Madhya Pradesh High Court
Radhelal Chouksey vs The Western Coalfield Limited on 20 November, 2025
Author: Vishal Mishra
Bench: Vishal Mishra
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VISHAL MISHRA
ON THE 20th OF NOVEMBER, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 6792 of 2018
RADHELAL CHOUKSEY
Versus
THE WESTERN COALFIELD LIMITED AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri R.P. Mishra - Advocate for petitioner.
Shri Anoop Nair - Senior Advocate with Ms. Subhankori Banerji - Advocate for
respondents.
ORDER
This petition is filed seeking a direction to the respondents/authorities
to consider and decide the pending representation.
2. It is the case of the petitioner that he is owner of land situated at
Telibut bearing khasra no.109/1 area 0.975 hectare and khasra no. 190/3 area
0.190 hectare total area 1.165 hectare which was acquired for Nandal Coal
Basari Railway Lines by the respondents in compliance of order dated
10.07.1988. The petitioner made representation alongwith relevant receipt
dated 03.11.2017 to respondent no.2 for providing appointment in the light
of relevant policy issued by the authority concerned in respect of the said
land acquired by the respondent no.2 but the respondents/authorities did not
take any decision till now. Hence, this petition is filed.
3. On notice being issued, a reply has been filed by the respondents
pointing out the fact that acquisition proceedings were completed way back
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in the year 1983-1984 and after a lapse of almost 35-40 years the
representation was filed in the year 2017 seeking appointment in lieu of
acquisition of land, which culminated in the year 1983 - 1984. As there is a
huge delay in filing the representation of almost more than three decades, it
is submitted that no relief can be extended to the petitioner. He has prayed
for dismissal of the writ petition.
4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
5. There is no explanation submitted by the petitioner for huge delay
in approaching authorities as well as this Court. This petition was filed in the
year 2018 and since then no action has been taken by the petitioner to pursue
the matter. The law with respect to sleeping litigant has been considered by
the Court in catena of cases. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Esha
Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy
and Ors. reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649 , has held as under :-
"21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles
that can broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic,
justice-oriented, nonpedantic approach while
dealing with an application for condonation of
delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise
injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be
understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and
purpose regard being had to the fact that these
terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in
proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and
pivotal the technical considerations should not be
given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to
deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence
on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken
note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bonafides imputable to a party
seeking condonation of delay is a significant and
relevant fact.
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21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to
strict proof should not affect public justice and
cause public mischief because the courts are
required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate
eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and
it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between
inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or
few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is
attracted whereas to the latter it may not be
attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict
approach whereas the second calls for a liberal
delineation.21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and
attitude of a party relating to its inaction or
negligence are relevant factors to be taken into
consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle
is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of
balance of justice in respect of both parties and the
said principle cannot be given a total go-by in the
name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted
or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful,
the courts should be vigilant not to expose the
other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one
gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or
interpolation by taking recourse to the
technicalities of law of limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be
carefully scrutinised and the approach should be
based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which
is founded on objective reasoning and not on
individual perception.
21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity
representing a collective cause should be given
some acceptable latitude.
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some
more guidelines taking note of the present day
scenario. They are:-
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay
should be drafted with careful concern and not in a
haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the
courts are required to condone delay on the
bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis
on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.
22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay
should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the
base of individual philosophy which is basically
subjective.
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22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid
down regard being had to the concept of judicial
discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving
consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory
system should be made as that is the ultimate
institutional motto.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay
as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical
propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant
manner requires to be curbed, of course, within
legal parameters."
6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa & Anr.
vs. Mamata Mohanty, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 436 has opined as under:-
"54. This Court has consistently rejected the
contention that a petition should be considered
ignoring the delay and laches in case the petitioner
approaches the Court after coming to know of the
relief granted by the Court in a similar case as the
same cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay
and laches. A litigant cannot wake up from deep
slumber and claim impetus from the judgment in
cases where some diligent person had approached the
Court within a reasonable time."
7. A Division Bench of this Court in Focus Energy Ltd. (M/s) vs
Government of India, (DB) reported in I.L.R. (2011) M.P. 53 relying upon
judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under :
"10. Thus, facts stated supra leads to irresistible
conclusion that appellant is guilty of delay and
laches. Its conduct disentitles it to any relief. In
New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and
Others, AIR 2007 SC 1365 the Supreme Court has
held that delay and laches are relevant factors for
exercise of equitable jurisdiction. In Municipal
Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000)
2 SCC 48 the Supreme Court has observed that
discretionary relief can be provided to one who has
not by his act or conduct given a go-bye to his
rights. Equity favours a vigilant rather than an
indolent litigant. In the State of Haryana v. Aravali
Khanij Udyog, (2008) 1 SCC 663 it has been held
that where third party rights are created, the High
Court should not interfere. Similarly, in Shiba
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Shankar Mohapatra (supra) it has been held that
the Court exercising public law jurisdiction does
not encourage agitation of stale claims where the
right of third parties crystallizes in the
interregnum."
8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power
Corpn. Ltd. vs K. Thangappan reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322 has held as
follows:
"6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to
be borne in mind by the High Court when they
exercise their discretionary powers under Article
226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the
High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary
powers if there is such negligence or omission on
the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken
in conjunction with the lapse of time and other
circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite
party. Even where fundamental right is involved
the matter is still within the discretion of the Court
as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief
Controller of Imports and Exports [(1969) 1 SCC
185 : AIR 1970 SC 769] . Of course, the discretion
has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes
Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper
Armstrong Hurd [(1874) 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492]
(PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon
Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and
Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor
Service [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329] .
Sir Barnes had stated:
"Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is
not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it
would be practically unjust to give a remedy either
because the party has, by his conduct done that
which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a
waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect
he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy,
yet put the other party in a situation in which it
would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy
were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these
cases, lapse of time and delay are most material.
But in every case, if an argument against relief,
which otherwise would be just, is founded upon
mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a
bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that
defence must be tried upon principles substantially
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equitable. Two circumstances always important in
such cases are, the length of the delay and the
nature of the acts done during the interval which
might affect either party and cause a balance of
justice or injustice in taking the one course or the
other, so far as it relates to the remedy."
9. It is further held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Ashok Kumar vs District Magistrate, Basti reported in (2012) 3 SCC 311
that :
"10. ... It is time and again, stated that a party who
has slept over his right since is not entitled to the
discretionary relief of the High Court."
10. If the aforesaid judgments with respect to delay and laches are
applied to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the petitioner has slept
over his right for a considerable period. Therefore, no relief can be extended
to him.
11. Accordingly, the petition sans merit and is hereby dismissed. No
order as to costs.
(VISHAL MISHRA)
JUDGE
sj
