Citation : 2026 Latest Caselaw 1221 MP
Judgement Date : 6 February, 2026
1 WA-413-2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
WA No. 413 of 2026
(BHOPAL MUNICIPAL CORPORATION AND OTHERS Vs MARLIN BUILDCON PVT. LTD. AND OTHERS )
Dated : 06-02-2026
Shri H.S. Ruprah - Senior Advocate with Shri Suyash Mohan Guru-
Advocate , Shri Dev Sharma, Shri Deepanshu Rai, Shri Akshat Agrawal,
Shri Shashank Patel, Shri Akash Malpani - Advocates for the appellants.
Shri Rahul Rawat and Shri Pramod Kumar Thakre - Advocates for the
respondent No.1.
1. On the oral prayer of the appellant Ms. Sanskriti Jain, Commissioner Municipal Corporation, Bhopal is permitted to be impleaded as an appellant.
2. Let the affidavit of the appellant and amended memo of parties be filed during the course of the day.
3. Appellant impugns order dated 27.01.2026, whereby a show cause notice has been issued to the Commissioner Municipal Corporation, Bhopal as to why contempt proceedings be not initiated against her for breach of orders passed by the Supreme Court in the case of " Directions in the matter
of Demolition of Structures (In Ref.) (2025) SCC 1.''
4. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants submits that the entire petition filed by the respondent does not take into account that the appellant has duly followed the procedure as prescribed by the Supreme Court. He further submits that in terms of Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the High Court is empowered to initiate proceedings for
2 WA-413-2026 contempt only of wilful breach of its own orders or orders of a court subordinate to it.
5. Learned senior counsel further submits that there is no allegations in the entire petition that the appellant has committed breach of any order or direction passed by the High Court or any court subordinate to it. Reference is drawn to judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Vitusah Oberoi and Ors. vs. Court of Its Own Motion (2017) 2 SCC 314 to contend that the Supreme Court has held the High Court is empowered to initiate proceedings for contempt of its orders or orders of any Court subordinate to it but is not empowered to initiate proceedings suo motu or otherwise for the contempt of orders of a superior court like the Supreme Court.
6. Learned senior counsel further submits that on 05.02.2026, the
appellant has been held guilty of flouting the directions for orders passed by the Supreme Court In Directions the matter of Demolition of Structures (Supra) and the matter is listed today for hearing on the quantum of punishment. He submits that since the order was made available late in the evening on 05.02.2026, an appeal against that order has been filed being WA No.414/2026, however the same has not yet been listed.
7. Issue notice.
8. Notice is accepted by learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 and he prays for some time to address arguments.
9. Notice shall issue to respondent No. 2 and 3, humdust in addition, returnable on 18.02.2026.
10. Reference may be had to the judgment of Supreme Court in
3 WA-413-2026 Vitusah Oberoi and Ors (Supra) , wherein the Supreme Court has held as under;
''9. The provisions of Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 also empower the High Court to punish for its own contempt or the contempt of Courts subordinate to it. Section 10 reads:
"10. Power of High Court to punish contempts of subordinate courts.--Every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempt of courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself:
Provided that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."
10. There is, from a plain reading of the above, nothing in the Contempt of Courts Act or in Article 215 of the Constitution which can be said to empower the High Court to initiate proceedings suo-motu or otherwise for the contempt of a superior Court like the Supreme Court of India. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court under Article 129 and High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution are both declared to be Courts of Record. One of the recognised attributes of a court of record is the power to punish for its contempt and the contempt of courts subordinate to it. That is precisely why Articles 129 and 215, while declaring the Supreme Court and the High Courts as Courts of Record, recognise the power vested in them to punish for their own contempt. The use of the expression "including" in the said provisions is explanatory in character. It signifies that the Supreme Court and the High Courts shall, as Courts of Records, exercise all such powers as are otherwise available to them including the power to punish for their own contempt.
11. Whether or not the power to punish for contempt of a subordinate court was an attribute of a court of record fell for consideration of this Court in Delhi Judicial Service Association vs. State of Gujarat (1991) 4 SCC
4 WA-413-2026
406. The argument there was that the Supreme Court could not initiate contempt proceedings based on an incident that involved a subordinate court like a Chief Judicial Magistrate working in the State of Gujarat. That contention was examined and rejected by this Court. It was held that the language employed in Article 129 indicated that the Supreme Court is a Court of Record and was entitled not only to punish for its own contempt but to do all that which is within the powers of a Court of Record. This Court held that since the Constitution has designed the Supreme Court as a Court of Record, Article 129 thereof recognises the existing inherent power of a Court of Record in its full plenitude including the power to punish for its own contempt and the contempt of its subordinate. The Court said:
29. Article 129 declares the Supreme Court a court of record and it further provides that the Supreme Court shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself (emphasis supplied).
The expression used in Article 129 is not restrictive instead it is extensive in nature. If the Framers of the Constitution intended that the Supreme Court shall have power to punish for contempt of itself only, there was no necessity for inserting the expression "including the power to punish for contempt of itself." The Article confers power on the Supreme Court to punish for contempt of itself and in addition, it confers some additional power relating to contempt as would appear from the expression "including." The expression "including" has been interpreted by courts, to extend and widen the scope of power. The plain language of the Article 129 clearly indicates that this Court as a court of record has power to punish for contempt of itself and also something else which could fall within the inherent jurisdiction of a court of record. In interpreting the Constitution, it is not permissible to adopt a construction which would render any expression superfluous or redundant. The courts ought not accept any
5 WA-413-2026 such construction. While construing Article 129 it is not permissible to ignore the significance and impact of the inclusive power conferred on the Supreme Court.
Since, the Supreme Court is designed by the Constitution as a court of record and as the Founding Fathers were aware that a superior court of record had inherent power to indict a person for the contempt of itself as well as of courts inferior to it, the expression "including" was deliberately inserted in the Article. Article 129 recognised the existing inherent power of a court of record in its full plenitude including the power to punish for the contempt of inferior courts. If Article 129 is susceptible to two interpretations, we would prefer to accept the interpretation which would preserve the inherent jurisdiction of this Court being the superior court of record, to safeguard and protect the subordinate judiciary, which forms the very back bone of administration of justice. The subordinate courts administer justice at the grass root level, their protection is necessary to preserve the confidence of people in the efficacy of Courts and to ensure unsullied flow of justice at its base level.
12. The power to punish for contempt vested in a Court of Record under Article 215 does not, however, extend to punishing for the contempt of a superior court. Such a power has never been recognised as an attribute of a court of record nor has the same been specifically conferred upon the High Courts under Article 215 A priori if the power to punish under Article 215 is limited to the contempt of the High Court or courts subordinate to the High Court as appears to us to be the position, there was no way the High Court could justify invoking that power to punish for the contempt of a superior court. That is particularly so when the superior court's power to punish for its contempt has been in no uncertain terms recognised by Article 129 of the Constitution. The availability of the power under Article 129 Aand its plenitude is yet another reason why Article 215 could never have been intended to empower the
6 WA-413-2026 High Courts to punish for the contempt of the Supreme Court. The logic is simple. If Supreme Court does not, despite the availability of the power vested in it, invoke the same to punish for its contempt, there is no question of a Court subordinate to the Supreme Court doing so. Viewed from any angle, the order passed by the High Court appears to us to be without jurisdiction, hence, liable to be set aside.''
11. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Vitusah Oberoi and Ors. (supra), there shall be stay of further proceedings before the Writ court till the next date of hearing.
List on 18.02.2026.
C.C. today.
(SANJEEV SACHDEVA) (VINAY SARAF)
CHIEF JUSTICE JUDGE
Akm
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!