Madhya Pradesh High Court
Kallu @ Amar vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 25 March, 2025
Author: Maninder S. Bhatti
Bench: Maninder S. Bhatti
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:14828
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MANINDER S. BHATTI
ON THE 25th OF MARCH, 2025
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1361 of 2017
KALLU @ AMAR
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Anoop Kumar Saxena - Advocate for the appellant.
Shri Y.D. Yadav - Govt. Advocate for the State.
Shri Subhash Chandra Patel - Advocate for respondent No.2.
ORDER
This criminal appeal has been filed by the appellant being aggrieved
by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 17.03.2017 passed
by Special Judge under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Chhatarpur
in Special Case No.114/2015, whereby the appellant has been convicted
under Sections 341 and 294 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(1)(x) of
the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and sentenced to fine of Rs.400/-,
fine of Rs.500/- and R.I. for 6 months with fine of Rs.1,000/- respectively
with default stipulation.
2. The counsel for the appellant submits that during the pendency of
the present appeal, good sense prevailed over the parties and the appellant
and complainant have arrived at an amicable settlement and therefore, in
view of the compromise entered into between the parties, the appellant be
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acquitted of the aforesaid offences. I.A. No.11334 of 2024 has been filed by
the complainant/respondent No.2 seeking permission to compound the
offences.
3. In terms of the order passed by this Court on 11.03.2025, the parties
appeared before the Registrar Judicial - II on 11.03.2025 for verification of
their compromise where their statements have been recorded and the
Registrar Judicial - II vide his report dated 11.03.2025 has verified the
compromise entered into between the parties. It is mentioned in the report
that the complainant has expressed that she has voluntarily entered into
compromise with the appellant with free will and volition and without any
threat and inducement to settle their disputes.
4. The Apex Court in the matter of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab
(2012) 10 SCC 303 while dealing with exercised inherent power under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. has issued guidelines and the relevant paragraphs
are reproduced below:
"Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of
settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as
compounding of offence. They are different and not
interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of
offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different
from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences,
power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions
contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and
squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of
opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or
criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the
material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify
such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be
acquittal or dismissal of indictment.
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B.S.Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma and Shiji do
illustrate the principle that the High Court may quash criminal
proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power
under Section 482 of the Code and Section 320 does not limit or
affect the powers of the High Court under Section 482. Can it be
said that by quashing criminal proceedings in B.S.Joshi, Nikhil
Merchant, Manoj Sharma and Shiji this Court has compounded the
non-compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so. There
does exist the distinction between compounding of an offence
under Section 320 and quashing of a criminal case by the High
Court in exercise of inherent power under Section 482. The two
powers are distinct and different although the ultimate
consequence may be the same viz. acquittal of the accused or
dismissal of indictment."
5. Further, the Apex Court recently in Ramawatar Vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh - (2022) 13 SCC 635 in Paragraphs 10 and 11 has observed as
under:-
"10. So far as the first question is concerned, it would be ad rem to
outrightly refer to the recent decision of this Court in Ram gopal
v. State of M.P. (2022) 14 SCC 531, wherein, a two-Judge Bench
of this Court consisting of two of us (N.V. Ramana, CJI & Surya
Kant, J.) was confronted with an identical question. Answering in
the affirmative, it has been clarified that the jurisdiction of a court
under Section 320 CrPC cannot be construed as a proscription
against the invocation of inherent powers vested in this Court
under Article 142 of the Constitution nor on the powers of the
High Courts under Section 482 CrPC. It was further held that the
touchstone for exercising the extraordinary powers under Article
142 or Section 482 CrPC, would be to do complete justice.
Therefore, this Court or the High Court, as the case may be, after
having given due regard to the nature of the offence and the fact
that the victim/complainant has willingly entered into a
settlement/compromise, can quash proceedings in exercise of their
respective constitutional/inherent powers.
11. The Court in Ramgopal 6 further postulated that criminal
proceedings involving non-heinous offences or offences which are
predominantly of a private nature, could be set aside at any stage
of the proceedings, including at the appellate level. The Court,
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however, being conscious of the fact that unscrupulous offenders
may attempt to escape their criminal liabilities by securing a
compromise through brute force, threats, bribes, or other such
unethical and illegal means, cautioned that in cases where a
settlement is struck post-conviction, the courts should, inter alia,
carefully examine the fashion in which the compromise has been
arrived at, as well as the conduct of the accused before and after
the incident in question. While concluding, the Court also
formulated certain guidelines and held: (SCC para 19)
"19.....Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide
amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of
quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind:
19.1. Nature and effect of the offence on the conscience of
society;
19.2 Seriousness of the injury, if any;
19.3. Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and
the victim and
19.4. Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the
occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant
considerations."
17. On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the
offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, is
primarily private or civil in nature, or where the alleged offence
has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or
where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse
of the process of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash
the proceedings. On similar lines, when considering a prayer for
quashing on the basis of a compromise/settlement, if the Court is
satisfied that the underlying objective of the Act would not be
contravened or diminished even if the felony in question goes
unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a
"special statute" would not refrain this Court or the High Court,
from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the
Constitution or Section 482 Cr.P.C."
(Emphasis supplied)
6 . Thus, in view of the compromise entered into between the parties
and in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Gian Singh
(supra) a n d Ramawatar (supra), I.A. No.11334 of 2024 is allowed.
Compromise is accepted.
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7. Consequently, in view of the compromise entered into between the
parties, this criminal appeal is allowed. The judgment of conviction and order
of sentence dated 17.03.2017 passed by Special Judge under the SC/ST
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Chhatarpur in Special Case No.114/2015
stands set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the offences under Sections 341
and 294 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The appellant is on bail, his bail bonds and
surety bonds stand discharged.
8 . Let record of the trial Court be sent back along with the copy of this
judgment for information and necessary action.
(MANINDER S. BHATTI)
JUDGE
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