Madhya Pradesh High Court
Ashish Gautam vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 13 October, 2025
Author: Milind Ramesh Phadke
Bench: Milind Ramesh Phadke
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:25807
1 MCRC-26099-2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
ON THE 13th OF OCTOBER, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 26099 of 2024
ASHISH GAUTAM
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Brajesh Kumar Tyagi - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Samar Ghuraiya - Public Prosecutor for the respondent
No.1/State.
ORDER
Notices to the respondent No.2 by RAD mode were sent. However,
the service report has not been returned back. Thus, in the light of Chapter
XV, Rule 11(2), of the High Court Rules, Respondent no. 2 is treated to
be deemed served.
2. This petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the
petitioner for quashment of FIR bearing crime No.224/2024 registered at
Police Station Hajira District Gwalior for offence punishable under Sections
376(2)(N), 506, 323 of IPC.
3. As per the prosecution case, the present FIR has been registered on
the basis of a written complaint submitted by the prosecutrix/respondent No.
2. It is alleged in the complaint that the marriage of the prosecutrix was
solemnized with one Vikki Mourya in the year 2020. Subsequently, the
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petitioner came into contact with the prosecutrix at a garments shop situated
at Hajira, and they started communicating with each other. At that time, a
domestic dispute was ongoing between the prosecutrix and her husband. It is
further alleged that the petitioner advised the prosecutrix to obtain a divorce
and assured her that he would marry her thereafter. Thereafter, the petitioner
frequently visited the house of the prosecutrix and allegedly established
physical relations with her on the false pretext of marriage and also subjected
her to physical assault. Subsequently, on 08.04.2024, the prosecutrix
obtained a decree of divorce, but thereafter, the petitioner refused to marry
her.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that from the perusal of
the prosecution version itself, it is evident that the prosecutrix is a major and
married lady aged about 24 years. It is further revealed from her own
statement that she was in a consensual relationship with the petitioner for the
last two years. The physical relationship between the parties was established
voluntarily and with her free consent. The said consent was neither obtained
by misrepresentation nor on the basis of any misconception of facts. When
the prosecutrix herself is a major married woman, the allegation that the
petitioner established physical relations with her on the pretext of marriage is
inherently absurd and untenable. The prosecutrix was fully conscious and
aware of the nature and consequences of the relationship. Thus, prima facie,
even from the version of the prosecution, no offence under Sections 376(2)
(n), 506, and 323 of the IPC is made out against the petitioner.
5. It is further submitted that as per the FIR, the prosecutrix was in a
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relationship with the petitioner for the last two years. No specific date, time,
or incident has been mentioned in the FIR to constitute the alleged offence
of rape. The prosecutrix continued to maintain an intimate relationship with
the petitioner over a long period, which clearly reflects that the relationship
was consensual and based on mutual affection.
6. It is further submitted that the allegations levelled by the prosecutrix
in the FIR are false, concocted, and motivated. The alleged threats by the
petitioner are also unsubstantiated by any legal evidence. Hence, the entire
FIR stands vitiated and does not disclose the commission of any cognizable
offence.
7. It is further submitted that prior to the lodging of the present FIR,
the prosecutrix had already registered another FIR against the petitioner and
his family members for the offences under Sections 294, 323, 506, and 34
IPC in Crime No. 688/2023 at Police Station Thatipur, District Gwalior. This
clearly indicates mala fide intention on the part of the prosecutrix.
8. It is further submitted that the relationship between the prosecutrix
and the petitioner was purely consensual, and both parties had spent
considerable time together of their own free will. Once such consensual
physical intimacy has occurred between two adults, it cannot subsequently be
termed as rape merely because the petitioner refused to marry the
prosecutrix. The consent of the prosecutrix was not induced by any deceitful
promise or false assurance. The petitioner and prosecutrix were known to
each other for a long time and were in a relationship. When the petitioner
declined to marry, the prosecutrix, in a revengeful manner and to misuse the
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process of law, lodged the present false FIR.
9. It is further submitted that the prosecutrix had matrimonial disputes
with her husband and subsequently obtained a divorce. The petitioner had no
role in her matrimonial discord or divorce proceedings. Thus, it is prayed
that impugned FIR be quashed. To bolster his submissions reliance is placed
on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Promad
Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr. reported in (2019) SCC
Online SC 1073.
10. Learned Public Prosecutor for the respondent/State, while
opposing the prayer for quashment of the FIR, submits that the allegations
levelled in the FIR, when taken at their face value, clearly disclose the
commission of cognizable offences under Sections 376(2)(N), 506, and 323
of the IPC. The petitioner, under the guise of a promise to marry, allegedly
established repeated physical relations with the prosecutrix and thereafter
refused to solemnize the marriage. The contents of the FIR make out a prima
facie case, and hence, the FIR cannot be quashed at the threshold. It is
submitted that the question as to whether the consent of the prosecutrix was
free and voluntary or was obtained on the false pretext of marriage is a
matter of trial and requires appreciation of evidence. At the stage of
considering an application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., the Court is not
expected to conduct a roving inquiry or evaluate the evidentiary value of the
allegations. If the contents of the FIR disclose the commission of any
offence, the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed merely on the basis of
disputed facts or probable defence of the accused.
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11. Heard counsel for the parties and peruse the record.
12. From the contents of the FIR as well as the statement of the
prosecutrix recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. , it is palpably clear
that the petitioner and the prosecutrix were well acquainted with each other.
There existed a love affair between them, and they had developed physical
relations which continued for a considerable period of time. However, before
arriving at any conclusive finding on the basis of the material available on
record and the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, it is
appropriate to first take note of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court as well as the various High Courts on the issue.
13. The Supreme Court in case of [Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi)]
Delhi 2024 INSC 879 dealing with similar circumstances has observed as
under:-
"17. In the present case, the issue that had to be addressed by the
High Court was whether, assuming all the allegations in the FIR
are correct as they stand, an offence punishable under Sections
376 and 506 IPC were made out. A bare perusal of the FIR reveals
that the appellant and the complainant first came in contact in the
year 2017 and established a relationship thereafter. The parties met
multiple times at various places during the years 2017 and 2019,
including at parks and their respective houses. Although the
complainant stated that the appellant had a forceful sexual
relationship with her, neither did she stop meeting the appellant
thereafter, nor did she file a criminal complaint during the said
period.
18. It is inconceivable that the complainant would continue to
meet the appellant or maintain a prolonged association or physical
relationship with him in the absence of voluntary consent on her
part. Moreover, it would have been improbable for the appellant to
ascertain the complainant's residential address, as mentioned in the
FIR unless such information had been voluntarily provided by the
complainant herself. It is also revealed that, at one point, both
parties had an intention to marry each other, though this plan
ultimately did not materialize. The appellant and the complainant
were in a consensual relationship. They are both educated adults.
The complainant, after filing the FIR against the appellant, got
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married in the year 2020 to some other person. Similarly, the
appellant was also married in the year 2019. Possibly the marriage
of the appellant in the year 2019 has led the complainant to file the
FIR against him as they were in a consensual relationship till
then."
14. In case of Shiv Pratap Singh Rana v. State of Madhya Pradesh &
Anr. reported in 2024 INSC 481 , the Supreme Court considering the long
relationship between the parties has observed as under:-
"25. From the factual matrix of the case, the following relevant
features can be culled out:
(i) the relationship between the appellant and the prosecutrix was
of a consensual nature;
(ii) the parties were in a relationship for a period of almost two
years; and
(iii) though there were talks between the parties and their family
members regarding marriage, the same did not fructify leading to
lodging of FIR.
26. That being the position and having regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case, we are of the view that it would be in
the interest of justice if the proceedings are terminated at this stage
itself. Consequently, impugned order of the High Court dated
03.10.2019 and the order of the Sessions Judge dated 24.04.2019
are hereby set aside and quashed."
15. Further, in case of Mahesh Damu v. The State of Maharashtra &
Anr. reported in 2024 INSC 897 , the observation made by the Supreme
Court is as under:-
"22. In our view, if a man is accused of having sexual relationship
by making a false promise of marriage and if he is to be held
criminally liable, any such physical relationship must be traceable
directly to the false promise made and not qualified by other
circumstances or consideration. A woman may have reasons to
have physical relationship other than the promise of marriage
made by the man, such as personal liking for the male partner
without insisting upon formal marital ties. Thus, in a situation
where physical relationship is maintained for a prolonged period
knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said with certainty that the
said physical relationship was purely because of the alleged
promise made by the appellant to marry her. Thus, unless it can be
shown that the physical relationship was purely because of the
promise of marriage, thereby having a direct nexus MCRC-54176-
2023 with the physical relationship without being influenced by
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any other consideration, it cannot be said that there was vitiation
of consent under misconception of fact.
xxx
31. In our view if criminality is to be attached to such prolonged
physical relationship at a very belated stage, it can lead to serious
consequences. It will open the scope for imputing criminality to
such long term relationships after turning sour, as such an
allegation can be made even at a belated stage to drag a person in
the juggernaut of stringent criminal process. There is always a
danger of attributing criminal intent to an otherwise disturbed civil
relationship of which the Court must also be mindful."
16. Further in case of Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of
Maharashtra and another reported in AIR 2019 SC 327, considering the
existing facts and circumstances of the case, which are almost similar to the
case in hand, has observed as under:-
"20. With this factual background, the Court held that the girl had
taken a conscious decision, after active application of mind to the
events that had transpired. It was further held that at best, it is a
case of breach of promise to marry rather than a case of false
promise to marry, for which the accused is prima facie
accountable for damages under civil law. It was held thus : (Deelip
Singh [Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, (2005) 1 SCC 88 : 2005
SCC (Cri) 253] , SCC p. 106, para 35) "35. The remaining
question is whether on the basis of the evidence on record, it is
reasonably possible to hold that the accused with the fraudulent
intention of inducing her to sexual intercourse, made a false
promise to marry. We have no doubt that the accused did hold out
the promise to marry her and that was the predominant reason for
the victim girl to agree to the sexual intimacy with him. PW 12
was also too keen to marry him as she said so specifically. But we
find no evidence which gives rise to an inference beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused had no intention to MCRC-
54176-2023 marry her at all from the inception and that the
promise he made was false to his knowledge. No circumstances
emerging from the prosecution evidence establish this fact. On the
other hand, the statement of PW 12 that "later on", the accused
became ready to marry her but his father and others took him
away from the village would indicate that the accused might have
been prompted by a genuine intention to marry which did not
materialise on account of the pressure exerted by his family elders.
It seems to be a case of breach of promise to marry rather than a
case of false promise to marry. On this aspect also, the
observations of this Court in Uday case [Uday v. State of
Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 775] at para 24
come to the aid of the appellant."
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17. Likewise in a case of Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana) reported
in (2013) 7 SCC 675, the Supreme Court has observed as under:-
"21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided,
obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason,
accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance,
the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between
rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very
carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to
marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false
promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls
within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction
between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false
promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at
an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and
whether the consent involved was given after wholly
understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence.
There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual
intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused,
and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the
accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which
he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was
unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such
cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for
rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the
accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.
xxx
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to
show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the
accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to
marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a
person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim
owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The "failure to keep
a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to
reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does
not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come
within the meaning of the term "misconception of fact", the fact
must have an immediate relevance". Section 90 IPC cannot be
called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in
entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court
is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had
never really intended to marry her."
18. The Supreme Court in case of Sonu @ Subhash Kumar v. State of
Uttar Pradesh and Anr. [Criminal Appeal No.233 of 2021 (Arising out of
SLP (Cri) No. 11218 of 2019], has observed as under:-
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"10. Bearing in mind the tests which have been enunciated in the
above decision [Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra,
(2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] , we are of the view
that even assuming that all the allegations in the FIR are correct
for the purposes of considering the application for quashing under
Section 482CrPC, no offence has been established. There is no
allegation to the effect that the promise to marry given to the
second respondent was false at the inception. On the contrary, it
would appear from the contents of the FIR that there was a
subsequent refusal on the part of the appellant to marry MCRC-
54176-2023 the second respondent which gave rise to the
registration of the FIR. On these facts, we are of the view that the
High Court was in error in declining to entertain the petition under
Section 482CrPC on the basis that it was only the evidence at trial
which would lead to a determination as to whether an offence was
established."
19. In case of Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand reported in
(2020) 10 SCC 108, the observation made by the Supreme Court is as
follows:-
"13. The question for our consideration is whether the prosecutrix
consented to the physical relationship under any misconception of
fact with regard to the promise of marriage by the appellant or was
her consent based on a fraudulent misrepresentation of marriage
which the appellant never intended to keep since the very
inception of the relationship. If we reach the conclusion that he
intentionally made a fraudulent misrepresentation from the very
inception and the prosecutrix gave her consent on a misconception
of fact, the offence of rape under Section 375 IPC is clearly made
out. It is not possible to hold in the nature of evidence on record
that the appellant obtained her consent at the inception by putting
her under any fear. Under Section 90 IPC a consent given under
fear of injury is not a consent in the eye of the law. In the facts of
the present case, we are not persuaded to accept the solitary
statement of the prosecutrix that at the time of the first alleged
offence her consent was obtained under fear of injury."
20. Further, in case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of
Maharashtra reported in (2019) 9 SCC 608, the Supreme Court has
considered the similar circumstances and observed as under:-
"12. This Court has repeatedly held that consent with respect
to Section 375 IPC involves an active understanding of the
circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act. An
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individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating
various MCRC-54176-2023 alternative actions (or inaction) as
well as the various possible consequences flowing from such
action or inaction, consents to such action. In Dhruvaram Sonar
[Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18
SCC 191 : 2018 SCC OnLine SC 3100] which was a case
involving the invoking of the jurisdiction under Section 482, this
Court observed :(SCC para 15) "15. ... An inference as to consent
can be drawn if only based on evidence or probabilities of the
case. "Consent" is also stated to be an act of reason coupled with
deliberation. It denotes an active will in mind of a person to permit
the doing of the act complained of."
This understanding was also emphasised in the decision of this
Court in Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala [Kaini Rajan v. State of
Kerala, (2013) 9 SCC 113 :(2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] : (SCC p.
118, para 12) "
12. ... "Consent", for the purpose of Section 375, requires
voluntary participation not only after the exercise of intelligence
based on the knowledge of the significance of the moral quality of
the act but after having fully exercised the choice between
resistance and assent. Whether there was consent or not, is to be
ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant circumstances."
xxx
14. In the present case, the "misconception of fact" alleged by the
complainant is the appellant's promise to marry her. Specifically in
the context of a promise to marry, this Court has observed that
there is a distinction between a false promise given on the
understanding by the maker that it will be broken, and the breach
of a promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not
fulfilled. In Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh [Anurag Soni v.
State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) 13 SCC 1 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC
509], this Court held : (SCC para 12)
"12. The sum and substance of the aforesaid decisions would be
that if it is established and proved that from the inception the
accused who gave the promise to the prosecutrix to marry, did not
have any intention to marry and the prosecutrix gave the consent
for sexual intercourse on such an assurance by the accused that he
would marry her, such a consent can be said to be a consent
obtained on a misconception of fact as per Section 90 IPC and, in
such a case, such a consent would not excuse the offender and
such an offender can be said to have committed the rape as
defined under Sections 375 IPC and can be convicted for the
offence under Section 376 IPC."
21. The Supreme Court in case of Uday v. State of Karnataka reported
in (2003) 4 SCC 46, dealing with the factual circumstances existing in the
said case has observed as under:-
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"21. It therefore appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is
in favour of the view that the consent given by the prosecutrix to
sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love
on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be
said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is
not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We are inclined to
agree with this view, but we must add that there is no straitjacket
formula for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix
to sexual intercourse is voluntary, or whether it is given under a
misconception of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid down
by the courts provide at best guidance to the judicial mind while
considering a question of consent, but the court must, in each case,
consider the evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances,
before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its own
peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the MCRC-54176-
2023 question whether the consent was voluntary, or was given
under a misconception of fact. It must also weigh the evidence
keeping in view the fact that the burden is on the prosecution to
prove each and every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent
being one of them.
xxx
23. Keeping in view the approach that the court must adopt in
such cases, we shall now proceed to consider the evidence on
record. In the instant case, the prosecutrix was a grown-up girl
studying in a college. She was deeply in love with the appellant.
She was, however, aware of the fact that since they belonged to
different castes, marriage was not possible. In any event the
proposal for their marriage was bound to be seriously opposed by
their family members. She admits having told so to the appellant
when he proposed to her the first time. She had sufficient
intelligence to understand the significance and moral quality of the
act she was consenting to. That is why she kept it a secret as long
as she could. Despite this, she did not resist the overtures of the
appellant, and in fact succumbed to them. She thus freely
exercised a choice between resistance and assent. She must have
known the consequences of the act, particularly when she was
conscious of the fact that their marriage may not take place at all
on account of caste considerations. All these circumstances lead us
to the conclusion that she freely, voluntarily and consciously
consented to having sexual intercourse with the appellant, and her
consent was not in consequence of any misconception of fact.
xxx
25. There is yet another difficulty which faces the prosecution in
this case. In a case of this nature two conditions must be fulfilled
for the application of Section 90 IPC. Firstly, it must be shown
that the consent was given under a misconception of fact.
Secondly, it must be proved that the person who obtained the
consent knew, or had reason to believe MCRC-54176-2023 that
the consent was given in consequence of such misconception. We
have serious doubts that the promise to marry induced the
prosecutrix to consent to having sexual intercourse with the
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appellant. She knew, as we have observed earlier, that her
marriage with the appellant was difficult on account of caste
considerations. The proposal was bound to meet with stiff
opposition from members of both families. There was therefore a
distinct possibility, of which she was clearly conscious, that the
marriage may not take place at all despite the promise of the
appellant. The question still remains whether even if it were so, the
appellant knew, or had reason to believe, that the prosecutrix had
consented to having sexual intercourse with him only as a
consequence of her belief, based on his promise, that they will get
married in due course. There is hardly any evidence to prove this
fact. On the contrary, the circumstances of the case tend to support
the conclusion that the appellant had reason to believe that the
consent given by the prosecutrix was the result of their deep love
for each other. It is not disputed that they were deeply in love.
They met often, and it does appear that the prosecutrix permitted
him liberties which, if at all, are permitted only to a person with
whom one is in deep love. It is also not without significance that
the prosecutrix stealthily went out with the appellant to a lonely
place at 12 o'clock in the night. It usually happens in such cases,
when two young persons are madly in love, that they promise to
each other several times that come what may, they will get
married. As stated by the prosecutrix the appellant also made such
a promise on more than one occasion. In such circumstances the
promise loses all significance, particularly when they are
overcome with emotions and passion and find themselves in
situations and circumstances where they, in a weak moment,
succumb to the temptation of having sexual relationship. This is
what appears to have happened in this case as well, and the
prosecutrix willingly consented to having sexual intercourse with
the appellant with whom she was deeply in love, not because he
promised to marry her, but because she also desired it. In these
circumstances it would be very difficult to impute to the appellant
knowledge that the MCRC-54176-2023 prosecutrix had consented
in consequence of a misconception of fact arising from his
promise. In any event, it was not possible for the appellant to
know what was in the mind of the prosecutrix when she
consented, because there were more reasons than one for her to
consent."
22. The Supreme Court in case of S tate of Haryana and others v.
Bhajan Lal and others reported in of 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, has laid down
the criteria/categories as to under what circumstances the Court should
exercise the power provided under Section 482 of CrPC or extraordinary
jurisdiction provided under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so as to
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quash the proceedings. The categories of the cases in which interference is
permissible quoted by the Supreme Court, are as under:-
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant
provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of
law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the
exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories
of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulate and to
give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such
power should be exercised:
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or
the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not
disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence,
no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order
of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance
of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the
Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala
fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a
view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
23. As per the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner, the
present case falls within category Nos.1, 3 and 5 as laid down by the
Supreme Court in the said case.
24. The facts of the present case reveal that both the prosecutrix and
the petitioner are major individuals who were in a consensual relationship for
approximately two years. At the time they entered into relationship
admittedly complainant/prosecutrix was married and knowing well that the
petitioner could not had married her at that time, entered into bigamous
relationship, thus the very conduct of the complainant/prosecutrix implies
that their physical relationship was the result of mutual consent and free will.
Subsequently, due to personal reasons, the petitioner had declined to marry
the prosecutrix, which led to the registration of the FIR. The allegations,
thus, even if taken at their face value, do not constitute the offence under
Section 376 IPC or any other cognizable offence. Continuation of the
criminal proceedings would therefore amount to abuse of the process of law.
25. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, this Court does not
find any material or ingredient available on record to indicate that any
offence under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC is made out against the petitioner.
Accordingly, the prosecution initiated against him deserves to be quashed in
light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal
(supra), while exercising the inherent powers conferred under Section 482 of
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:25807
15 MCRC-26099-2024
the CrPC.
26. Ex consequentia, the petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The
FIR registered against the petitioner vide Crime No.224/2024 at Police
Station Hajira, District Gwalior, for the offences punishable under Sections
376(2)(n), 506 and 323 of the IPC is hereby quashed, along with all
consequential proceedings arising therefrom.
27. Accordingly, the petition stands allowed and disposed of. No order
as to costs.
(MILIND RAMESH PHADKE)
JUDGE
ojha
