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Madhya Pradesh High Court
Shiva Parihar vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 6 April, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
ON THE 6 th OF APRIL, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 4253 of 2014
SHIVA PARIHAR
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Ravi Rahul, Advocate for petitioner.
Shri Shiraz Qureshi,Government Advocate for respondents/State.
ORDER
This petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India has been filed
seeking for following reliefs :-
i) That, the impugned order Annexure P-1 being not in
consonance of the principle of natural justice, is liable to be set
aside.
ii) That, the order passed by the appellate authority and the order
passed in the mercy appeal, may kindly be set aside, in the
interest of the petition.
iii) Cost of the petition be awarded or any other order or direction
deemed fit in the circumstances of the case be issued in the favour
of the petitioner.
2. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that petitioner was appointed on
the basis of compassionate appointment vide order dated 22.12.2009. Petitioner
was sent to the Police Training School, Tighra, Gwalior for the training on
18.10.2011. During training, petitioner fell severely ill and because of illness, he
remained absent from training for the period of 140 days i.e. from 10.11.2011 to
02.04.2012. Due to the absence from training, departmental enquiry was initiated
against petitioner and after conducting the said enquiry, petitioner has been
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dismissed from service by order dated 05.05.2013. Thereafter, petitioner has
preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority and Appellate Authority has
rejected the appeal of petitioner by order dated 25.06.2013. Thereafter, petitioner
has preferred a mercy appeal that has also been rejected by order dated
05.10.2013. Learned counsel for petitioner further submitted that Officials of the
PTS, Tighra admitted the petitioner to Government Hospital and one Praveen
Mehra was appointed as Attendant to the petitioner and investigation report and
other papers have already been submitted by petitioner, but that have not been
considered. Learned counsel for petitioner relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of Maan Singh Vs. Union of India & Others, passed in
Appeal(Civil) 2531 of 2001 vide order dated 18.02.2003.
3. Per contra , learned Government Advocate submitted that initially,
petitioner was appointed on compassionate basis in the year 2009 and within a
short period i.e. near about four years, petitioner was punished thrice and out of all
these punishments, petitioner was given two major and one minor punishments. It
is further submitted that petitioner has rightly been dismissed from service as
during the enquiry, petitioner was found guilty of misconduct. It is further
submitted that opportunity of hearing has already been provided to the petitioner
during the enquiry. Learned counsel for the respondents/State further submitted
that the appellate authority after taking into consideration the ground raised and
material available on record has also declined interference and maintained the
order passed as per Annexure P-1 which is well within parameters of law,
warrants no further interference. The entire departmental enquiry has been
conducted in consonance of Rules and Provisions contemplated and after granting
proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, the order of punishment has been
passed by Disciplinary Authority and in such circumstances, in view of the well
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settled position in respect of decision of the administrative order whether rational
or reasonable, the scope of interference under the writ proceedings become very
narrow and limited, hence no interference is warrants and the petition is liable to
be dismissed.
4. Heard both the parties and perused the entire record with due care.
5. Petitioner has only submitted punishment order, appeal rejection order
and mercy appeal rejection order. Even, petitioner has not submitted documents as
such, enquiry statement, statement of witnesses and reply to the enquiry report,
appeal memo and very casually petition has been filed by petitioner. Even in the
medical document submitted by petitioner, it is not clear that on what basis
petitioner remained absent.
6. Petitioner was appointed on compassionate basis in the year 2009 and
within a short period i.e. near about four years, petitioner was punished thrice and
out of all these punishments, petitioner was given two major and one minor
punishments. Petitioner has rightly been dismissed from service as during the
enquiry, petitioner was found guilty of misconduct. Opportunity of hearing has
already been provided to the petitioner during the enquiry. The appellate authority
after taking into consideration the grounds raised and material available on record
has also declined interference and maintained the order passed as per Annexure P-
1 which is well within parameters of law, warrants no further interference. The
entire departmental enquiry has been conducted in consonance of Rules and
Provisions contemplated and after granting proper opportunity of hearing to the
petitioner, the order of punishment has been passed by Disciplinary Authority and
in such circumstances, in view of the well settled position in respect of decision of
the administrative order whether rational or reasonable, the scope of interference
under the writ proceedings become very narrow and limited, hence no interference
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is warranted and the petition is liable to be dismissed.
7. The scope of interference by this Court in departmental matters.
The Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka and another Vs. N.
Gangraj reported in (2020) 3 SCC 423 has held as under:
"8. We find that the interference in the order of punishment
by the Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court suffers from
patent error. The power of judicial review is confined to the
decision-making process. The power of judicial review
conferred on the constitutional court or on the Tribunal is
not that of an appellate authority.
9. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723,
a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that the High
Court is not a court of appeal over the decision of the
authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public
servant. It is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is
held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according
to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the
rules of natural justice are not violated. The Court held as
under : (AIR pp. 1726-27, para 7)
"7. ... The High Court is not constituted in a
proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution
a court of appeal over the decision of the
authorities holding a departmental enquiry
against a public servant : it is concerned to
determine whether the enquiry is held by an
authority competent in that behalf, and according
to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and
whether the rules of natural justice are not
violated. Where there is some evidence, which
the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the
enquiry has accepted and which evidence may
reasonably support the conclusion that the
delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not
the function of the High Court in a petition for a
writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and
to arrive at an independent finding on the
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evidence."
10. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749
: 1996 SCC (L&S) 80], again a three-Judge Bench of this
Court has held that power of judicial review is not an appeal
from a decision but a review of the manner in which the
decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to
ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to
ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is
necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. The
court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as
an appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to
arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. It
was held as under :
(SCC pp. 759-60, paras 12-13)
"12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a
decision but a review of the manner in which the
decision is made. Power of judicial review is
meant to ensure that the individual receives fair
treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion
which the authority reaches is necessarily correct
in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is
conducted on charges of misconduct by a public
servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to
determine whether the inquiry was held by a
competent officer or whether rules of natural
justice are complied with. Whether the findings
or conclusions are based on some evidence, the
authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry
has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a
finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding
must be based on some evidence. Neither the
technical rules of the Evidence Act nor of proof
of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to
disciplinary proceeding. When the authority
accepts that evidence and conclusion receives
support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is
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entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is
guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its
power of judicial review does not act as appellate
authority to reappreciate the evidence and to
arrive at its own independent findings on the
evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere
where the authority held the proceedings against
the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent
with the rules of natural justice or in violation of
statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or
where the conclusion or finding reached by the
disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If
the conclusion or finding be such as no
reasonable person would have ever reached, the
Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion
or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make
it appropriate to the facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of
facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate
authority has co-extensive power to reappreciate
the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a
disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal
evidence and findings on that evidence are not
relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of
evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed
before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v.
H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC
364, this Court held at p. 728 that if the
conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence
reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse
or suffers from patent error on the face of the
record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of
certiorari could be issued."
11. In High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000)
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1 SCC 416 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 144, this Court held that
interference with the decision of departmental authorities is
permitted if such authority had held proceedings in violation
of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory
regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry while
exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
It was held as under : (SCC p. 423, para 16)
"16. The Division Bench [Shashikant S. Patil v.
High Court of Bombay, 1998 SCC OnLine Bom
97 : (2000) 1 LLN 160] of the High Court seems
to have approached the case as though it was an
appeal against the order of the
administrative/disciplinary authority of the High
Court. Interference with the decision of
departmental authorities can be permitted, while
exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution if such authority had held
proceedings in violation of the principles of
natural justice or in violation of statutory
regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry
or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by
considerations extraneous to the evidence and
merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by
the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly
arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person
could have arrived at such a conclusion, or
grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot
overlook that the departmental authority (in this
case the Disciplinary Committee of the High
Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry
has been properly conducted. The settled legal
position is that if there is some legal evidence on
which the findings can be based, then adequacy
or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter
for canvassing before the High Court in a writ
petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution."
12. In State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand
Nalwaya, (2011) 4 SCC 584:(2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 721, this
Court held that the courts will not act as an appellate court
and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor
interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the
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material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and
properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the
question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of
the evidence will not be ground for interfering with the
findings in departmental enquiries. The Court held as under:
(SCC pp. 587-88, paras 7 & 10)
"7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an
appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic
enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is
possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been
fairly and properly held and the findings are based on
evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the
reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for
interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries.
Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact
recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such
findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly
perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a
tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such
conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts
will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary
matters,if principles of natural justice or statutory
regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be
arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous
considerations.(Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India,
(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80, Union of India v.
G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S)
1806 and Bank of India v.Degala Suryanarayana, (1999) 5
SCC 762 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1036, High Court of Bombay
v. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416 : 2000 SCC (L&S)
144].)
****
10. The fact that the criminal court subsequently
acquitted the respondent by giving him the benefit of
doubt,will not in any way render a completed disciplinary
proceeding invalid nor affect the validity of the finding of
guilt or consequential punishment. The standard of proof
required in criminal proceedings being different from the
standard of proof required in departmental enquiries, the
same charges and evidence may lead to different results in
the two proceedings, that is, finding of guilt in departmental
proceedings and an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in
the criminal proceedings. This is more so when the
departmental proceedings are more proximate to the
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incident, in point of time, when compared to the criminal
proceedings. The findings by the criminal court will have no
effect on previously concluded domestic enquiry. An
employee who allows the findings in the enquiry and the
punishment by the disciplinary authority to attain finality by
nonchallenge, cannot after several years, challenge the
decision on the ground that subsequently, the criminal court
has acquitted him."
13. In another judgment reported as Union of India v. P.
Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S)
554, this Court held that while reappreciating evidence the
High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the
disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the parameters as
to when the High Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary
proceedings : (SCC p. 617, para 13)
"13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution
of India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry,
in case the same has been conducted in
accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on
which findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may
appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment
unless it shocks its conscience."
14. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent
relies upon the judgment reported as Allahabad Bank v.
Krishna Narayan Tewari, (2017) 2 SCC 308 : (2017) 1 SCC
(L&S) 335, wherein this Court held that if the disciplinary
authority records a finding that is not supported by any
evidence whatsoever or a finding which is unreasonably
arrived at, the writ court could interfere with the finding of
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the disciplinary proceedings. We do not find that even
o n touchstone of that test, the Tribunal or the High Court
could interfere with the findings recorded by the disciplinary
authority It is not the case of no evidence or that the findings
are perverse. The finding that the respondent is guilty of
misconduct has been interfered with only on the ground that
there are discrepancies in the evidence of the Department.
The discrepancies in the evidence will not make it a case of
no evidence. The inquiry officer has appreciated the
evidence and returned a finding that the respondent is guilty
of misconduct.
15. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the
enquiry officer and had passed an order of punishment. An
appeal before the State Government was also dismissed.
Once the evidence has been accepted by the departmental
authority, in exercise of power of judicial review, the
Tribunal or the High Court could not interfere with the
findings of facts recorded by reappreciating evidence as
if the courts are the appellate authority. We may notice that
the said judgment has not noticed the larger Bench
judgments in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963
SC 1723 and B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6
SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80 a s mentioned above.
Therefore, the orders passed by the Tribunal and the High
Court suffer from patent illegality and thus cannot
be sustained in law."
The Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India and
others Vs. Ramesh Dinkar Pundereported in(2006) 7 SCC
212 has held as under:
"6. Before we proceed further, we may observe at this stage
that it is unfortunate that the High Court has acted as an
Appellate Authority despite the consistent view taken by
this Court that the High Court and the Tribunal while
exercising the judicial review do not act as an Appellate
Authority:
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"Its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to
correct errors of law or procedural error, if any,
resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or
violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial
review is not akin to adjudication on merit by
reappreciating the evidence as an
Appellate Authority."(See Govt. of A.P. v. Mohd.
Nasrullah Khan [(2006) 2 SCC 373 : 2006 SCC
(L&S) 316], SCC p. 379, para 11.)
9. It is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the
evidence which had been considered by the inquiry officer, a
disciplinary authority and the Appellate Authority. The
finding of the High Court, on facts, runs to the teeth of the
evidence on record.
12. From the facts collected and the report submitted by the
inquiry officer, which has been accepted by the disciplinary
authority and the Appellate Authority.
15. In Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur [(1972) 4 SCC 618
: (1972) 2 SCR 218] it is held as under: (SCC p. 623, para
15)
A disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial.
T h e standard proof required is that of preponderance of
probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. If
t h e inference that lender was a person likely to have
official dealings with the respondent was one which a
reasonable person would draw from the proved facts of the
case, the High Court cannot sit as a court of appeal over a
decision based on it. The Letters Patent Bench had the same
power of dealing with all questions, either of fact or of
l a w arising in the appeal, as the Single Judge of the
H i g h Court. If the enquiry has been properly held the
question of adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot
b e canvassed before the High Court. A finding cannot
b e characterised as perverse or unsupported by any
relevant materials, if it was a reasonable inference from
proved facts. (SCR p. 219)
16. In Union of India v. Parma Nanda [(1989) 2 SCC 177 :
1989 SCC (L&S) 303 : (1989) 10 ATC 30] it is held at SCC p.
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189, para 27 as under:
"27. We must unequivocally state that the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment
cannot be equated with an appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal
cannot interfere with the findings of the inquiry officer or
competent authority where they are not arbitrary or utterly
perverse. It is appropriate to remember that the power to impose
penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the competent
authority either by an Act of legislature or rules made under the
proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. If there has been an
enquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance with
principles of natural justice what punishment would meet the ends
of justice is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
competent authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is
imposed on the proved misconduct, the Tribunal has no power to
substitute its own discretion for that of the authority. The
adequacy of penalty unless it is mala fide is certainly not a matter
for the Tribunal to concern itself with. The Tribunal also cannot
interfere with the penalty if the conclusion of the inquiry officer
or the competent authority is based on evidence even if some of it
is found to be irrelevant or extraneous to the matter."
17. I n Union Bank of India v. Vishwa Mohan [(1998) 4 SCC 310
: 1998 SCC (L&S) 1129] this Court held at SCC p. 315, para 12
as under:
"12. After hearing the rival contentions, we are of
the firm view that all the four charge-sheets
which were enquired into relate to serious
misconduct. The respondent was unable to
demonstrate before us how prejudice was caused
to him due to non-supply of the enquiry
authority's report/findings in the present case. It
needs to be emphasised that in the banking
business absolute devotion, diligence, integrity
and honesty needs to be preserved by every bank
employee and in particular the bank officer. If
this is not observed, the confidence of the
public/depositors would be impaired. It is for this
reason, we are of the opinion that the High Court
had committed an error while setting aside the
order of dismissal of the respondent on the
ground of prejudice on account of non-furnishing
of the enquiry report/findings to him."
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18. In Chairman and MD, United Commercial Bank v. P.C.
Kakkar[(2003) 4 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 468] this
Court held at SCC pp. 376-77, para 14 as under:
"14. A bank officer is required to exercise higher
standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with
the money of the depositors and the customers.
Every officer/employee of the bank is required to
take all possible steps to protect the interests of
the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost
integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to
do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank
officer. Good conduct and discipline are
inseparable from the functioning of every
officer/employee of the bank. As was observed
by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-
Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik
[(1996) 9 SCC 69 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1194] it is
no defence available to say that there was no loss
or profit resulted in case, when the
officer/employee acted without authority. The
very discipline of an organisation more
particularly a bank is dependent upon each of its
officers and officers acting and operating within
their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's
authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is
a misconduct. The charges against the employee
were not casual in nature and were serious. These
aspects do not appear to have been kept in view
by the High Court."
19. In Regional Manager, U.P. SRTC v. Hoti Lal [(2003) 3
SCC 605 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 363] it was pointed out as under: (SCC
p. 614, para 10)
"If the charged employee holds a position of trust
where honesty and integrity are in built
requirements of functioning, it would not be
proper to deal with the matter leniently.
Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with
iron hands. Where the person deals with public
money or is engaged in financial transactions or
acts in a fiduciary capacity,the highest degree of
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integrity and trustworthiness is a must and
unexceptionable."
20. In Cholan Roadways Ltd. v. G. Thirugnanasambandam
[(2005) 3 SCC 241 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 395] this Court at
SCC p. 247, para 15 held:
"15. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the
principles of the Evidence Act have no application in a
domestic enquiry."
8. This Court, in exercise of power under Article 226 of Constitution of
India, cannot act as an Appellate Authority and cannot substitute its own findings
b y reversing the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. This Court
can interfere with the findings of fact, provided they are based on no evidence.
10. After going through the record of case, judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court,
it is clear that the aforesaid submissions misconceived. The Courts will not act as
an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor
interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If
the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on
evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the
evidence will not be ground for interfering with the findings in departmental
enquiries. The standard of proof required in criminal proceedings being different
from the standard of proof required in departmental enquiries.
9. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has
been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can
be based.
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(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its cons
cience.
10. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and
had passed an order of punishment. An appeal was also dismissed. Once
t h e evidence has been accepted by the departmental authority, in exercise of
power of judicial review, this Court could not interfere with the findings of
facts recorded by reappreciating evidence as if the courts are the appellate
authority. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary
matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated
or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on
extraneous considerations.
11. It is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence which had
been considered by the inquiry officer, a disciplinary authority and the Appellate
Authority. Jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or
procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of
principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication on merit
by reappreciating the evidence as an Appellate Authority. In the
respondent/department absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty needs
to be preserved by every employee. Under these circumstances, the degree of
proof in departmental enquiry is not as strict as it is required in criminal case. The
departmental enquiries are decided on preponderance of probability.
12. The judgment cited by counsel for petitioner in the case of Maan Singh(Supra)
passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in not applicable in the present case as facts and
grounds are different as petitioner was appointed in the year 2009 and within a
period of four years, petitioner has been punished thrice. Therefore, no case is
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made out warranting interference
13. Accordingly, petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
(ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT)
JUDGE
R
