Madhya Pradesh High Court
Santosh Kumar Das vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 30 October, 2025
Author: Maninder S. Bhatti
Bench: Maninder S. Bhatti
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MANINDER S. BHATTI
ON THE 30th OF OCTOBER, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 7377 of 2014
SANTOSH KUMAR DAS
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Kailash Chandra Ghildiyal - Senior Advocate with Shri Aditya
Singh Thakur - Advocate for the petitioner.
Ms. Shikha Sharma - Government Advocate for the State.
Shri Vasu Jain - Advocate for respondent Nos.2 & 3.
ORDER
This petition has been filed by the petitioner while praying for the
following reliefs:
"(i) issue a writ in the nature of Mandamus, thereby,
directing respondent no. 2 to 4 forthwith act on the
recommendation dated 25-04-2014 (Annexure P-5) and
to make payment of arrears of salary to the tune of
Rs.15,98,018/- coupled with interest @ 12% per annum
to the petitioner.
(ii) issue direction to the respondents to produce the
entire original records pertaining to the issue raised in
the writ petition for the kind perusal of the Hon'ble
High Court.
(iii) any other relief which this Hon'ble Court may deem
fit in the facts and circumstances of the case and cost of
litigation may also be awarded in favour of petitioner."
2. As per the facts as detailed in the petition, the petitioner was
appointed as an Assistant Teacher in the establishment of respondent Nos.2
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to 4 on 01.07.1988. The petitioner while working as an Assistant Teacher
was retired on 31.12.2012. The primary school of respondent Nos.2 to 4 was
receiving grant-in-aid from the State for 4 posts of Assistant Teachers and
accordingly, those Assistant Teachers were receiving the salary out of the
grant which was being made available by the State Government. Though the
petitioner herein was not appointed against the post of Assistant Teacher for
which the grant-in-aid was being received but as he was being discriminated,
therefore, he filed a miscellaneous petition before this Court vide M.P.
No.568/1992 and the said petition was disposed of by this Court vide order
dated 20.11.1993 while directing respondent Nos.2 to 4 to treat the petitioner
as regular Assistant Teacher and the petitioner was held to be entitled for
payment of monthly salary as was being paid to other similarly situated
employees to whom the salary was being paid out of the grant made
available by the State. The said order remained affirmed. However, the
respondents did not take any action to make the payment and even the
officials of the school recommended vide Annexure P/5 as well as Annexure
P/7 that payment to the petitioner be made of the arrears of the fifth pay
commission as well as the arrears of salary at par with the other employees
to whom the salary was being paid out of grant. However, both the
recommendations which are contained in Annexures P/5 and P/7 were not
implemented and thus, the petition was filed.
3. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner contended that in the
present case, the controversy was already decided by this Court in the
previous round of litigation i.e. M.P. No.568/1992. This Court issued
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specific directions to the respondents to extend the said benefit. However,
despite the specific direction, the benefit was not extended. Moreover, there
are recommendations contained in Annexures P/5 and P/7 which have not
been implemented. It is thus contended by the counsel that the respondents
be directed to ensure implementation of the order passed by this Court in
M.P. No.568/1992.
4 . Per contra, counsel for respondent Nos.2 & 3 contended that the
present petition is liable to be dismissed. The present petitioner undisputedly
was never appointed against a post for which the grant was being disbursed
by the State. The petitioner by no stretch of imagination was entitled for the
said payment. It is further contended by the counsel that the present writ
petition filed by the petitioner is not maintainable against the respondent
Nos.2 & 3 institution in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the
case of St. Mary's Education Society and another v. Rajendra Prasad
Bhargava and others reported in (2023) 4 SCC 498 . It is further contended by
the counsel that in paragraph Nos.30 and 33 of the decision in St. Marry's
Education Society (supra), there is reference to other decisions of the Apex
Court. Those other decisions were not brought to the notice of this Court
when M.P. No.568/1992 was decided and thus, the question of
maintainability was not dealt with. It is the further contention of the counsel
that in view of the judgment of Ramakrishna Mission and another v. Kago
Kunya and others reported in (2019) 16 SCC 303 , this petition deserves to be
dismissed. It is further contended by the counsel that there is a distinction
between the employees who were appointed against the post which is based
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on fund made available by way of grant by the State and an employee who is
paid emolument by the society or institution from its own pocket. The
present petitioner is not entitled for any relief in view of the decision of a
coordinate Bench of this Court in W.P. No.1739/2022 (Ashaskiya Anudan
Prapt Adim Jati Anusuchit Jati Shikshak Aivam Karmchari Sangh v. The
State of Madhya Pradesh and others) vide order dated 25.03.2022 .
5. In rejoinder arguments, counsel for the petitioner contends that the
Apex Court has held in the case of ABL International Ltd. and another v.
Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. and others reported in
(2004) 3 SCC 553 and also in the case of National Thermal Power
Corporation Limited v. Mahesh Dutta and others reported in (2009) 8 SCC
339 that even if the petition involves disputed question of facts, the same can
be entertained. The counsel also submitted that even if the period to file the
contempt petition has expired, still relief to the petitioner cannot be declined.
6. No other point is pressed or argued by counsel for the parties.
7. Heard the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and
perused the record.
8. A perusal of the record reflects that the petitioner has filed this
petition on the ground that previously he had approached this Court by filing
M.P. No.568/1992 and the said petition was allowed vide order dated
20.11.1993. The said order passed by this Court has not been complied with
by the respondent as on date. To deal with the controversy, it is first
germane to take into consideration the order passed by this Court on the
previous occasion. This Court allowed the petition while passing the
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following order:
"3. यह तो प है क ित ाथ कमांक 4 मा यता ा
सं थान है और उनके ारा शासक य मा यता ा ाथिमक
पर ा हे तु व ािथय को तैयार कया जाता है । उनका
पा यकम मा यता ा है फल व प यह सं थान अ य
शासक य ाथिमक पाठशालाओं के समान ह कायरत है ।
जहां तक सं थान का है वह तो मा यता ा है ह । उसम
कायरत अ य िश क हे तु शासक य अनुदान ा होता है
फल व प उ ह अ य मा यता ा कायरत िश क के
समान वेतन एवं अ य सु वधाये ा ह। केवल 3
यािचकाकताओं को ह यह वेतन एवं सु वधा ा नह ं है । तब
या केवल इस कारण क ित ाथ कमांक 3 व 4 ने केवल
इन यािचकाकताओं हे तु अनुदान ा करने का यास नह ं
कया या उ ह शासक य अनुदान ा नह ं हुआ, हो इन
यािचकाकताओं को उनके मूलभूत अिधकार जो अनु छे द 14
एवं 21 ारा द है से वंिचत कया जा सकता है ? या इस
संदभ म ित ाथ कमांक 4 का अ प सं यक वग का
सं थान होना मह वपूण है ? इसी सं थान के िम डल कमूल
सबंधी यािचका कमांक 423/92 (अजय मसीह... व .. म०
० शासन व अ य) म भी यह इस यायालय के
वचाराथ तुत कये गये थे और प कार ारा तुत तक
पर गंभीरता पूवक वं व तार पूवक वचार करने के उपरांत
इस यायालय ने यह यव था द है क केवल कितपय
िश क हे तु शासक य अनुदान ा म न होने के करण ह उन
िश क को उनके मूलभूत अिधकार से वंिचत नह ं कया जा
सकता । उ िनणय म इस यायालय ने यह भी यव था द
है क ित ाथ सं थान को सं वधान के अनु छे द 30 के
अ तगत ा अिधकार का ता पय यह कदा प नह ं होता क
उनके यहां कायरत िश क को सं वधान के अनु छे द 14 एवं
21 का लाभ ा न हो। उ िनणय म दया गया आदे श इन
करण मे भी भलीभांित लागू होता है । चू ं क उ िनणय इन
यािचकाकताओं के ित ाथ 3 व 4 से ह संबंिधत है अब उ
तक पर पुनः वचार करने क आव यकता नह ं है और उ
िनणयसार इन करण म भी दये गये माने जायगे ।
फल व प उ िनणय के काश म यह िनण त कया जाता
है क य प ित ाथ कमांक 3 व 4 को सं वधान के
अनु छे द 30 के अ तगत अपने सं थान को संचािलत करने
का पूण अिधकार ा है क तु वे उन अिधकार क आड़ म
यािचकाकताओं के मूलभूत अिधकार जो उ ह सं वधान के
अनु छे द 14 एवं 21 के अंतगत ा ह से वंिछत नह ं कया
जा सकता । फल व प ये अपने वतमान पद पर
िनयिमतीकरण एवं अ य मा यता ा िश क के समान
वेतन इ या द पाने के अिधकार ह। तदनुसार ित ाथ
कमांक 3 व 4 को उ ह त काल भाव से यह लाभ दे ने हे तु
आदे िशत कया जाता है ।
4. जहां तक यािचकाकताओं के संबंध म शासक य अनुदान
का है उसके िलये यास तो ित ाथ कमांक 4 सं थान
को ह करना पड़े गा । फल व प य द ित ाथ गण चाह तो वे
यािचकाकताओं के संदभ म शासन से अनुदान ा करने हे तु
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आवेदन कर सकते ह। ित ाथ कमांक 1 व 2 को आदे िशत
कया जाता है क य द ित ाथ कमांक 3 व 4 ऐसा कोई
ाथना प तुत करते ह तो उ ाथना प पर
िनयमानुसार एवं विध संगत कायवाह कर अ वलंब आदे श
पा रत करगे ।
5. फल व प यािचका वीकार क जाती है और
यािचकाकताओं को उनके वतमान पद पर िनयिमत घो षतम
कया जाकर उ ह अ य मा यता ा िश क के समान
वेतन ा करने का अिधकार घो षत कया जाता है ।
यािचकाकता इस यािचका का यय ित ाथ कमांक 3 व 4 से
ा करने के अिधकार ह गे । अिधव ा शु क 500/- पये
येक पकरण म लगाया जावे ।"
9. Thereafter, a review petition was filed by respondent Nos.2 & 3
before this Court. However, the said review petition which was filed by way
of MCC No.862/1994 was dismissed vide order dated 20.03.1997 and after
that there is a document i.e. contained in Annexure P/5 dated 25.02.2014 on
record by which headmistress of the primary school had recommended
payment of arrears to the petitioner. The memorandum of petition if perused
carefully reflects that till paragraph 5.3, the petitioner has submitted the
detail of passing of order in the previous round of litigation i.e. M.P.
No.568/1992 and also passing of order on the review petition. However,
subsequently in paragraph 5.4 of the petition, there is reference to the
communication dated 25.02.2014 sent by Headmistress to the President of
the society which is contained in Annexure P/5. Thus, the period
commencing from 20.03.1997 i.e. the date on which the review filed by
respondent Nos.2 & 3 was rejected till the issuance of communication dated
25.02.2014 i.e. total period of 17 years has not been explained anywhere in
the petition. It is nowhere stated in the petition as to why the petitioner was
sitting tight over the matter for a prolong period of 17 years. The petitioner
has made an attempt to create a cause of action on the strength of
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communication dated 25.02.2014, which from its perusal reflects that the
same was issued at the instance of the present petitioner. The petitioner has
not at all furnished any explanation in paragraph 4 of the petition as to what
was the cause of inaction by the petitioner for a prolong period of 17 years. It
is undisputed that the petitioner did not file any contempt petition before this
Court for non-compliance of the order passed in M.P. No.568/1992.
Therefore, it is evident that the petitioner was sitting tight over the matter for
a prolong period of more than 17 years. Such inordinate delay on the part of
the petitioner disentitles him from claiming any relief.
10. The Apex Court in the case of Union of India and others v. C.
Girija and others reported in (2019) 15 SCC 633 has held as under:
"18. Again, this Court in State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv
Charan Singh Bhandari [State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv
Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179 : (2014) 3
SCC (L&S) 32] had occasion to consider question of
delay in challenging the promotion. The Court further
held that representations relating to a stale claim or
dead grievance does not give rise to a fresh cause of
action. In paras 19 and 23 following was laid down :
(SCC pp. 184-85)
"19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear
as crystal that even if the court or tribunal
directs for consideration of representations
relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it
does not give rise to a fresh cause of action.
The dead cause of action cannot rise like a
phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of
representation to the competent authority
does not arrest time.
***
23. In State of T.N. v. Seshachalam [State of
T.N. v. Seshachalam, (2007) 10 SCC 137 :
(2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 475], this Court, testing
the equality clause on the bedrock of delay
and laches pertaining to grant of service
benefit, has ruled thus : (SCC p. 145, para 16)
'16. ... filing of representations
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alone would not save the period of
limitation. Delay or laches is a
relevant factor for a court of law to
determine the question as to
whether the claim made by an
applicant deserves consideration.
Delay and/or laches on the part of
a government servant may deprive
him of the benefit which had been
given to others. Article 14 of the
Constitution of India would not, in
a situation of that nature, be
attracted as it is well known that
law leans in favour of those who
are alert and vigilant.'"
11. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of S.S. Balu v. State of Kerala
reported in (2009) 2 SCC 479 held as under:
"17. It is also well-settled principle of law that "delay
defeats equity". ...It is now a trite law that where the
writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long
delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the
ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that
they are similarly situated to the other candidates who
obtain the benefit of the judgment."
(emphasis supplied)
12. In view of aforesaid legal preposition as has been dealt with by the
Supreme Court, and considering that no explanation whatsoever was given
by the petitioner. This Court refrains itself from making indulgence in the
matter. Further, the Courts have vigorously reiterated that delay defeats
equity. Thus, it is clear that entertaining such a petition would amount to
unsettling the already settled legal position. It is the foremost duty of Court
to see whether a claim is barred by limitation. A time barred claim is to be
dismissed. The legal proposition of delay disentitling a remedy has been very
well encapsulated in the legal maxim 'Vigilantibus Non Dormientibus Jura
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Subveniunt' which means law will assist only those who are vigilant and not
those who sleep over their rights. Furthermore, the legal maxim ''Interest
Reipublicae ut sit finis litium'' lays down that it is in interest of the state that
there should be an end to litigation.
13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hameed Joharan v. Abdul Salam
reported in (2001) 7 SCC 573 , taking note of the Latin maxim 'Vigilantibus
Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt', explained the use of legal diligence and
as to how lapse of time results in forfeiture of a remedy. In the words of
Hon'ble Supreme Court, the above principle is explained as hereunder: -
"14. .....It cannot but be the general policy of our law to
use the legal diligence and this has been the consistent
legal theory from the ancient times: even the doctrine of
prescription in Roman law prescribes such a concept of
legal diligence and since its incorporation therein, the
doctrine has always been favoured rather than claiming
disfavour. Law courts never tolerate an indolent litigant
since delay defeats equity -- the Latin
maxim vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura
subveniunt (the law assists those who are vigilant and
not those who are indolent). As a matter of fact, lapse of
time is a species for forfeiture of right. Wood, V.C.
in Manby v. Bewicke [(1857) 3 K&J 342 : 69 ER
1140] (K&J at p. 352) stated: (ER p. 1144)
"The legislature has in this, as in every
civilized country that has ever existed,
thought fit to prescribe certain limitations of
time after which persons may suppose
themselves to be in peaceful possession of
their property, and capable of transmitting the
estates of which they are in possession,
without any apprehension of the title being
impugned by litigation in respect of
transactions which occurred at a distant
period, when evidence in support of their
own title may be most difficult to obtain.""
14. The Apex Court in the case of Karnataka Power Corpon. Ltd. Vs.
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K. Thangappan reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322 has held as under:
"6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be
borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise
their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may
refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such
negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to
assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of
time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the
opposite party. Even where fundamental right is
involved the matter is still within the discretion of the
Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief
Controller of Imports and Exports. Of course, the
discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock
in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd
(PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon
Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher and Maharashtra SRTC v.
Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service. Sir Barnes had
stated:
"Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of
equity is not an arbitrary or a technical
doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust
to give a remedy either because the party has,
by his conduct done that which might fairly
be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or
where by his conduct and neglect he has
though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet
put the other party in a situation in which it
would not be reasonable to place him if the
remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay
are most material. But in every case, if an
argument against relief, which otherwise
would be just, is founded upon mere delay,
that delay of course not amounting to a bar
by any statute of limitation, the validity of
that defence must be tried upon principles
substantially equitable. Two circumstances
always important in such cases are, the
length of the delay and the nature of the acts
done during the interval which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or
injustice in taking the one course or the other,
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so far as it relates to the remedy."
8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of
this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in
relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent
that what has been stated as regards that article would
apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in
Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India that no relief can
be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable
explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after
inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is
itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that
it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this
Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in
petitions filed after inordinate delay.
9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal that
the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not
ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the
acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate
delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not
satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to
intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a
number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily
permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy
because it is likely to cause confusion and public
inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and
if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay,
it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship
and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It
was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked,
unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-
party rights in the meantime is an important factor
which also weighs with the High Court in deciding
whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction."
(emphasis supplied)
15. The Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Ram Mohan Raja Vs. State
of T.N. reported in (2007) 9 SCC 78 has held as under:
"11. So far as the question of delay is concerned, no
hard-and- fast rule can be laid down and it will depend
on the facts of each case. In the present case, the facts
stare at the face of it that on 8-10-1996 an order was
passed by the Collector in pursuance of the order passed
by the High Court, rejecting the application of the writ
petitioner for consideration of the grant of mining lease.
The writ petitioner sat tight over the matter and did not
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challenge the same up to 2003. This on the face of it
appears to be very serious. A person who can sit tight
for such a long time for no justifiable reason, cannot be
given any benefit."
16. The Supreme Court in the case of NDMC Vs. Pan Singh reported
in (2007) 9 SCC 278 has held as under:
"16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot
be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ
petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their
grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did
not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest
possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves
as parties even in the reference made by the State before
the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after
1982, those employees who were employed or who
were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted
the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore,
the writ petitions could not have been entertained even
if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the
discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour
of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay
and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable
jurisdiction. (See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, U.P.
Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh and Karnataka Power
Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan.)
17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided
for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be
filed within a reasonable time. (See Lipton India Ltd. v.
Union of India and M.R. Gupta v. Union of India.)"
(emphasis supplied)
17. In view of the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court, it is evident
that the petitioner herein was sleeping tight over his rights for years together
and without furnishing any explanation as regards inaction for a prolong
period of 17 years, the petitioner filed this petition. Perusal of Annexures P/5
and P/7 reflect that by the aforesaid communication the Headmistress of
primary school forwarded the grievance of the petitioner which according to
the said communication was agitated by the petitioner before the then
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:54572
13 WP-7377-2014
Headmistress. There is no document on record to establish that the petitioner
herein made any communication to the society prior to 25.02.2014. There is
no document on record to establish that the petitioner herein ever made any
effort to approach respondent Nos.2 & 3 prior to 25.02.2014 i.e. the date on
which the Headmistress sent a communication contained in Annexure P/5
and therefore, said inaction on the part of the petitioner disentitles him from
claiming any relief.
18. Thus, this Court is of the view that the present petition deserves to
be dismissed.
19. The petition accordingly stands dismissed.
(MANINDER S. BHATTI)
JUDGE
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