[Cites 17, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Urmila Devi vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 1 April, 2026
Author: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
Bench: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
1
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:8532
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT I N D O R E
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR
ON THE 1 OF APRIL, 2026
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 52783 of 2024
URMILA DEVI & OTHERS
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANOTHER
Appearance:
Shri Sachin Patel, advocate for the petitioners.
Shri Gajendra Singh Dondiya, public prosecutor for
respondent/State.
Shri Virendra Sharma, Senior Advocate, with Shri Jitendra Sharma,
advocate for respondent No.2 through VC.
.....................................................................................................................
ORDER
This petition under Section 482 of CrPC/528 of the BNSS, 2023
has been filed by petitioners for quashing of FIR pertaining to Crime No.
43 of 2024 registered at Women Police Station, Ujjain, District Ujjain for
offence punishable under Sections 3, 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and
subsequent proceedings thereto.
2. The exposition of facts, giving rise to present petition, is as under:
a. Deepak Singh Tomar reported to the Police Station Women
Cell Ujjain on 13.06.2024 that marriage of his daughter Mahima @
Pranjal was fixed with Naveen Kumar son of Kaushal Singh. An
engagement ceremony was solemnized on 22.4.2024 with consent
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of both the parties at Meghdoot Resort Indore. After engagement,
Kaushal Singh communicated with him on mobile phone on
24.4.2024 and conveyed his unhappiness over engagement
function. Praveen Kumar elder son of Kaushal Singh objected to
inadequate gifts as dowry on 26.4.2024. The discussion on
marriage resumed after intervention of other family members.
Naveen and Mona demanded Rs. 25 Lacs, 20 Tola gold and car for
marriage. Thus, Naveen, Praveen, Kaushal Singh and Urmila Devi
are demanding dowry of Rs. 25-30 Lacs, gold of 25 Tola and a car
for marriage of Mahima @ Pranjal with Naveen. On such
allegations, the Police Station Women Cell, Ujjain registered FIR
for offence punishable under Sections 498-A of IPC and Sections 3
and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. The statements of witnesses have
been recorded. Mobile transcript of communication was seized.
The final report was submitted on completion of investigation for
offence punishable under Section 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition
Act, 1961.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners, in addition to the facts and
grounds mentioned in the petition, submits that the petitioners are falsely
implicated in the alleged offence. The petitioner No. 1 is not a relative of
husband. There is no allegation of demand by the petitioners. It is a case
of discord between the parties over marriage ceremony. Learned counsel
further submitted that solemnization of marriage is condition precedent
for constitution of offence punishable under Section 4 of Dowry
Prohibition Act. Learned counsel referred to the judgment of the Supreme
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Court in the case of P. Sivakumar and others Vs. State Rep. by the
Deputy Superintendent of Police etc. reported in 2023 SCC Online SC
1737; and order dated 21st June, 2023 passed by the Coordinate Bench in
Criminal Revision No. 2217/2023 in the matter of Ramanuj Tripathi Vs.
State of MP to buttress his submissions.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/State opposed the
petition and submitted that the FIR and material on case diary clearly
makes out the demand of dowry for marriage of daughter of complainant
with Naveen, relative of petitioners. Therefore, the alleged offence is
prima facie made out. The petition is meritless.
5. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 referring to the object and
reasons of the Dowry Prohibition Act contends that the act takes in
consideration the demand of dowry made before the marriage also. The
alleged offence is made out from the statements of complainant and
witnesses. Therefore, petition is meritless.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
7. The Supreme Court in case of State of Haryana vs. Ch. Bhajan
Lal, reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 after an elaborate consideration of the
matter and after referring to its various earlier decisions, has observed in
para 108 as under:-
''108. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of
the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this
Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code
which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following
categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to
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secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any
precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines
or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases
wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials,
if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)of the Code
except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and
the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission
of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence
but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section
155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and
inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach
a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the
Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to
the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide
and/or where the proceeding is maliciously Instituted with an ulterior motive
for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.''
8. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao
Angre, reported in (1988) 1 SCC 692, a three-Judge Bench of this Court
has laid down the law as to quashment of proceedings under Section
482CrPC as follows :
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'7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the
initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the
court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima
facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into
consideration any special features which appear in a particular case
to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to
permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the
court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the
opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak
and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing
a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into
consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding
even though it may be at a preliminary stage.'
9. A three judge Bench of the Supreme Court in matter of L.V.
Jadhav v. Shankarrao Abasaheb Pawar, reported in (1983) 4 SCC 231
observed as under-
7. According to the appellant's complaint, when the marriage of his daughter
Anita and the second respondent, the son of the first respondent, was in
progress on June 19, 1979, both the respondents demanded from him cash of
Rs 50,000 in the presence of respectable persons under the pretext that the
amount was required for the passage or transport of Anita and the second
respondent to the United States where the second respondent was employed at
that time and they told him that if he did not comply with their demand by way
of dowry further ceremonies in the marriage would not be completed. It is
further alleged that some respectable persons who were present at that time
persuaded the respondents to complete the marriage ceremonies and
formalities and thereafter the marriage ceremonies were completed and that
subsequently the second respondent went to the United States in July 1979
alone because the passport and visa of Anita had to be arranged which was
done some time later while Anita was staying in the house of the first
respondent, and the respondents continued to persist in their demand for the
money when Anita was staying in the house of the first respondent without
being sent to the United States. Mr V.S. Desai, Senior Advocate, appearing for
the respondents invited our attention to the decision of a learned Single Judge
of the Delhi High Court in Inder Sain v. State [1981 Cri LJ 1116 : 1981 Chand
Cri C 90 : (1981) 20 Del LT 309 : 1981 MLR 238] and also of another Single
Judge of the Patna High Court in Kashi Prasad v. State of Bihar [1980 BBCJ
612] and submitted that the demand for Rs 50,000 alleged in the complaint
would not constitute an offence under Section 4 of the Act as there is no
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:8532
allegation in the complaint that the appellant consented to pay the amount and
that without consent to the payment the sum of Rs 50,000 alleged to have been
demanded does not become dowry within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act
which defines "dowry" as meaning "any property or valuable security given or
agreed to be given either directly or indirectly--
"(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or
(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person,
to either party to the marriage or to any other person;
at or before or after the marriage as consideration for the marriage of
the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of
persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies."
Section 2 contains two explanations with which we are not concerned in this
case. In the Delhi High Court's decision the question for consideration was
what constituted "consideration" for marriage within the meaning of Section 2
of the Act, and Luthra, J. has observed:
"Thus the definition of the word 'consideration' as given in the Contract
Act also leads to the conclusion that the property or valuable security
should be demanded or given whether in the past, present or future for
bringing about solemnization of marriage. After the marriage giving of
property or valuable security by the parents of the bride cannot constitute a
'consideration' for marriage unless it was agreed at the time of or before
the marriage that such property or valuable security would be given in
future."
The complaint in that case did out spell out that the articles mentioned in the
same were given after the marriage as a result of some agreement for the
purpose of the marriage. The allegations in the complaint indicated that those
articles were given after the marriage with a view to have smooth sailing and
continuance of good marital relations. The learned Judge, therefore, held that
the articles given in those circumstances did not constitute dowry within the
meaning of Section 2 of the Act. We think that the learned Judge is right in
holding so, and that it is desirable that even such a demand should be
prohibited and made punishable in law.
8. We are concerned in the present case with a complaint in which it has been
alleged that the demand for the sum of Rs 50,000 as dowry was made when
the marriage ceremonies between the appellant's daughter Anita and the
second respondent were in progress, by both the respondents, under the pretext
that it was required for the passage of the parties to the marriage to the United
States with a threat that if the amount was not paid the marriage ceremonies
would not be completed and that there was demand for payment of the amount
even after the marriage ceremonies were over when Anita was staying in the
house of the first respondent after the second respondent went away alone to
the United States because the passport and visa for Anita had not been
obtained by then. The decision of even the Patna High Court relied upon by
Mr Desai relates only to what constitutes "consideration" for the marriage
within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act. On the other hand, Dr Y.S. Chitale,
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:8532
Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellant invited our attention to a decision
of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Daulat Mansingh
Aher v.C.R. Bansi [1980 Cri LJ 1171 : (1980) 2 Mah LR 304 : 1980 Cri LR
(Mah) 459] and submitted that a mere demand for money as dowry for
completing the marriage ceremonies on pain of not completing the ceremonies
if the money was not given is sufficient to constitute an offence under Section
4 of the Act even though there was no consent on the part of the appellant to
comply with that demand. What appeared from the record of the case out of
which the decision of the Bombay High Court arose, was that the accused-
petitioner filed an application on October 6, 1978 raising a contention that the
Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Dadar, Bombay had no jurisdiction to
entertain and try the case because the accused and the complainant were
residing outside the jurisdiction of that Court. A contention was also raised
that the complaint was barred by limitation and was, therefore, liable to be
dismissed. However, during the arguments in the High Court it was conceded
by the learned counsel for the accused-petitioner that the complaint was filed
within the period prescribed. Therefore, the only question that arose for
consideration by the learned Judges of the Division Bench was the one relating
to the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Dadar, Bombay to entertain
and inquire into the complaint. However, the learned Judges have observed in
the judgment after extracting Section 4 of the Act that "what is made
punishable under that provision is the demand itself, whether direct or indirect,
from the parents of a bride or bridegroom". The learned Judges have further
observed thus:
"On the averments made in the complaint the demand is made by the
accused by writing a letter from Wadala, Bombay-31. This demand was
made through his elder brother who is the son-in-law of the complainant
and resides at Agartala. From Agartala the said letter of demand was
forwarded by the son-in-law of the complainant to Andheri, Bombay
where the complainant is residing. Therefore, the demand by accused was
not made at Agartala. He had only used the good offices of his elder
brother to forward the letter. Instead of writing a direct letter to
complainant demanding dowry the demand was made through the elder
brother, who is residing at Agartala. Still the demand is by accused and is
made from Wadala at Bombay. The demand became complete when the
complainant received letter at Andheri, Bombay. Hence the dowry was
demanded at Bombay. The offence was partly committed at Wadala,
Bombay, from where dowry was demanded. It was also partly committed
at Andheri, Bombay, where the complainant received the demand letter. It
is further alleged by the complainant in the complaint that the marriage of
Alka which was almost settled, could not take place due to the demand of
dowry made by the accused. This consequential result or consequence of
the demand also took place at Bombay. Wadala is within the local
jurisdiction of Metropolitan Magistrate, Dadar. Letter of demand was
actually sent from Wadala, Bombay. Hence in any case it can safely be
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:8532
said that offence as alleged is partly committed at Wadala also. Though a
contention was raised before the trial court that neither accused nor
complainant are residing within the jurisdiction of Dadar Court, now it is
an admitted position that accused resides at Wadala.
Even if it is held that offence became complete when complainant received
letter at Andheri, Bombay, still it will be triable by Bombay Court.
Whether it is Dadar or Andheri Court will not make any difference. On the
other hand we are told that Dadar Court is nearer to the residence of
accused. The point raised is too technical and no prejudice will be caused
to the accused nor on that count it could be said that trial is vitiated; or will
result in failure of justice. Hence there is no substance in this contention."
9. It appears from a reading of this judgment that it was either not disputed
before the learned Judges or that it was presumed that a mere demand for
property as consideration for the marriage taking place would constitute an
offence under Section 4 of the Act.
10. The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 is intended to prohibit the giving or
taking of dowry, and Parliament has made every offence under the Act non-
compoundable by Section 8 of the Act. By Section 5 it has been enacted that
any agreement for the giving or taking of dowry shall be void. Section 3
makes abetment of the giving or taking of dowry an offence. No doubt,
according to Section 2 of the Act "dowry" is any property or valuable security
given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly at or before or after the
marriage as consideration for the marriage but does not include dowar or mahr
in the case of person to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies. It
would appear from Section 2 that consent to comply with the demand for any
property as consideration for the marriage would alone make the property or
valuable security given or agreed to be given directly or indirectly, "dowry"
within the meaning of the Act. But having regard to the dominant object of the
Act which is to stamp out the practice of demanding dowry in any shape or
form either before or after the marriage, we are of the opinion that the entire
definition of the word "dowry" should not be imported into Section 4 which
lays down that "if any person after the commencement of this Act, demands,
directly or indirectly from the parents or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as
the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment which
may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to five thousand
rupees or with both". According to Webster's New World Dictionary, 1962
Edn., bride means a woman who has just been married or is about to be
married, and bridegroom means a man who has just been married or is about
to be married. If we give this strict meaning of a bride or a bridegroom to the
word bride or bridegroom used in Section 4 of the Act property or valuable
security demanded and consented to be given prior to the time when the
woman had become a bride or the man had become a bridegroom, may not be
"dowry" within the meaning of the Act. We are of the opinion that having
regard to the object of the Act a liberal construction has to be given to the
word "dowry" used in Section 4 of the Act to mean that any property or
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:8532
valuable security which if consented to be given on the demand being made
would become dowry within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act. We are also
of the opinion that the object of Section 4 of the Act is to discourage the very
demand for property or valuable security as consideration for a marriage
between the parties thereto. Section 4 prohibits the demand for 'giving'
property or valuable security which demand, if satisfied, would constitute an
offence under Section 3 read with Section 2 of the Act. There is no warrant for
taking the view that the initial demand for giving of property or valuable
security would not constitute an offence and that an offence would take place
only when the demand was made again after the party on whom the demand
was made agreed to comply with it. The learned Magistrate was, therefore,
right in proceeding on the basis that the allegations in the complaint prima
facie constitute an offence under Section 4 of the Act and issuing processes to
the respondents. The High Court, we cannot refrain from observing, might
well have refused to invoke its inherent powers at the very threshold in order
to quash the proceedings, for these powers are meant to be exercised sparingly
and with circumspection when there is reason to believe that the process of
law is being misused to harass a citizen. The present was not such a case. We
find that the complaint had been filed after obtaining the previous sanction of
the State Government or of such officer as the State Government may by
general or special order specify in this behalf as required by the proviso to
Section 4 of the Act. Mr P.G. Gokhale who appeared for the second
respondent, State of Maharashtra, was not in a position to tell us about what
the exact stand of the State Government in this appeal is as to whether it
supports or opposes the contention of the appellant that the allegation made in
the complaint constitutes an offence under Section 4 of the Act. For the
reasons stated above, we allow the appeal and direct the learned Judicial
Magistrate, First Class to take further proceedings on the complaint and
dispose of the case according to law.
10. The material on record is examined in the light of aforestated
propositions of law.
11. The contents of impugned FIR clearly show allegation regarding
demand of Rs. 25 Lacs, 20 Tola gold and car for marriage of Mahima
with Naveen. There are specific allegations with details of incidents. The
veracity of prosecution and the material submitted alongwith the final
report will be considered at the trial. This Court while considering
quashing of FIR cannot indulge into threadbare analysis of the material
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on record or evaluation of the evidence submitted before the trial
Court. The FIR and the material submitted alongwith the final report
prima facie show complicity of the petitioner in the alleged offence.
The Judgement in case of P. Sivakumar v. State 2023 SCC OnLine SC
1737 has no relevance to the matter in hand.
12. Considering aforestated facts and circumstances, the quashing of
impugned FIR and subsequent proceedings against the petitioner would
itself be an abuse of the process of court. There is no ground for invoking
the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC./528 of the BNSS.,
2023. Consequently, the present petition, being meritless, is hereby
dismissed.
C.C. as per rules.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR)
JUDGE
BDJ
