and has filed the eviction suit on the grounds of bona fide need to open nursing home for himself and his children as they are also having medical degree.

4. It is not in dispute that the defendants filed an application for eviction of plaintiff under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC on the grounds that since the

property is let out for commercial purpose, therefore, the suit will lie only before the commercial court and not before the regular court or the RCA. This objection has been sustained by the RCA and the claim has been rejected. The aforesaid order is passed by the RCA on the ground that the respondents had also filed a suit against the landlord as they were apprehending unlawful dispossession at the hands of the landlord and his family members and sought permanent injunction, and in that suit, the District Court held that it is not maintainable before the Civil Court, but before a Commercial Court. Hence, the landlord should also approach the Commercial Court.

5. In the present case before the RCA, the defendants/respondents filed an application for rejection of plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC on the

3 CR-980-2024 ground that since the property is let out for commercial purpose, therefore, the suit will lie before the Commercial Court and not before the Regular Court or the RCA. This objection has been sustained by the RCA and the plaint has been rejected.

6. The aforesaid order is defended by learned counsel for the respondents defendants on the ground that the respondents had also filed a suit against the landlord as they were apprehending unlawful dispossession at the hands of the landlord and his family members and sought permanent injunction. In the said suit, which was filed during the pendency of the suit/application before the RCA, the landlord appeared and took objection that the matter is cognizable by Commercial Court and that objection was sustained by the District Judge and now the landlord cannot take a different plea in the matter and even otherwise the RCA was bound by what was held by the District Judge.

7. Upon considering the aforesaid assertions and on perusal of the record, it is seen that the suit has not been filed raising any commercial dispute. It is simply filed by a landlord for eviction of the suit premises and the plea of jurisdiction of Commercial Court is being raised only on account of the fact that the suit premises are let out for commercial purpose, i.e., running a nursing home by the tenants.

8. It is settled in law that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by estoppel and if the landlord in the suit filed by the tenant seeking injunction against the landlord, had taken an objection that the suit

would lie before the Commercial Court that would not bestow jurisdiction to

4 CR-980-2024 the Commercial Court, if it otherwise does not have such jurisdiction and the order passed by the District Judge returning the plaint of the tenant in some other proceedings would not be read as res-judicata so as to confer jurisdiction on the Commercial Court. It is very well settled in the law that there can be no estoppel in the matter of subject matter jurisdiction and the parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the Court by their agreement. Therefore, this Court is bound to consider that whether the Commercial Court otherwise had the jurisdiction for the subject matter.

9. It is seen that as per Section 2(c)(vii) of the Act of 2015, following has been provided as one of the commercial disputes defined under the Act of 2015:-

"(vii) agreements relating to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce;"

10. In the present case, there are no allegations of breach of any agreement or enforcement of terms of any agreement executed between the parties. Neither any violation of written agreement nor any oral agreement has been pleaded by either of the parties which has been alleged to be violated by the defendant or sought to be enforced by the Landlord. The entire plaint does not relate to any clause of the oral or written agreement alleged to be breached, either at the instance of the Plaintiff or at the instance of the defendants who also have not made any pleading of breach of any oral or written agreement between the parties. It is simply a eviction suit on ground of bonafide need.

11. The same dispute was raised before the Calcutta High Court in the case of Deepak Polymers (P) Ltd. v. Anchor Investments (P) Ltd. reported in

5 CR-980-2024 2021 SCC OnLine Cal 4323 and the Calcutta High Court in the aforesaid case has decided the matter in great detail and held that once the suit arises out of statutory right conferred by Section 108 of Transfer of Property Act having no direct nexus with the lease agreement, therefore, once the precondition of dispute emanating out of lease agreement being not satisfied, the matter would not fall within the purview of Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

12. The Calcutta High Court in the aforesaid case held as under:-

"30. However, the cardinal question which has not been addressed but is pivotal to the present adjudication is the expression "dispute" which precedes the expression "arising out of" as appearing in Section 2(1)(c) of the 2015 Act. Reading sub-clause (vii) in conjunction with the starting words of Clause (c), it is seen that the expression "agreements relating to immovable property...." qualifies the term "dispute" arising out of such agreements.

31. A "dispute" can only be determined by the cause of action of the suit and not the preceding backdrop. Even if Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act deals with termination of the jural relationship of lessor and lessee, pre-supposing a prior lease agreement, the bundle of facts comprising the cause of action of the suit is the sole determinant of the "dispute" involved in the suit.

32. In the event the suits, in the present case, had been filed for recovery of possession in respect of immovable property on the ground of forfeiture for contravention of any of the terms and conditions of the respective agreements-in-question, it might have been argued that the suits pertains to disputes "arising out of" such agreements.

33. However, the dispute itself, in the present case, arises out of refusal by the defendants to comply with the notices issued by the lessor under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which is based on a statutory right independent and irrespective of any clause of the lease agreements.

34. Hence, the suits squarely arise out of a statutory right conferred by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, having no direct nexus with the lease agreements in respect of the immovable properties concerned. Thus, the pre-condition of the applicability of Section 2(1)

(c)(vii), that is, the emanation of the dispute out of the lease agreement, is not satisfied in the present suits. Thus, the secondary question as to whether the immovable properties are used exclusively in trade or

6 CR-980-2024 commerce, pales into insignificance."

13. Similar is the present case in hand wherein the Landlord has filed eviction suit exercising the rights given to the Landlord and the grounds of eviction given to the Landlord as per M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 and has exercised the rights laid down in grounds under Section 12 (1) of the said Act seeking eviction of tenant.

14. This issue has been decided by a coordinate Bench of this Court in Mohit Sadana Vs. Vijay Kumar Goyal reported in 2025 (3) JLJ 147 , wherein an exactly similar dispute has been decided and it has been held that a suit for eviction would not be maintainable before a Commercial Court only because the suit shop is being used for carrying out business or trade. The judgment of Division Bench of Gujarat High Court has been considered by the Coordinate Bench and it has been held as under:-

"9. In order to find out as to whether a dispute is a commercial dispute or not, one has to conjointly read Sections 2(1)(c)(vii), Section 2(1)(i) and Section 12 of the Act. From a plain reading of aforesaid provisions, it is clear that only suits, appeals or applications relating to a commercial dispute of a specified value are to be tried by the Commercial Court. Merely because the suit shop is being used for carrying out business or trade, the suit for eviction from the suit shop would not fall within the definition of commercial dispute of specified value.

10. The Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in the case of Ujwala Raje Gaekwar (Supra) has held that merely because the movable property in question is going to be used or is being used exclusively in trade or commerce, the dispute does not become a commercial dispute as defined under Section 2(1)(c) of the Act. If the object and purpose of establishment of Commercial Courts, Commercial Divisions and Commercial Appellate Divisions of the High Court are considered, then it is clear that the establishment of Commercial Courts had become necessary on account of inordinate delays and to ensure fast disposal of high value commercial disputes to provide assurance to domestic and foreign investors.

7 CR-980-2024

11. ........................... It has also been held that a perusal of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Commercial Courts Act Act, 2015 and the various amendments to the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and insertion of new rules to that Code applicable to suits of commercial disputes show that the said Act has been enacted for the purpose of providing an early disposal of high value commercial disputes. A purposive interpretation of the Statement of Objects and Reasons and various amendments to the Civil Procedure Code leaves no room for doubt that the provisions of the Act require to be strictly construed. If the provisions are given a liberal interpretation, the object behind constitution of Commercial Division of Courts viz. putting the matter on fast track and speedy resolution of commercial disputes, will be defeated. If one takes a closer look at the Statement of Objects and Reasons, words such as "early" and "speedy" have been incorporated and reiterated. The object shall be fulfilled only if the provisions of the Act are interpreted in a narrow sense and not hampered by the usual procedural delays plaguing our traditional legal system. Thus, a dispute relating to immovable property per se may not be a commercial dispute. But it becomes a commercial dispute, if it falls under sub-clause (vii) of Section 2(1) (c) of the Commercial Courts Act viz. "the agreements relating to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce". The conclusion arrived at herein, that in order to fall within Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the Commercial Courts Act, the immovable property must be "used exclusively" or "being used exclusively"

in trade or commerce, is agreed to. The words "used exclusively in trade or commerce" are to be interpreted purposefully. The word "used" denotes "actually used" and it cannot be either "ready for use" or "likely to be used" or "to be used". It should be "actually used". Such a wide interpretation would defeat the objects of the Act and the fast tracking procedure for deciding the commercial disputes. In the present case, there is nothing on record to show that at the time when the agreement to sell came to be executed in 2012, the property was being exclusively used in trade and commerce so as to bring the dispute within the ambit of sub-clause

(vii) of Section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act. Merely because the property is likely to be used in relation to trade and commerce, the same cannot be the ground to attract the jurisdiction of the Commercial Court.

12. Therefore, this Court is of considered opinion that merely because suit shop is being used for running business, the question of eviction from said suit shop would not become commercial dispute."

8 CR-980-2024

15. The coordinate bench has relied on a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. K.S. Infraspace LLP and Another, (2020) 15 SCC 585 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-

"13. The learned Senior Advocate for the appellant would however, contend that a strict interpretation as in the case of taxing statutes would not be appropriate in the instant case where the issue relates to jurisdiction. In that regard, the learned Senior Advocate has referred to the Statement of Objects and Reasons with which the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 is enacted so as to provide speedy disposal of high value commercial disputes so as to create the positive image to the investors world about the independent and responsive Indian legal system. Hence, he contends that a purposive interpretation be made. It is contended that a wider purport and meaning is to be assigned while entertaining the suit and considering the dispute to be a commercial dispute. Having taken note of the submission we feel that the very purpose for which the CC Act of 2015 has been enacted would be defeated if every other suit merely because it is filed before the Commercial Court is entertained. This is for the reason that the suits which are not actually relating to commercial dispute but being filed merely because of the high value and with the intention of seeking early disposal would only clog the system and block the way for the genuine commercial disputes which may have to be entertained by the Commercial Courts as intended by the lawmakers. In commercial disputes as defined a special procedure is provided for a class of litigation and a strict procedure will have to be followed to entertain only that class of litigation in that jurisdiction. If the same is strictly interpreted it is not as if those excluded will be non-suited without any remedy. The excluded class of litigation will in any event be entertained in the ordinary civil courts wherein the remedy has always existed.

14. In that view it is also necessary to carefully examine and entertain only disputes which actually answers the definition "commercial disputes" as provided under the Act. In the instant case, as already taken note neither the agreement between the parties refers to the nature of the immovable property being exclusively used for trade or commerce as on the date of the agreement nor is there any pleading to that effect in the plaint. Further the very relief sought in the suit is for execution of the mortgage deed which is in the nature of specific performance of

9 CR-980-2024 the terms of Memorandum of Understanding without reference to nature of the use of the immovable property in trade or commerce as on the date of the suit. Therefore, if all these aspects are kept in view, we are of the opinion that in the present facts the High Court was justified in its conclusion arrived through the order dated 1-3-2019 [K.S. Infraspace LLP v. Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Guj 1926] impugned herein. The Commercial Court shall therefore return the plaint indicating a date for its presentation before the Court having jurisdiction.

36. A perusal of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and the various amendments to the Civil Procedure Code and insertion of new rules to the Code applicable to suits of commercial disputes show that it has been enacted for the purpose of providing an early disposal of high value commercial disputes. A purposive interpretation of the Statement of Objects and Reasons and various amendments to the Civil Procedure Code leaves no room for doubt that the provisions of the Act require to be strictly construed. If the provisions are given a liberal interpretation, the object behind constitution of Commercial Division of Courts viz. putting the matter on fast track and speedy resolution of commercial disputes, will be defeated. If we take a closer look at the Statement of Objects and Reasons, words such as "early" and "speedy" have been incorporated and reiterated. The object shall be fulfilled only if the provisions of the Act are interpreted in a narrow sense and not hampered by the usual procedural delays plaguing our traditional legal system."

16. Another coordinate bench of this Court in Bhopal Fracture Hospital Vs. Savitri Devi Vijaywargiya (2024 (4) MPLJ 223) has also held the same by referring to the statement of objection reasons of Commercial Courts Act, the plain language of Section 2 as well as Section 12 of the said Act, that relates to determination of specified value.

17. In view of the aforesaid, following the views taken by the coordinate benches of this Court so also by the earlier view of Calcutta High Court in the case of Deepak Polymers (supra) which has not been considered in its later case of Maharshi Commerce (supra) cited by the learned counsel

10 CR-980-2024 for the Petitioner, so also the view taken by the Gujarat High Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that in such matters of eviction where the Landlord is exercising his right given to him to seek eviction on specified grounds under M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, the suit would not fall within the definition of Commercial dispute in terms of Section 2(c) of Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

18. Consequently, it is found that the impugned order passed by the RCA rejecting the plaint is clearly erroneous, because the suit would not fall within the definition of commercial dispute in terms of Section 2(c) of Commercial Courts Act and therefore, the impugned order is set aside. The present petition is allowed and the eviction application before the RCA is held to be maintainable. The RCA would now decide the case on its own merits as per law.

(VIVEK JAIN) JUDGE