[Cites 23, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Dewas Transport Pvt Ltd vs State Of M.P. on 15 April, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:10063
1 AA-3-2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE PAVAN KUMAR DWIVEDI
ON THE 15th OF APRIL, 2026
ARBITRATION APPEAL No. 3 of 2021
DEWAS TRANSPORT PVT LTD
Versus
STATE OF M.P. AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Aniket Naik, learned counsel for the appellant.
Shri Kratik Mandloi, learned counsel for the respondent/State.
Reserved on : 10.02.2026
Pronounced on : 15.04.2026
ORDER
The present appeal has been filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 challenging the order dated 22.09.2020 passed in
MJC AV No.2/2018 whereby the application filed by the appellant under
Section 34 of the said Act has been dismissed for want of jurisdiction with
an observation to file before the Court having jurisdiction.
Factual Matrix
2. The facts relevant for the adjudication of the present dispute are that
the appellant entered into an agreement with the respondent for providing
parking facility at Simhastha Mela, Ujjain, 2016. As there were some
disputes between the parties, the appellant instituted arbitration proceedings
against the respondent for which by mutual consent sole arbitrator was
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appointed by the parties.
3. The learned Arbitrator after due deliberation passed award dated
31.07.2018 whereby, while partly allowing the claim, directed the
respondent to pay the appellant an amount of Rs.2,50,06,500/- within one
month from the date of award for the services rendered by the appellant
during Simhastha Mela.
4. Both the parties being aggrieved by the award filed their respective
Section 34 applications before the Court at Ujjain. The application filed by
the appellant was presented before the centerlized filing section of District
Ujjain on 13.10.2018 which was titled as arbitration case and addressed to
District Judge, Ujjain. The case was then taken up by the District Judge on
15.10.2018 and 22.10.2018.
5. The District Judge, Ujjain after satisfying itself about the maintainability
of the application, transferred the case to the court of Vth Additional District
Judge, Ujjain on 22.10.2018 itself. The presiding officer after perusal of the
reader report and the case file, admitted the application for final hearing,
thus the case was registered at MJC AV No. 02/2018 and proceedings were
initiated.
6. The case remained pending before the said court, during pendency of the
proceedings the said court, as per order sheet dated 15.09.2020, sought
guidance from the District Judge, Ujjain regarding maintainability of the
case before it, as it felt that the same is covered under the commercial
dispute thus be tried by the commercial court. As the proceeding dated
15.09.2020 would reflect, the District Judge directed to dispose the dispute
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on merits. In view of the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
7. The Court, irrespective of the direction of the District Judge, Ujjain,
considered the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and recorded
its prima facie satisfaction that the dispute in hand is a commercial dispute
and in view of the provisions of Section 15 of the said Act, the commercial
dispute pending before courts on the date of enforcement of the said Act
have to be transferred to the concerned Commercial Court, however as the
present case was filed on 13.10.2018, i.e. after the enforcement of the said
Act, the suit was rejected with direction to present the same to the competent
court vide impugned order dated 22.09.2020.
Submissions of Appellant
8. Challenging this order, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the
award was passed by the sole arbitrator on 31.07.2018. The application under
Section 34 was filed by the appellant on 13.10.2018. On the date of filing
application, the Court at Ujjain was having jurisdiction in view of the
notification dated 01.04.2017, which was issued in terms of the provisions of
Section 3(3) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. However, by virtue of
subsequent notification i.e. 02.04.2019, the commercial court for Ujjain and
several other territories was designated at Indore. He submits the Court in
view of this subsequent notification should have transferred the case to
commercial court at Indore, instead of rejecting the same for presentation
afresh.
9. He submits, the procedure as adopted by the Court is erroneous on two
counts; First, a coextensive court has passed the order dismissed application
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while observing for filing before the Court having jurisdiction, however,
while doing so it completely overlooked the fact that the order of dismissing
the application would operate as res-judicata in view of the provisions of
Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He further submits that even
if the provisions of Sub-section 3 of Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act are seen then there is an outer limit of 120 days in filing the
application under Section 34 and as the award was passed on 31.07.2018 and
the application was dismissed on 22.09.2020 in any case it could not have
been brought within the purview of limitation and as there is no provision for
condonation of delay in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the
application would have rendered time barred. Thus, the court erred in
dismissing the application instead it should have transferred the case to the
commercial court at Indore which was designated during pendency of the
proceedings.
Submissions of Respondents
10. Per contra, learned counsel for the State submits that in fact, the
impugned order has correctly been passed by the concerned court for the
reason that the dispute arises out of a contractual relationship between the
applicant and respondent which squarely covered within the definition of
commercial dispute in terms of the provisions of Commercial Courts Act,
2015. He, thus, submits that once the notification dated 02.04.2019 came,
designating court at Indore as commercial court even for district of Ujjain,
the court had no option but to dismiss the application for want of
jurisdiction. He further submits that the court has not simply dismissed the
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application for want of jurisdiction but also directed the applicant/appellant
to file the same before the competent court, thus, in fact, the appeal is
misplaced as the appellant should have filed the application before the
commercial court at Indore.
Appellant's Rejoinder
11. In the rejoinder submissions, learned counsel for the appellant
submits that in fact, the arguments of the learned counsel for the State
completely ignores that the outer limit of 120 days is mandatory and there is
no provision for condonation of delay and even if the appellant would have
explained before the commercial court at Indore that the period of pendency
before the court at Ujjain has to be excluded then also there may be
procedural delay in filing application before commercial Court at Indore in
absence of any provision for condonation of delay the same could not have
been condoned by the commercial court and which may have rendered the
application time barred. He in fact points out that the respondent has also
after dismissal of his application for the same reason has filed application
before the commercial court. He submits that in fact he has raised the
objection of maintainability of the application in view of the order
dismissing the application of the respondent for want of jurisdiction by
contending that this order under Order II Rule 2 of CPC bars the same.
Conclusions by Court
12. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
13. It may be profitable to point out at the outset that undisputedly the
application under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
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was filed by the appellant on 13.10.2018 before the central registry of the
District Court, Ujjain. The District Judge taken up said application on
15.10.2018 and 22.10.2018 and after satisfying itself about its
maintainability, transferred the same to Vth Additional District Judge,
Ujjain, who, in turn, admitted it for final hearing and registered the case.
14. Pertinently, before filing of the application and its registration in the
year of 2018, The Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and
Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 (as it was then
called) had already come into force with effect from 01.01.2016. Also, the
State Government, in terms of Section 3 (3) of the said Act had issued a
notification on 01.04.2017, whereby the State Government, with the
consultation of Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice of this Court, had appointed the
District and Sessions Judge, Ujjain as the Judge of the Commercial Court for
the District of Ujjain.
15. It is thus clear that on the date when the application under section 34
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was filed by the appellant
before the District Judge, Ujjain, it was the designated commercial court and
thus was having jurisdiction to try the case. Now, the aspect that whether the
District Judge could have transferred the case to the Vth Additional District
Judge or not is not relevant for the purposes of the present case thus not
being considered and decided.
16. In the year of 2018, the said Act was renamed as The Commercial
Courts Act, 2015 with several amendments in it, including amendments in
section 3 of the same. Pursuant to this the State Government, with
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consultation of the High Court, constituted Special Commercial Courts in
terms of section 3(1), (1-A) & (2) of the said Act vide notification no.
F.No.17/2016/XXI-B(1)1888/2019 dated 02.04.2019, according to this
notification, the cases pertaining to commercial disputes of district Ujjain
were to be tried by the Commercial Court at Indore.
17. As such, while the case was pending before the court at Ujjain,
the notification dated 02.04.2019 came into being whereby the Court at
Indore is designated as commercial court for purposed of entertaining all
commercial dispute within the territorial limits as provided in the said
notification which included District-Ujjain also. In view of this notification,
the Court at Ujjain where the case was pending was of the view that it is not
having jurisdiction to entertain the dispute and consequently, vide order
dated 22.09.2020 the arbitration case MJC Arbitration No.2/2018 was
rejected with an observation that it may be filed before the competent court.
18. In view of the above facts two things are established, first that the
application was correctly filed by the appellant before the court at Ujjain on
13.10.1018 as the said court was having jurisdiction on the date of filing
application in view of the earlier notification dated 01.04.2017. And second,
that on the date (22.09.2020) when the impugned order was passed the
jurisdiction was no more with the said court in view of the later notification
dated 02.04.2019.
19. Now the question is, what was the course of action which was available
to the court in view of the peculiar facts of the case. In order to understand
the same, it would be profitable to visit the provisions of Order VII Rule 10
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and 10A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Section 15 of the
Commercial Disputes Act, 2015.
Order VII Rule 10 and 10A of CPC
Rule 10. Return of plaint.-- (1) Subject to the provisions of Rule
10-A, the plaint shall] at any stage of the suit be returned to be
presented to the Court in which the suit should have been
instituted.
Explanation.-- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared
that a court of appeal or revision may direct, after setting aside the
decree passed in a suit, the return of the plaint under this sub-rule.
( 2 ) Procedure on returning plaint.-- On returning a plaint the
Judge shall endorse thereon the date of its presentation and return,
the name of the party presenting it, and a brief statement of the
reasons for returning it.
10-A. Power of Court to fix a date of appearance in the Court
where plaint is to be filed after its return .-- (1) Where, in any suit,
after the defendant has appeared, the Court is of opinion that the
plaint should be returned, it shall, before doing so, intimate its
decision to the plaintiff.
(2) Where an intimation is given to the plaintiff under sub-rule
(1), the plaintiff may make an application to the Court--
(a) specifying the Court in which he proposes to present the plaint
after its return,
(b) praying that the Court may fix a date for the appearance of the
parties in the said Court, and
(c) requesting that the notice of the date so fixed may be given to
him and to the defendant.
(3) Where an application is made by the plaintiff under sub-rule
(2), the Court shall, before returning the plaint and
notwithstanding that the order for return of plaint was made by it
on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to try the suit,--
(a) fix a date for the appearance of the parties in the Court in
which the plaint is proposed to be presented, and
(b) give to the plaintiff and to the defendant notice of such date for
appearance.
(4) Where the notice of the date for appearance is given under
sub-rule (3),--
(a) it shall not be necessary for the Court in which the plaint is
presented after its return, to serve the defendant with a summons
for appearance in the suit, unless that Court, for reasons to be
recorded, otherwise directs, and
(b) the said notice shall be deemed to be a summons for the
appearance of the defendant in the Court in which the plaint is
presented on the date so fixed by the Court by which the plaint
was returned.
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(5) Where the application made by the plaintiff under sub-rule (2)
is allowed by the Court, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to appeal
against the order returning the plaint.
20. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Tejparas Associates & Exports (P) Ltd. , (2019) 9 SCC 435 was considering
return of section 34 application, it observed in para 7 to 12 as under:
7. While taking note of these aspects the fact that the award was initially
passed on 28-6-2004 and the third learned arbitrator disposed of the application
under Section 33 of the 1996 Act on 7-12-2004 is the position which emerges
from the record. In that view, the petition filed under Section 34 of the 1996
Act before the learned District Judge, Jaipur, on 24-2-2005 is within the time-
frame as stipulated under Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act. The position is also
that the learned District Judge, Jaipur, returned the original application through
the order dated 12-3-2008 permitting the appellant to present it before the
learned District Judge, Jodhpur, on 2-4-2008. If the petition was presented on
the said date in terms of the order the need for consideration on delay would
not have arisen. However, as noticed the appellant Insurance Company re-
presented the petition before the learned District Judge, Jodhpur only on 10-4-
2008. In view of the application filed by the respondent under Section 3 of the
Limitation Act seeking dismissal in that context, the appellant herein filed the
application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The issue that would
therefore arise is as to whether the presentation of the petition before the
learned Judge, Jodhpur, should be considered as a fresh petition and the
explanation for the entire period from the original limitation period i.e. from
the date of the award is to be considered for the purpose of condonation of
delay for prosecuting in an alternate jurisdiction, while considering the
application under Section 14 of the Act or in the present circumstance since the
earlier court had exercised the power under Order 7 Rules 10 and 10-A of the
Civil Procedure Code, the consideration should be for the delay condonation
between the period 2-4-2008 to 10-4-2008 merely being the delay in re-
presentation.
8. The learned counsel for the respondent in that regard has contended that
when a plaint is returned under Order 7 Rule 10 CPC to be filed before the
court having jurisdiction and in that circumstance when the plaint is presented
in the court having jurisdiction the petition can be deemed to be instituted in
the proper court as a fresh petition when the plaint is presented in such court.
To buttress such contention, the learned counsel has relied on the decision
in Amar Chand Inani v. Union of India [Amar Chand Inani v. Union of India,
(1973) 1 SCC 115] with reference to para 9 thereof. We have carefully perused
the said decision in the background of the said contention. Though such
decision was rendered in the facts arising therein and the decision was
rendered on 13-10-1972 in the context of the provision contained in Order 7
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Rule 10 CPC as it existed, it is to be noted that amendment was made on 1-2-
1977 whereunder Rule 10-A was substituted under Order 7 Rule 10 CPC. A
perusal of the same will indicate that after amendment the matter is not left in a
limbo after the plaint is returned in terms of Rule 10(2) which existed earlier.
Presently through Rule 10-A of Order 7 CPC on an application being made a
date is to be specified for its presentation so as to enable the appearance before
the court in which it would be re-presented. Therefore, the re-presentation of
the petition in the court which is indicated in the order for return cannot be
considered as a fresh filing in all circumstances when, it is returned to the
plaintiff for such re-representation. This Court in Joginder Tuli v. S.L.
Bhatia [Joginder Tuli v. S.L. Bhatia, (1997) 1 SCC 502] has held that (at SCC
p. 503, para 5) normally, when the plaint is directed to be returned for
presentation to the proper court perhaps it has to start from the beginning but in
the cited case, since the evidence was already adduced by the parties, the
matter was tried accordingly. The High Court had in that case directed [S.L.
Bhatia v. Joginder Tuli, CM No. 3825 of 1995 in CRP No. 723 of 1995, order
dated 8-1-1996 (Del)] to proceed from the stage at which the suit stood
transferred and this Court did not find any illegality in such order passed by the
High Court to treat the same as a continuation of the proceedings.
9. In the instant case, though the appellant herein had not filed the application
indicating the court to which the petition would be re-presented and did not
seek for fixing the date of hearing, the court at Jaipur while ordering return of
the petition after consideration of the application of the respondent under Order
7 Rule 11 CPC had indicated the court to which it was to be presented and the
date for appearance on 2-4-2008 for that purpose. Hence, it is not as if the
proceeding came to an abrupt end when the petition was returned so as to
consider the next filing as a fresh petition. In that circumstance, when the time
had been granted and date was fixed by the learned District Judge at Jaipur and
if for any reason the re-presentation was not possible on that date, the course
open to the appellant was to file an application under Section 148 CPC before
the court at Jaipur which ordered for return and fixed the time for presentation
in the court at Jodhpur, seeking extension of time granted earlier. However,
since the same was not resorted to by the appellant and the petition was re-
presented before the District Court at Jodhpur with a delay of about 8 days
from the date fixed for presentation and as no extension was also sought as
indicated above, condonation of such delay ought to have been sought. Since
the petition was filed with delay and no other application had accompanied the
petition, the respondent filed the application under Section 3 of the Limitation
Act which prompted a knee jerk reaction by the appellant in filing the
application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Though the said
application has invoked Section 14 of the Limitation Act and thereafter
supported by an additional affidavit, the averments in the application is in the
nature of an application seeking condonation of delay in re-presentation of the
petition as against the date fixed by the Court for presentation in Jodhpur.
10. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the decision in S.
Ganesharaju v. Narasamma [S. Ganesharaju v. Narasamma, (2013) 11 SCC
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341 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 210] to contend that the expression "sufficient
cause" as contemplated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should be given
liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and the delay should be
condoned unless the opposite party is able to show mala fides in not
approaching the court within time. It is further contended that it is held therein
that the rules of limitation are not meant to destroy or foreclose the right of
parties. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand would
contend that the said decision rendered is in the context of consideration of
"sufficient cause" as contemplated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act which
would not be applicable to proceedings under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. In
that regard, the learned counsel for the respondent has relied on the decision
in Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. [Union of India v. Popular
Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470] wherein it is held that Section 5 of the
Limitation Act is not applicable to the proceedings under Section 34 of the
1996 Act for setting aside the arbitral award. Further the decision in Simplex
Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India [Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of
India, (2019) 2 SCC 455 : (2019) 1 SCC (Civ) 738] is also relied upon to
contend that Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application to a petition
challenging the arbitral award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The said
decision would however indicate that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is
applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of the 1996 Act
seeking for exclusion of certain period if the application under Section 34 of
the 1996 Act is at the first instance filed within the limitation period provided
under Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act. The position of law that Section 5 of the
Limitation Act is not applicable to condone the statutory period under Section
34(3) of the 1996 Act is well established and needs no reiteration.
11. Having noticed the said decisions, in the instant case as already indicated
above the condonation of delay sought is not for filing the petition under
Section 34 of the 1996 Act for the first time. The petition filed under Section
34 of the 1996 Act at Jaipur was within the period of limitation and the delay
regarding which explanation is put forth is for the period of 8 days in
representing the petition beyond the date fixed after it was returned under
Order 7 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code. Therefore, in that circumstance
even if the term "sufficient cause" as contained under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act is taken note, in the present facts the same is not with reference
to petition under Section 34 of the 1996 Act for condonation of delay beyond
the period prescribed under Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act. Though that be the
position what is necessary to be taken note herein is that the application filed
for excluding the time is under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In addition to
the very decisions cited above indicating that Section 14 of the Limitation Act
would be applicable to the proceedings under Section 34 of the 1996 Act
subject to the petition under Section 34 being filed within time, the learned
counsel for the appellant has also relied upon the decision in Consolidated
Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt. [Consolidated Engg.
Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt., (2008) 7 SCC 169] wherein the same position
is reiterated.
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12. The learned counsel for the respondent would however, refer to the very
same decision and contend that even if Section 14 of the Limitation Act is
applicable, the exclusion of time can only be of the proceedings which is bona
fide initiated in a court without jurisdiction. It is contended that in the instant
case the entire cause of action had occurred at Jodhpur and despite the same
the appellant had deliberately initiated the proceedings at Jaipur which cannot
be considered as a bona fide mistake. Though such contention is put forth,
what cannot be lost sight of in the instant facts is that the learned Judge of the
Additional District Court, Jaipur while considering the maintainability of the
proceedings before that Court, through the order dated 12-3-2008 has taken
note of the very rival contentions with regard to the cause of action as
contended and also the Court before which the proceedings was required to be
initiated. Though at this point of time the position of law has been enunciated
through several decisions, and there is clarity, at that juncture the consideration
with regard to the definition of court as contained in the Act was required to be
interpreted and on taking note of various decisions of the Supreme Court had
arrived at the conclusion that keeping in view the fact situation the petition is
to be returned for presentation in the appropriate court. The very nature of
consideration made by the court at Jaipur would indicate that the matter
required a detailed consideration before exercising the power under Order 7
Rules 10 and 10-A of the Civil Procedure Code and the court during the said
proceedings has not arrived at a conclusion that the proceedings had been
initiated mala fide before that court. However, keeping in view the overall
facts and circumstances of the present case the court had ordered return of the
petition for appropriate presentation and the date had been fixed. The
correctness of the said order had not been assailed by the respondent herein
seeking absolute rejection of the petition by raising grounds on the nature of
findings rendered therein since that court had not held the petition to be mala
fide.
21. The above provisions and case law would show that the principles of
Order 7 rule 10 and 10A should be adopted when the court is of the view that
the case has not been instituted in proper court having jurisdiction, as such
the plaint should be returned for presenting the same in the correct court.
Apart from this, the court has also to consider that in an application under
section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 though section 14
of the Limitation Act will apply but the provisions of section 5 of the said
Act are not available.
22. In the present case, even if we consider that if the court was of the view
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that the application was not filed in proper court for want of jurisdiction then
also the proper course was to return the application in terms of order 7 rule
10/10A of CPC. However, the court instead of doing the same has rejected
the application with an observation to file before proper court, this may
create problems to the appellant. The contention of the learned counsel that
there may arise difficulties inasmuch as there may be several objections
relating to delay and also the bar of maintaining second application in view
of provisions of Order II Rule 2 of CPC may have some substance.
23. However, the return of plaint is only contemplated when the court is of
the view that the application has not been filed in the proper court, but this
case has a peculiar situation in as much as, on the date when the application
was filed at Ujjain, the said court was having jurisdiction over the issue (as
analysed above). Now, during pendency of the same, the jurisdiction was
snatched and conferred to court at Indore in view of the notification dated
02.04.2019. Here comes into picture the provisions of section 15 of the
Commercial Courts Act, which provides as under:
15. Transfer of pending cases .--(1) All suits and applications,
including applications under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 (26 of 1996), relating to a commercial dispute of a Specified
Value pending in a High Court where a Commercial Division has
been constituted, shall be transferred to the Commercial Division.
(2) All suits and applications, including applications under
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), relating
to a commercial dispute of a Specified Value pending in any civil
court in any district or area in respect of which a Commercial
Court has been constituted, shall be transferred to such
Commercial Court:
Provided that no suit or application where the final judgment has
been reserved by the court prior to the constitution of the
Commercial Division or the Commercial Court shall be
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transferred either under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2).
(3) Where any suit or application, including an application under
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), relating
to a commercial dispute of Specified Value shall stand transferred
to the Commercial Division or Commercial Court under sub-
section (1) or sub-section (2), the provisions of this Act shall
apply to those procedures that were not complete at the time of
transfer.
(4) The Commercial Division or Commercial Court, as the case
may be, may hold case management hearings in respect of such
transferred suit or application in order to prescribe new timelines
or issue such further directions as may be necessary for a speedy
and efficacious disposal of such suit or application in
accordance 23[with Order XV-A] of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (5 of 1908):
Provided that the proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order V of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall not apply to
such transferred suit or application and the court may, in its
discretion, prescribe a new time period within which the written
statement shall be filed.
(5) In the event that such suit or application is not transferred in
the manner specified in sub-section (1), sub-section (2) or sub-
section (3), the Commercial Appellate Division of the High Court
may, on the application of any of the parties to the suit, withdraw
such suit or application from the court before which it is pending
and transfer the same for trial or disposal to the Commercial
Division or Commercial Court, as the case may be, having
territorial jurisdiction over such suit, and such order of transfer
shall be final and binding.
24. The court while passing the impugned order considered that the
application under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
was filed in the year of 2018 whereas the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 had
come into force well before that thus it was of the view that the provisions of
section 15 of the said Act will not apply (as it appears from the concluding
paragraphs of the impugned order). However, the court while considering the
same has remained completely oblivious to the notification dated 01.04.2017
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which conferred jurisdiction on the District Judge, Ujjain in terms of Section
3(3) the Commercial Courts Act for hearing the commercial disputes. Thus
no fault can be found in filing of the application before the said court, as on
the date of filing the application it was having jurisdiction. Now, during
pendency of the application the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 was amended
and pursuant to this amendment the new notification was issued on
02.04.2019, thus the Court at Ujjain lost jurisdiction to Court at Indore which
was designated as the Commercial Court for several districts including the
District of Ujjain.
25. Thus sub-section (2) of above quoted section 15 has to be seen in view
of the above facts of the case, considering the fact that when notification was
issued on 02.04.2019, the court at Ujjain was having jurisdiction, thus by
treating the application as pending case in terms of section 15 of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015, the same should have been transferred to the
concerned commercial court. Thus, when the earlier notification dated
01.04.2017 stood superseded by the subsequent notification, the natural
consequence of such change of designation in terms of Section 3 of the
Commercial Courts Act should have been that all the proceedings which
were pending before different courts in various districts which are covered
by the notification dated 02.04.2019 should have been transferred to
commercial court designated at Indore. However, without resorting to this
process simply the pending cases were dismissed with an observation to file
the same before the designated commercial court at Indore which, in the
considered view of this Court, is not correct procedure.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:10063
16 AA-3-2021
26. In this view of the matter, this Court is of the view that the impugned
order is not sustainable, hence, the order dated 22.09.2020 is hereby set
aside. It is directed that the proceedings of arbitration case i.e. MJC AV
No.2/2018 shall stand transferred from the court of 5th Additional District
Judge, Ujjain to commercial court at Indore. The proceedings shall be
commenced from the stage upto the which they have reached before the
court at Ujjain.
27. With the aforesaid, present appeal stands allowed and disposed of.
(PAVAN KUMAR DWIVEDI)
JUDGE
N.R.
