Madhya Pradesh High Court
The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Ratlam Sarva Sewa Sangh Registered ... on 27 October, 2025
Author: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
Bench: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
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1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT I N D O R E
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR
ON THE 27TH OF OCTOBER, 2025
FIRST APPEAL NO. 457 OF 2024
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Versus
RATLAM SARVA SEWA SANGH & ANOTHER
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Appearance:
Shri Anirudh Malpani Government Advocate for the appellant.
Shri V.K. Jain, senior advocate with Shri Vinay Chandel, advocate
for respondent No.1.
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ORDER
Heard on IA No. 2236/2024, which is an application for
condonation of delay.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant in addition to the grounds and
facts mentioned in the IA, submits that the civil suit was decreed by the
trial Court on 10.9.2023, present appeal is filed after a delay of 448 days.
The counsel representing the State before the trial Court did not inform
the authorities about passing of the impugned judgment and decree. The
concerned authorities came to know about the impugned judgment and
decree while preparing of reply to writ petition No. 22804/2023 on
8.2.2024. The SDO informed the Collector regarding impugned judgment
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and decree vide Note-sheet dated 12.2.2024., The certified copy of the
impugned judgment and decree was applied on 15.2.2024on direction of
the Collector. After receipt of certified copy, higher authorities were
moved for permission to file present appeal. The Collector directed for
filing the present appeal on 20.2.2024. Accordingly, present appeal was
filed on 2.3.2024. The delay is attributable to the working of government
machinery from lower level to higher level. The delay was caused due to
official formalities and the procedure and same is bonafide. There is no
malafide or deliberate negligence on part of any government authority,
therefore, delay be condoned in the interest of justice. Learned counsel
referred to the judgment of the Supreme court in the cases of Shivraj
Singh Vs. Union of India reported in (2023) INSC 855, Inder Singh Vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2025) Live Law SC 339 and State
of Manipur Vs. Koting Lamkang reported in (2019) 10 SCC 408 to
buttress his contentions.
3. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent opposes the
application and submits that the delay on the part of the appellant suffers
from malafide and gross negligence. The impugned judgment and decree
was passed in a bi-parte matter where the state was represented by a
counsel. The state has contested the civil suit. No inference can be drawn
that the counsel for the State did not inform the authorities about outcome
of the litigation. Learned counsel further referred to the Note-sheet dated
18.8.2023 of SDM with regard to the Bhil Vishranti Grih at Ratlam
wherein, it was mentioned that the judgment dated 10.9.2022 has been
passed in RCS-A No. 2400028/2015 by IIIrd District Judge, Ratlam. The
note sheet was marked to the Collector, Ratlam and Collector has
acknowledged this Note-sheet on 24.8.2023. Learned counsel further
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referred to Annexure R-2, report of Patwari dated 18.8.2023, wherein
intimation regarding the impugned judgment was specifically given to
Tehsildar alongwith copy of the impugned judgment. Learned counsel
further referred to Annexure R-3, a show cause Notice dated 24.8.2023,
issued by Collector, Ratlam wherein, the details of impugned judgment
were mentioned. Learned counsel further referred to Annex. R-4, a copy
of reply filed by respondent dated 31.8.2023, wherein all the details of
impugned judgment and decree were mentioned. Learned counsel
contended that the Collector Ratlam was well aware of the impugned
judgment and decree in August, 2023 itself whereas, the present appeal
was filed on 2.3.2024. Therefore, there is no explanation for delay in
filing of present appeal. Learned counsel referred to the judgments in
cases of Postmaster General & others Vs. Living Media India Ltd and
another reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563; State of Madhya Pradesh Vs.
Bherulal, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 654; State of Madhya Pradesh Vs.
Chaitram Maywade reported in (2020) 10 SCC 667; State of Madhya
Pradesh Vs. Jaipuri Cooperative Housing Society Limited reported in
MANU/MP/0557/2023; State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ramkumar
Choudhary reported in 2025 (1) JLJ 210and contends that different
yardsticks cannot be applied for condoning the delay merely for the
reason that the government authorities are involved in the matter. Delay
needs to be satisfactorily explained. The unreasonable and unexplained
delay cannot be condoned as matter of generosity, if it lacks bonafide.
4. Heard learned counsel for both the parties. Perused the record.
5. This first appeal is filed on 03.02.2024 assailing the Judgement and
decree dated 10.09.2022 passed in RCS-A no. 2400028 of 2015 by the
Third District Judge,Ratlam along with an application for condonation of
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delay of 435 days(IA no. 2236/2024). The appellant has pleaded that the
delay is attributable to the working of government machinery from lower
level to higher level, it was caused due to procedural official formalities.
6. The Supreme Court in case of Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India,
reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531, on consideration of law laid down in
Collector (LA) v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107, G. Ramegowda v. LAO,
(1988) 2 SCC 142, State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC
132, Tehsildar (LA) v. K.V. Ayisumma, (1996) 10 SCC 634, State of
Nagaland v. Lipok Ao, (2005) 3 SCC 752, State of Manipur v. Koting
Lamkang, (2019) 10 SCC 408, Postmaster General v. Living Media India
Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563, Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar
Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC
654, University of Delhi v. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 745, observed
as under-
30. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there cannot be any quarrel that
this Court has stepped in to ensure that substantive rights of private parties and
the State are not defeated at the threshold simply due to technical
considerations of delay. However, these decisions notwithstanding, we
reiterate that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to
courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of
the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length
of delay being immaterial.
31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable
explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned
whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the
explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must
distinguish between an "explanation" and an "excuse". An "explanation" is
designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something.
It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to
point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his
fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an "explanation" from an
"excuse". Although people tend to see "explanation" and "excuse" as the same
thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a
distinction which, though fine, is real.
32. An "excuse" is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and
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consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling
something as just an "excuse" would imply that the explanation proffered is
believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all
situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on
existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At
this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations,
that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard
public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a
meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication.
40. We can also profitably refer to State of Manipur v. Koting Lamkang,
(2019) 10 SCC 408, cited by Mr Sen, where the same Bench of three Hon'ble
Judges of this Court which decided University of Delhi v. Union of India,
(2020) 13 SCC 745 was of the view that the impersonal nature of the State's
functioning should be given due regard, while ensuring that individual defaults
are not nit-picked at the cost of collective interest. The relevant paragraphs
read as follows :
"7. But while concluding as above, it was necessary for the Court to
also be conscious of the bureaucratic delay and the slow pace in
reaching a government decision and the routine way of deciding
whether the State should prefer an appeal against a judgment adverse
to it. Even while observing that the law of limitation would harshly
affect the party, the Court felt that the delay in the appeal filed by the
State, should not be condoned.
8. Regard should be had in similar such circumstances to the
impersonal nature of the Government's functioning where individual
officers may fail to act responsibly. This in turn, would result in
injustice to the institutional interest of the State. If the appeal filed by
the State are lost for individual default, those who are at fault, will not
usually be individually affected." (emphasis supplied)
39. According to Mr Sharma, University of Delhi v. Union of India, (2020) 13
SCC 745 is a decision by a larger Bench and, therefore, binding on us. This
Court, while deciding University of Delhi , was seized of a situation where
even if the delay were to be condoned, it would cause grave prejudice to the
respondent Delhi Metro Rail Corporation at the instance of the casual
approach of the appellant University. This Court, on the argument of non-
availability of the Vice Chancellor for granting approval to file the appeal, and
other reasons put forth in the matter, could not conclude that there was
fulfilment of sufficient cause for condonation of delay; hence, the refusal to
condone the delay. The decision really turns on the facts before this Court
because of the prejudice factor involved.
41. Having bestowed serious consideration to the rival contentions, we feel
that the High Court's decision to condone the delay on account of the first
respondent's inability to present the appeal within time, for the reasons
assigned therein, does not suffer from any error warranting interference. As the
aforementioned judgments have shown, such an exercise of discretion does, at
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times, call for a liberal and justice-oriented approach by the courts, where
certain leeway could be provided to the State. The hidden forces that are at
work in preventing an appeal by the State being presented within the
prescribed period of limitation so as not to allow a higher court to pronounce
upon the legality and validity of an order of a lower court and thereby secure
unholy gains, can hardly be ignored. Impediments in the working of the grand
scheme of governmental functions have to be removed by taking a pragmatic
view on balancing of the competing interests.
7. Thereafter, in the matter of DDA v. Tejpal, reported in (2024) 7
SCC 433, it was held that-
C.Law on condonation of delay
22. Since the issue in this batch of appeals concerns the condonation of delay, it
would be worthwhile to briefly allude to the law of limitation. The Limitation
Act, 1963 ("the Limitation Act") is a statute of repose founded on
considerations of public policy and expediency. The dominant objective
underlying the law of limitation is that the title to property, and matters of rights
in general, cannot be kept in a state of constant uncertainty, doubt or suspense.
Public interest requires that finality should be put to litigation. The Limitation
Act, thus, prescribes the specific points of time from which the period of
limitation begins to run for the institution of actions. On expiry of such period,
no action can be initiated save and except where the court condones the delay
for a sufficient cause. A party who is insensible to the value of civil remedies,
and who does not assert his claim with promptitude is denied the ability to
enforce even an otherwise rightful claim. This position is reflected in the Latin
maxim, vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt i.e. the law aids the
vigilant and not those who sleep on their rights.
23. The Bombay High Court in Kumudini Ramdas Shah v. K.M.
Mody [Kumudini Ramdas Shah v. K.M. Mody, 1984 SCC OnLine Bom 302 :
AIR 1985 Bom 320, para 4] aptly exposited the philosophical pillars supporting
the concept of limitation : (i) the sword of prosecution ought not to be hanging
over an individual for an indeterminate period; (ii) those who have been
lethargic in safeguarding their interests should not expect the law to come to
their rescue; and (iii) a defendant ought not to suffer for lost evidence owing to
the passage of time.
24. Section 3 of the Limitation Act reflects this philosophy. Every suit or appeal
made after the period of limitation ought to be dismissed, notwithstanding
whether such ground had been raised by the opposite side. However, this does
not imply that the Limitation Act destroys the right itself. Instead, it only
extinguishes the ability to enforce the right, without either creating or
destroying the underlying cause of action or entitlement itself.
25. As is clear from a plain reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, there are
exceptions to this general rule. The statute allows for admitting an action
provided "sufficient cause" is shown. This vests courts with the discretion to
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extend the period of limitation if the applicant can show that he had sufficient
cause for not preferring an appeal or application within the prescribed period.
Section 5 requires analysis of two ingredients : first, an examination of whether
"sufficient cause" has been made out; and second, whether such cause has been
shown for not filing the appeal/application "within the prescribed period".
26. As regards the first ingredient, the Limitation Act itself does not provide
more guidance on what its constituent elements ought to be. Instead, Section 5
leaves the task of determining appropriate reasons for seeking condonation of
delay to judicial interpretation and exercise of discretion upon the facts and
individual circumstances of each case.
27. While there is no arithmetical formula, through decades of judicial
application, certain yardsticks for judging the sufficiency of cause for
condonation of delay have evolved. Mere good cause is not sufficient enough to
turn back the clock and allow resuscitation of a claim otherwise barred by delay.
The court ought to be cautious while undertaking such an exercise, being
circumspect against condoning delay which is attributable to the applicant.
[Basawaraj v. LAO, (2013) 14 SCC 81, paras 9-11] Although the actual period
of delay might be instructive, it is the explanation for the delay which would be
the decisive factor. [Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi Amma, (2008)
8 SCC 321, para 13]
28. The court must also desist from throwing the baby out with the bathwater. A
justice-oriented approach must be prioritised over technicalities, [Raheem
Shah v. Govind Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 764 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 910, para 6]
as one motivation underlying such rules is to prevent parties from using dilatory
tactics or abusing the judicial process. Pragmatism over pedanticism is therefore
sometimes necessary -- despite it appearing liberal or magnanimous. The
expression "sufficient cause" should be given liberal construction so as to
advance substantial justice. [Lonand Grampanchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi, 1967
SCC OnLine SC 105, para 4.]
29. In addition to "sufficient cause", Section 5 also requires that such cause
must be shown within the prescribed period. To satisfy the latter condition, the
applicant must show sufficient cause for not filing the appeal/application on the
last day of the prescribed period and explain the delay made thereafter.
[Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., 1961 SCC OnLine SC 39, para 8] Causes
arising after the culmination of the limitation period, despite being sufficient in
substance, would not suffice for condonation given this second prong of Section
5 of the Limitation Act. However, the applicant shall not be required to prove
each day's delay till the date of filing such appeal/application.
[Ummer v. Pottengal Subida, (2018) 15 SCC 127, para 14 : (2019) 1 SCC (Civ)
113]
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D.3.Leeway to be granted to Government entities
48. The appellants have vehemently contended that the Government entities
ought to be allowed leeway for condonation of delay. For this, the appellants
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placed reliance on Collector (LA) v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 and G.
Ramegowda v. LAO, (1988) 2 SCC 142 which held that courts ought to be
generous while considering delay on the part of Government entities given
factors unique to them like the impersonal nature of their functioning,
inherited bureaucratic methodology, and procedural red-tapeism.
49. However, with time, the position of law held in these cases has been
diluted. In CWT v. Amateur Riders Club, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 603, para 3, this
Court noted that while latitude can be granted to the Government, it has to
show its bona fides and diligence in filing the appeals. In case of bureaucratic
indifference, delay cannot be condoned.
50. Subsequently, in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012)
3 SCC 563, this Court noted that the delay cannot be condoned mechanically
only because the appellant is a government entity. The Court explicitly negated
the earlier rationale of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology given modern improvements in technology. Lastly, the Court
held that Government entities must show bona fides and demonstrate diligence
in pursuing the matter.
51. This Court has again in State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654,
reiterated the reasoning of the Postmaster General and held that the Collector
(LA) could not be relied upon any longer as it was laid down in a different
bureaucratic and technological period. The proposition that Government
entities ought to be afforded greater latitude on issues of delay on account of
administrative exigencies, is no longer a precedent to be followed routinely.
52. Although the appellants have cited two more decisions of this Court in
support of their prayer for condonation of delay, we find both of them
distinguishable on facts. In State of Manipur v. Koting Lamkang, (2019) 10
SCC 408, a three-Judge Bench of this Court, in the peculiar circumstances
where certain individual officers had acted with mala fides, chose not to
extend the burden of individual recklessness to the State's institutional interest;
as may be seen from the following extract :
"8. Regard should be had in similar such circumstances to the
impersonal nature of the Government's functioning where individual
officers may fail to act responsibly. This in turn, would result in
injustice to the institutional interest of the State. If the appeal filed by
the State are lost for individual default, those who are at fault, will not
usually be individually affected." (emphasis supplied)
53. Similarly, in Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India, (2023) 10 SCC 531, the
marked distinction was the scope of interference by this Court while
exercising judicial review of an order of condoning delay passed by a High
Court. This Court distinguished between the two situations, namely : (i) its
constraints while sitting in appeal over a discretionary order; and (ii) itself
considering an application for condonation of delay. Such a distinction is
discernible from the following passage in Sheo Raj Singh -
"33. Be that as it may, it is important to bear in mind that we are not
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hearing an application for condonation of delay but sitting in appeal
over a discretionary order of the High Court granting the prayer for
condonation of delay. In the case of the former, whether to condone or
not would be the only question whereas in the latter, whether there has
been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for
condonation would be the question." (emphasis supplied)
54. It seems to us that acceding to the appellants' request on the aforesaid
account would also have undesirable consequences. If delay were to be
condoned merely on the basis of a broad general assertion of bureaucratic
indifference, without requiring demonstration of bona fides or an act of mala
fides on the part of specific individuals, it would create an artificial distinction
between the private parties and the Government entities vis-à-vis the law of
limitation. This would not be in conformity with the spirit of equality before
law as guaranteed under our Constitution. Allowing such latitude would
further distort incentives for the Government and encourage more laxity by the
bureaucracy in its general functioning, thereby undermining quality
governance.
8. Recently, in the matter of Shivamma Vs. Karnataka Housing
Board and Ors. Reported in 2025 INSC 1104, the Supreme Court, on
consideration of precedents on the subject, observed as under-
210. What may be discerned from the aforesaid is that the jurisprudence on
condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, particularly where
the State or any of its instrumentality is involved, has witnessed a significant
shift. From a regime that once accorded preferential indulgence to the State,
premised on its bureaucratic complexities and institutional inertia, the law has
now evolved to insist upon parity between the government and private
litigants. The rationale is that public interest is better served not by excusing
governmental inefficiency, but by fostering accountability, diligence, and
responsibility in the conduct of public litigation.
211. The earlier decisions of this Court, particularly in K.V. Ayisumma (supra),
Chandra Mani (supra), Lipok AO (supra) and Indian Oil Corpn (supra) insofar
as they favoured a liberal approach towards the State or any of its
instrumentality in matters of condonation of delay, and showed indulgencein
condoning the same on ground of impersonal and slow-moving nature of these
entities, no longer reflects the correct position in law. No litigant, be it a
private party or a State or any of its functionaries, is entitled to a broader
margin of error, falling in the category of inaction, negligence or casualness, in
matters of limitation.
212. The law as it presently stands, post the decision of Postmaster General
(supra), is unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an
exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties,
must demonstrate bona fide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent
such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the
identity of the applicant.
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213. From a combined reading of Bal Kishan Mathur (supra) and Sheo Raj
Singh (supra) it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra)
is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be
accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same
standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would not only compromise
the sanctity of limitation. The earlier view, insofar as it favoured a liberal
approach towards the State or any of its instrumentality is no more the correct
position of law. Secondly, that thehabitual reliance of Government
departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative
inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always,
invariably accepted as a "sufficient cause" for the purpose of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the
very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be
diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation.
214. What has been conveyed in so many words, by the decision of Postmaster
General (supra) is that while excuses premised solely on bureaucratic lethargy
cannot, by themselves, constitute sufficient cause, there may nonetheless be
circumstances where the explanation offered, though involving bureaucratic
procedures, reflects a genuine and bona fide cause for the delay. In such
instances, the true test is whether the explanation demonstrates that the State
acted with reasonable diligence and whether the delay occurred despite efforts
to act within time. Where such bona fides are established, the Court retains the
discretion to condone the delay.
215. In other words, Postmaster General (supra) does not shut the door on
condonation of delay by the State in all cases involving bureaucratic
processes. The real distinction lies between a case where delay is the result of
gross negligence, inaction, or casual indifference on the part of the State,of a
defensive action. Calling something as just an "excuse" would imply that the
explanation proffered is believed not to be true. An "explanation" on the other
hand would demonstrate genuineness in actions and reasons assigned, and
would other wise be devoid of any gross negligence, deliberate inaction or
lack of bona fides, or indifference or casualness in conduct. Thus said, there is
no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for
condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to
be decided on its own facts. of a defensive action. Calling something as just an
"excuse" would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true.
An "explanation" on the other hand would demonstrate genuineness in actions
and reasons assigned, and would other wise be devoid of any gross negligence,
deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, or indifference or casualness in
conduct. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and,
therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of
sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts.
********
218. However, equally important to note is that wherever, any explanation is
sought to be given on account of bureaucratic lethargy and inherent
complexities of governmental decision-making, the same more often than not
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would invariably always is an "excuse", as experience has shown us, depicted
from a long line of decisions of this Court. It is at this stage, where the
decision of Postmaster General (supra) assumes significance. It seeks to
convey the messages, that court should not be agnostic, to how the State or its
instrumentalities, often tend to take the recourse of condonation of delay in a
casual manner.
219. Which is why, as per the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) and a
plethora of other subsequent decision, the ordinary approach of the courts, in
cases where delay is sought to be condoned by offering the explanation of
bureaucratic lethargy or red-tapism, must be one of circumspection and
reluctance. The courts ought to loathe in accepting such explanations as
"sufficient cause". They should apply their minds carefully, be slow in
condoning delays on such reasons, and exceptional instances, where the
explanation is found to be genuine, reflective of reasonable vigilance and
promptitude in conduct, and free from gross negligence, deliberate inaction,
lack of bona fides, or casual indifference, should such an explanation be
accepted.
********
231. Public interest, therefore, does not lie in condoning governmental
negligence, but in compelling efficiency, responsibility, and timely decision-
making. This Court has time and again emphasised that liberal condonation of
delay on behalf of the State, merely on the ground that refusal might cause the
dismissal of a potentially meritorious matter, is a misplaced proposition.
Public interest is not synonymous with the cause of the Government; it is,
instead, synonymous with the enforcement of rule of law, certainty in legal
rights, and an administrative machinery that functions with diligence and
accountability.
232. It must, therefore, be underscored that the guiding principle is not the
protection of governmental indifference but the promotion of responsible
governance. The State is under a higher duty to act in time, for in every matter
it litigates, it does so not in its private capacity, but as the trustee of the
people's interest. Hence, repeated indulgence in condoning delays on grounds
of bureaucratic inefficiency would amount to eroding the veryobject of
limitation statutes, which are enacted in every civilised jurisdiction for the
sake of finality, certainty, and public order.
233. Any other view, would invariably defeat the sound public policy
embodied in the Limitation Act and fail in enthusing efficiency in
administration, and bring a balance between accountability and autonomy of
action, It would result in giving immunity or carte blanche power to act as it
pleases with the public at whim or vagary and inevitably spell doom all over
the collective responsibility that the State and its instrumentalities are
entrusted with. Thus, we are of the considered opinion, that delay cannot be
condoned, merely because not doing so would result in non-suiting the State
and thereby run the ostensible risk of public interest suffering. Such by no
stretch can be the sole consideration for the purpose of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, as to do so would be to ignore the provision of Section 3 and
the overarching public policy of giving quietus to lis, that forms the bedrock of
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the Limitation Act.
9. The material on record is examined in the light of aforestated
proposition of law. The respondent has relied upon the copies of certified
copy of the Note-sheet dated 18.08.2023 of the office of Collector,Ratlam
(Annex. R-1),Report of kasba patwari,Ratlam dated 18.08.2023 (Annex.
R-2) and reply dated 31.08.2023 to show cause notice dated 24.08.2023
issued by the Collector, Ratlam (Annex. R-4). The respondent has filed
affidavit in support of the averments in reply stating the contents of these
documents. The veracity and authenticity of these documents have not
been assailed by the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant was
at loss to explain the reason for delay, when the Collector,Ratlam was
aware of the impugned Judgement and decree dated 10.09.2022 passed in
RCS-ANo.2400028 of 2015 in August, 2023 as reflected by the
documents submitted along with the reply.
10. Thus, the material on record reveals that the Collector, Ratlam was
aware of the impugned Judgement in August, 2023, still, he issued
direction to get the certified copy of the Judgement on 15.02.2024 and for
filing of the appeal on 20.02.2024.There is no explanation for the
interregnum period between August, 2022 to 15th February 2024.The
explanation put forth by the applicants does not appear credible and
bonafide. The duration of delay becomes insignificant provided the
applicant gives sufficient reasons to explain it. The explanation put forth
by the applicants appears to be an attempt in despair to somehow revive
the litigation. Apparently, the reasons are an excuse rather than an
explanation. There is apparent lack of diligence,inaction and gross
negligence. The appellant/applicant has failed to give "sufficient reasons"
for condoning the delay in filing of the appeal.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:30853
11. Consequently, I.A.No. 2236 of 2024, being devoid of merit, is
rejected and present appeal is dismissed as barred by limitation.
12. The record of Court of first instance be remitted along with copy of
this order after necessary compliances.
C.C. as per rules.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR)
JUDGE
BDJ
