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Madhya Pradesh High Court
Tekchand Jain vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh Thr. on 9 February, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:5132
1 WP. No. 1564 of 2015
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
ON THE 9th OF FEBRUARY, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 1564 of 2015
TEKCHAND JAIN AND OTHERS
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THR. AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Rabindra Kumar Mishra - Advocate for petitioner.
Shri Prabhat Pateriya - Government Advocate for respondent/State.
ORDER
This petition, under Article 226 of Constitution of India, has been filed
seeking the following relief (s):-
"(i) That, the order Annexure P/1 & P/2 be quashed with a further
direction to restore the pay fixation made by the district authority in
compliance of the Hon'ble Court order from the dated of
confirmation.
(ii) That, the recovery imposed by the order annexure P/1 & P/2 be
quashed.
(iii) That, the other relief doing justice including cost be awarded."
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2. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners are
aggrieved by the arbitrary action of the respondent authority in withdrawing the
benefit of Adhyapak Samvarg granted to the petitioners just after completion of
the probation period of three years, as per the decision taken by the authority in
light of the order passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in W.P. No.
602/10 (Mohan Lal & Others Vs. State of M.P. & Others). It is further
submitted that the petitioners were initially appointed to the post of Shiksha
Karmis in the regular pay scale and after completion of the probation period of
three years, were not extended the regular pay scale of Adhyapak Samvarg since
2001. In light of the order passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the
case of Mohan Lal (supra), respondent authority, while deciding the
representations submitted by the petitioners, extended such benefit. However,
subsequently, vide order dated 09.12.2014, the aforesaid benefit of the petitioners
was cancelled and in a casual manner, an order of recovery was passed. It is
further submitted that before issuing the impugned recovery order dated
02.03.2015, no proper opportunity of being heard was afforded to the petitioners.
Although a show-cause notice was issued to petitioner and they submitted a
detailed reply thereto but reply were not considered by the respondents and
consequently, a non-speaking and unreasoned impugned recovery order dated
02.03.2015 was passed.
3. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent/State on the other hand opposed
the prayer made by learned counsel for petitioner and supported the impugned
order dated dated 2.3.2015.
4. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:5132
5. Before issuing the impugned order dated 02.03.2015, a show-cause notice
dated 08.01.2015 (Annexure P/6) was issued to the petitioner, and the petitioner
submitted a reply thereto; however, the respondent did not consider the reply at
all while passing the impugned order. Important part of the punishment order
dated 02.3.2015 is quoted herein below:-
"mijksä lanfHkZr i= }kjk vkidks ,sfj;j jkf'k dh fjdojh 20 leku fdLrksa
esa djus gsrq dkj.k crkvks lwpuk i= tkjh fd;k x;k Fkk ftlds lacaèk esa
vkids }kjk çLrqr mÙkj larks"ktud u ik;s tkus ds dkj.k vkidh fjdojh
çkjHk dh tkrh gSA"
Considering the aforesaid reply submitted by the petitioner has not been
considered by the respondents and issued a non-speaking and unreasoned
impugned recovery order.
6. It is a settled position in law that when a discretion is vested in an authority
to exercise a particular power, the same is required to be exercised with due
diligence, and in reasonable and rational manner. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
catena of decisions has reiterated time and again the necessity and importance of
giving reasons by the authority in support of its decision. It has been held that the
face of an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority or even by an administrative
authority affecting the rights of parties must speak. The affected party must know
how his case or defence was considered before passing the prejudicial order.
7. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab
v/s. Bandip Singh and others reported in (2016) 1 SCC 724 is relevant to
quote. In the said decision it had been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that
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every decision of an administrative or executive nature must be a composite and
self-sustaining one, in that it should contain all the reasons which prevailed on
the official taking the decision to arrive at his conclusion.
8. In the same judgment in paragraph 7, the Hon'ble Supreme Court clarifies
that the Government does not have carte blanche to take any decision it chooses
to; it cannot take a capricious, arbitrary or prejudiced decision. Its decision must
be informed and impregnated with reasons. Paragraph 7 of the said decision is
quoted as under:-
"7. The same principle was upheld more recently in Ram Kishun v.
State of U.P. (2012) 11 SCC 511 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 382. However,
we must hasten to clarify that the Government does not have a carte
blanche to take any decision it chooses to; it cannot take a capricious,
arbitrary or prejudiced decision. Its decision must be informed and
impregnated with reasons.
This has already been discussed threadbare in several decisions of this
Court, including in Sterling Computers Ltd. v. M & N Publications
Ltd (1993) 1 SCC 445, Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC
651, Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. (2000) 2 SCC
617, B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd. v. Nair Coal Services Ltd. (2006) 11
SCC 548 and Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa (2007) 14 SCC 517"
9. Also the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kranti
Associates Pvt. Ltd. and another v/s Masood Ahmed Khan and others cited in
(2010) 9 SCC 496 highlights this point. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph
15 opined that the face of an order passed by a quasi judicial authority or even an
administrative authority affecting the rights of parties, must speak. It must not be
like the inscrutable face of a sphinx. In paragraph 47 the Honb'le Supreme Court
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:5132
summarized its discussion. The relevant subparagraphs of the said summary are
quoted as under:-
"47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:
(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in
administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.
(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its
conclusions.
(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle
of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done
as well.
(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible
arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative
power.
(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-
maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.
(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a
decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by
judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.
(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and
constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on
relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making
justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as
the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one
common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant
factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining
the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial
accountability and transparency.
(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about
his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the
person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of
incrementalism.
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(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A
pretence of reasons or "rubber-stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a
valid decision-making process.
(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint
on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only
makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes
them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of
Judicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-37].)
(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad
doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now
virtually a component of human rights andwas considered part of
Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553]
EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford [2001 EWCA Civ
405 (CA)] , wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European
Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent
reasons must be given for judicial decisions".
(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting
up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law,
requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is
virtually a part of "due process"."
10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case Oryx Fisheries Pvt.Ltd vs Union
Of India & Ors; (2010) 13 SCC 427 has held as under:-
"41. In M/s Kranti Associates (supra), this Court after considering
various judgments formulated certain principles in para 51 of the
judgment which are set out below
a. In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even
in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone
prejudicially.
b. A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its
conclusions.
c. Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider
principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also
appear to be done as well.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:5132
d. Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any
possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even
administrative power.
e. Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision
maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous
considerations.
f. Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a
decision making process as observing principles of natural justice by
judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.
g. Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior Courts.
h. The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law
and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based
on relevant facts. This is virtually the life blood of judicial decision
making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.
i. Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as
different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these
decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by
reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This
is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery
system.
j. Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability
and transparency.
k. If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about
his/her decision making process then it is impossible to know whether
the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to
principles of incrementalism.
l. Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct.
A pretence of reasons or `rubber-stamp reasons' is not to be equated
with a valid decision making process.
m. It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of
restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision making
not only makes the judges and decision makers less prone to errors but
also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:5132
Defence of Judicial Candor (1987) 100 Harward Law Review 731-
737).
n. Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad
doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said requirement is now
virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of
Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See (1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29
and Anya vs. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405, wherein the
Court referred to Article 6 of European Convention of Human Rights
which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for
judicial decisions". o. In all common law jurisdictions judgments play
a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for
development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is
of the essence and is virtually a part of "Due Process".
42. In the instant case the appellate order contains reasons. However,
absence of reasons in the original order cannot be compensated by
disclosure of reason in the appellate order.
43. In Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna and
others,(1986) 4 SCC 537, it has been held:
"......after the blow suffered by the initial decision, it is
difficult to contemplate complete restitution through an
appellate decision. Such a case is unlike an action for
money or recovery of property, where the execution of
the trial decree may be stayed pending appeal, or a
successful appeal may result in refund of the money or
restitution of the property, with appropriate compensation
by way of interest or mesne profits for the period of
deprivation. And, therefore, it seems to us, there is
manifest need to ensure that there is no breach of
fundamental procedure in the original proceeding, and to
avoid treating an appeal as an overall substitute for the
original proceeding."
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44. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court quashes the show cause
notice as also the order dated 19.03.2008 passed by the third
respondent. In view of that, the appellate order has no legs to stand
and accordingly is quashed."
11. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned
order dated 02.03.2015 is hereby quashed. The respondent/competent authority is
directed to pass a fresh, detailed, and speaking order after considering each and
every ground mentioned by the petitioner in the reply, within a period of three
months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. At the time of
consideration of the petitioner's case, the respondent shall grant an opportunity
of being heard to petitioner.
12. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the
merits of the case.
13. Pending interlocutory application, if any, are disposed of.
(Anand Singh Bahrawat)
Judge
Ahmad
