Madhya Pradesh High Court
The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Hemant Kumar Shukla on 2 May, 2025
Author: Milind Ramesh Phadke
Bench: Milind Ramesh Phadke
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:9808
1 WA-3033-2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE RAJENDRA KUMAR VANI
ON THE 2nd OF MAY, 2025
WRIT APPEAL No. 3033 of 2024
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Versus
HEMANT KUMAR SHUKLA AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri G.K. Agarwal - Govt. Advocate for the appellants/State.
Shri Alok Bandhu Shrivastava - Advocate for the respondents.
ORDER
Per: Justice Milind Ramesh Phadke
Heard on I.A.No.12572 of 2024 , which is an application for
condonation of delay in filing the present appeal.
2. The present intra-Court appeal under Section 2(1) of Madhya
Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khandpeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005
has been filed by the appellants/State assailing the order dated
01.08.2023 passed by learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.16252 of
2023.
3. By way of Writ Petition No.16252 of 2023, the respondents
have sought following reliefs:
"(i) Direct the respondents to extend all service
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benefits of equal pay scale from the date when it was
given to similarly situated employee, working under
same employer State Govt. of M.P. and comply
with.direction of Hon'ble High Court as has been given
in Annexure P/3, P/4, P/5 and P/5
(ii) Direct the respondents to reject/recall the order
annexure P/1 dated 21.09.2020 and consider/comply
with direction of Hon'ble High Court order Annexure
P/2. Extend benefits of pay scale/revised pay scale and
arrear amount with interest from the date when given to
others similar employee.
(iii) That any other relief which this Hon'ble Court
deem fit in the fact circumstances of the present."
4. Short facts of the case are that the respondents who were
appointed on the post of Time Keeper in Work Charge Establishment
under Water Resources Department, had sought benefit as was extended
to the similarly placed employees in the matters of A.L. Thakur &
Others Vs. State of M.P. & Others vide order dated 27.06.2012 passed in
Writ Petition No.16054 of 2003 and R.K. Lakhera & Others vs. State of
M.P. & Others vide order dated 25.09.2018 passed in Writ Petition No.
No.4413 of 2018 which had attained finality up-til the Apex Court.
5. The learned Writ Court, after considering the submissions and
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perusing the orders dated 27.06.2012 and 25.09.2018, had disposed of
said writ petition vide impugned order dated 01.08.2023 by observing as
under:
"4 Considering the submissions and upon perusal
of orders as referred above by the petitioners, this
petition is disposed of with a direction to the respondents
to consider the case of petitioners in light of the orders
passed by this Court which attained finality uptil Apex
Court from time to time and extend the benefits as given
to the similarly placed petitioners.
5. Resultantly, the impugned order dated
21.06.2019 (Annexure P/1) is hereby set aside.
6. Petition stands allowed and disposed of in
above terms."
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the present writ appeal has been
filed on 10.12.2024.5. After hearing counsel for the parties and perusing
the record as well as the order impugned herein, this Court doesn't find
any justifiable reason to interfere in the matter at the behest of the State
who had continuously slept over its rights and woke up from the deep
slumber after an inordinate delay of approximately 407 days in
approaching this Court by way of filing instant writ appeal, which in
light of the order dated 25.04.2025 passed by the Division Bench of this
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Court in Writ Appeal No.665 of 2024 wherein in similar matters
explanation afforded by the State for condoning a delay of 121 days in
filing that appeal, was not accepted and the appeal of the State was
dismissed by relying upon the various judgments of the Apex Court
which are quoted as under:
"10. The Supreme Court in the case of Pathapati
Subba Reddy (Died) By Lrs & Ors . v. The Special
Deputy Collector (LA) decided on 8-4-2024 in S.L.P.
(C) No. 31248/2018 has held that while considering the
question of limitation, the merits of the case are not to be
considered. It has been held that howsoever liberal
approach is adopted in condoning the delay, existence of
'sufficient cause' for not filing the appeal in time is a
condition precedent. The phrases 'liberal approach',
'justice- oriented approach' and cause for the
advancement of 'substantial justice' cannot be employed
to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters
or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-
opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
In the said case, the Supreme Court has held as under:-
"16. Generally, the courts have adopted a
very liberal approach in construing the phrase
'sufficient cause' used in Section 5 of the
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Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to
enable the courts to do substantial justice and to
apply law in a meaningful manner which subserves
the ends of justice. In Collector, Land Acquisition,
Anantnag and Ors. vs. Katiji and Ors., this Court in
advocating the liberal approach in condoning the
delay for 'sufficient cause' held that ordinarily a
litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an
appeal late; it is not necessary to explain every
day's delay in filing the appeal; and since
sometimes refusal to condone delay may result in
throwing out a meritorious matter, it is necessary in
the interest of justice that cause of substantial
justice should be allowed to prevail upon technical
considerations and if the delay is not deliberate, it
ought to be condoned. Notwithstanding the above,
howsoever, liberal approach is adopted in
condoning the delay, existence of 'sufficient cause'
for not filing the appeal in time, is a condition
precedent for exercising the discretionary power to
condone the delay. The phrases 'liberal approach',
'justice oriented approach' and cause for the
advancement of 'substantial justice' cannot be
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employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to
allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead
matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid
of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
17. It must always be borne in mind that
while construing 'sufficient cause' in deciding
application under Section 5 of the Act, that on the
expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for
filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a
decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be
lightly disturbed. The decree-holder treats the
decree to be binding with the lapse of time and may
proceed on such assumption creating new rights.
18. This Court as far back in 1962 in the case
of Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs. Rewa
Coalfields Ltd has emphasized that even after
sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not
filing an appeal within time, the said party is not
entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing the
delay is the discretionary jurisdiction vested with
the court. The court, despite establishment of a
'sufficient cause' for various reasons, may refuse to
condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of
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the party.
19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar
Pratap Narain Singh and Ors., it had been held that
the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation
on equitable consideration or on the ground of
hardship. The court has time and again repeated
that when mandatory provision is not complied
with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and
convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the
delay on sympathetic grounds alone.
20. In this connection, a reference may be
made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of
Haryana and Ors. wherein while observing, as
above, this Court further laid down that if some
person has obtained a relief approaching the court
just or immediately when the cause of action had
arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the
same by approaching the court at a belated stage
simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy
and compassion.
21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of
Andhra Pradesh & Ors., where the High Court,
despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of
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3703 days, had allowed the applications for
condonation of delay, this Court held that the High
Court failed to exercise its discretion in a
reasonable and objective manner. High Court
should have exercised the discretion in a systematic
and an informed manner. The liberal approach in
considering sufficiency of cause for delay should
not be allowed to override substantial law of
limitation. The Court observed that the concepts
such as 'liberal approach', 'justice-oriented
approach' and 'substantial justice' cannot be
employed to jettison the substantial law of
limitation.
22. It has also been settled vide State of
Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani &
Ors. , that the merits of the case cannot be
considered while dealing with the application for
condonation of delay in filing the appeal.
23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land
Acquisition Officer, this Court held that the
discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised
judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances
of each case. The expression 'sufficient cause' as
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occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot
be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or
lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed
that even though limitation may harshly affect
rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all
its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the
courts have no choice but to apply the law as it
stands and they have no power to condone the delay
on equitable grounds.
24. It would be beneficial to quote paragraph
12 of the aforesaid decision which clinches the
issue of the manner in which equilibrium has to be
maintained between adopting liberal approach and
in implementing the statute as it stands. Paragraph
12 reads as under:
"12. It is a settled legal proposition that law
of limitation may harshly affect a particular party
but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the
statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable
grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory
provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to
ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
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distress resulting from its operation." The statutory
provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a
particular party but the court has no choice but to
enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal
maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is
hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a
situation. It has consistently been held that,
"inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute."
25. This Court in the same breath in the same very
decision vide paragraph 15 went on to observe as under:
"15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the
effect that where a case has been presented in the court
beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court
as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an
adequate and enough reason which prevented him to
approach the court within limitation. In case a party is
found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his
part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found
to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there
cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No
court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate
delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The
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application is to be decided only within the parameters
laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of
delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a
litigant to approach the court on time condoning the
delay without any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of
the statutoryprovisions and it tantamounts to showing
utter disregard to the legislature."
(emphasis supplied)
26. On a harmonious consideration of the
provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down
by this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy
that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the
right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been
exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an
end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to
be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be
construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be
construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though
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liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of
substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same
cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation
contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to
condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained,
but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and
may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is
established for various factors such as, where there is
inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar
matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to
the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the
cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii)
Merits of the case are not required to be considered in
condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be
decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the
delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the
conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to
disregarding the statutory provision."
1 1 . The Supreme Court in the case of H.
Guruswamy & Ors. Vs. A.Krishnaiah Since Deceased
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By Lrs decided on 8-1-2025 in Civil Appeal No.
317/2025 has held as under:-
"15. The rules of limitation are not meant to
destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see
that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but
seek their remedy promptly.
16. The length of the delay is definitely a
relevant matter which the court must take into
consideration while considering whether the delay
should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the
approach of the respondents herein, it appears that
they want to fix their own period of limitation for
the purpose of instituting the proceedings for which
law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is
held that a party has lost his right to have the matter
considered on merits because of his own inaction
for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-
deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the
case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial
justice deserves to be preferred as against the
technical considerations. While considering the plea
for condonation of delay, the court must not start
with the merits of the main matter. The court owes
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a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the
explanation offered by the party seeking
condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause
assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the
other side is equally balanced that the court may
bring into aid the merits of the matter for the
purpose of condoning the delay.
17. We are of the view that the question of
limitation is not merely a technical consideration.
The rules of limitation are based on the principles
of sound public policy and principles of equity. No
court should keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging
over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of
time."
6. Thus when a Coordinate Division Bench had already dismissed
similar Writ Appeal on the ground of delay, this Court doesn't find any
reason to take a different view and accordingly, no relief can be
extended to the appellants.
7. This Court has also time and again reiterated that delay defeats
equity and if the appellants approach the Court after long delay then the
relief prayed for can be denied on the ground of delay and laches.
8. In view of the above, this Court refrains from exercising
extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 2(1) of Adhiniyam, 2005, as the
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appeal preferred by the appellants/State suffers from unexplained delay
and laches and accordingly, it is not required to go into the merits of the
matter.
9. I.A.No.12572 of 2024 is hereby rejected. Accordingly, the writ
appeal is dismissed as barred by limitation.
(MILIND RAMESH PHADKE) (RAJENDRA KUMAR VANI)
JUDGE JUDGE
pwn*
