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The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Hemraj S/O Kanhaiyalal (Died) Through ...
2025 Latest Caselaw 6143 MP

Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 6143 MP
Judgement Date : 28 March, 2025

Madhya Pradesh High Court

The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Hemraj S/O Kanhaiyalal (Died) Through ... on 28 March, 2025

                           NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:6064        1           MCC No.493/2019




                                            IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                                                              AT INDORE

                                                                    BEFORE

                                     HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA

                                                    MISC. CIVIL CASE No.493 of 2019


                           THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER

                                                                                    ...Applicants

                                              and


                           HEMRAJ S/O KANHAIYALAL (DECEASED)

                           THROUGH LRS. KESARBAI AND OTHERS

                                                                                     ...Respondents



                           Reserved on          27.03.2025
                           Pronounced on        28.03.2025

                           Appearance:
                                Shri Aproov Joshi, learned Government Advocate for the
                           applicants / State.
                                  Shri Shashwat Seth, learned counsel for the respondents.
                           -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                                                    ORDER

The applicant / State has filed present MCC No.493/2019 on 28.02.2019 along with I.A. No.1548 of 2019 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to condone the delay of 642 days.

02. The averments made in the petition are that being aggrieved by and dis-satisfied with the judgment and decree of learned trial Court in

NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:6064 2 MCC No.493/2019

Regular Civil Suit No.14-A/2003 dated 29.07.2006 and learned First appellate Court in Property Appeal No.155-A/2006 dated 24.02.2007, the present second appeal No.889/2007 is filed with a delay of 87 days, the delay condoned, admitted the appeal on 18.01.2010 and ordered notice to respondents, one of the respondent died, no steps have been taken to bring the legal heirs of deceased respondent (Hemraj) due to which appeal is abated on 06.05.2011 on the ground of failure to bring the legal heirs of respondent (Hemraj).

03. The applicant / State filed MCC No.512/2011 on 29.09.2011 to set aside the abatement order dated 06.05.2011 and legal representatives of deceased respondent (Hemraj) to be taken on record and the said MCC No.512/2011 came up for hearing on 07.12.2011 granted a week's time to applicant / State to remove the defaults, failing which, MCC No.512/2011 shall be dismissed without further reference to the Court. When the applicants failed to comply with the order dated 07.12.2011, the MCC No.512/2011 dismissed on 23.11.2012 for non-compliance of per- emptory order dated 07.12.2011.

04. The applicant / State filed MCC No.451/2012 for restoration of MCC No.512/2011, which was dismissed on 23.11.2012 consequently, S.A. No.889/2007 may be restored, the said MCC No.451/2012 is allowed on 03.09.2014 and MCC No.512/2011 is restored. In spite of allowing the MCC No.451/2012 on 03.09.2014, till 30.03.2017 applicants / State did not take steps to bring the legal heirs of respondent on record, on 30.03.2017 when the came up for hearing, four weeks' time granted to bring the legal heirs of deceased, failing which, present MCC No.512/2011 shall stand dismissed without reference to the Court. On 19.06.2017 in non-compliance of per-emptory order dated 30.03.2017 in

NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:6064 3 MCC No.493/2019

MCC No.512/2011 applicants / State have not removed the defects within time, consequently, the order in MCC No.512/2011, same is to be treated to have been dismissed on 19.06.2017 without reference to the Court.

05. The MCC No.512/2011 dismissed on 19.06.2017 for non- compliance of the per-emptory order dated 30.03.2017 (supra). The present MCC No.493/2019 has been filed for restoration of MCC No.512/2011 with a delay of 642 days period from (19.06.2017 to 28.02.2019).

06. A reply filed by the respondents containing inter alia that the present MCC No.493/2019 has been filed by the applicant / State for restoration of MCC No.512/2011 dismissed on 07.12.2011 and for restoration of Second Appeal No.889/2007 dismissed on 06.05.2011. Further stated that MCC No.512/2011 dismissed for non-compliance of per-emptory order dated 30.03.2017. Further stated that Tehsildar and other officials having received the communication on 04.02.2019, the applicant / State took more than 02 years to bring the legal representatives of deceased respondent (Hemraj) and caused delay of 642 days in filing the restoration of the MCC No.512/2011 without showing sufficient cause in case and condonation of delay is found to be thoroughly negligent by the applicant / State. Further averred that applicants / State not cured the defects till the date of dismissal of MCC No.512/2011 dated 19.06.2017. No sufficient cause has been averted in the application in spite of granting much time to bring the legal heirs of the deceased on record and the delay has not explained properly and no sufficient cause shown to condone the delay, the applicant / State failed to establish cause of delay for bringing the legal heirs of deceased respondent, he prays to dismiss the MCC No.493/2019 as lack of merits.

NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:6064 4 MCC No.493/2019

07. The learned Government Advocate submitted that no doubt there was delay and Tehsildar and other officials have not respond in spite of reminders issued to them and failed to submit report to bring the legal heirs of deceased and causes delay and the delay in filing application may be condoned and MCC No.512/2011 may be restored.

08. The learned counsel for the respondents stated that the second appeal filed by State bearing No.889/2007 dated 15.10.2007 against the concurrent findings of Courts below and pending appeal, one of the respondent Hemraj died on 06.09.2010 and no steps were taken, respondents filed an application for dismissal of the appeal, the applicants / State were aware of the aforesaid fact, they have not taken any steps and the appeal stands abated on 06.05.2011. Further submitted that the applicants / State filed MCC No.512/2011 for restoration of S.A. No.889/2007 and condoning the delay of 118 days, which was dismissed on 23.12.2011 for non-compliance of per-emptory order dated 07.12.2011, further submitted that respondent filed another MCC No.451/2012 to restore the MCC No.512/2011 and consequently, S.A. No.889/2007, which was dismissed on 06.05.2011 and the said MCC No.451/2012 was allowed on 03.09.2014, further submitted that in spite of allowing the above MCC, the applicants / State have not taken steps to bring the legal heirs of respondent on record, on 30.03.2017, the per- emptory order granting four weeks' time to bring the legal heirs of respondent No.3, failing which, MCC No.512/2011 stands dismissed without further reference, the said MCC No.512/2011 was dismissed on 19.06.2017 for non-compliance of per-emptoray order dated 30.03.2017. Further submitted that the present MCC No.493/2019 filed with a delay of

NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:6064 5 MCC No.493/2019

642 days without showing any sufficient cause and he prays to dismiss the present petition.

09. In the light of above arguments of the learned counsel for the parties, the point for determination arises as follows :

"(i) Whether, the delay of 642 days be condoned by showing any sufficient cause to restore the MCC No.512/2011, which was dismissed on 19.06.2017 and consequently, to restore the Second Appeal No.889/2007 dismissed on 06.05.2011?"

10. On perusal of the application, it is found that delay has not been properly explained except stating that the Tehsilar and other officials are not responding to submit a report bringing the legal heirs of respondent in spite of issuing many reminders to them except that they have not stated anything showing sufficient causes for delay.

11. The explanation submitted by the applicants / State is not at all appropriate in view of the judgments of the Apex Court in Chief Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media India Limited and Another1 observed as under :-

"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides,

1. (2012) 3 SCC 563

NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:6064 6 MCC No.493/2019

a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.

29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentality that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.

30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay."

12. The Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with the issue of condonation of delay in the following judgments :

13. In Allala Bhagavanth Rao vs. Garvandula Vijayalaxmi and others2, in paras-12 to 15 held as follows:-

12. The word 'sufficient cause' is not defined either in the Limitation Act or in the C.P.C.; the reason appears to be that there is no straight jacket formula to decide whether the cause shown for condonation of delay is

2. 2016 (4) ALT 43

NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:6064 7 MCC No.493/2019

sufficient cause or not. Depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, the Court can exercise discretion and decide the sufficient cause. Sufficient cause shall be construed liberally without adopting any pedantic approach. It cannot be stretched to frustrate the very intention of Legislature in specifying the period for filing appeal or petition etc.

13. In Lanka Venkateswarlu (Died) by L.Rs.v.State of A.P., (2011) 1 UPLJ 242 (SC), the apex Court heavily laid on the Courts when to allow the petitions, though no sufficient cause is made out, and ruled as follows:

"We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as "liberal approach", "justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation, especially in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers."

"14. In fact, the petitioner did not make out any sufficient cause except making a bald unsubstantiated allegation in the affidavit If such lame excuses for condoning the delay are accepted as sufficient causes, virtually denuding or jettisoning the substantive law of limitation.

15. In view of the law declared by the apex Court basing on the concept of real justice, substantial justice the Courts cannot allow petitions under Section 5 of

NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:6064 8 MCC No.493/2019

Limitation Act, when no sufficient cause is made out. Therefore, basing on lame excuse or unsubstantiated cause, it is difficult to condone the delay, liberally construing the word sufficient cause."

14. In Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy3, the Hon'ble Apex Court broadly culled out the following principles:

"i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-

oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

ii) The terms sufficient cause should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation.

iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

3. (2013) 12 SCC 649

NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:6064 9 MCC No.493/2019

ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.

xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.

xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.

16. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:

a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. \

b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.

c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.

d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-

serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challan manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.

NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:6064 10 MCC No.493/2019

15. In Majji Sannemma alias Sanyasirao vs. Reddy Sridevi and others4, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed:-

"17. In the case of Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [(1962 2 SCR 762] (supra), it is observed and held as under:--

In construing s.5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light- heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chattappan, (1890) J.L.R. 13 Mad. 269, "s. 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words 'sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant."

18. In the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala [(1997) 7 SCC 556], while refusing to condone the delay of 565 days, it is observed that in the absence of reasonable, satisfactory or even appropriate explanation for seeking condonation of delay, the same is not to be condoned lightly. It is further observed that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. It is further observed that while exercising discretion for condoning the delay, the court has to exercise discretion judiciously.

4. 2021 SCC OnLline 1260

NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:6064 11 MCC No.493/2019

19. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448], it is observed as under:--

"The laws of limitation are founded on public policy. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as "statutes of peace". An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is based on the maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium", that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and 8 preventing oppression. The object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy."

20. In the case of Basawaraj Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81], it is observed and held by this Court that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case. It is further observed that the expression "sufficient cause" cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. It is further observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. It is further observed that in case a party has acted with negligence, lack of bona fides or there is inaction then there cannot be any justified ground for condoning the delay even by imposing conditions. It is observed that each application for condonation of delay has to be decided within the framework laid down by this Court. It is further observed that if courts start condoning delay where no sufficient cause is made out by imposing conditions then that would amount to violation of statutory principles and showing utter disregard to legislature."

16. In Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai5, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:

"What needs to be emphasized is that even though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of

5. (2012) 5 SCC 157

NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:6064 12 MCC No.493/2019

power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statues, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the costs.

What colour the expression "sufficient cause" would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay."

Eventually, the Bench upon perusal of the application for condonation of delay and the affidavit on record came to hold that certain necessary facts were conspicuously silent and, accordingly, reversed the decision of the High Court which had condoned the delay of more than seven years."

17. In Kilaru Appa Rao vs. Sunku Prathapa Reddy6, the Hon'ble Court observed:-

"11. The dictum of law is that the delay if inordinate, should not be condoned by adopting casual or liberal approach. Courts are not expected to condone the delay in the following circumstances:-

"1. When the reason urged is found to be concocted.

2. When the party who seeks for condonation of delay is found to be thoroughly negligent.

3. In case condonation of inordinate delay leads to substantial injustice to the opposite party due to the subsequent events.

4. The inordinate delay, if condoned, results in unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The list is illustrative and not exhaustive."

18. A conspectus of above the judgments referred (Supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. It was further held that the primary

6. 2022 (6) ALT 288 (TS)

NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:6064 13 MCC No.493/2019

function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties and they are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. Hon'ble Apex Court also cautioned that if the delay is occasioned by party deliberately to gain time then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. The explanation should not be fanciful and concocted. The Courts while dealing with an application to condone delay should keep in mind the right accrued to other side and should deal with such application with utmost care and caution.

19. As per the expressions of Hon'ble Apex Court, while condoning the delay the Court must see whether the deponent explained sufficient cause. Involving substantial rights of the parties alone is not the criteria. Unless, sufficient cause is shown, that in case inordinate delay, condoning the delay does not arise. The appellant / State failed to show sufficient cause to condone the delay of 642 days and supported by affidavit nothing to say anything causes delay.

20. Accordingly, in view of the judgments stated (supra), there is delay of 642 days, this Court does not find any ground to condone the delay.

21. Thus, I.A. No.1548 of 2019 is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, I.A. is dismissed. Consequently, the present MCC No.493/2019 is also stand dismissed.

(Duppala Venkata Ramana, J) Anushree

 
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