Madhya Pradesh High Court
Chhidami Lal Patel vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 2 September, 2025
Author: Vishal Mishra
Bench: Vishal Mishra
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VISHAL MISHRA
ON THE 2 nd OF SEPTEMBER, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 33325 of 2025
CHHIDAMI LAL PATEL
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Ms. Sushma Bairagy - Advocate for petitioner.
Mr. Suyash Thakur - Govt. Advocate for respondents/State.
ORDER
This petition is filed seeking the following reliefs :
(i) To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus
directing the respondents to give lease to the petitioner in lieu of his
ancestral land acquired by the respondents.
(ii) The respondents be directed to consider and decide the
representation of petitioner for issuing lease dt. 06/08/2025 Annexure
P/3.
(iii) Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper
may kindly be passed.
2. It is the case of the petitioner that his land was acquired by the State
authorities in the year 1987. Now this petition has been filed seeking a
benefit of policy issued by the State Government in the year 2002 in terms of
Annexure P/2.
3. A specific query was put to petitioner's counsel to explain the delay in
approaching the Court as well as the fact that how the policy issued by the
State Government in the year 2002 is applicable to the case of the petitioner.
Nothing is argued on behalf of the petitioner regarding applicability of the
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policy in the present case. The only argument advanced before this Court that
the petitioner time and again has approached the authorities orally for
redressal of his grievances.
4. However, the fact remains that the petitioner has filed a stale claim
which cannot be revived as the land was acquired by the State authorities in
the year 1987 for which representation for the first time was made on
06.08.2025 in terms of Annexure P/3 and within a short time i.e. on
19.08.2025, this petition has been filed seeking a mandamus to the
respondents-authorities to decide the representation.
5. In this context, a plethora of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
on the issue regarding delay and as to how, a Court of equity, exercising
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot extend its hands to
such persons who approach the Court after several years can be relied upon.
In fact, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in several decisions that stale
claims ought not to be entertained by the High Courts exercising writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power Corpn.
Ltd. v. K. Thangappan reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322 has held as follows :
6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in
mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate
case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary
powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of
the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the
lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the
opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the
matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out
in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports
(1969) 1 SCC 185. Of course, the discretion has to be
exercised judicially and reasonably.
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7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in
Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd (1874) 5
PC 221 (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon
Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and
Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service
[AIR 1969 SC 329]. Sir Barnes had stated:
"Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an
arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically
unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his
conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent
to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has
though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other
party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to
place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material.
But in every case, if an argument against relief, which
otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that
delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of
limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon
principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always
important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the
nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking
the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy."
7. In A.P. SRTC vs N. Satyanarayana reported in (2008) 1 SCC 210, it is
held as under :
10. Even on a bare reading of para 18 of the judgment on
which reliance has been placed by the learned Single Judge
and the Division Bench, it is clear that the relief was moulded
to avoid anomalies and in view of the peculiar situation
involved. This Court categorically held that the orders
impugned in the appeals were not sustainable because the writ
petitions were filed after a long lapse of time. Similar is the
position here. The regularisation was done w.e.f. 1-8-1987 and
the writ petitions were filed in the year 1999. That being so
and since in the writ petition without any explanation having
been offered for the delayed approach, writ petition should
have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.
8. In S.S. Balu vs State of Kerala reported in (2009) 2 SCC 479, it is held
as under :
17. It is also well-settled principle of law that "delay defeats
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equity". The Government Order was issued on 15-1-2002. The
appellants did not file any writ application questioning the
legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed
by others were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an
appeal thereagainst, they impleaded themselves as party-
respondents. It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner
approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for
may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches
irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the
other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment. It is,
thus, not possible for us to issue any direction to the State of
Kerala or the Commission to appoint the appellants at this
stage. In NDMC v. Pan Singh (2007) 9 SCC 278 this Court
held:
"16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost
sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17
years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time.
They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17
workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not
implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by
the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that
after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were
recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale
of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions
could not have been entertained even if they are similarly
situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not
be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a
long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of
equitable jurisdiction."
9. In State of Orissa vs Mamata Mohanty reported in (2011) 3 SCC 436,
it is observed thus :
54. This Court has consistently rejected the contention that a
petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches in
case the petitioner approaches the Court after coming to know
of the relief granted by the Court in a similar case as the same
cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. A
litigant cannot wake up from deep slumber and claim impetus
from the judgment in cases where some diligent person had
approached the Court within a reasonable time. (See Rup
Diamonds v. Union of India (1989) 2 SCC 356], State of
Karnataka v. S.M. Kotrayya (1996) 6 SCC 267 and Jagdish
Lal v. State of Haryana (1997) 6 SCC 538).
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10. I n Ghulam Rasool Lone vs State of J&K reported in (2009) 15 SCC
321, it is held as follows :
19. It is beyond any cavil of doubt that the remedy under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a discretionary one.
For sufficient or cogent reasons a court may in a given case
refuse to exercise its jurisdiction; delay and laches being one
of them. While considering the question of delay and laches on
the part of the petitioner, the court must also consider the
effect thereof.
11. It is further held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok
Kumar vs District Magistrate, Basti reported in (2012) 3 SCC 311 that :-
"10. ... It is time and again, stated that a party who has slept
over his right since is not entitled to the discretionary relief of
the High Court."
12. In the present case, as there is no explanation for the delay in
approaching the Court coupled with the fact that petitioner's counsel could
not point out that the policy issued by the State Government in the year 2002
is applicable to the case of the petitioner, no relief can be extended.
13. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed on the ground of delay as well
as on merits. However, no order as to costs.
(VISHAL MISHRA)
JUDGE
VV
