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Madhya Pradesh High Court
Madhav Singh & Anr. vs The State Of M.P. on 8 April, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:27852
1 CRA-802-1997
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK KUMAR SINGH
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE AJAY KUMAR NIRANKARI
ON THE 8 th OF APRIL, 2026
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 802 of 1997
MADHAV SINGH & ANR.
Versus
THE STATE OF M.P.
Appearance:
Shri L.C.Chourasia - counsel for the appellants
Shri B.K.Upadhyay - Government Advocate for the respondent -State
Reserved on : 28/08/2025
Delivered on : 8/04/2026
JUDGMENT
Per: Justice Ajay Kumar Nirankari
The instant criminal appeal has been preferred by the appellants
against the judgment dated 07/04/1997 passed by Sessions Judge, Sagar
District Sagar in S.T.No.354/1996, whereby the appellants have been
convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced
to undergo RI for life and fine of Rs.1,000/-to each with default stipulations.
2. The facts, in nutshell, of the case are that on the information
received from the authorities of District Hospital, Sagar, a merg No. 27/96
was registered under Section 174 of Cr.P.C. During merg inquiry, the police
authorities reached the conclusion that the deceased Alok had been murdered
by the accused persons namely Madhav Singh and Rajkumar, and the
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ornaments stolen from the deceased Alok were sold to co-accused Nand
Kishore. On the basis of the merg inquiry, FIR in Crime No. 232/1996 was
registered at Police Station Gopalganj, District Sagar under Section 302/34
of IPC.
3. After registration of FIR, the police authorities started
investigation, prepared the spot map, recorded the statements of witnesses,
arrested the accused persons, recorded their memorandum under Section 27
of the Evidence Act, seized the ornaments and after completing the
investigation, filed the charge-sheet against the accused persons. It is alleged
that accused Madhav Singh and Rajkumar along with deceased Alok, at
about 12:00 p.m. on 27/08/1996, reached Hotel Sublok, District Sagar and
demanded one room for stay. On the next day, accused Madhav Singh and
Rajkumar left the hotel. The hotel authorities found deceased Alok in
unconscious condition; therefore, they followed the accused persons, traced
them at the bus stand and brought them back to the hotel. Thereafter, the
accused persons brought the deceased to the District Hospital and attempted
to run away. The hospital authorities upon examination found that Alok had
already died.
4. As per the post-mortem report, a ligature mark was found on the
neck of the deceased and the cause of death was asphyxia due to
strangulation. It is further alleged that the accused persons sold the
ornaments of the deceased to co-accused Nand Kishore. It is also alleged that
from midnight 12:00 a.m. on 27/08/1996 till morning 6:00 a.m. on
28/08/1996, the accused persons were in the hotel room and during that
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period they killed the deceased by strangulation.
5. The police authorities filed the charge-sheet before the JMFC,
District Sagar, who, after perusal of the charge-sheet, committed the case and
sent to the Sessions Court for trial. The learned Sessions Judge registered the
case as Sessions Trial No. 354/1996. The learned trial court framed charges
under Sections 379 and 302 of IPC against accused Madhav Singh and
Rajkumar and also framed charge under Section 411 of IPC against co-
accused Nand Kishore. The accused persons denied the charges and wished
to face trial.
6. To substantiate its case, the prosecution examined 23 witnesses as
PW-1 to PW-23 and exhibited documents Ex. P-1 to P-24. The accused
persons did not examine any defence witness in support of their defence.
However, they exhibited the statements of Ratanlal and Lala Singh as Ex. D-
1 and D-2.
7. In their statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., the
accused persons submitted that they are innocent and have not committed the
alleged offence. They further stated that the police authorities had arrested
them from the bus stand.
8. The learned trial court after appreciation of the material available
on record, reached to the conclusion that the appellants Madhav Singh and
Rajkumar were guilty of committing the murder of deceased Alok and
awarded them life imprisonment under Section 302 of IPC. The co-accused
Nand Kishore was acquitted of the alleged charges on the ground that the
ornaments were seized from the back of his house, which is an open place,
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and there was no evidence on record to prove that the ornaments had been
sold or handed over by the accused persons to co-accused Nand Kishore.
Against the impugned judgment dated 07/04/1997, Madhav Singh and
Rajkumar preferred the instant appeal.
9. During the pendency of the instant appeal, appellant Rajkumar
was reported to have died. The factum of death of Rajkumar was duly
verified by the State. Considering the same, vide order dated 29/11/2024, the
appeal was dismissed as abated in respect of Rajkumar.
10. Learned counsel for the appellant has advanced the argument that
the appellant is an innocent person and has not committed the alleged
offence. It is submitted that the learned trial court has not properly
appreciated the relevant material available on record. The prosecution has
failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant committed the
murder of deceased Alok. It is further submitted that under Section 106 of
the Indian Evidence Act, the burden lies on the prosecution to establish and
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the murder of the
deceased. He further submits that, lastly, only three persons were present in
the hotel room, namely the appellant, the deceased, and co-accused
Rajkumar. There is no material available on record to prove that the deceased
was killed by the appellant by throttling. In such circumstances, the appellant
has prayed for allowing the appeal, setting aside the impugned judgment, and
granting acquittal.
11. Per contra, learned counsel for the State has advanced the
argument that the prosecution, by way of oral and documentary evidence, has
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duly proved that at the time of the incident the present appellant, co-accused
Rajkumar, and deceased Alok were in Room No. 208 of Hotel Sublok,
District Sagar. On the very next day, both the accused persons left the hotel,
whereas Alok was found in the room either dead or in an unconscious
condition. The hotel authorities called the accused persons from the bus
stand and persuaded them to take Alok for medical treatment. At the District
Hospital also, the accused persons tried to run away, but the police
authorities apprehended them when it was found that the deceased had
already died. The post-mortem report opined that the cause of death of the
deceased was homicidal, due to strangulation.
12. The auto driver Ratanlal, in his deposition, admitted the fact that
he had dropped the deceased along with accused Madhav Singh and
Rajkumar at Hotel Sublok at about 11:00-12:00 p.m.
13. PW-16 Suresh Kumar, in his deposition, also stated that he
brought the deceased to District Hospital, Sagar, along with accused Madhav
Singh and Rajkumar, and both the accused persons tried to run away from
the hospital; however, on the request of the authorities of District Hospital,
they stopped the auto.
14. The prosecution, by way of oral and documentary evidence, has
strongly proved and established the fact that at the time of the incident the
accused persons were present with the deceased within the four walls of the
hotel room. Therefore, the Court has rightly shifted the burden on the
appellants to explain the facts and circumstances to show that they had not
committed the said offence.
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15. We have heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused
the record.
16. For adjudication, two questions arise before us: (i) whether the
prosecution has properly linked the chain of circumstantial evidence, and (ii)
whether the trial court was justified in shifting the burden on the accused
persons to explain the incriminating circumstances.
17. As per the post-mortem report (Exhibit P-1), there was a ligature
mark on the neck of the deceased, which could have been caused by a hard
or soft object. The cause of death of the deceased was asphyxia due to
strangulation, and the time of death was within 24 hours from the time of
conducting the post-mortem.
18. Dr. Dilip Jain (PW-1), who conducted the post-mortem of the
deceased, stated in his deposition that he found three ligature marks on the
neck of the deceased and an abrasion on the chest. According to him, the
cause of death is asphyxia due to throttling, and the ligature marks could
have been caused by a towel. He further stated that the fibres and veins had
burst, which may occur when throttling is applied for a prolonged period.
The appellant has not brought any material in cross-examination to discredit
this testimony or to prove his innocence.
19. Dr. Harsh Mishra (PW-2), who was posted in District Hospital,
Sagar, as Assistant Surgeon on 28/08/1996, stated in his deposition that the
accused persons brought Alok for medical examination and tried to run away
after leaving the body in the hospital. On examination, he found that the
deceased had already expired before reaching the hospital. When the accused
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7 CRA-802-1997
persons attempted to run away, the hospital authorities apprehended them
and took them to the police station along with the dead body.
20. From the analysis of the post-mortem report and the statements
of doctors PW-1 and PW-2, it is clear that the death of the deceased was
homicidal in nature.
21. PW-6 Ratanlal, who is an auto driver, stated in his deposition
that on 27/08/1996 at about 11:00-12:00 p.m., he dropped the accused
persons along with the deceased at Hotel Sublok, District Sagar.
22. PW-5-Shyamlal Chakraworthy, , Manager of Hotel Sublok,
admitted that on 27/08/1996 at about 12:00 p.m., the accused persons along
with the deceased reached the hotel and demanded accommodation, stating
that the deceased was suffering from illness and they had come to provide
him medical treatment. PW-5 and PW-6 further admitted that on the next day
at about 6:00 a.m., the accused persons left the hotel and went towards the
bus stand.
23. PW-19-Dhruv Kumar, an employee of Hotel Sublok engaged for
maintaining cleanliness and hygiene, stated that the accused persons left
deceased Alok alone in the hotel room. When PW-5 asked him to trace the
accused persons, he went to the bus stand and requested them to return to the
hotel.
24. PW-16 Suresh Kumar, another auto driver, stated in his
deposition that the accused persons brought the deceased to District Hospital
in his auto for treatment and, after leaving the deceased in the hospital, they
tried to run away; however, on his request, they stopped the auto.
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25. Ramesh Chandra (PW-20), father of the deceased & Narendra
Kumar (PW-7), uncle of the deceased stated in their depositions that on
27/08/1996 the deceased left his house and could not be traced. On the next
morning, they gathered information that accused persons Madhav Singh and
Rajkumar, who are their neighbours, were also not present in the colony,
whereafter they lodged a missing report.
26. The Test Identification Parade (TIP) of accused persons Madhav
Singh and Rajkumar was conducted in jail by PW-10, C.P. Nigam, Naib
Tahsildar who in his deposition before the Court, admitted that the TIP was
conducted in accordance with the rules and during TIP the accused persons
were duly identified by the witnesses by placing their hands on the heads of
the accused.
27. It is a well-settled proposition of law that the burden lies on the
prosecution to establish and prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
persons have committed the offence. However, when the prosecution,
beyond reasonable doubt, establishes that at the time of the incident the
accused and the deceased were present within the four walls of a room for a
limited period, and during that period the incident took place, then the burden
shifts on the accused persons to explain the circumstances and to bring
evidence on record to prove their innocence.
28. In the present case, from midnight 12:00 a.m. of 27/08/1996 till
6:00 a.m. the next morning, the deceased was in Room No. 208 of Hotel
Sublok along with the accused persons. Thereafter, the accused persons left
the hotel after leaving the deceased in the said room and attempted to run
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away. Their presence and the "last seen" circumstance in Room No. 208
were duly established by the prosecution. The cause of death of the deceased
was strangulation, and the veins of the neck were found ruptured, which
indicates that the neck of the deceased was strangulated with a hard or soft
object for a prolonged period. The ligature marks found on the neck of the
deceased further indicate that such injuries could not have been caused if
only a single person had attempted to strangulate the deceased with a hard or
soft object like a towel.
29. The Supreme Court in Nusrat Parween vs. State of Jharkhand ,
reported in 2024 Supreme (SC) 1164, has extensively dealt with the
aforesaid aspect. Relevant paragraphs no.17 to 21 are reproduced as under:-
"17 It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence
that Section 106 of the Evidence Act shall apply and the
onus to explain would shift on to the accused only after
the prosecution succeeds in establishing the basic facts
from which a reasonable inference can be drawn
regarding the existence of certain other facts which are
within the special knowledge of the accused. When the
accused fails to offer a proper explanation about the
existence of the said other facts, the Court can draw an
appropriate inference against the accused. In cases
based on circumstantial evidence, the accused's failure
to provide a reasonable explanation as required under
Section 106 of the Evidence Act can serve as an
additional link in the chain of circumstantial evidence -
but only if the prosecution has already established other
essential ingredients sufficient to shift the onus on to the
accused. However, if the prosecution fails to establish a
complete chain of circumstances in the first place, then
the accused's failure to discharge the burden under
Section 106 of the Evidence Act becomes irrelevant.
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18. The law concerning the invocation of shifting of
onus under Section 106 of the Evidence Act has been
explained by this Court in the case of Shambu Nath
Mehra v. State of Ajmer28, wherein it was held as
follows:
"8. Section 106 is an exception to section 101.
Section 101 lays down the general rule about the burden
of proof.
"Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to
any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of
facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts
exist".
Illustration (a) says-
"A desires a Court to give judgment that B shall be
punished for a crime which A says B has committed.
A must prove that B has committed the crime".
9. This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case
the burden of proof is on the prosecution and section
106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty.
On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain
exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at
any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution
to establish facts which are "especially" within the
knowledge of the accused and which he could prove
without difficulty or inconvenience. The word
"especially" stresses that. It means facts that are pre-
eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the
section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead
to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the
burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not
commit the murder because who could know better than
he whether he did or did not. It is evident that that
cannot be the intention and the Privy Council has twice
refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain
other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on
an accused person to show that he did not commit the
crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v.
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Emperor and Seneviratne v. R.
11. We recognise that an illustration does not exhaust
the full content of the section which it illustrates but
equally it can neither curtail nor expand its ambit; and if
knowledge of certain facts is as much available to the
prosecution, should it choose to exercise due diligence,
as to the accused, the facts cannot be said to be
"especially" within the knowledge of the accused. This
is a section which must be considered in a
commonsense way; and the balance of convenience and
the disproportion of the labour that would be involved
in finding out and proving certain facts balanced against
the triviality of the issue at stake and the ease with
which the accused could prove them, are all matters that
must be taken into consideration. The section cannot be
used to undermine the well established rule of law that,
save in a very exceptional class of case, the burden is on
the prosecution and never shifts." (emphasis supplied)
19. Further, in Tulshiram Sahadu Suryawanshi and Anr.
v. State of Maharashtra, (2012)10 SCC 373 , this Court
observed as under:
"23. It is settled law that presumption of fact is a rule
in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be
inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring
the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the
court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a
logical conclusion as the most probable position. The
above position is strengthened in view of Section 114 of
the Evidence Act, 1872. It empowers the court to
presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely
to have happened. In that process, the courts shall have
regard to the common course of natural events, human
conduct, etc. in addition to the facts of the case. In these
circumstances, the principles embodied in Section 106
of the Evidence Act can also be utilised. We make it
clear that this section is not intended to relieve the
prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, but it would apply to
cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving
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facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn
regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the
accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding
such facts, failed to offer any explanation which might
drive the court to draw a different inference.
(emphasis supplied)
20. A similar observation is found in Nagendra Sah v.
State of Bihar(2021) 10 SCC 725, wherein the Court
held that: -
"22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will
apply to those cases where the prosecution has
succeeded in establishing the facts from which a
reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the
existence of certain other facts which are within the
special knowledge of the accused. When the accused
fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of
said other facts, the court can always draw an
appropriate inference.
23. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if
the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in
discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section
106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an
additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case
governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of
circumstances which is required to be established by the
prosecution is not established, the failure of the accused
to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the
Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is
not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to
convict the accused."
21. Recently, this Court in the case of Anees v. The
State Govt. of NCT, 2024 INSC 368, held in the
following terms:
"40. Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be
invoked to make up the inability of the prosecution to
produce evidence of circumstances pointing to the guilt
of the accused. This section cannot be used to support a
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conviction unless the prosecution has discharged the
onus by proving all the elements necessary to establish
the offence. It does not absolve the prosecution from the
duty of proving that a crime was committed even
though it is a matter specifically within the knowledge
of the accused and it does not throw the burden on the
accused to show that no crime was committed. To infer
the guilt of the accused from absence of reasonable
explanation in a case where the other circumstances are
not by themselves enough to call for his explanation is
to relieve the prosecution of its legitimate burden. So,
until a prima facie case is established by such evidence,
the onus does not shift to the accused."
30. On overall consideration and analysis of the oral and
documentary evidence available on record, we reach the conclusion that the
learned trial court has not committed any error in shifting the burden on the
accused persons to explain the circumstances and to prove their
innocence. The findings recorded by the learned trial court are fully justified
and well-reasoned. We have not found any substantial force in the grounds
and arguments raised by learned counsel for the appellant warranting
interference in the well-reasoned and speaking judgment of the learned trial
court.
31. Thus, the appeal filed by the appellant is devoid of any substance
and the same is hereby dismissed.
32. Record be send back to the trial court. A copy of this order be
kept in the record of this appeal.
(VIVEK KUMAR SINGH) (AJAY KUMAR NIRANKARI)
JUDGE JUDGE
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S /-
