[Cites 17, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Mp Real Estate Regulatory Authrority vs Briddhi Real Estate Pvt. Ltd. on 6 February, 2026
Author: Hirdesh
Bench: Hirdesh
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:4972
1 MA-7743-2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE HIRDESH
ON THE 6 th OF FEBRUARY, 2026
MISC. APPEAL No. 7743 of 2025
MP REAL ESTATE REGULATORY AUTHRORITY
Versus
BRIDDHI REAL ESTATE PVT. LTD. AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Sameer Kumar Shrivastava - learned Counsel for petitioner.
Shri Raja Girraj Sharma- learned Counsel for respondents.
ORDER
The instant misc. appeal has been preferred by the appellant under
Section 58 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016
(hereinafter referred to as the "Act of 2016"), challenging the order dated
25.06.2025 passed in Appeal No. 60 of 2022 by the Real Estate Appellate
Tribunal, Bhopal (hereinafter referred to as the "Appellate Tribunal"),
whereby the Appellate Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by respondents
No.1 and 2, by setting aside the order dated 29.04.2022 passed by the
appellant/the Real Estate Regulatory Authority (in short "RERA").
2. A few facts necessary for adjudication of this appeal are that the
appellant is a statutory authority constituted under Section 20 of the aforesaid
Act of 2016. The order challenged in this appeal was passed on 25.06.2025,
but it was received in the office of the appellant on 05.08.2025.
Consequently, the instant appeal has been filed within the prescribed period
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:4972
2 MA-7743-2025
of 60 days from the date of communication of the decision. The respondents
are promoters as defined under Section 2(zk) of the Act of 2016. They filed
an application for the registration of a real estate project named "The
Address" under Section 3 of the Act on 12.06.2018. On the basis of the
submission of the application by the respondents, ID No. 273253112520 was
generated, and the scrutiny process commenced. Thereafter, via notice dated
06.07.2018, the appellant instructed the promoter to cure the defects relating
to required documents, i.e., EWS, colonization registration, sanction of
MOA building, calculation sheet, sanctioned plan of TNCP, scheme of
payment, and other documents. On 06.12.2018, a reminder letter bearing No.
392 was sent due to the lack of response. However, no compliance was made
by the respondents. It was found by the appellant that despite the fact that the
project, namely "The Address," was not registered and the defects had not
been cured, the respondents had begun selling plots. Therefore, the appellant
took suo motu cognizance and registered a case vide MRC/369/2019 against
the respondents for violation of Section 3 of the Act of 2016. Thereafter, on
14.11.2019, a notice vide No. 13456 was issued under Section 59 of the Act
of 2016, but the respondents did not appear before the appellant, as a result
of which, an ex-parte order was passed on 03.01.2020, directing the
confiscation of fees of Rs. 8,54,080/- and the freezing of the respondents'
account, among other penalties.
3. The respondents challenged the ex-parte order dated 03.01.2020
before the Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No. A-25/2020. The Appellate
Tribunal partly allowed the appeal on 09.04.2021, setting aside the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:4972
3 MA-7743-2025
confiscation of registration fees and the fine, but confirming the restriction
on the sale of plots. However, the names of the respondents were directed to
be kept in the list of defaulters. The matter was again relegated to the
appellant by the Appellate Tribunal with a direction that the appellant would
again start the process of registration of the project.
4. Thereafter, another communication was sent to the respondents on
03.11.2021 to cure the defects, but no steps were taken by the respondents.
Since nothing was done by the promoter/respondents, on 28.02.2022, a
detailed letter was sent to the respondents in which deficiencies found by the
appellant were pointed out to the respondents. Thereafter, again on
16.03.2022, another communication was sent by the appellant in which
deficiencies still persisting were informed to the respondents. However,
when the deficiencies were still not cured, by exercising power under Section
5 of the Act of 2016, the appellant rejected the application of the respondents
regarding the registration of the project, namely "The Address."
5. Against the order dated 29th of April, 2022, the
respondents/promoters preferred an appeal under Section 44 of the Act of
2016 before the Appellate Tribunal constituted under Section 43 of the Act
of 2016. The Appellate Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the
respondents/promoters by setting aside the order dated 29.04.2022 and
remitted the matter back to the authority. The respondents were directed to
appear before the authority on 07.07.2025 and submit a fresh application for
registration along with the required documents as required under Section 4 of
the Act and Rule 3 of the Rules of 2017, and deposit the required fees. The
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:4972
4 MA-7743-2025
deducted amount of 10% cess would be included in the registration fees,
meaning thereby the respondents shall deposit the amount returned by the
authority after deduction of 10% to the respondents.
6. Hence, this miscellaneous appeal.
7. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the Appellate
Tribunal erred in concluding that the appellant first informed the respondents
about deficiencies on 16.03.2022. The project registration application was
submitted on 12.06.2018, and the appellant promptly pointed out deficiencies
in the project, sending a reminder on 06.12.2018. The respondents failed to
comply, and the appellant later registered a case (MRC/369/2019) due to
unauthorized sales of plots. Despite this, the Appellate Tribunal wrongly
claimed no notices were issued until 16.03.2022. It is further contended that
the Appellate Tribunal overlooked its own earlier orders, including the
appeal in 2021, which recorded multiple notices sent to the respondents. The
Appellate Tribunal's finding that the appellant failed to inform the
respondents for four years contradicts the factual record. Additionally, the
Appellate Tribunal ignored the earlier litigation, which should have been
considered before passing the impugned order. It is also contended that the
Appellate Tribunal failed to thoroughly review the entire record, including
the note-sheet, before making its decision. The respondents have taken
advantage of their own wrong by repeatedly failing to cure deficiencies and
delaying the registration process, and thus, the Appellate Tribunal's order
should be set aside. It is also argued that the order passed by the Appellate
Tribunal suffers from the issue of coram non judice. Section 45 of the Real
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:4972
5 MA-7743-2025
Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 requires the Appellate
Tribunal to consist of the Chairman and two members. The order in this case
was passed by the Chairman and one member, which renders the order
defective and contrary to the law. Therefore, the impugned order is liable to
be set aside. In support of his contentions, learned Counsel for appellant has
placed reliance on Coordinate Bench (Indore) decision of this Court in the
matter of G. S. Enterprises, Indore and Others vs. Yogesh Agrawal, 2024(2)
MPLJ 140, in which the same question has been decided.
8. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondents supports the
impugned order, arguing that Section 43 of the Real Estate (Regulation and
Development) Act, 2016 allows for a Bench of the Appellate Tribunal to
consist of one Judicial Member and one Administrative or Technical
Member. There is no requirement for the Chairman and two members to
constitute the Tribunal. Therefore, the composition of the Appellate Tribunal
was valid, and the order was legally sound. It is further argued that there was
no legal issue with the composition of the Appellate Tribunal, and the
decision passed by the Appellate Tribunal is in compliance with provisions
of the Act of 2016. Therefore, the present miscellaneous appeal filed by the
appellant should be dismissed.
9. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.
10. This miscellaneous appeal was admitted for final hearing by the
Coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 14-10-2025 on the
following substantial questions of law:-
''1. Whether the order passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal is
vitiated on account of not considering its own earlier order dated
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:4972
6 MA-7743-2025
09.04.2021 passed in Appeal No. A-25/2020?
2. Whether the learned Appellate Tribunal was justified in passing
the impugned order without considering the entire records of the
case, and whether the order passed by the learned Appellate
Tribunal is sustainable in the eyes of law?
3. Whether the learned Appellate Tribunal could have passed the
order in the absence of a proper coram constituting the learned
Appellate Tribunal as per Section 45 of the Real Estate
(Regulation and Development) Act, 2016?''
11. If the aforesaid Question No.3 is to be decided, it will have an
impact on the first two questions above. The primary issue in this case is
whether the matter could be heard by a two-member Bench, or whether it is
required to be heard and decided by the Appellate Tribunal consisting of a
Chairman and two other members.
12. The Coordinate Bench of this Court, in its judgment in the matter
o f G.S. Enterprises, Indore (supra) discussed this issue in detail and
concluded that an order passed by a two-member Bench cannot be sustained
in the eyes of law. The Coordinate Bench, in the case of G.S. Enterprises
(supra), particularly in paragraphs 23 and 24, held as follows:-
''23. In the considered opinion of this court, the controversy
involved in the present case has already been answered by the four
judges bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Bharosey
Agarwal v. Har Swarup Maheshwari, (1976) 3 SCC 435 where a
similar controversy arose before the Supreme Court in the case of
wherein the similar provisions under s.9 and s.13 of the Advocates
Act, 1961 were pressed into service and s.13 is in pari materia
with s.55 of the Act of 2016, and while holding in favour of the
appellant who had challenged the constitution of the Disciplinary
Committee of the Bar Council, comprising of two members only
instead of three members, it was held as under:-
"9. Thirdly, it has been argued by Mr Sen that although Section 9
of the Advocates Act provided that the Bar Council shall
constitute one or more Disciplinary Committees, each of which
"shall consist of three persons", only two persons were present on
July 21, 1974 when the appellant's defence was closed and
arguments were heard in the case. Mr Sharma appearing on behalf
of the respondent has not been able to deny that this was so. He
has argued that, by virtue of Section 13 of the Act, no act done by
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:4972
7 MA-7743-2025
the Bar Council or its committee could be called in question on
the ground merely of the existence of any vacancy in, or any
defect in the constitution of the Council or committees, as the case
may be. We have gone through Section 13, but it is inapplicable to
the present controversy as it cannot be said that there was any
"vacancy" in the Disciplinary Committee. It is nobody's case that
any of the three members of the committee ceased to be a member
thereof at any time during the course of the proceedings before the
committee. It is also nobody's case that there was any defect in the
constitution of the committee or that it was permissible to function
with two members only. There is therefore justification for the
third argument of Mr Sen also.
10. In these circumstances, we are constrained to allow the appeal
and to set aside the appellate order dated December 10, 1974. In
the circumstances of the case, we would direct that the parties
shall pay and bear their own costs." (emphasis supplied).
24. In view of the aforesaid dictum of the Supreme Court, it leaves
no room for any further interpretation of s.45 and 55 of the Act of
2016. And thus, it is held that a Real Estate Appellate Tribunal
shall consist of Chairman and two members as aforesaid, and any
defect in the constitution would not mean that it is permissible to
function with two members only. In the case at hand, as there was
neither any vacancy in the Appellate Tribunal nor any defect in its
constitution, thus, only two members could not have passed the
final order. In such circumstances, the first substantial question of
law is answered in favour of the appellant and the impugned order
is hereby set aside.''
13. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties and after perusal of
the impugned order, as well as a thorough examination of the aforesaid case-
law, it appears that in the present case, the impugned order (Annexure P-1)
was passed by a Bench consisting solely of the Chairman and a Judicial
Member, without the participation of a Technical Member. As per the
provisions of Section 45 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development)
Act, 2016, and the judicial precedents discussed earlier, the Appellate
Tribunal must consist of the Chairman and two members, one of whom must
be a Technical Member. Therefore, the impugned order (Annexure P-1)
cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. The order impugned, thus, stands set
aside. The matter is remanded to the Appellate Tribunal for fresh
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:4972
8 MA-7743-2025
consideration, in accordance with law and in light of the observations made
in this order. It is expressly clarified that this Court has refrained from
commenting on the merits of the case, and no findings on the substantive
issues have been made. The original record shall be transmitted to the
Appellate Tribunal, and both parties are hereby directed to appear before the
Appellate Tribunal on 16th March 2026.
14. In view of the above, the instant miscellaneous appeal s tands
disposed of. No order is made as to costs.
(HIRDESH)
JUDGE
MKB
